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Preface 
In 2000 I conducted a survey on different civil society initiatives engaged in the broad 
field of sustainable urban development in Cape Town. Since this first encounter with the 
landscape of local actors in the city, the idea developed to have a closer look at how the 
interface between these actors materialises in a specific field. Housing seemed to be an 
exciting area of investigation since it is a driving force behind many government, non-
governmental and grassroots initiatives. The emerging institutional frameworks for par-
ticipation and active civil society organisations also opened a window of opportunity to 
study such interactions. It framed the understanding that housing processes need to be un-
derstood as a matter of governance. 
When I started with my field study in 2006 the organisations as case studies seemed to be 
well selected, defined and contacts with key actors established. However, just before en-
tering into the field, the setting changed all over: after the municipal elections a new rul-
ing party got into power with all kinds of changes involved at the political and administra-
tive level. It was also a time of considerable restructuring and rebuilding within the civil 
society sector. Organisational structures around my two selected case studies dissolved: 
The Non-Governmental Organisation Development Action Group and the People’s Or-
ganisations on grassroots level were affected by the break-up of their inter-organisational 
structures: the Urban Sector Network and the People’s Housing Networking Forum. The 
organisations aligned to Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in South Africa also 
experienced vigorous transformations. Here the split of the Federation and closure of 
People’s Dialogue led to a resolution of the Alliance between the Federation and the 
NGOs uTshani Fund and People’s Dialogue as well as to the introduction of the Federa-
tion of the Urban Poor as the successor of SDI practice and Federation-building in South 
Africa. 
An international consultant commented on my empirical research: “You have chosen a 
very interesting, and also complex topic - a kind of “moving target”.” Thanks to David 
Sogge - he made me realise that the field of investigation is much more dynamic – a key 
aspect that my initial research framework had not taken into consideration. This comment 
became the motto of my further investigations: “Searching for moving targets.” 
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Glossary 
Adequate shelter “[…] adequate housing is the sum of a number of considerations, 
including location, basic infrastructure, affordability, sustainabil-
ity, right to tenure, and a range of household types.” (Pottie, 
2003: 433) 
Backyard shack Special term used in South Africa: Shelter occupied in the back-
yard of one household who rents out the space to other house-
holds. (see Crankshaw/Gilbert/Morris, 2000: 842) 
Beneficiary Special term used in South Africa: An individual who qualifies 
for a housing subsidy or in whose name a subsidy has already 
been allocated. (see USN, 2003) 
Civic organisations/ 
Civics 
Special term used in South Africa: “[…] residents’ associations 
in black communities that were part of the mass democratic 
movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Civics were ini-
tially formed to deal with local issues and, more specifically, to 
campaign for an improvement in the conditions in townships.” 
(van Donk/ Pieterse, 2006: 127) 
Empowerment Redistribution of power to control sources of power for a group 
(see Friedmann, 1984) 
Erf/erven Special term used in South Africa: Plot/plots, site, deriving from 
erven [Dutch = land, yard] 
Greenfield Land that has never been built upon as opposed to Brownfield 
land (previously developed land). 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final 
goods and services produced within a country in a given period 
of time. (City of Cape Town, 2006c) 
Gross Geographic 
Product (GGP) 
The total value of goods and services by sector in an area per an-
num. (City of Cape Town, 2006c) 
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Happy letter Special term used in South Africa: Signed declarations that the 
house is complete according to building inspection and accepted 
by beneficiaries. Thereby beneficiaries become homeowners and 
take over responsibility for fees and property. 
Managed PHP Special term used in South Africa. Centrally managed housing 
development with confined choices in house design and layout 
and with labour contribution by households during construction 
process. (see DAG, 2003c: 16) 
Mortgage loan Loan for purchasing fixed property in which the property is used 
as security (see USN, 2003) 
Imbizos Special term used in South Africa: public policy discussion fora 
organised by government. 
Informal settlement Unauthorised status of a settlement. Informality can occur in 
terms of access to land, layout of sites, shelter construction and 
infrastructure provision. 
In situ upgrading The de facto recognition of informal settlements by upgrading in 
terms of tenure regularisation and service provision. 
People’s Housing 
Process (PHP) 
Special term used in South Africa: A housing delivery approach 
in which people build, or manage the building of, their own 
houses. The term is also used in a narrow sense to refer to pro-
jects which gain access to People’s Housing Process establish-
ment grants in terms of the Housing Subsidy Scheme. (see USN, 
2003) 
PHP support or-
ganisation 
Special term used in South Africa: Legal entity which is either 
formed or contracted by beneficiaries. Possible support organisa-
tions are provincial and local government, Community-Based or 
Non-Governmental Organisations or private sector institutions. 
They are required to establish a housing support centre and give 
technical, financial and administrative assistance. 
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Political  
opportunity 
“Political opportunity refers to the relative openness or closure 
of the political system, the stability of alignments among domi-
nating groups, the possibilities for movements to associate with 
sections of the elite, and the risk of harsh repression.” (Törn-
quist, 2002: 12) 
Rollover scheme Special term used in South Africa: Internal relocation of house-
holds within informal settlement to conform to standardisation. 
Slum 
 
The term refers to poor housing and living conditions. Slums 
range from high-density, central-city tenements to squatter set-
tlements at the periphery. Physical conditions are characterised 
by lack of basic services, inadequate building structures, over-
crowding, unhealthy, hazardous conditions, insecure tenure, 
poverty and exclusion. (see UN-Habitat, 2005) 
Sites-and-services Formal land subdivisions with basic services but no top structure 
housing provision. 
Stokvel Special term used in South Africa: Saving club. 
Top structure The housing unit, excluding infrastructure. 
Upgrading Land regularisation and service provision in existing informal 
housing settlements. 
Stakeholder Stakeholders are affected or affect development (see World 
Bank, 1998: 1). 
“uTshani”  Special term used in South Africa: Zulu word for “grass“ 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Focus of thesis 
This research aims to provide an analysis of collective actors and networks and their im-
pact on urban governance. The relevance of such an approach is illustrated by the empiri-
cal analysis of two civil society alliances, their internal relations and their interface to lo-
cal government in the field of housing in Cape Town, South Africa. 
Cities in South Africa, as others in the ‘Global South’1, are trapped in contradicting chal-
lenges of globalisation and developmentalism. In South Africa cities are promoted as 
‘World Class Cities’ and constitute important contributors to the national economy. 
Meanwhile, they are characterised by increasing fragmentation in terms of social, politi-
cal, economic and physical development. 
Against this background, the rising levels of urbanisation and urban poverty lead to a 
growth of informal housing solutions which are mostly characterised by a lack of ade-
quate shelter, secure land and basic services. Housing has thus become a critical issue 
which is addressed in the development context. 
Current models to meet housing needs reflect the international ‘good governance’ agenda. 
In South Africa horizontal forms of governance are fostered both as partnerships with the 
private sector and with civil society and last, but not least, as community participation. An 
opening of the political space, however, requires political will and an organisational 
change by state and civil society actors as well as the establishment of new interaction 
between them. 
The research is therefore interested in an interaction-oriented explanation of prospects and 
limits of governance in local housing processes. The focus on civil society alliances and 
their interface with the state in South Africa is motivated by the fact that civil society or-
ganisations are restructuring their networks and practices towards the state whilst the state 
has transformed in a way to allow a degree of participation in the housing process. From 
their experience one can draw key lessons about urban governance and social change. 
                                                 
1 ‘Global South’ refers to the difference between developed countries (mostly in the Northern hemisphere) 
and less developed regions (predominantly in the Southern hemisphere). Although this North-South divide 
is imprecise, the term ‘Global South’ is commonly used to explain the development gaps between regions.  
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Beyond participating in institutional forums, civil society organisations advocate on other 
strategic levels and households negotiate with the local state on a day-to-day project-
basis. Obviously, both the expanded space and alternative engagement require adequate 
capacities and mechanisms to influence decision-making. Therefore similarly, civil soci-
ety actors foster empowerment and build up new internal relations both as multi-scalar 
and horizontal networks. Organisations (as actors) and their interactions become essential 
to provide an intermediary interface on project-specific and strategic scale between eve-
ryday practices and state regulations. 
Moreover, dynamics are at work in these processes which lead to shifting roles, changing 
relationships, and moving in and outside formal governance arrangements by some actors. 
This is what is referred to as ‘moving targets’ in this study. 
Current research seeks to explain the organisational mechanisms for community involve-
ment in the housing process and to understand the impact of new civil society organisa-
tions in state-negotiations. Often, associated discussions either indicate prospects for re-
sponsive governance or question the emerging structures in the light of new exclusions. 
Instead, this research maintains that in-depth understanding of the substance of the new 
relationships is still lacking. The research is firstly interested in variations of organisa-
tional structures and networks and secondly, in the meaning of urban governance. 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Research rationale 
Researchers construct knowledge by selecting and excluding specific theories. Sehested 
therefore suggests that knowledge is not objective but an “expression of power”. Follow-
ing her argument, instead of verifying or disproving a theory, this research takes a social 
constructivist perspective2 when investigating urban governance.  
“Viewing theories as different social constructs of ”reality“ implies that the multiplicity of 
theories is not a problem for research into urban governance, rather it is productive in the 
sense that it illustrates a variety of possible interpretations to build on in further research.”3 
Furthermore, since the research assumes that actors construct their perception of reality, it 
also adopts a social-constructivist perspective in its empirical part. Given this understand-
                                                 
2 See Berger/Luckmann (1967). 
3 Sehested (2001), p. 7. 
 3
ing, the methodology led to a set of qualitative methods in the field research (see chapter 
3). 
1.2.2 Research approach 
The research is based on a review of three discourses: Housing, urban governance and 
civil society. It is supported by in-depth empirical research on actor constellations in local 
level housing processes (which will be detailed in chapter 3). 
The literature review brings together political science, planning, sociological and social 
science perspectives. Discussions are reviewed both from an international and South Afri-
can academic context. 
The review will show how these discourses interlink. Actor-centred and network theories 
are identified as the link and common thread when discussing housing and governance 
contexts and in regard to the focus on emerging alliances in civil society. Thus, the dis-
courses provide three conceptual pillars as the basis for the analysis of multiple actors and 
networks in local housing processes (see figure 1.1). 
 
Fig.1.1: Research topics, Source: Own design 
This approach is chosen because each conceptual pillar provides key aspects for under-
standing the particular interface between civil society actors and local government in 
housing.  In development policy it is assumed that the devolution of power provides direct 
access to political decision-making processes. In the context of good governance and 
partnerships there is a further normative valuation of participation which emphasises the 
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empowerment aspect of local communities. 
Nevertheless, the line of argument remains ambiguous: local participation and inclusion 
of communities might well gain momentum from decentralised government structures. 
However, there is no evidence that decentralisation will automatically lead to institution-
alised participation or even empowerment. Consequently, if one investigates the inclusion 
of civil society in housing processes, what becomes obvious is the need to understand the 
transformed interface between the local state and civil society in the context of local gov-
ernance. 
In fact, such analysis becomes crucial in the context of transformative governance. In 
South Africa the legacy of segregation and exclusion poses a key challenge for the inte-
gration of society. Increasing poverty and inequality threaten stability. The unsolved 
housing crisis is indicative of these tendencies. With rising inequality internationally this 
phenomenon is not unique to South Africa. 
This means that South African cities should not only be understood as a case for general 
developments, but to put it in Appadurai’s words as “[…] a site for the examination of 
how locality emerges in a globalizing world […] and of how global facts take local 
form.”4 Cape Town is therefore not of interest as a geographic site, but as a locality where 
governance transformation becomes visible. Experiences from there could feed into the 
general research interest. 
Indeed, South Africa offers the opportunity of learning something about these processes.  
Firstly, the shift from representative to participatory democracy and partnership models 
were central to local government reforms in South Africa. 
Secondly, South Africa is an illustrative case for an active civil society and a housing 
field characterised by informal practices. Local modes of housing provision play a central 
role in the post-apartheid societal transformation. 
Thirdly, policy and implementation, governance and civil society are in a state of flux in 
South Africa which provides a rich context in which to study the dynamics of governance 
arrangements. 
The case study design seemed ideally suited to explore governance arrangements in-depth 
and from a variety of perspectives. It is supported by the understanding that new urban 
governance forms only derive from specific contexts. 
                                                 
4 Appadurai (2000), p. 18. 
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Furthermore, the advantage of studying two cases is that: a) it allows analysing and ex-
plaining a phenomenon such as complex organisational arrangements in detail, and b) by 
exposing similar or contrasting results under similar conditions, it allows a degree of rep-
lication and analytical generalisation. Yin defines the scope of case study as: 
“[…] an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.”5  
However, in contrast to Yin, case study research here was limited to the choice of the ob-
ject of study and not as the method applied for data generation and interpretation as these 
involved further qualitative instruments (see chapter 3). 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
With the focus on actors and networks this analysis will be limited to understanding the 
interface between the local state and organised civil society in local housing processes. 
The ultimate aim is to understand the agency structures in civil society-government inter-
faces and to detect types and tendencies in the way they organise and relate to one an-
other. 
Based on empirical research between 2001 and 2007 the research focuses on the actors 
and networks at work in Cape Town. Focus will be given to what extent local government 
and civil society actors create relationships in people-driven housing processes with spe-
cific attention to the organisational and relational change. 
Increasing fragmentation, differentiation and social complexity make it necessary to apply 
theoretical frameworks which enable an understanding of planning as social control. In 
this context planning can gain from withdrawing from other disciplines. The sociological 
perspective applied here for empirical research draws from theories of policy networks 
and actor-centred institutionalism. 
Thus the research is intended to uncover characteristics of networks and contribute to the 
understanding of local governance through civil society alliances in the context of the 
housing process in South Africa. The question therefore is, if one can speak of a new 
mode of urban governance which is reflected through innovations in organisational and 
network structures. 
The research focus is embedded in the wider field of literature which aims at developing a 
                                                 
5 Yin (2003), p. 13. 
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better understanding of urban governance focusing on the interaction between the state 
and civil society. 
It therefore excludes urban social or spatial development aspects which are both influenc-
ing factors and outcomes of urban policy. Such structural conditions will be provided as 
context information without in-depth analysis. 
Furthermore, there is an awareness of the inadequacies of Eurocentric and Western con-
cepts as criticised in postcolonial theory6 and stressed by South African researchers who 
call for more context-sensitivity while studying respective situations7. The research im-
plied literature review of the South African discourse (which is however similarly charac-
terised by Western approaches) and qualitative methods based on Grounded Theory to 
provide a certain degree of context-sensitivity. 
1.4 Structure of study 
The study comprises three parts: 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework and conceptual model for the empirical 
study. It provides a critical review of the three key concepts: housing, governance and 
civil society. It is based both on the international and on South African academic dis-
courses, policies and practices. The relationship between these concepts will be exploited 
by network and actor-centred theories. 
The first section of Chapter 2 gives a brief reflection on housing trends which indicate a 
tendency towards governance concepts as well as a juxtaposition of interventionism and 
enabling approaches in the settlement context.  This leads to the second domain of dis-
course which reviews theories related to urban governance. Governance is discussed from 
a variety of perspectives which share concerns for the interaction between the public and 
private sector. Deriving comprehensive governance concepts stress the fluid relationships 
of actors in networks. Based on this understanding, focus is given to the integration of 
civil society actors in governance arrangements. This brings about the third theme of civil 
society. Concepts of the third sector, social capital and civil society, are introduced as a 
background for a review of the discourse on the relevance of Non-Governmental Organi-
sations and Grassroots Organisations in (urban) development. Thus this section recon-
nects to the housing discussion by reviewing the discourse on the role of civil society or-
                                                 
6 See for instance Said (1978) and (1994); Bhabha (1994). 
7 See for example Watson (2002b). 
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ganisations in the settlement planning context. Finally, the last section presents the theo-
retical perspective and conceptual model. From a sociological perspective a concept is 
outlined that integrates the structuring effects of organisations (as collective actors) and 
networks for the interaction of actors. A deficit of the concepts of organisations and net-
works is indicated since they fail to describe the hybrid and dynamic structures which are 
exposed by actors and their relationships in the local housing processes. 
The third chapter introduces the field study by outlining the research design and methods 
used for the empirical part. It explains the selection criteria of case studies, looks at data 
generation and identifies the variables that specified data collection, and concludes with a 
brief review of Grounded Theory analysis for data interpretation. 
Chapter 4 describes the housing, governance and civil society context in Cape Town. This 
is followed by the fifth chapter which presents the two case studies and an in-depth ac-
count of the actors and networks in practice. 
Chapter 6 assesses the characteristics of actor and network structures found in the case 
studies and outlines emerging tendencies. Based on this synthesis the final chapter dis-
cusses how the findings can be interpreted in relation to housing, governance and civil 
society and provides some conclusions for actors and policy-making. 
 
Fig. 1.2: Structure of study, Source: Own design 
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2. Theoretical framework:  
    the discourse on housing, governance and civil society 
2.1 Housing discourse 
2.1.1 Urbanisation trends as a housing challenge 
Contemporary dynamics of urbanisation1 in the ‘Global South’ are without precedent. As 
a result the global urbanisation level is expected to reach 61% by 2030.2 The year 2007 
marked the watershed when the percentage of people living in urban areas exceeded those 
living in rural areas.3 Thus the new millennium is also characterised as the ‘urban millen-
nium’. Of the 2.1 billion new urban population expected by 2030 about 2.0 billion will 
live in urban areas in the Less Developed Regions (LDR). Hence, Jenkins/Smith/Wang 
refer to these regions as the ‘rapidly urbanising world’. They outline that while in 1950 
more than half of the worldwide urban population lived in developed regions, this has 
shifted and by 2003 around 70% lived in developing regions.4 
Differences in urbanisation trends amongst regions are significant as some may have 
reached stable urbanisation levels whilst others are still in the process of urbanisation. 
Jenkins/Smith/Wang offer three broad categories: firstly, regions in an ‘urban explosive 
phase’ such as Sub-Saharan Africa; secondly, regions which have passed this phase but 
still experience rapid growth in secondary cities such as Latin America and thirdly, re-
gions with relative stabilisation of urban population after rapid urbanisation which are 
characterised by a need of consolidation such as parts of East Asia.5 
Urbanisation is often explained against the background of accounts of globalisation and 
liberalisation. Clark argues that urbanisation is a global phenomenon today due to changes 
in the economy. As production, trade and services extend globally, urbanisation extends 
to the ‘Global South’.6  
                                                 
1 Urbanisation refers to the process of movement of people from rural to urban areas (measured by annual 
urbanisation rates) by which the proportion of people in urban areas increases (urbanisation level). 
2 Compared to 47% in 2000. See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006). 
3 However, it needs to be stressed that the distinction between rural and urban is increasingly misleading 
as the boundaries between them get blurry. Therefore scholars suggest referring to an ‘urban/rural contin-
uum’. See for instance Montgomery et al (2004), pp. 67ff. 
4 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 12. 
5 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 299. 
6 See Clark (1996), p. 77. 
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Cities affected by globalisation are conceptualised either as ‘global cities’ or ‘megacities’. 
Firstly, some large cities arise as powerful actors which function as primary capital mar-
kets and sites for corporate headquarters.7 
Secondly, at the same time megacities emerge characterised by dynamic urban growth, 
large numbers of population and socioeconomic problems. Both concepts have limita-
tions. The global cities concept does not explain what characterises large agglomerations 
without transnational economic functions while the concept of megacities remains blurry. 
It focuses on population numbers without giving universal qualitative characteristics 
which megacities have in common. However, two aspects might be considered as com-
mon threads linked to dynamic urbanisation:  
a) Increasing inequalities are produced between and within cities, and 
b) Informality is increasing and not just as an outcome of lack of state or market capacity 
but fulfilling a function within the market logic. It therefore is assumed not to be a 
temporary but a permanent phenomenon.  
Whereas previous urbanisation processes were linked to industrialisation and economic 
development, this is not necessarily the case anymore. African cities for instance experi-
ence a job-less urban growth.8 As a result the urban population is increasingly confined to 
inadequate living conditions. Estimates assume that about 1 billion new slum dwellers 
will be added to the current worldwide slum population of 924 million (see table 2.1). 
Characteristics 2000 2015 2030 Increase (2000 – 2030)
Global urbanisation in %* 47.1 53.6 60.8  
Urban population in bn* 2.8 3.8 4.9 2.09 
Urban pop. in LDR in bn* 2.0 2.9 3.9 1.95 
Slum population in bn** 0.92 (2001)  ca. 1.9 ca. 1.00  
Tab. 2.1: Urbanisation trends, Source: Own design, *UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(2006); ** UN Statistics Division (2006) 
These urbanisation tendencies indicate social and political risks as one third of all urban 
dwellers in the world are living in slums.9 Therefore the challenge of urbanisation was 
linked to the need for shelter and increasingly entered the international development 
agenda.10 
                                                 
7 See Sassen (2001). 
8 See Rakodi (1997). 
9 See Herrle/Jachnow/Ley (2006), p. 2. 
10 See UN-Habitat (2003b); (2004); Hall/Pfeiffer (2000). 
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2.1.2 Housing in the international development debate and practice 
Slums, informal settlements and squatter camps need to be differentiated. Whereas the 
term ‘slum’ refers to the physical housing condition, the terms ‘squatter’ or ‘informal set-
tlement’ can be equated with the legal (unauthorised) status. 
UN-Habitat offers an operational definition of slums based on a combination of physical 
and legal characteristics of settlements which comprise:11 
a) Inadequate access to safe water 
b) Inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure 
c) Poor structural quality of housing 
d) Overcrowding 
e) Insecure residential status 
Although slums cannot be equated with informal settlements there is a great overlap since 
the majority of slum dwellers are excluded from formal housing provision. Therefore in-
formal settlements are the prevalent and mostly the only accessible housing option for the 
urban poor. Informality can occur in terms of access to land, layout of sites, shelter con-
struction and infrastructure provision. Consequently in the context of informal settlements 
planning and housing issues are interlinked. A broad typology of informal settlements can 
be made following characteristics of their unauthorised status: 
 Informal house/ temporary 
construction 
Formal house/ permanent con-
struction 
Informally occupied land Shack on invaded land Permanent structure on invaded 
land 
Officially planned and 
authorised land occupation 
Shack on an official serviced site Formal house in an official subdivi-
sion 
Tab. 2.2: Informal settlement types, Source: University of the Witwatersrand (2003) 
These settlements primarily function through an extended and diverse informal sector, as 
there is little access to the formal housing and job market. AlSayyad and Roy (2004) ar-
gue that this informality is presently an organising urban logic.12 
                                                 
11 See UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 12. 
12 See AlSayyad/Roy (2004). 
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Formal housing and planning interventions changed according to shifts in international 
development thinking.13 Deriving mechanisms for housing provision comprise state-
provided, self-help or market-driven interventions which in practice mostly coexist or are 
combined.  
1960s Mass public housing and slum clearance 
1970s Sites-and-services and physical upgrading 
1980s Community enabling (comprehensive upgrading) and market enabling approaches 
mid 1990s Urban management approaches 
since 2000 Juxtaposition of technical and community-driven approaches 
Tab. 2.3: Shifts in housing approaches, Source: Own design 
2.1.2.1 Providing approaches 
Public housing and slum clearance 
In the 1960s/70s the international development debate linked the poverty agenda to eco-
nomic development (‘trickle down’). Furthermore, poverty was associated with the rural 
context and urbanisation seen as a solution to overcome poverty. 
The supply of housing was supposed to stabilise labour. The welfare state implemented 
large-scale housing and slum improvement programmes. State subsidised housing com-
prised mostly tenement blocks and individual units at the periphery. In terms of slum im-
provement projects master plans suggested the clearance and redevelopment of slums by 
conventional housing. Policy-makers perceived informal settlements as ‘marginal’ linked 
to social decay and substandard housing. Eradication therefore represented the solution to 
marginality. However, the housing provision appeared to be too costly for the state. Also, 
in terms of rental accommodation, government failed to be an effective landlord: rents 
were too low and the maintenance and rent payments by tenants poor. The subsequent at-
tempt to sell off the rental housing stock led to slum-like conditions. Furthermore, hous-
ing in ownership tenure led to a resale of housing units to the middle class. The failure of 
mass public housing resulted in an increased housing backlog and further spread of slums 
and informal settlements.14 
                                                 
13 For a detailed overview on development theories see Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 36ff. 
14 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 154-156; Ward (1982a), (1982b); Gilbert (2007a). 
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2.1.2.2 Self-build and self-help housing paradigm 
An alternative approach to eradication and provision of conventional housing was seen in 
self-build and self-help housing. 
The ‘self-build’ and ‘self-help’ housing concept was influenced by ideas of Charles 
Abrams (1966) and John Turner who stressed the relevance of incremental settlement up-
grading. According to Turner migrants to the city undergo a progress from ‘bridgeheader’ 
to ‘consolidator’.15 Incremental upgrading was therefore supposed to facilitate a consoli-
dation process. Following Turner’s understanding, self-help was more needs based, effec-
tive and affordable than conventional housing. Housing shifted from being perceived as a 
product to be understood as a process (‘housing as a verb’). 
The housing needs of the urban poor were linked to the livelihood opportunities of a spe-
cific housing solution. Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel suggest a differentiation of housing needs ex-
emplified for the case of Calcutta (see the figure 2.1).16 
 
Fig. 2.1: Needs fulfilled by informal housing in Calcutta 
Source: Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel (1981), p.93, adapted from Duyar-Kinast (2005), p.72 
Turner opposed eradication approaches and promoted to see settlements as part of the so-
lution to the housing challenge. He argued that squatter areas expose potentials of ‘self-
                                                 
15 See Turner/Fichter (1972). 
16 See Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel (1981), pp. 90-95. 
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help’ and thus need more autonomy. This understanding was linked to anthropological 
studies of the self-development potential of informal settlements in the mid 1960s referred 
to as ‘slums of hope’17. Scholars opposed the view about the urban poor being ‘mar-
ginal’.18  Marginality was rather understood as the poor being exploited and repressed.  
“Marginality exists but it is the marginality of exclusion and exploitation rather than of low 
motivations and parochialism.”19 
Self-help projects underwent significant changes from autonomous and self-build ap-
proaches in the 1960s to assisted and self-managed processes in the 1970s/80s (see figure 
2.2). Also Turner, who initially called for autonomy and self-building approaches, later in 
the 1980s turned to promoting self-organised processes with a focus on community de-
velopment.20 
 
Fig. 2.2 Shifts in self-help approaches, Source: Own design 
Aligned to self-help approaches was a reduced role of the state that was to ensure the pro-
vision of tenure security, introduction of lower standards and giving access to financial 
and technological assistance. 
Sites-and-services and slum upgrading interventions 
The self-help ideas of the Turner/Abrams school influenced international thinking21 and 
became a dominant development strategy of the 1970s and 80s. 
                                                 
17 See Lloyd (1979).  
18 See Perlman (1979); Castells (1983). 
19 Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 161. 
20 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 161. 
21 See for instance UNCHS (1976). 
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The de facto recognition of informal settlements translated into project-oriented upgrad-
ing in terms of tenure regularisation and service provision (in situ upgrading) as well as 
the provision of new serviced sites (sites-and-service schemes). The state shifted its sup-
port from housing production to the provision of housing subsidies and promotion of self-
help. The World Bank financed these self-help housing projects on the principle of cost-
recovery in terms of payment by users (instead of subsidies) which required afforda-
bility.22 This approach is criticised for transferring responsibility to the poor and thereby 
distorting the original concept of self-help.23 
Operational critics pointed out that the approach failed to reduce the backlog and was dif-
ficult to implement on the principle of cost recovery. Unit costs appeared to be above the 
affordability of the poorest. Shortcomings emerged in terms of lack of capacity in admini-
stration, inappropriate norms and standards, increasing costs for transport through periph-
eral location of settlements, lack of access to income-generating opportunities and unaf-
fordable monthly payments for services. Physical upgrading and provision of sites-and-
services did not translate into social upliftment. Instead the infrastructure investments of-
ten led to speculation and crowding-out of the poor by the middle class. Moreover, formal 
interventions threatened community cohesion and thereby increased vulnerability (social 
disruption through planning, relocation, and individualisation).24 
Finally, slum-upgrading and site-and-service approaches were perceived as failing as they 
were not replicable and were too cost-intensive. With the international debt crisis and re-
duced funding the site-and-service schemes ended in the 1980s25 and upgrading ap-
proaches were adapted.26 
The operational concerns were combined with a general critique of the ‘myth of self-help’ 
which resulted in an extensive ‘self-help housing debate’ in the 1970s and 80s. From a 
Neo-Marxist perspective the reason for self-help to be introduced as a development strat-
egy lies in the compatibility to the World Bank’s interest to make housing affordable 
without subsidising. Turner’s approach of self-help, incrementalism and legalisation 
                                                 
22 See Pugh (1995). 
23 See Harms (1982), Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 30. 
24 See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 38. 
25 Site-and-services housing loans by the World Bank decreased from 100% in 1972 to 5% in 1990. See 
Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 167. 
26 See Pugh (1995); Gilbert (2007a); Van der Linden (1986); Davis (2006). 
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therefore fitted in with the World Bank’s search for pragmatic and effective mechanisms. 
Davis (2006) argues that the compatibility represented a downsizing of entitlement and 
withdrawal of the state.27 
“Self-help emerges as governmental policy where redistribution and social equity are low 
priorities.”28 
Most prominent critic was put forward by Burgess who argued that self-help housing rep-
resented a form of double exploitation. He stressed that state-assisted self-help reduced 
the advantages of ‘spontaneous’ self-help as it seeks to commodify practices.29 
From a Neo-Marxist position the self-help framework does not enhance empowerment 
and instead leads to depoliticisation. By promoting individual self-help, according to the 
critique, the state attempts to break down group solidarity.30 
The self-help debate was by-passed in the late 1980s as the critique did not provide alter-
native solutions. Instead the focus broadened and empirical studies focused on the nego-
tiation processes and on the link between policy and practice.31 From this perspective 
scholars criticised the Neo-Marxist analysis for simplifying the role of the state and un-
derestimating its power as being dictated by elite classes. Moreover, they see the self-help 
approach as being misinterpreted. It is argued that self-help provides a means to empow-
erment for the poor by building collective capacity and thereby contributes to social sta-
bility and state legitimacy.32 
2.1.2.3 Enabling approaches 
In the 1980s a ‘whole housing system’ approach emerged which comprised enabling of 
private and community sector activities. 
“Enablement was defined as providing legislative, institutional and financial frameworks for 
entrepreneurship of private sector, communities and individuals, and hence in this period the 
international agencies focused assistance on promoting the development of policies and pro-
grammes as opposed to projects.”33 
                                                 
27 See Davis (2006), p. 72; Burgess (1992), p. 82. 
28 Marcuse (1992), p. 21. 
29 See Burgess (1992); Mathey (1992); Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 163ff. 
30 See Burgess (1992); Harms (1982), p. 49. 
31 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 166; Payne (1984); Gilbert (1986). 
32 See Mathey (1992); Fiori/Ramirez (1992); Gilbert (1986); Muller/Mitlin (2007). 
33 Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 168. 
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Differences consist in the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS)34 ena-
bling approach with an emphasis on community and grassroots participation and the 
World Bank approach35 with a stronger focus on enabling markets, property rights and 
mortgage finance. Later the UNCHS enabling approach shifted from a grassroots focus to 
private and third sector integrative approach and from community to market enable-
ment.36 
Community enabling by comprehensive upgrading 
The slum upgrading approach regained momentum in the late 1980s with the rise of the 
urban poverty agenda. The greater concern for poverty alleviation was aligned to a new 
understanding of poverty as a process instead of a physical condition. Given this context, 
in situ upgrading was seen as a potential to maintain social ties. Upgrading was interna-
tionally acknowledged as a strategy for poverty reduction in the Habitat Agenda. The ap-
proach shifted from single projects to comprehensive programmes. In this context self-
help was extended to ‘community self-management’ whereby the state acted as an enabler 
of local development managed by communities.37 
This was linked to the vulnerability debate whereby interventions had to prevent shocks 
and stress events (such as relocation) and to strengthen resilience (such as through social 
capital38). Whereas previous interventions were often limited to top-down physical up-
grading, and thereby posed a threat to social assets, the realigned approach promotes peo-
ple-centred and participatory interventions.39 
Apart from physical improvements the comprehensive upgrading approach comprises the 
provision of social infrastructure, employment, community organisation and security of 
tenure. In contrast to earlier strategies, roles and responsibilities are more complex. Gov-
ernment is required to moderate between interests and to find a flexible approach with 
norms and standards. Shortcomings were seen in the lack of capacity, skills and adequate 
                                                 
34 See UNCHS (1987). 
35 See The World Bank (1993). 
36 See Pugh (1997). 
37 See Gilbert (2007a); Smith H. (2002); Hamdi (1991); The World Bank (1991), p. 9. 
38 For a review of the social capital debate see chapter 2.3. 
39 See Huchzermeyer (2004b), pp. 42ff. 
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analysis within the administration. Also, there is often mistrust in the community towards 
government and the assumed solidarity within communities is often not present.40 
Beyond these externally designed comprehensive upgrading approaches, alternative sup-
port-based interventions emerged. Huchzermeyer (2004b) differentiates these alternative 
approaches into those initiated by government and those by civil society organisations.41 
The latter were again linked to an empowerment agenda.42 NGO-initiated support-based 
interventions were perceived as “[…] fulfilling the important function of assisting infor-
mal settlement residents in strengthening their position in society and in relation to the 
state.”43 
Market enabling approach through property titles and finance 
The criticism of sites-and-service provision and physical upgrading led to an adjustment 
of World Bank policies in the 1980s which now focused on the enablement of private sec-
tor engagement in housing. The ‘affordability problem’ of home owners was seen to be 
overcome by private sector housing investment or by improving household investment 
capacity. The underlying assumption was that the private sector would need to compete 
and thereby produce at lower cost. Subsidies or loans were given to the poor who then 
could buy a house on the market. However, in reality, the private sector perceived low 
cost-housing as a risk investment and did not engage in housing developments.44  
By the late 1980s the market approach gained momentum when the World Bank shifted to 
enhancing household finance capacity by the provision of property titles. De Soto argued 
that titling would provide access to capital for the poor as it represented collateral for 
bank loans and would eventually lead to housing improvements. The underlying assump-
tion is that the housing need could be addressed through the integration of the poor into 
the market.45 This assumption was questioned by scholars who stressed that titling does 
not unlock capital lending by banks.46 Moreover, the house would not represent a collat-
                                                 
40 See UNCHS (1999). 
41 See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 53. 
42 For a detailed discussion on the role of civil society organisations see chapter 2.3. 
43 Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 77. 
44 See Gilbert (2007a); Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 166. 
45 See De Soto (2000). 
46 See Datta/Jones (2000); Durand-Lasserve /Payne (2006). 
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eral in the context of a non-existent secondary housing market.47 In contrast scholars 
feared that titling will result in further speculation, displacement and social differentia-
tion.48 Payne illustrates that titling results in a distortion of the land market as better-off 
households crowd-out the newly legalised freeholders (see figure 2.3). 
 
Fig. 2.3: Distortion of land market and crowding-out as effects of titling, Source: Payne (2006) 
Also, as Muller/Mitlin point out, poor households are hesitant to borrow in order to avoid 
financial risks by loan repayments. Instead they resort to savings for lower-cost housing 
investments. To motivate these investments the legal recognition of the right to stay is 
therefore more of a concern, than titles as such.49 
Therefore scholars call for alternatives to titling such as rental housing, progressive im-
provement of land rights or temporary occupation permits. UN-Habitat recognised the 
need for a continuum of land rights to secure tenure and introduced a Global Campaign 
for Secure Tenure and a Global Land Tool Network (GLTN). 
                                                 
47 See Gilbert (2002a). 
48 See Durand-Lasserve/Royston (2002a); Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006); Payne (2000), (2006); Davis 
(2006), p. 80. 
49 See Muller/Mitlin (2007), pp. 431-432. 
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Further, scholars promote interventions preventing speculation such as land banking and 
property taxes.50 
Nevertheless, titling has continued to be a popular approach. Davis (2006) explains the 
popularity of de Soto’s approach by its easy implementation and by representing a form 
of appeasement of the urban poor.51 He warns that in the context of decreasing free land 
and lack of employment and commodification of property this “is a theoretical recipe for 
exactly the vicious circles of spiralling rents and overcrowding […].”52 
2.1.2.4 Urban management approaches 
In the last couple of decades the understanding of the state shifted from that of a provider 
to the state as an enabler and partner in development.53 Given this context, indirect devel-
opment strategies gained momentum. Since the mid 1980s the housing approach by the 
World Bank shifted from project or programme interventions to a policy ‘support ap-
proach’. This was paralleled by an Urban Management Program (UMP) as a combined 
initiative by UNCHS, UNDP54 and the World Bank. It focused on housing as part of the 
urban economy and promoted decentralisation and institutional development. However, 
weak local governments had difficulties in facing the complexity of the institutional ap-
proach. Instead decentralisation often reinforced local power structures.55 In the 1990s the 
urban management approach therefore emphasised capacity-building, good governance 
and alliance-building which was also stressed by the Habitat Agenda as its overarching 
approach to adequate shelter and sustainable human settlements. 
Capacity-building 
It is argued that policy adjustments would not lead to changes in interventions as long as 
the capacity for implementation has not been enhanced. Capacity-building has to be dif-
ferentiated between institutional development (to increase the efficiency of formal institu-
tions) and empowerment as informal capacity-building in a situation of organisational 
structures which are lacking. 
                                                 
50 See Gilbert (2007a); Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006); GLTN (2006). 
51 See Davis (2006), p. 81. 
52 Davis (2006), p. 94. 
53 See also Jenkins/Smith (2001a); Pugh (1995). 
54 United Nations Development Programme 
55 See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 172; Gilbert, (2007a), p. 9. 
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The institutional approach stresses that the state, market and society require structures and 
capacity to play their roles in the housing systems. The deriving frameworks to analyse 
actor capacity are therefore linked to new institutionalism and can be divided into two 
schools of thought: the state capacity concepts56 and the social movement capacity con-
cepts57. The objective is to understand the actor capacity and to enhance it through capac-
ity-building (see also chapter 2.2.2). 
With regards to communities capacity-building was extended to empowerment. In ‘The 
Architecture of Empowerment’ Serageldin argues that the poor know better than any ar-
chitect or technocrat about their needs and feels that architects should show more respect 
to them as partners in development.58 The focus is on mediating structures between the 
government and the individual.59 Later empowerment concepts were linked to concepts of 
social capital.60 
For housing delivery to reduce poverty and to be needs-based, it is argued that, “[…] poor 
residents need to be able to articulate their needs and assert their claims on resources 
through the political and administrative systems.”61 
Good governance 
The urban poverty agenda was also linked to the normative agenda of ‘good govern-
ance’.62 Increasingly governance of cities was understood as relevant for dealing with the 
housing backlog, polarisation and poverty. Based on the assumption that poverty allevia-
tion requires improved governance structures, UN-Habitat introduced a Global Campaign 
on Urban Governance in 1999. UN-Habitat recognised that a key factor for pro-poor 
policies is to adopt new roles for the urban actors involved, i.e. the state, private sector 
and civil society. The Habitat Agenda specifically mentions institutional cooperation and 
partnerships and identifies governments as responsible for enabling cooperative models.63  
                                                 
56 See for instance Jenkins/Smith (2001b); Grindle (1996). 
57 See for instance Rakodi (2002); Stokke (2002); Törnquist (2002). 
58 See for instance Seralgedin (1997).  
59 See Berger/Neuhaus (1984). 
60 See for instance Bebbington et al (2006); Muller/Mitlin (2007). 
61 Rakodi (2002), p. 105. 
62 For a detailed discussion on governance see chapter 2.2. 
63 See UN (1996) ; UN-Habitat (2001), p. 211. 
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Partnerships in housing  
Urban development and housing challenges were perceived as not being able to be solved 
by government on its own which led to the formation of partnerships. The Habitat Agenda 
perceived partnerships as key to realising adequate shelter and sustainable human settle-
ments. The Millennium Project Task Force sees partnerships with slum dwellers and their 
organisations (providing legitimacy) and with private sector (providing investment), local 
government (providing accountability and resources), and national government (providing 
policy and frameworks) as central. However, the ‘good governance’ approach idealised 
partnerships as strong relationships between distinct sectors, thus the critique. In reality, 
Majale indicates, these relationships are far more complex and heterogeneous.64 
 
Fig. 2.4: Idealised versus complex relationships between sectors, Source: Hamdi/Majale (2004) 
Hamdi and Majale (2004) outlined that central for partnership formation is an understand-
ing of power relations and interests of actors, assistance of poor in unequal power rela-
tions and selection of appropriate organisational forms and levels of relations according to 
the capacities of stakeholders. This formation is based on thorough analysis of stakeholder 
capacities, of opportunities and threats, and of stakeholder interests based on action plan-
ning methods.65 
2.1.2.5 Juxtaposition of technical and community-driven approaches 
The World Bank realigned its strategy from urban management to an emphasis on na-
tional urban strategies, City Development Strategies (CDS), services for the poor, upgrad-
                                                 
64 Majale (2005), p. 3. 
65 See Hamdi/Majale (2004). 
 23
ing and capacity-building.66 This approach was accompanied by the introduction of the 
Cities Alliance in 1999 as an international coalition of UN-Habitat, the World Bank, nu-
merous cities and development partners addressing urban poverty through CDS and a Cit-
ies without Slums action plan.67  
Slums were interpreted as an outcome of urbanisation and poverty. The Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs)68 therefore call for an improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers by the year 2020 (target 11 of Goal 7) which is to be realised 
through improved access to water, sanitation and security of tenure.69 The MDGs are 
criticised for their limitations in terms of top-down expert-led interventions and focus on 
measurable outcomes.70 Scholars fear that with “the return of the slum” in the interna-
tional development language, earlier research and recommendations will be ignored. It is 
argued that by stressing physical decay governments will return to instant solutions such 
as eradication.71 
UN-Habitat promotes a broader focus integrating the underlying causes of poverty for the 
existence of slums. The Habitat Agenda underlined the need for pro-poor policies in for-
mulating, adopting and implementing land, housing and service provision. The report 
‘The Challenge of Slums’ stresses the importance of income generation and integration 
for poverty reduction. The ‘State of the World’s Cities 2004/05’ report also focuses on the 
importance for citizenship rights and proactive planning for social inclusion. 
Scholars stress the multiple aspects of urban poverty (including voicelessness and power-
lessness) and call for official development assistance to redirect their funds accordingly. 
A focus is given to local institutions (both municipality and urban poor organisations) 
which are, according to the critique, neglected through the dominant channelling of re-
sources through national government. Instead they specifically stress the contribution by 
civil society organisations in addressing poverty and local governance.72 Given the con-
text of limited regulation capacity of the public sector, municipalities can only meet the 
                                                 
66 The World Bank (2000). 
67 See Cities Alliance (2005) and Cities Alliance (no date). 
68 At the Millennium Summit in 2000 the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) outlining the targets for poverty reduction. 
69 See UN (2000); UN Millennium Project (2005). 
70 See Bigg/Satterthwaite (2005). 
71 See Gilbert (2007b). 
72 The debate is therefore interlinked with the civil society discourse which is reviewed in chapter 2.3. 
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challenges of rapid urbanisation through cooperation with informal institutions.73  Schol-
ars advocate for a shift from conventional international development funding to the sup-
port of community-driven processes in order to realise the goals outlined in the Millen-
nium Declaration.74  
2.1.3 Housing in South Africa 
80% of all households in South Africa are considered to be unable to access adequate 
housing on their own.75 Against this background the South African housing policy is 
based on the notion of ‘adequate shelter for all’76 which, as a social right, is also en-
trenched constitutionally. In the post-apartheid period after 1994 the government intro-
duced a national housing programme and promised to build one million houses within 
five years. As a result, between 1994 and 2001 South Africa delivered more subsidised 
houses than any other country worldwide.77  
This mass delivery of housing perpetuated settlement structures of the apartheid era.78 
Furthermore, it did not meet the backlog. Instead informal settlements and the numbers of 
inadequately housed people have been growing.79 The high demand for land and housing 
is met with the help of informal institutions and unlawful occupation of land which con-
tinue to be primary options for poor households to access land and housing in cities.  
The housing situation is characterised by approximately 50% of households owning their 
accommodation, about a third residing in rental accommodation (including formal and in-
formal rental) and 12.3% of residents living in informal dwellings (squatting, backyard 
shack and backyard room rental).80 
                                                 
73 Kombe/Kreibich (2003). 
74 See for instance Satterthwaite (2002), p. 385; Mitlin/Satterthwaite (2004a), (2004b), p.278ff; 
Biggs/Satterthwaite (2005); D’Cruz/Satterthwaite (2005). 
75 See Smit (2003), p. 167. 
76 According to the Housing Act adequate shelter is measured by legal security of tenure, availability of 
services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, cultural 
adequacy. See RSA (1997b), preamble. 
77 See Rust (2006), p. 7. 
78 See Godehart (2001), p. 31. 
79 The number of households in shacks increased from 1.45 million in 1996 to 1.84 million in 2001. This 
increase of 27% is greater than the 10% population increase in the same period. See Statistics South Africa 
(2001). 
80 See Rust (2006), p. 15. 
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2.1.3.1 Land reform since 1994 
South Africa still tries to come to terms with its legacy of unequal land distribution and 
tenure insecurity.81 Racially based legislation caused land inequalities and tenure insecu-
rity for non-white people82 within urban areas and formed part of the urban exclusion 
strategy by the apartheid state government (see following table). 
1913 Access to land restricted to homeland territories 
1923 Restricted access to urban areas 
1945 Section 10 right defines legitimacy of presence in urban areas 
1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (PISA) authorises evictions and forced removals 
1952 Pass Laws control residence permit of black people in urban areas 
1959 Group Areas Act defines racial zones in cities 
1978 99-year leasehold right 
1986 End of pass laws and influx control – residence and land ownership in urban areas legalised 
Tab. 2.4: Land rights in urban areas for non-whites during apartheid era, Source: Own design 
As a result, access to land represented a key concern on the post-1994 political agenda. 
Section 25 of the new Constitution (also referred to as the ‘property clause’) outlines that: 
“The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available re-
sources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable ba-
sis.”83 
In the transition to democratic government racially based legislation was repealed and 
legislation for a new land regulation provided.84 Based on the Constitution and the Recon-
struction and Development Programme (RDP) the government introduced various acts 
and policies85 and embarked on a land reform in 1994. The reform consists of a land resti-
tution programme to compensate those previously dispossessed, a land redistribution pro-
gramme to enable access to land for black South Africans, as well as a tenure reform pro-
gramme to secure tenure for those who have been deprived.  
All three land reform programmes showed limited effects which has contributed to in-
                                                 
81 A detailed overview and assessment of the historical context of housing and land related policy and de-
livery in South Africa has been given for instance by Christopher (1994); Judin/Vadislavic (1998), Roys-
ten (2003), Todes/Pillay/Kronje (2003); USN/Development Works (2004). 
82 The usage of racial-based terminology is only applied to further the understanding of the differentiations 
made in land and housing provision. 
83 RSA (1996a), Chapter 25(5). 
84 The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (ARBLMA) (No. 108 of 1991); the Less Formal 
Township Establishment Act (No. 113 of 1991); the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (ULTRA) (No. 
112 of 1991). 
85 For instance the Development Facilitation Act (1995), the White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) and the Housing Act (1997). 
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creased disillusionment. The land inequality has been described as a “time bomb” by the 
World Bank warning against a similar situation as with the Zimbabwean land-grabs.86 
Therefore on the National Land Summit in 2005 both government and civil society 
stressed the need to review the land reform programme.87 
Moreover, land reform was primarily aimed at the transfer of agricultural land and rural 
development. The only land reform financing mechanism available in urban areas to ac-
cess land for residential purposes is the Settlement / Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). 
However, it has never been used extensively.88 
The largely agricultural land reform focus and the neglect of urban areas has been criti-
cised: 
“If there is no land question in urban areas, how do we explain the rise and spread of infor-
mal settlements, which often arise out of illegal occupation of vacant - in most cases, munici-
pal - land? There is a clear need for a more nuanced conception that incorporates the quest 
for land in both urban and rural areas.”89 
In reality access to land and tenure security in urban areas is provided outside the land re-
form programmes. For urban poor households the only viable option to access security of 
tenure and land is either through legal protection from eviction or through the housing 
process by upgrading their tenure status and access to land. 
Tenure security 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE Act) 
(No. 19/1998) and various Constitutional court rulings provide for tenure security. The 
new housing strategy also prioritises informal settlement upgrading as opposed to reset-
tlement. However, there is a tendency by the state to redeem from earlier prevention of 
eviction regulations. The reorientation towards a policy of eradication of slums induced a 
change of legal provisions. Given this ambiguous policy context there are two alternative 
routes to implement policy: either to recognise the de facto occupancy and provide for 
upgrading or to evict, resettle and provide alternative accommodation. 
In reality local political choice is constrained by limited resources and powerful interests 
                                                 
86 See Blandy (2007). 
87 See Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2005), p. 9. 
88 See Royston (2002), p. 173ff; Royston (2003), p. 241; Hall R. (2004), p. 32. 
89 Ntsebeza (2007). 
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to regenerate high value land for other uses. Therefore impetus is given to evictions in 
prime locations whereas land invasions on the periphery are often neglected as govern-
ment would be responsible to finance the resettlement and alternative accommodation. 
Access to land for low-income housing 
The state is confronted by two contradicting normative principles:  
a. Spatial integration by allocating well-located land and promoting a compact city model  
b. Equity in land access by making land available to as many beneficiaries as possible 
Integration as a normative objective to land release for low-income housing projects was 
difficult to implement by local government as it was challenged by objections of private 
property-owners referred to as ‘Not-In-My-Backyard’ (NIMBY) syndrome. In addition, 
the principle of well-located and integrated development was challenged by a dominating 
housing subsidy route which aimed at minimal costs for land development. 
The scope of action which remains for local government then is to secure sites against in-
vasion and provide alternatives to evictions. “[…] the de facto driver of local authority 
land release is invasion/eviction/resettlement”.90 
2.1.3.2 Housing reform since 1994 
The evolution of housing policy and its implementation also referred to as the ‘housing 
legacy’91 still impacts the housing need as well as policy and delivery orientation.92 
In the 1950s and 60s (referred to as ‘early apartheid’) state housing for black people in 
urban areas was characterised by demolitions of unregularised slums, forced removals and 
mass rehousing.93 The technocratic housing delivery approach was informed by the stan-
dardisation of low-cost housing units, neighbourhood planning and township design and 
influenced by European modernist planning.94 
State subsidised housing shifted in the 1960s/70s (referred to has ‘high apartheid’).  In-
                                                 
90 Royston (2003), p. 41. 
91 See for instance Gardner (2003), p. 5. 
92 The evolution of the post-1994 housing policy has been reviewed extensively. See for instance Goodlad 
(1996); Huchzermeyer (2001); Jenkins (1999) and (2002); Khan (2003). 
93 For more information on the history of state housing provision see: Lemon (1991), Parnell (1992); 
Smith D. (1992); Wilson/Ramphele (1989). 
94 See Japha (1998); Crankhaw/ Parnell (1998). 
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stead of extending township areas in the as ‘white’ considered cities, urban areas for black 
occupation were developed in the homelands. The ban of state subsidised housing in 
‘white’ South Africa led to an increased housing backlog which fuelled political opposi-
tion in the 1970s. 
In the 1980s the state left the housing production to the private sector which provided 
only to higher income township residents.95  
The poor, who were unable to access credit and therefore lacked financial resources to 
contribute to housing production or to purchase the privatised state housing, were limited 
to site-and-service schemes. 
1950s/60s (early apartheid) Forced eviction and relocation to townships or homelands  
Mass public housing in peripheral township areas by the state 
1960s/70s (high apartheid) State housing provision ceased and was only limited to homelands 
1980s 
 
Private sector housing production and housing finances 
Site-and-service schemes by government 
Tab. 2.5: Apartheid state approach to housing for non-whites in urban areas, Source: Own design 
Pre-1994 housing policy negotiations 
With democracy coming into being the new government had to tackle the massive back-
log in housing and service provision and open new ways for empowerment of the for-
merly disadvantaged. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the 
South African Constitution are therefore based on a strong commitment to social and eco-
nomic rights. Housing was regarded as a basic human right and the delivery thereof as a 
central means to approach the inequalities. The Constitution of South Africa (Section 26) 
states that all South Africans have the right to adequate housing. Government is therefore 
responsible to achieve the realisation of this right on a progressive basis.  
The strategies and instruments as to how government is to fulfil its responsibility have 
been laid out in the South African Housing Policy. Policy negotiations initiated in the pre-
1994 period with the National Housing Forum (NHF) which consisted of representatives 
from state, private and civil society sector. However, a key critique which was formulated 
was the lack of participation of progressive civil society groups and the lack of influence 
                                                 
95 See Porteous (2003), p. 192. 
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by the landless and homeless.96 
At the forum, private sector delivery interests met interests of the democratic movement 
towards process orientation in housing. Numerous commentators have pointed out that the 
housing policy therefore accommodates contradicting interests and thus lacks coher-
ence.97 
1994-1999 State-assisted market-driven delivery 
In 1994 the Housing White Paper was launched. Since then policy development has pri-
marily been managed by the state with limited participation of non-state actors.98 
The housing policy has been fixed in two macro policy frameworks. In 1994 the Recon-
struction and Development Programme (RDP) as the socio-economic policy stressed that 
housing provision for all is a responsibility of government.  The Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR), as the macro-economic strategy, was adopted in 1996 to 
ensure financial discipline and macro-economic stability. In the following government 
expenditure was reduced which therefore also impacted on the housing budget alloca-
tion.99 
The Housing White Paper of 1994 represents the framework for the National Housing 
Policy and for all policy, programmes and guidelines which followed. It specifies the right 
to adequate housing, as was formulated in the RDP, by emphasising a product orientation 
in terms of housing provision. This became most apparent with the National Housing 
Goal set out in the White Paper declaring “to reach the target of the Government of Na-
tional Unity of 1,000,000 houses in five years”.100  
The provisions of the White Paper were later legislated by the Housing Act of 1997 (Act 
No. 107 of 1997) which is the supreme law replacing previous housing legislation. It lays 
down the general principles applicable to housing development and clarifies the functions 
of the different spheres of government. Government is required to prioritise the needs of 
the poor in housing development and to ensure that housing development is based on the 
                                                 
96 See for example Khan/Thurman (2001), p. 6ff; Goodlad (1996); Huchzermeyer (2001); Khan (2003), 
p.11ff; Khan/Ambert (2003), p.iv. 
97 See Khan (2003), p. 14. 
98 See Gardner (2003), p. 6. 
99 For a review of the development discourse in South Africa see chapter 2.3.3. 
100 Department of Housing (1994), 4.3. 
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principles of integration, participation, and empowerment, and that it offers a range of 
housing and tenure options.101 A report by CSIR acknowledges that the Act embraces a 
more holistic notion of housing. At the same time, the authors argue that the Act rein-
forces the market-centred approach by prescribing an enabling role for the state and “thus 
stepping back to let others take control of the situation”.102  
The Urban Development Framework (UDF) and housing policy (laid down in the Na-
tional Housing Code of 2000) refer to be aligned to the Habitat Agenda (1996) and stress 
a more comprehensive understanding of housing emphasising aspects such as integration, 
habitable communities, economic development, institutional transformation and partner-
ships with non-state actors.103 
The housing policy provided a National Housing Programme. One significant element of 
the housing programme is the Housing Subsidy Scheme (HSS).104 The subsidy scheme 
gives households earning below a specific income line access to funding for housing, se-
curity of tenure and services. The interpretation of the ANC objective of ‘housing for all’ 
was highly disputed. Government avoided approaches like site-and-service schemes due 
to community opposition against such ‘apartheid-like’ state approaches. The once-off 
capital had to make provision for a starter house (also referred to as RDP houses105) which 
was supposed to be improved incrementally by the beneficiaries. 
Most stakeholders in the housing process agreed upon policy direction but have concerns 
around its implementation. The fundamental critique is around the low quality and inade-
quate size of the building and surrounding environment, the lack of affordability by poor 
households and the lack of integration which contributes to a perpetuation of apartheid 
style settlement location on the peripheries.106  
In fact, Huchzermeyer (2004) questions that the South African housing policy is in line 
with the Habitat Agenda since it makes no reference to urban poverty.107 
                                                 
101 See RSA (1997b), 2(1). 
102 Du Plessis/Landmann (2002), p. 113. 
103 See Republic of South Africa (1997), UDF. 
104 The other elements of the housing programme will not be reviewed in the following. 
105 As a reference to the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
106 See Thurmann (1999); Jenkins (1999); Seekings (2000); Huchzermeyer (2001). 
107 See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 46. 
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The state-delivery model however nurtured a culture of entitlement to a house which 
could not be realistically fulfilled. Therefore scholars strongly promoted alternative 
mechanisms beyond the state-driven housing delivery.  
“The assumption is that people will wait in the queue. The nature of the queue is long and 
slow. There is only one queue, the queue is for only one product. How trustworthy is the 
queue? There is an issue of corruption – people know that the queue is not fair. The key 
premise of an informal settlement upgrading policy is that people can’t wait for government 
to deliver. At the moment, there is only one channel through which to access legal housing – 
the subsidy system. One needs to open this to different alternatives.”108 
1999-2004 State-assisted self-help and state-driven delivery 
The limitations of the housing policy were acknowledged both by academics and gov-
ernment itself. With the second term of ANC government the housing ministry responded 
with policy refinements towards a more qualitative approach, minimum norms and stan-
dards, greater beneficiary responsibility and new forms of tenure. 
The housing policy integrated both an enabling role for the state as a ‘state-assisted, mar-
ket delivery approach’ and a ‘state-assisted self-help’ approach including both private sec-
tor and people-driven housing delivery.109 
Since 1998 one key national strategy to shift housing policy towards quality delivery and 
sustainable human settlements has been the support of the People’s Housing Process 
(PHP). PHP assists households to access housing subsidies and to build or organise the 
building of their homes themselves. The people-centred development route gives a facili-
tating and co-ordinating role to government and leaves more responsibility to civil society 
organisations. 
PHP is meant as an entry into other economic and livelihood enhancing activities by giv-
ing more control over planning, location and design to residents and thus contributing to 
the beneficiary’s satisfaction and to social inclusion.110 PHP was largely influenced by in-
ternational donors which were promoting a slum upgrading approach and by the pressure 
of civil society organisations particularly the South African Homeless People’s Federa-
tion with its support NGO People’s Dialogue which were pioneering new self-help ap-
proaches in South Africa. A national People’s Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT) was es-
                                                 
108 Royston (2003) quoted from University of the Witwatersrand (2003). 
109 See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 255. 
110 See DoH (no date). 
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tablished to strengthen PHPs by a capacitating programme at provincial and local level.111 
In terms of the PHP process the discourse is split into a benefit view and a perception that 
the state is shifting responsibility to the poor. 
An evaluation of Housing Subsidy Scheme recommended the support of PHP. An ex-
pected outcome is the restoration of human dignity through community participation, 
quality products and environments as well as a job-creation strategy.112  
However, some operational weaknesses have also been noted since its inception. Housing 
experts highlight the slow process and low delivery rate of PHP projects, the complexity 
of community organisation-building and participation, the lack of capacity and the limita-
tion to community construction which is also hindered by inappropriate building norms 
and standards.113  
Critics point out that the neglect of a more incremental approach is due to a focus on the 
number of delivery as the key performance indicator.114 In fact, it is argued that in South 
Africa upgrading approaches are distorted by the capital subsidy system. The govern-
ment-initiated interventions are reduced to the house construction component. As a result, 
no space is given for community decision-making over layout or management of infra-
structure projects.115  
Rust (2003) claims while there is growing emphasis of PHP processes, nevertheless pro-
cedures in implementation have not transformed adequately.116 
Lohnert (2002) even questions the feasibility of self-help approaches in the South African 
context. She argues that the willingness and capacity for self-help is reduced in a context 
of high mobility. Moreover, the incremental upgrading, consolidation and socio-economic 
upliftment is not given in the context of economic deprivation and effects of 
HIV/AIDS.117 
2002 marked a further shift from a Public-Private Partnership model towards a state-
                                                 
111 For further information on the evolution of PHP see Napier (2003).  
112 See USN (2003a). 
113 For evaluations of PHP see for example Napier (2003); Rust (2003); Thurmann (1999); USN (2003a); 
Baumann (2003); Bay Research and Consultancy (2003); USN (1998). 
114 See Napier (2003), p. 329; Rust (2003), Huchzermeyer (2003a), pp. 591ff; Charlton/Kihato (2006). 
115 See Huchzermeyer (2004), p. 77. 
116 See Rust (2003). 
117 See Lohnert (2002), pp. 255ff. 
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driven approach. Reasons are seen in the withdrawal of the private sector in low-income 
housing delivery, but also in increased political interests of gaining control over deliv-
ery.118 Since local authorities have been allowed to act as developers since 2002, some lo-
cal councillors are interested in demonstrating delivery outcomes to their constituents. 
Critics stress that subsidised housing developments continue to be inadequately located 
and integrated, and housing finance largely ignores the needs of the poor.119  
Since 2004 new housing policy ‘Breaking New Ground’  
Since 2004 the political discourse emphasises the link between public investment in hous-
ing and poverty reduction. The Department of Housing was under constraint to adjust pol-
icy in order to integrate socio-economic concerns.120 It launched a new Housing Plan 
Breaking New Ground for the development of ‘sustainable human settlements’.121 This 
plan comprises the integration of social facilities, subsidies for middle-income house-
holds, greater co-ordination between different spheres of government, new structures for 
monitoring and evaluation, pro-active land identification and acquisition. Further it pro-
motes incremental planning and redevelopment of existing physical structures. However, 
the plan does not substitute existing housing policies and programmes. The strategy en-
tails the alignment between the housing programme and municipal Integrated Develop-
ment Plans (IDP) and promotes the preparation of municipal housing plans in the IDP 
process.122 
Charlton and Kihato, however, argue that BNG “[…] does not seem to have essentially 
departed from the original housing policy” since it neglects key weaknesses which have 
been identified in the policy.123  
On the one hand the state intends to activate a private housing finance market; on the 
other hand it promotes self-build processes and community savings. At the same time its 
                                                 
118 See Khan/Ambert (2003), p. xv; Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 263f. 
119 See Huchzermeyer (2001); CSIR (2002); Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 275. 
120 See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 256f. 
121 “Sustainable human settlements” implies a shift from the production of single housing units to respon-
siveness to multidimensional needs. It refer to “well-managed entities in which economic growth and so-
cial development are in balance with the carrying capacity of the natural systems on which they depend 
for their existence and result in sustainable development, wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equity.” 
DoH (2004b), p. 11. 
122 See DoH (2004b). 
123 See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 257. 
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capital subsidy system is ambiguous between scaling up delivery and promoting empow-
erment. As an result, the state is regarded both as an enabler and a supplier of housing 
which Khan describes as a “combination of a selective appropriation of enablement and 
high modernism”.124 
2.1.3.3 Governing the gaps in land and housing provision 
Low-income housing in South Africa is characterised by a general ambiguity between 
contradicting aims of policies and contradictions between policies and practices. The aim 
to create sustainable settlements is contrasted by quantitative delivery targets and per-
formance measurement. The policy adjustment also entails ambiguous attitudes which 
translate in a variety of practices.  
On the one hand, to ensure fast track and mass delivery, constructor-built projects are 
promoted. This would entail a further engagement of the construction industry which in 
reality sees very low profit margins in the low-income housing sector and which, at the 
time, is absorbed by high profit projects.  
People-driven processes on the other hand are promoted as a way to ensure more quality 
in the housing process. Tight regulations and formalised application processes however 
impede implementation and require much support for community groups. 
The underlying opposing pressures under which housing policies are developed may re-
sult from different political orientations and values which constitute ‘governance gaps’.125 
These gaps generate different local policies and practices (see table 2.6). 
The contradictions in policy orientation are displayed in a variety of interventions. The 
tensions particularly between the delivery and process oriented positions were not re-
solved within the policies but were left open for interpretation by programmes or during 
implementation on the ground.  
Finally, the discrepancies between policy ideal and practice are based on: 
a) How policy is interpreted and thus a matter of political or institutional will,  
b) Institutional arrangements affecting policy implementation, 
                                                 
124 Khan (2003), p. 77. 
125 See Pierre (1999), pp. 373ff. 
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c) Capacities to implement, and  
d) Resources to bring policy into being. 
Phase  Economic growth oriented GAP Basic needs oriented 
Tenure security Objectives Protect right of property owner  Protect right of unlawful occupier 
Instrument Eviction Emergency services,  
Temporary rights 
Policy Amendment to PIE Act, 
Norms and standards 
PIE Act, 
Grootboom Case 
Access to land Objectives Equity in land allocation, pro-
tect high value land, attract in-
vestors, promote private initia-
tive 
Integration, well-located land, redis-
tribution, control private initiative 
Instrument „Willing-seller-willing-buyer“ 
transactions 
Pro-active land identification (IDP), 
expropriation 
Policy Land Reform Programme, BNG BNG 
Housing  
finance 
Objectives Subsidy: Development, mass 
delivery (quantity) 
 
Credit: Increase engagement of 
private sector to offer loans 
Subsidy: Empowerment, enhance 
livelihood strategies (quality) 
 
Credit: Promote self-build process 
and community-based finances 
Instrument Subsidies for supply-driven pri-
vate developer delivery 
 
Reduce risks and costs for loan
Subsidies for demand-driven peo-
ple-led process 
 
Secure loans against savings, 
combine subsidy with savings and 
loan 
Policy BNG BNG, PHP 
Land  
development 
Objectives Product orientation 
Fast-track delivery by private 
developer land development 
 
Greenfields 
Process orientation 
Demand-driven by application and 
development through beneficiaries 
 
In situ upgrading 
Instrument Pre-planning, township estab-
lishment, relocation 
Land application by beneficiaries 
Land rehabilitation 
Policy BNG BNG, PHP 
Tenure  
alternatives 
Objectives Enabling markets Enabling livelihoods, tenure choice, 
entry points in housing 
Instrument Individual ownership, property 
asset creation 
Area-based, alternative tenure, 
rental, enhancing social capital as 
asset 
Policy BNG PHP within BNG  
Rental Housing Act (50 of 1999) 
Construction Objectives Consumer Protection Promote self-built process  
Instrument Control norms and standards Progressive housing standards, 
support by consumer education 
Policy National Home Builders Regu-
lations, Provincial minimum 
norms and standards 
Less Formal Township Establish-
ment Act (1991); Development Fa-
cilitation Act (1995) 
Tab. 2.6: Governance value orientation in different phases of low-cost housing, Source: Own design 
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2.1.3.4 Role of developmental local government in housing 
“[…] making the connection between local government and housing is a challenging task, 
one that has largely been ignored in most discussion about low-cost housing.”126 
Since 1994, responsibilities for infrastructure, spatial development and subsidies have 
been extensively passed on to the local level. Parnell and Pieterse argue that these strate-
gies “reflect a fundamentally different approach to the management of human settle-
ments”.127 Based on the principle of developmental local government the Housing Act 
(1997) defines the role of the different spheres of government in housing provision (see 
table 2.7). 
Sphere of government Roles and responsibilities 
National government Determines national housing policy 
Sets national housing delivery goals 
Facilitates provincial and local housing delivery goals 
Performance monitoring 
Capacity support 
Consultation 
Communication 
Provides programmes and finance 
Land registration 
Tenure reform 
Finance for acquisition and servicing of land 
Provincial government Administers national and provincial housings programmes 
Administers Housing Subsidy Scheme (if municipality is not accredited) 
Determines provincial policy and legislation 
Co-ordinates housing development in the province 
Capacity support for municipalities 
Intervention to perform municipal duties 
Provides a multi-year plan 
Assesses application for municipal accreditation 
Approves IDP 
Subsidises bulk infrastructure 
Legalizes informal settlements 
Approval of Land Development Applications 
Local government Must ensure that right to adequate housing is realised on progressive basis  
Identifies land and sets housing delivery goals in IDP  
Initiates, plans, co-ordinates, facilitates, promotes and enables appropriate 
housing development 
Provides land and services for new housing developments 
If accredited, municipalities can administer funding through national housing 
programmes 
Land Development Objectives (LDO) through IDP 
Spatial Development Framework (SDF) through IDP 
Town Planning Schemes 
Taxation 
Land acquisition 
Tab. 2.7: Roles and responsibilities in housing provision  
Source: Own design according to the Housing Act, RSA (1997) 
                                                 
126 Pottie (2003), p. 439. 
127 Parnell/Pieterse (2002), p. 80. 
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Local government was perceived as an enabler of private sector investment in housing de-
livery according to the ‘state-assisted market-delivery approach’ which was predominant 
between 1994 and 1999. Confronted with the reluctance by the private sector to engage in 
low-income housing delivery and with the political interest to control housing, local gov-
ernment shifted towards enabling self-help approaches as well as ‘state-driven delivery’ 
between 1999 and 2004. 
Since 2004 national government has shifted towards a poverty reduction framework com-
bined with an interventionist role for the local state. To improve state-driven housing de-
livery the Breaking New Ground policy provides reforms for greater co-ordination 
amongst different spheres of government and for pro-active land identification by local 
government. 
Local government has a defined area of powers and function in housing policy. In terms 
of constitutive functions to reform laws and regulations and to set policies, it is limited to 
control and ensure the rule of law. This however leaves room for political interpretation. 
Local government withholds more power when it comes to strategic planning and identi-
fying land for development. The municipal IDP is the strategic instrument for the realisa-
tion of these functions. The challenge lies in how to provide well-located land for hous-
ing. To access strategic land parcels, a municipality can either use legislative instruments 
such as expropriation or use fiscal instruments by increasing taxation on property. 
The scope for local government to allocate and purchase land is presently broadened. Pre-
viously land allocation for low-income housing was defined through the Housing Subsidy 
Scheme which contributed to the development of Greenfield projects at the periphery. The 
new housing strategy BNG provides for the transfer of well-located state land to local 
government and empowers local government to the acquisition of private land for low-
income housing. However, it does not empower local government to allow community 
organised land acquisition. 
In terms of land development the South African system is highly centralised. Bottlenecks 
with land development occur most notably with land application approvals and the regis-
tration of titles which are within the provincial and national government competency. 
Therefore land development procedures cause intergovernmental conflict between prov-
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ince and local government.128  
Another obstacle in land development is the conflicting town planning and land use 
schemes. These define regulations such as zoning, subdivision, land use, floor-area ratio 
and building height. These are formalised as bye-laws and administered by local govern-
ment. The schemes therefore form a key part of a municipality's regulatory power. 
In terms of the housing process and practice, local government’s area for innovation is 
limited by the standardised housing programme. Municipalities are reluctant to apply for 
accreditation to administer housing subsidies. Therefore higher spheres of government 
continue to be the key players in state subsidised housing provision. Especially provincial 
government holds vested powers. This implies that provinces largely control the type of 
housing development and kind of developer.129 
Nevertheless, the scope for municipal action is broadened. In its role of delivering houses 
and services local government can strategically select and prioritise projects and influence 
the degree of community inclusion and the mode of governance it is willing to embark on. 
Still it has a political choice in the situation of governance gaps. Key areas for local gov-
ernment to influence housing provision are: pro-active land identification and prioritising 
people-driven processes. Both areas therefore represent the political opportunity structure 
for influence by civil society organisations at local government level. 
                                                 
128 In the case of the DFA route, for instance, development application approval is taken away from local 
government to provincial tribunals.  
129 See Khan (2003), p. 17; Durand-Lasserve (2002), p. 21. 
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2.2 Urban governance discourse 
2.2.1 The rise of governance concepts 
Against the background of the financial crisis in the 1970s the role of the state shifted 
from a welfare to a managerial state which was assumed to be more efficient. Subse-
quently new governance arrangements became prominent. Programmes implemented in 
this context were ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) focusing on outsourcing service 
functions to the private sector and thereby reducing the role of the state.130 
The governance discourse also influenced development policy-making as by the end of 
the 1980s the difficulties in implementing structural adjustment programmes became ap-
parent.131 The World Bank embarked on ‘new governance’ seeing political and institu-
tional changes as effective for economic reform.132 
Since the mid 1990s international politics have shifted from a rollback of state to improv-
ing and reforming state institutions, deepening democracy and enabling roles for non-state 
actors.133 Since then the term governance is used to refer to new emerging organisational 
forms and coordination in society. 
“Governance indicates a new kind of social-political steering logic in the public sector char-
acterised by a differentiated and multicentered political system with a mix of private and pub-
lic actors participating directly in the decision-making process without any clear hierarchic 
relation between the many centers and actors.”134 
The governance concept broadened from a state-centred perspective to an integration of 
other sectors of society. This shift was induced by economic globalisation, financial con-
straints of governments, the rise of transnational corporations and increased demands by 
civil society. Given this context, the fragmentation of governance and the interdependence 
of various agencies became apparent. The following numerous international conferences, 
such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
1992 or the United Nations world conference on human settlements (Habitat I 1976, 
Habitat II 1996), reflected the approach to integrate other stakeholders into a global gov-
ernance decision-making process. In 1992 a UN Commission on Global Governance was 
                                                 
130 See Heinrichs (2005), p. 28. 
131 See for example The World Bank (1989), (1992). 
132 See Heinrichs (2005), pp. 28f. 
133 See Weiss (2000), pp. 804f. 
134 Sehested (2001), p. 11. 
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endorsed which stressed the need for co-operation between different sectors of society in 
order to manage common affairs.135 The Agenda 21 programme which was adopted at the 
UNCED conference in 1992, also makes particular reference to the inclusion of non-state 
actors.136 This transformation of political regulation has created debates on the democratic 
legitimacy of governance arrangements and thereby crossed the particular discourses 
within political science policy-making research.137 Here the discourse on governance 
interlinks with the discourse on democracy and civil society. Benz and Papadopoulos out-
line normative democratic governance as a continuous adjustment of preferences between 
power holders and those affected by decisions.138 
Normative ‘good governance’ concepts became conditional also in developing countries 
(e.g. by Poverty Reduction Strategies). “Good” refers to the quality of governance proc-
esses and their institutions and the responsible use of power and resources to provide pub-
lic goods and services.139  
The aspects of good governance are, however, differently accentuated. Whereas the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank highlighted public sector manage-
ment and the rule of law140, UN institutions emphasise human development aspects such 
as the need for horizontal coordination (UNDP)141, the aspect of collaborative action (UN-
Habitat)142 and human rights (UNCHR)143. 
In urban management the new approach translated into an enabling role for government 
which was differentiated in market enablement (e.g. privatisation), local government en-
ablement (by decentralisation and institutional reform) and community enablement (by 
participation and empowerment).144 
Critics of the ‘good governance’ principle claim that it reflects a further reduction of the 
state and focus on economic growth, and thus is just a mechanism to enable capital 
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flow.145 
Thus comprehensive governance concepts seek to conceptualise the patterns of interac-
tion, the regulation of common affairs and the fusion of public and private resources. 
Benz and Papadopoulos (2006) characterise a comprehensive governance concept along 
the following elements146: 
a) There is a plurality of decision centres with no clear hierarchy. Instead decision struc-
tures are characterised by relationships between actors organised in networks. 
b) Boundaries of decision structures are fluid in terms of inclusion and outcomes. They 
are determined in functional, not territorial terms. 
c) Actors, especially collective actors, hold power. Interest group participation is an es-
sential characteristic of governance. 
d) Modes of governance vary in negotiation processes as interaction can be character-
ised both by competition and cooperation. However, a general willingness to compro-
mise is expected. 
e) Institutions characterise governance as they determine inclusion, mode of interaction 
and influence the linkage between actors. The degree of institutionalisation varies. 
2.2.2 International discourse on urban governance 
In the context of a dynamic urban society and economy, government cannot only be seen 
as a function to deliver services, but also as a realm for agency and powers to govern 
these dynamics. 
Given this context, local governments are not understood to have exclusive control of 
governance matters. The mechanisms at work and the role of the different institutions and 
actors have been interpreted in various ways. 
The conceptual understanding of urban governance was further expanded by integrating a 
perspective of re-scaling of urban governance. This is based on the experience of in-
creased global competitiveness of cities.147 Castells interprets the consequences of global-
isation as a deterritorialisation and circulation of people, commodities and identities in a 
                                                 
145 See for example Evans (2001). 
146 See Benz/Papadopoulos (2006b), pp. 2f. 
147 See Sassen (2001); Taylor (2003); GAWC (no date). 
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‘space of flows’.148 Instead Brenner argues that spatial fixes persist and cities become 
reterritorialised. As a consequence, polity is increasingly fragmented and power redistrib-
uted vertically from international to local level and horizontally between localities which 
is subsumed under the term ‘glocal governance’.149  
The theoretical discourse on urban governance is very diverse. The multiplicity of theo-
ries, however, shares a perspective on processes and mechanisms of coordination by dif-
ferent actors.150 Based on the acknowledgment of increasing fragmentation, differentia-
tion and complexity in social and political life, theories have widened conceptual horizon 
and connected earlier theories.151 The interest into complex interaction of private and pub-
lic decisions has been induced by the practical experience of urban change. Cities have 
increasingly become the economic growth producers for the national economy, competi-
tion between cities has increased, the disparity between local government responsibility 
and its institutional set-up has become apparent leading to institutional reforms and fi-
nally, urban social movements re-emerge. 
2.2.2.1 Urban political economy theories 
Urban political economy theories are based on two perspectives: a structuralist and a 
postmodern structuralist-pluralist perspective. 
Structuralist accounts show evidence that cities cannot be looked at as isolated elements 
but are affected by social and economic constraints and imperatives. The ‘urban growth 
machine’ model focused on the relationship between politics and economy and argued 
that stable coalitions between the political agenda and private investment decisions are 
dominant.152 Scholars have accused these structuralist accounts of limiting local politics to 
functionalist imperative to support private investment and that the model is based too 
much on US experience. Their argument is that the structuralist imperative does not give 
an explanation for variations of local politics and neglects other social forces at play.153 
The return to politics in theoretical accounts gave rise to a theoretical synthesis which ac-
                                                 
148 See Castells (1989). 
149 See for example Brenner (1999). 
150 See Pierre (2005), p. 452. 
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(2004), pp. 122f. 
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knowledged both the impact of market forces as well as the influence of popular interests. 
Common to postmodern theories, and what differentiates them from earlier work, is that 
they see a diffusion and decentralisation of political steering and increased dysfunction of 
bureaucratic means. Consequently the divisions between politics and administration, as 
well as those between public and private spheres dissolve.154 
Urban regime theory  
Urban regime theory tries to overcome the limits of the growth machine model by focus-
ing on the nature of informal coalition behaviour. The model expands also to non-
business directed regimes since dominant coalitions are in need of grassroots legitimacy 
and support.155 Criticism of urban regime theory stresses that the model is US-centric and 
cannot be applied universally.156 Even Stone (2005) acknowledged later that a prevalence 
of the business sector in regimes is common but not inevitable and depends on the con-
text. 
Regulation theory 
Post-Fordist analysis describes the change of urban politics under the conditions of in-
creased complexity and flexibility. In contrast to regime theory a Post-Fordist perspective 
holds that if the constraints of regimes are not taken into account, they will result in con-
flict.157 
The outsourcing of public service and social consumption functions to the private and 
non-profit sector results in an ‘expansion of the sphere of local political action’. Thus bar-
gaining systems, forms of collaboration and the role of local government are redefined. 
According to Mayer, whether the outcome of bargaining is responsive to needs or en-
forces marginalisation will be determined by the capacity of the local authorities to enable 
negotiation and the ability of the third sector to influence decision-making.158 
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2.2.2.2 Urban governance from an institutional perspective 
With the shift from government to governance Pierre points out the risk of oversimplifica-
tion as every exchange between public and private becomes governance.159 
‘New institutionalism’ is based on earlier sociological perspectives. It assumes a wider 
governance concept and relative autonomy of the state as opposed to political concepts. 
Whereas growth coalition and urban regime theories see the state as a weak actor, it has, 
from an institutional perspective, economic, legal and political privileges. Hence political 
institutions not only react to, but direct processes. However, they are neither static nor do 
they behave in consistent ways. Instead, as Pierre says, it depends on the underlying eco-
nomic, political and ideological frameworks (value systems) which determine the con-
figurations of the actors.160 
‘Actor-centred institutionalism’161 therefore assumes that interactions of intentional actors 
are influenced by the institutional setting.162 Instead of a cause-and-effect filter model 
(policies determine institutions, institutions determine options for action), actor-centred 
institutionalism takes the view that policy, institutions and options for actions influence 
one another in a circular model.163 
 
Fig. 2.5: Policies, institutions and action - from a filter to a circular model, Source: Own design 
Institutions and policies can therefore be influenced by the actions of actors. These actors, 
Scharpf argues, are interdependent. Thus, outcome is not produced by a single but multi-
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ple actors with different interests, perceptions and capabilities.164 
Institutionalism is therefore interested in interagency relationships as modes of govern-
ance. Different concepts to categorise modes of governance reflect ideal types which in 
reality might constitute rather a combination or hybrid of modes of governance.165  
Therefore Pierre and Gaetano/Strom present models which categorise the modes of gov-
ernance not in the three steering logics (hierarchy, market and networks) but according to 
criteria such as instruments, values, outcomes, interactions (governance relations), meth-
ods (governance logic), actor constellation and political objectives. 
Gaetano/Strom thereby arrive at a categorisation of clientelistic (pragmatic personalised 
exchange relationship), corporatist (consensus-oriented exclusionary ruling coalitions), 
managerial (formal and bureaucratic relations), pluralist (bargaining, competing interests) 
and populist (inclusion and participation of grassroots) modes of governance (see table 
2.8). 
 
Clientelistic Corporatist Managerial Pluralist Populist 
Governing    
relations 
Particularistic, 
personalised, 
Exchange 
Exclusionary 
negotiation 
Formal, bureau-
cratic, or con-
tractual 
Brokering or 
mediating 
among compet-
ing interests 
Inclusionary   
negotiation 
Governing 
logic 
Reciprocity Consensus 
building 
Authoritative de-
cision making 
Conflict man-
agement 
Mobilisation of 
popular support 
Values 
Pragmatic Control or sup-
port market 
forces 
Support market 
forces 
Control market 
forces 
Control market 
forces 
Instrument 
Networks Deliberation 
Partnerships 
Contracts Deliberation Networks 
Key decision 
makers/       
Participants 
Politicians and 
clients 
Politicians and 
powerful civic 
leaders or pri-
vate sector elites 
(pro growth coa-
lition) 
Politicians and 
civil servants 
(Professionals) 
Politicians and 
organised inter-
ests 
Politicians and 
community 
movement lead-
ers 
Political objec-
tives 
Material 
(Selected   
Benefits) 
Purposive 
(Distribution or 
Growth) 
Material 
(Efficiency) 
Purposive 
(Equity) 
Symbolic 
(Participation) 
Tab. 2.8: Modes of urban governance, Sources: Pierre (1999), p. 388; Gaetano/Strom (2003), p. 366. 
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2.2.2.3 Re-politisation of governance through networks 
Institutionalism has been criticised for its apolitical standpoint. Particularly network gov-
ernance is increasingly politically interpreted with regards to the legitimacy and democ-
ratic nature of networks.166 
Networks are defined as informal, decentralised and horizontal inter-organisational rela-
tions.167  
Castells claims that society has moved to an information age by new information technol-
ogy and globalisation. Castells feels that these technologies allow reconfigurations in 
flexible and networking forms of social relations (‘network society’). Networks in this 
context become a key feature as they increase efficiency as opposed to hierarchical struc-
tures. Participation within networks, according to Castells, is determined by the ability of 
actors (as nodes within networks) to contribute to the goals of the network. 
The normative assumption is that networks are better equipped than state or market to 
deal with interdependencies and complexity in society.168 According to Hajer and 
Wagenaar (2003) networks constitute an ‘expansive democracy’ which is characterised by 
direct democracy or through strong linkages “by relating decision-making to the persons 
who are affected.”169 
Critics argue that network-style relationships may also lead to the formation of inner and 
outer networks. Those who have resources and status are more likely to be included.170  
Instead people unrelated to networks are often oriented to communities as the ‘space of 
place’ whilst information networks are placeless operating in a ‘space of flows’: “elites 
are cosmopolitan, people are local”, so Castells.171 He argues that communal resistance 
against the ‘space of flows’ is determined by the ability of communities to build networks 
with other communities.172 
It then becomes essential to ask who is included, how policy preferences are shaped, to 
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whom they are responsive, and how constituency can make decision-makers accountable 
on policy outcomes.173 
Hence a network form of governance is reconnected to democracy concerns. Analytical 
frameworks then interpret governance arrangements as either representing a collaborative 
advantage or exclusion. 
2.2.2.4 Urban governance from a planning perspective 
Planning theory assumed that planners act on the basis of normative concepts such as the 
good city (compact, revitalisation), good planning (rationality) and good society (equity, 
efficiency). According to rational, incremental and neo-rational theories planners as ex-
perts define needs and values in society and regulate and control urban development. Ac-
cording to postmodern neo-rational planning this is to be achieved by new management 
methods such as New Public Management (NPM). 
Other postmodern planning scholars perceived planning no longer as a technical process, 
but a political activity. In this context communicative and collaborative planning theory174 
withdraws from Habermas and promotes planning as an interactive and deliberative proc-
ess to find consensus. The “good“ planner is understood to be a reflexive planner who is 
aware of the power relations and who enables participation, empowerment and commu-
nity action.  
Power relations in participation have been categorised for the first time by Arnstein in 
1969. With her prominent ‘ladder of participation’ she revealed a continuum of influence 
in decision-making from non-participation to citizen control.175 Her model has been re-
fined by Hamdi and Goethert who suggest distinguishing levels and stages of participa-
tion. The level of participation can vary during a project cycle. Differences in the level of 
participation also involve a variation of aligned roles for the participants and outside ex-
perts (see figure 2.6).176 
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Fig. 2.6: Roles related to levels and stages of participation 
Source: adapted from Hamdi/Goethert (1997), p. 66 and 68. 
From a critical planning perspective planning cannot be normatively good. Collaborative 
planning, scholars argue, would fail to see the underlying processes that shape cities. In-
stead they applied frameworks to understand ‘planning as social control’ to contribute to a 
critical theory of planning.177 
“[…] cities and regions might be shaped by forces that planning has no ability to influence. 
This does not mean giving up in despair but, rather, searching for unthought possibilities for 
action and resistance beyond the confines of ‘planning’ (however defined).”178 
Referring to Foucault’s auto-governmentality179 they argue that the actors always repro-
duce power relations - also in deliberative and participatory processes. 
A further critique questions the relevance of Western normative planning ideals in the 
context of the contentious and complex reality of ‘everyday life’ in the cities of the Global 
South. 
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Watson has demonstrated the gap between a normative formal planning ideal and the real-
ity of informality and everyday techniques of survival.180  
Obviously tensions are present between rational planning and communicative planning 
ideals, between communicative planning ideals and theories of power as well as between 
the Northern dominated rationality and the planning reality in the Global South. 
Against this background Watson asks how to arrive at a normative understanding of plan-
ning without withdrawing from conflicting rationalities. She promotes a research which is 
‘Seeing from the South’. Cities in the Global South illustrate worldwide tendencies of in-
formality and inequality. Therefore the study of these phenomena can contribute to plan-
ning theory in general. To do so, she argues that one should take a theoretical perspective 
outside the planning field.181 
AlSayyad and Roy for instance suggest applying an analytical framework on urban in-
formality which not only focuses on the built form but enlarges the understanding of the 
organising logic of urban informality revealing the social and political processes. They 
argue that new forms of informality may entail both formal and informal sectors, which 
may include not only the poor but also the middle-class, and which may have new forms 
and geographies.182 
Herrle and Walther outline that these disjointed discourses can again be integrated under 
the use of the concept of social exclusion and inclusion since it combines normative with 
critical analysis and overcomes the limitations of universal concepts which are not 
grounded in the complexity and particularity of informality in the development context. 
The authors argue that it also translates beyond local particularities since it is applied 
against the background of general tendencies of fragmentation and complexity in cities.183  
Given this context, the relevance of participation can be re-evaluated. Geddes for instance 
questions the extent to which local partnerships enhance cohesion and integration to com-
bat social exclusion in the EU. Partnerships which aim to engage those excluded, claim to 
link communities with formal organisations. Geddes points out that it is rather local activ-
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ists than the wider community which are involved. Moreover those involved lack the ca-
pacity and resources to engage in the expert circles. Also the tensions and divisions within 
a community are often neglected. Geddes concludes that there are limits to inclusion in 
partnership projects.184 
Participation can then be characterised as creating new exclusion. But it can also integrate 
the informal mechanisms of ‘the excluded’. Goethert asks: “Perhaps it is us, the minority 
formal sector of development planners that are the excluded and irrelevant?” He envis-
ages a change of participation which does not try to integrate the informal into the formal 
framework, but instead he assumes a convergence towards the informal.185 
2.2.3 Local government and governance in South Africa 
2.2.3.1 Developmental local government 
The role of local government has been constantly re-shaped within a changing develop-
ment discourse in South Africa. The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), which was introduced in 1994, expressed a developmental state model. It focused 
on redistribution and meeting basic needs.186 
In 1996 national government embarked on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) strategy. The shift from RDP to GEAR is seen as a result of the weakness of the 
state to deliver and the willingness of the African National Congress (ANC) to take up a 
more economy oriented position.187 Given this context the state shifted from delivery to-
wards enabling development by the private sector. Chipkin argues this implied a changing 
role for government from a technical and administrative to a policy co-ordinator and me-
diator role. Government then had to stimulate private investment and to enable alliances 
with non-state bodies.188 
After the financial crisis in mid-1997 the ANC turned to Third Way governance as this 
was agreeable to both economic and social-oriented agencies.189 In the following govern-
ment tried to resolve the ambiguity in the development discourse through a combination 
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of public sector efficiency and individual responsibility.190 
Influenced by the international debate on New Public Management (NPM) budget reforms 
and public sector reform were introduced. This entailed speeding up delivery whilst main-
taining fiscal stability.191 At the same time development responsibility was passed on to 
the new and transformed local government: 
„A municipality must – (a) structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and plan-
ning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social 
and economic development of the community; and (b) participate in national and provincial 
development programmes.“192 
Given the Third Way approach the role of local government was redefined as Develop-
mental Local Government (DLG).193 DLG entails both an economic and redistributive 
role for local government as the key driver in delivery in partnership with the non-state 
sector.194 
DLG has been widely criticised since the development mandate did not acknowledge the 
contradiction between GEAR and RDP and thus entails a competing interpretation which 
either triggered strategies for economic liberalisation or addressing basic needs.195 
Since 2000 stronger focus has been given to poverty reduction however whilst ensuring 
macroeconomic stability.196 Although government has reached macroeconomic stability, 
unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Instead the economic growth rather con-
tributed to further income inequality.197 Opponents of the economic growth strategy argue 
that it has not contributed to any significant job creation for un-skilled labour and has 
rather enhanced a perpetuation of poverty within a new so-called ‘economic apartheid’.198 
Therefore since 2005, DLG has been redefined as requiring more control and direct influ-
ence in order to reduce poverty.199 This implies a shift towards interventionist policies. 
Swilling outlines: 
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“Building the “developmental state” is now official government policy, and with this comes 
an interventionism across the board that is premised on the assumption that greater state 
control means greater success.”200 
In 2006 government introduced the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (AsgiSA) which aims at accelerating economic growth and to cut poverty and un-
employment by half by 2014.201 It continues in the belief that economic growth will even-
tually reduce poverty. AsgiSA is therefore not a new macroeconomic paradigm but pro-
vides adjustments towards a more interventionist role of the state.202 
The recent shift in development policy towards a new poverty agenda is based on interna-
tional thinking and their aligned delivery mechanisms. Although being welcomed in terms 
of a more refined understanding of poverty and processes, scholars caution that the new 
agenda will lead to an oversimplified approach and shift the focus away from citizenship 
and empowerment.203 
Phase Development Discourse Role of Developmental Local State 
1994-96 Basic needs Delivering/ Interventionist state 
1996-1998 Economic growth Enabling private sector investment 
1998-2004 “Third Way”: Poverty reduction and mac-
roeconomic stability 
Driving delivery in partnership with non-state 
sector 
Post 2004 Poverty reduction Delivering/ Interventionist state 
Tab. 2.9: Shifts in the development role for local government in South Africa, Source: Own design 
2.2.3.2 Decentralisation and local government restructuring 
Reforms to decentralise government functions in South Africa have been pushed since the 
1980s. At that time local government structures restricted representation of the black 
population in urban areas. In 1982 the apartheid state aimed at disrupting the anti-
apartheid struggle by establishing Black Local Authorities (BLAs) in the townships.204 
These however lacked financial resources to be autonomous and moreover represented the 
continuous racial-based differentiation. Therefore local authorities were not accepted in 
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the black, coloured or Indian communities.205 
During the transition, the South African government intended to strengthen an integration 
of urban areas. In this context decentralisation was considered antidotal to fragmentation 
and segregation. Hence government restructured racially-based areas, transformed gov-
ernment institutions and provided strategic planning tools.  
The negotiations in terms of reforming local government206 in the 1990s resulted in poli-
cies which particularly emphasise the role of local authorities.  Three of the groundbreak-
ing policies in the transitional period were:  
a) In terms of institutional reform the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) in 1993  
which provided for institutional transition and mapped out the phases of the transition 
process;  
b) In terms of restructuring racially-based areas the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 
which enabled the restructuring into newly demarcated municipalities.207 
c) In terms of introducing strategic planning tools the Development Facilitation Act 
(DFA) in 1995 which allowed former planning instruments to be bypassed, introduced 
instruments to transfer power to the local sphere and made Land Development Objec-
tives (LDO) and Integrated Development Planning (IDP) obligatory to strategically 
develop land and direct resources according to priorities.208 
Institutional restructuring 
Political and administrative restructuring of local government can be distinguished in 
three phases: pre-interim until 1996, interim until 2000 and final phase (see following ta-
ble).209 In 1996 the Constitution established a third sphere of government and the White 
Paper on Local Government detailed the local government system which came into effect 
after the municipal elections in 2000.210 
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Phase Local Government Structure 
Pre-interim until 1995/96 Local negotiation forums as statutory bodies and appointed temporary 
councils 
Interim 1996-2000 Transitional local government structures and two-tier local government 
structures in metropolitan areas 
Post-2000 Single-tier local government structure with Metropolitan Council and Ward 
committees 
Tab. 2.10: Transition phases and aligned local government structures in South Africa, Source: Own design 
Local government in South Africa includes both political representation and administra-
tion. The executive power remains with a metropolitan council which appoints officials in 
administration. There are two options for political representation: the Executive Mayoral 
Committee system which provides larger powers to the mayor or the Executive Committee 
system with proportional representation from council.  
In terms of administration the former government negotiated a ‘sunset clause’ which 
meant a job guarantee for civil servants in order to ensure economic and administrative 
continuity.211 With the amalgamation of administrations in 2000 the internal administra-
tion was restructured and new top management and organisational structures introduced. 
Subsequently, staff replacements took place on a large scale. The re-organisation also im-
plied a shift from a hierarchical bureaucracy to a more ‘networked’ organisation.212 
Re-demarcation 
The demarcation of municipal boundaries as a means for segregation policies during 
apartheid has been a highly contested field in the South African context. In the following 
controversial standpoints emerged in terms of establishing single (Unicity) or dual-level 
(with subcouncils) metropolitan systems. After an interim period (1996-2000) of dual-
level structures the ANC implemented the Unicity concept by 2000.213 As Nel and Binns 
point out this reduced the numbers of local and metropolitan municipalities to less than a 
third.214 
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Local government autonomy and powers 
The devolution of power to the new local government structures was incorporated in the 
Constitution.  It granted an executive and legislative power to the local state as a distinct 
sphere of government: 
“A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of 
its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitu-
tion.” 215 
Nevertheless, the level of autonomy of the local state has remained an area of concern. 
Chipkin has put forward that ‘autonomy’ of local government was interpreted as internal 
operational or management autonomy but not as autonomy in policy-choice.216 
According to Chipkin, the notion of local government is contradictory. On the one hand it 
is informed by the ANC theory of National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which per-
ceived the city and community as part of the struggle for socialism. Following this think-
ing local government has to implement the pre-defined general interest which has been 
expressed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Thus it is reduced 
to administrative and managerial functions. On the other hand, particularly activist plan-
ners understand government as a mediator between contesting interests and social forces. 
This notion is based on theories of local democracy, autonomous political space and so-
cial movements.217 
Oldfield (2002) argues that other spheres of government can still influence local state 
autonomy and performance. Financial incentives through funds and programmes by 
higher sphere of government on local government activities are an indication that the ver-
tical inter-tier state relations are not only determined by legislation but are far more com-
plex and open to political bargaining.218 
Pottie also puts forward that political power remains centralised and stresses: 
“While this political practice gives the party an important strategic lever in terms of policy 
implementation, it can also negatively blunt local accountability and representation.”219 
This entails an ambiguity for local authorities as an autonomous sphere of state which has 
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to function as the key agent for the delivery of programmes by a higher sphere of state. 
The tendency becomes even more explicit with the promotion of multi-level governance 
as a mechanism for aligning state budgets and planning.220 For instance the Sun City Ac-
tion Plan stresses that local council areas are ‘impact zones’ for higher sphere of govern-
ment action.221 At a South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) conference in 
December 2006, President Thabo Mbeki stressed the importance of local government as 
the sphere of government where delivery must take place.222 
Various authors have pointed out that in reality, the requirement for alignment and devel-
opment limited decentralisation to the delegation of functions to local government to fulfil 
national government policies and programmes.223 Oldfield therefore applied the term ‘em-
bedded autonomy’ to illustrate the interrelated and interdependent vertical governance 
structures.224 
Alternatively to limited local government autonomy, there emerges a potential for collec-
tive city actors.225 The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) as a body 
to influence national policy, however, has been questioned if it is capable of fulfilling its 
mandate of representing local government.226 
Instead, the South African Cities Network (SACN) was established in 2002 by nine met-
ropolitan centres as a knowledge-sharing network between cities and spheres of govern-
ment. Van Donk and Pieterse put forward that it influences policy processes not as an in-
terest group but through information sharing.227 
Intergovernmental cooperative governance 
The mode of integration of the three spheres of government is specified in the White Pa-
per of Local Government (1998) as ‘cooperative governance’. It further regulates the 
competencies between the different tiers of government. To support intergovernmental 
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coordination the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) was estab-
lished which has policy-making, capacity-building and monitoring functions in terms of 
provincial and local government systems and performance. 
However, concerns have been raised around poor co-ordination between the different 
spheres of government. Often this is a result of a power struggle between provincial and 
local government level.228 Confronted with service delivery constraints and aligned pro-
tests the provincial and local government system is under review.229 
Since 2005 the Inter-Governmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005) has been 
introduced to clarify the delegation of power and functions to local government. The Act 
provides for new intergovernmental consultative forums to discuss national policy im-
plementation and outlines procedures for intergovernmental relations as a mechanism to 
resolve disputes around roles and responsibilities. Concerns have been raised that this re-
stricts local and provincial government to administrative units of national government.230 
Financial restructuring 
With the delegation of functions local governments are under financial pressure. Over-
spending resulted in a fiscal crisis for many metropolitan areas by the end of the 1990s. 
As a consequence, local government operations were reorganised by selling or transform-
ing entities to corporations and shifting from redistribution to economic growth orienta-
tion.231 
Municipalities can draw from three sources of finance: tax revenue, provincial transfers 
and an ‘equitable share’ funds from national government. The provincial and national 
funds are low232 and local revenue is difficult to generate. This situation can cause diffi-
culties in cost recovery in the context of increasing poverty and unemployment in urban 
areas.233 
The Municipal System Act of 2000 differentiates between the transfer of authority (as-
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signment) and the transfer of responsibility (delegation) to local government. Provinces 
prioritise the delegation of responsibility without adequate resources. One primary con-
cern therefore is the ‘unfunded mandate’ as municipalities have to perform delivery func-
tions without adequate financial resources.234 
2.2.3.3 Horizontal governance 
The policies and legislations introduced since the early 1990s not only prescribe the verti-
cal relations between the spheres of government, but also the horizontal integration of 
civil society to local government. The Constitution outlines the objectives of local gov-
ernment as being accountable to local communities and “to encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.”235 
Integration to decision-making in South Africa is largely limited to consultation via 
stakeholder forums. In 1996 a shift had taken place from ad hoc participation to bureau-
cratic, limited participation.236 
The conceptual challenge, according to Pieterse, is to integrate effects of economy, bu-
reaucracy, power and agency.237 The following institutional structures have been intro-
duced to ensure participation: 
a) Representation through council by local government elections and through local ward 
committees as an interface between the community and political representatives. 
b) Neo-corporatist forums such as Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) which require 
local governments to inform and consult communities on development priorities and 
City Development Strategies (CDS). 
c) Partnerships such as Public-Private and Municipal-Community-Partnerships. 
d) Participatory mechanisms aligned to specific services (such as housing). 
Representative forms 
National policy outlines that at local government level there is supposed to be a structure 
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of participatory governance above the formal representative council structures.238 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998) specifies the role of the developmental lo-
cal state to enhance local democracy. Local councillors are required to encourage the par-
ticipation of citizens and community groups in establishing and implementing municipal 
programmes.239 
Since the post-2000 municipal election ward committee structures became a widespread 
model for community participation in local government. They are supposed to be a con-
sultative body and meant to ensure interaction between the community and municipality. 
Reasons for the non-functioning of ward committees can be summarised as a neglect of 
diverse community interests, competition between existing community structures and 
council as well as a lack of consensus on who represents the community. It has been indi-
cated that their performance can be largely defined as dysfunctional and ineffective.240 
“Many of these ward committees have become non-functional or have yet to be formed in the 
first place. We have witnessed, in 2005 in particular, major tensions and protest actions at 
local government level, fuelled in part by the inability of this sphere to effect credible partici-
pation.”241 
Given this context, local government and civil society engagement remains problematic 
as mutual consensus on interventions are almost impossible to achieve.242 
Also, local government was required to fulfil a double democratic responsibility by inte-
grating participation and delivering in terms of RDP objectives. The White Paper ac-
knowledges that opening the development process to participation might cause bargaining 
over resources and strategies. Thus it emphasises that development overrules empower-
ment objectives: 
“[…] the participatory processes must not become an obstacle to development, and narrow 
interest groups must not be allowed to 'capture' the development process. It is important for 
municipalities to find ways of structuring participation which enhance, rather than impede, 
the delivery process.”243 
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The White Paper allows local government to create and structure the participation and 
therefore influence who and how to integrate civil society. 
In an attempt to increase its public outreach, government increasingly convenes public 
hearings (Imbizos). They are criticised for not enabling a structured participation process, 
for being limited to information sharing and for excluding the poor.244 
Further, Local Development Forums (LDFs) were conceptualised to directly represent 
‘people’s power’ and community interest. Later they were reconceptualised as representa-
tive forms of civil society recognising the existing plurality in communities. This also in-
formed ‘community-driven development’ as Local Development Forums were then lim-
ited to advisory bodies and only consulted in terms of prioritising development needs.245 
The report for the African Peer Review puts forward that there are concerns around the ef-
fectiveness of decentralisation for local democracy.246 
Firstly, the legitimacy of development forums is questioned. Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) 
outline that LDFs tend to be dominated by ANC structures in the black urban areas and 
contribute to a co-optation of civil society actors into state structures.247 
Secondly, Mabin (2006) therefore suggests integrating perceptions of the marginalised 
urban population whose “[…] priorities for development may be very different from those 
of councillors and officials”. In reality, however, according to Bettina von Lieres, the 
post-apartheid system has produced a new political exclusion of the marginalised despite 
citizenship rights which are provided.248 
Furthermore, there are concerns around an arrogant mode of leadership. Meintjes (2004) 
asserts that as the ANC has the confidence to remain in power, leaders become distanced 
from people-needs.249 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) even 
warned that the ANC leadership was “drifting towards dictatorship” and that the ANC 
only provides a “low-intensity democracy”.250 
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Neo-corporatist forums in planning 
South African planning practice has shown evidence of both modern and postmodern 
planning ideals. The apartheid state used modern planning concepts for social control 
(“planned oppression”) and enforced the planning ideal through authoritarian measures 
coupled with large public spending. Since the 1980s planning followed the international 
notion of urban management with a focus on effective local government, financial per-
formance and service delivery. This was juxtaposed by the opposition movement which 
resorted to comprehensive planning and power redistribution (“planned emancipation”). It 
demanded institutional changes and new processes and practices of planning particularly 
in terms of participation.251 
At the beginning of the 1990s the ideal of urban reconstruction was largely informed by 
normative planning ideas about the compact city, spatial integration and mixed land 
use.252 Chipkin outlines that, in this context, municipal planning has been understood as 
rational planning to overcome the spatial deficiencies of the apartheid city. The role of 
planners was to make recommendations in terms of realising this planning ideal with the 
use of land-use and zoning plans.253 
There were two key concerns raised with the adoption of a spatial planning approach. 
Firstly, it has been widely questioned whether the compact city, as an urban reconstruc-
tion concept, can be realised when confronted with the power realities which materialised 
in fragmentation and suburbanisation.254 
Secondly, the ambiguity over roles and responsibilities of local government made appar-
ent the need for a strategic and more comprehensive instrument for coordination.255 
Post-modern planning - both neo-rational planning and communicative planning - 
emerged with the introduction of Integrated Development Plans (IDP) in the mid 1990s. 
IDPs were seen as key strategic instruments for planning during the local government 
transition. The plan has a legal status and is supposed to supersede all other local plans. It 
directs resources and activities of a municipality aligned to the five-year local government 
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election period. They became legally binding through an amendment to the Local Gov-
ernment Transition Act (LGTA)256 and Municipal Systems Act (MSA)257 which require all 
local councils to prepare and adopt IDPs. 
Although all municipalities were to prepare a full IDP by March 2002, because of diffi-
culties in strategic planning, alignment with budget and intergovernmental linkage, only a 
few met the deadline.258  
IDPs have been influenced by the international discourse on New Public Management 
(NPM) which was believed to strengthen efficiency in public sector agencies.259 Later 
IDPs were reshaped integrating a notion of planning which incorporates various sectors, 
activities and actors. This is based of an understanding of planning as a coordination 
process to enhance synergy effects.260 
Harrison puts forward, IDPs emphasise concerns for participation, integration and em-
powerment while integrating NPM objectives on service-delivery and performance. They 
require both a collective process in terms of “collaborative planning” and spatial policy-
making to regulate strategic investments and land use.261 
Integration was based on the acknowledgement of interdependence of agents. This has 
built the ground for institutionalising participation and promoting partnerships between 
agents in governance networks. 
One of the key elements of Integrated Development Planning is to involve the local 
stakeholders and integrate the community in the planning process. The objective is to 
identify the needs of the community through a prioritisation process.262 
Mabin criticises the standardisation of the planning process263 and argues that planning 
processes are messier than can be outlined in a manual.264 
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Various authors have pointed out that there is evidence that participation and integration 
of informal networks in the planning process remains limited. They are concerned with 
how to incorporate the diversity of informal networks.265 
Harrison states that in regard to participatory governance, IDPs show mixed and varying 
results. One challenge, he argues, is that it is confronted with a culture of performance 
management which contradicts the need for more flexibility and time within participatory 
processes. 
“The IDP attempts to marry inclusiveness and participation with a largely technocratic man-
agerialism, and top-down control with bottom-up processes.”266 
Moreover, local government had to ensure both participation and alignment with national 
programmes as Integrated Development Plans are dependent on national financial re-
sources and have to be linked with national and regional priorities and programmes.267 
Hence in reality national government supersedes local planning and thereby undermines 
local priorities. Given this context, the IDPs have been perceived as ‘lengthy shopping 
lists’.268 
The City Development Strategy (CDS) methodology exemplifies a further forum for insti-
tutionalised participation. CDS is aligned to the Cities Alliance’s promotion of economic 
development and, according to the critics, exposes a threat of new exclusion and of de-
mobilising civil society actors.269 
Partnerships 
South African academics have outlined that there has been a radical shift from the percep-
tion that local government is responsible for delivery to that municipalities share func-
tions and power with civil society organisations, citizens and the private sector. This re-
quires greater organisational collaboration to form alliances and partnerships with the 
non-state sector in development.270 
Partnerships therefore have appeared between the public and private sector in policy areas 
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such as housing, urban regeneration and infrastructure delivery exemplified by public-
private companies such as the Johannesburg Development Agency (as JDA) and Cape 
Town Partnership. However, some critical observers put forward the constraints question-
ing their effectiveness271 and cautioning that the private sector tends to take over con-
trol.272 
Partnerships with organised civil society are interpreted as an option for resource mobili-
sation. This instrumentalisation of civil society organisations is specifically outlined in the 
White Paper on Local Government: 
“Partnerships with community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations can 
be effective ways of gaining access to external expertise and experience.”273 
Renewed Municipal-Community Partnerships (MCPs) are particularly stressed given the 
fact that delivery is realised largely through informal practices. Since the relationship of 
the poor to local government is characterised by ‘negative engagement”, these resources 
remain untapped.274 
Beyond delivery advantages Municipal-Community Partnerships are simultaneously per-
ceived as enhancing democracy. However, a number of constraints, such as inner-
community conflicts, tensions and mistrust between municipality and community, lack of 
capacity and skills for engagement, hinder meaningful partnership relations. For partner-
ships to work, critics promote a better understanding of the diversity of the civil society 
sector, taking into consideration the existing power imbalances and creating an enabling 
environment. 275 
Participatory mechanisms in housing 
Housing delivery in South Africa was driven by contradicting aims of government to 
promote both community development through the introduction of the People’s Housing 
Process (PHP) and to engage the private sector in low-income housing. The state inter-
preted community participation as self-help in labour-intense work. Jenkins (1999) argues 
that housing delivery did not stimulate community involvement and development. In-
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stead, the state moved away from people-centred development. Jenkins (2002) therefore 
recommends a strengthening of civil society and its role for community development. 
“[…] it is through organisations within civil society that negotiations with the state on set-
tlement upgrading can take place, as well as negotiation at the higher, urban strategy or na-
tional policy-making level”.276 
Khan criticises that the housing policy is mainly about market enablement and integration 
in formal circuits and as an alternative suggests transforming social relations and institu-
tions.277 An entry point according to Khan is presented by decentralised associations: 
“Institutional reform- downsizing and descaling, initially widely criticised, is now believed to 
have had positive effects, leading to the construction and mobilisation of new decentralised 
associations on the boundaries between state and civil society.”278 
Towards multi-tiered relations 
Given the context that institutionalised forms of horizontal governance showed limitations 
(also referred to as the ‘crisis of institutionalisation’279), scholars have shifted recommen-
dations and interest to network forms of governance. They put forward that state-centred 
concepts of governance are not applicable in the South African context. Instead, they sug-
gest shifting from a state-centred focus on institutions to a relational perspective of state 
and society. This is based on an understanding of governance practice which in reality is 
characterised by ‘nodal governance’ and entails a variety of governance outside the 
state.280 
In reality, it is assumed, that African identities are mobile social formations based on mul-
tiple spaces of operation. This mode of ‘becoming’, it is argued, is more creative and pro-
ductive and often embedded in invisible spaces. Urban residents maintain multiple mem-
berships in various associations and participate in formal and informal economies across 
different localities. In terms of governmentality, Gotz and Simone (2003) argue, these 
processes create blind spots for government to determine in advance the interests of a di-
versifying set of actors. 
Current institutionalised governance arrangements and participatory mechanisms con-
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struct particular kinds of citizenship and function as practices of self-improvement and 
self-accountability. They are perceived as inadequate as they may erode less visible prac-
tices through which residents are able to access other activities.281 
Pieterse therefore suggests a relational model to study urban politics and thereby tran-
scend the limited focus on either local government restructuring or on social movements. 
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2.3 Civil society discourse 
2.3.1 The international debate on third sector, social capital and civil society 
In international development policy and practice concepts of third sector, civil society and 
social capital gained popularity. In the development field NGOs were increasingly recog-
nised as representatives of the third sector throughout the 1980s. UN-Habitat promoted 
the cooperation with NGOs already in 1976 at the first Habitat-conference and again at 
Habitat II in 1996282, the World Bank developed a programme for cooperation with Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 1981 and the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) founded the Civil Society Division in 1986.  
This reflects a new understanding of NGOs as development actors. Since the role of the 
state was reduced and poverty increasing, funding was increasingly channelled through 
NGOs as donors were faced with corruption of postcolonial states.283 “[…] NGOs have 
emerged to fill a gap at a time of increasing need and declining institutional “suppliers”.”, 
refer Mitlin.284 
This technocratic-managerial perspective shifted to a broader and political governance 
understanding of civil society organisations in the 1990s. 
“Although most international agencies will be reluctant to admit it, the urban management 
debate has gradually become more political, dealing with issues of power […].”285 
The impact of informal self-help groups for development was recognised which was cou-
pled with a concern about accountability and effectiveness of NGOs. Given this context, 
the term third sector was increasingly avoided. Instead, social capital experienced par-
ticular prominence amongst international development actors. This was aligned to the re-
appearance of poverty reduction as the key objectives in development. The World Bank 
for instance initiated a Social Capital Implementation Framework (SCIF) and became in-
terested in the practical relevance of the concept for its operations. The assumption was 
that social capital represents a resource for improving government performance.286  
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With this shift came an empowerment agenda by the mid 1990s. The discourse of civil 
society was concerned with its radical role for social transformation and creating new re-
lationships between the poor and the state. Scholars stressed the significance of these ac-
tors for development alternatives. 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the new millennium the poverty reduction focus again 
reduced civil society organisations to development actors conforming to a reformist no-
tion of intervention alternatives (“big D” Development) as opposed to a systemic alterna-
tive notion of development as a process of structural change (“little d” development).287 
There are various discourses whether concepts of third sector, social capital and civil so-
ciety are applicable in the development context. A general concern is whether they should 
be interpreted as an imposition of Western concepts aligned to the promotion of neo-
liberal policies or if they constitute a progressive development of democracy and empow-
erment. 
Third sector 
The term third sector was formed at the beginning of the 1970s in the US context. The 
third sector was clearly differentiated from market and state. It included all formal organi-
sations which take over tasks which neither market nor state fulfilled.288 
Focus of interest in third sector research was the organisational structure of volunteer as-
sociations and their comparative advantages of performance. Furthermore, the third sector 
was also contributed an intermediary role between the public and state. Its meso level 
functions, it is assumed, also comprises advocacy, the articulation of needs and represen-
tation of interest. Thereby direct relations between the citizen and the state and market 
shift to indirect relations.289  
Thus third sector research and practice shows a predominant interest in organisational 
structure and performance assuming and promoting an apolitical nature of third sector or-
ganisations. 
With regard to the relevance of third sector concepts scholars critically point out that out-
side the Western-centric model of a third sector other intermediary forms exist such as lo-
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cal self-organisation, ethnic groups or patron-client systems. All in all intermediary func-
tions are transmitted by a wide range of structures which articulate, filter and concentrate 
needs and interests vis-à-vis policy formulation and participate in its enforcement.290 
Also, the apolitical position was unrealistic particularly in a context of poor neighbour-
hoods where they unavoidably work in politicised conditions.291 
Social capital 
The social capital discourse derived from sociological theory in the early 20th century. A 
prominent differentiation was offered by Bourdieu who distinguished three forms of capi-
tal (economic, cultural and social capital). Social capital, according to Bourdieu, is de-
fined as resources which are achieved through social networks.292 Whereas Bourdieu ap-
plies the concept in order to critically reflect on inequalities in society, a more normative 
strain gained momentum in the US debate in the 1990s293: An influential approach for po-
litical science is based on Putnam’s concept of ‘Making Democracy Work’ (1993). Social 
capital, according to Putnam, comprises trust, networks and norms. It determines success 
or failure of policy implementation. Putnam’s work exposes a link to the civil society and 
third sector discourse as he stresses the democratic value of collective social capital. Lack 
of social capital - characteristic for individualism and limited social networks in modern 
societies - increases transaction costs within society, according to the assumption. He 
thereby highlighted the significance of associations, participation and the intermediary 
sphere. Later social capital research referring to Putnam shifted analysis from collective to 
individual social capital and thereby distanced from civil society concepts.294 
Critical reviews of Putnam’s concept argued that social capital is not normatively as good 
as assumed.295 Moreover, Bak and Askvik (2005) argue that there is a paradox between 
trust and democracy. According to the authors a democratic system has to institutionalise 
distrust through the principle of legitimacy.296 The normative value of social capital has 
also been questioned in the development context. A general concern is that the normative 
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understanding of social capital disregards the fluidity of social capital and structural fac-
tors in emerging democracies.297 Further, Mitlin (1999) for instance suggests that social 
capital can facilitate links to government (based on trust), however, the purpose of links is 
left open (can also be used by regimes).298 Also Robins questions the ‘civic virtue’ of so-
cial capital. Robins criticises the normative conception of social capital as it “[…] fails to 
acknowledge the embeddedness of local hierarchies and patronage networks”. Moreover, 
he stresses that what is perceived as ‘good social capital’ is determined by the state 
(which can suppress one form of social capital and support another).299 
Civil society 
Zimmer and Freise (2008) argue that the concept of civil society offers a framework to in-
tegrate both micro-level social capital and meso-level third sector research (see figure 
2.7). 
 
Fig. 2.7: Civil society as an encompassing concept, Source: adapted from Zimmer and Freise (2008), p.29. 
Civil society and third sector research refer to the same phenomenon in society: The in-
termediary level of social organisation. However, while discourses on civil society and 
social capital focus on democracy theoretical problems, third sector discourses are inter-
ested in the performance and while civil society and third sector discourses focus on vol-
unteer associations and organisational structure, social capital research is more interested 
in collective and individual networks. 
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The concept of civil society derives from pluralistic systems of Western societies. It has 
experienced a renaissance since the end of the Cold War. The civic movements of the 
1970s in Eastern Europe, the new social movements in the 1980s and the emergence of an 
international civil society were interpreted as the “[…] re-entry of civil society in political 
discourse”300. Civil society is broadly defined as the intermediary space between state and 
society.301 The social science discourse focused on the relevance of civil society actors in 
the transformation process and the significance of civil society in Western liberal democ-
racies.302 It was further dealt with in globalisation discourses reinforced by global tenden-
cies of increased social inequality and deficiencies of the nation state. This discourse has 
lead to a re-emergence of political and democracy-related theoretical concepts of the in-
terrelation between civil society and the state.  
Limitations of representative democracy and steering of society resulted in a normative 
understanding of civil society to fulfil an intermediation role between state and society 
and to deepen democracy. This aspect of civicness is entailed in the definition of civil so-
ciety: 
“Civil societies are non-violent entities, capable of intensive discourse and able to reach 
consensus by means of discussions.”303 
In the development field Mitlin uses the following definition: 
“”Civil society” is used as an all-embracing term for voluntary associations between the 
state and individual citizens and their families. As such, the definition includes non-
government organizations, non-profit associations, informal organizations addressing public 
interest issues and self-help groups and associations.”304 
In the development discourse the civil society concept seemed paradoxal since this het-
erogeneous space of intermediary organisations could only be relevant as long as it con-
trols resources independently of the state. Neubert (1992) argued that the poor are ex-
cluded from formation processes of a civil society and Thiery (1992) put forward that 
self-help organisations remain politically irrelevant as they concentrate on survival. 
By the end of the 1990s research focused on collective action of the urban poor and the 
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role of grassroots organisations as intermediaries to the formal world. This links the de-
velopment discourse to democratic concerns. As Post and Baud (2002) postulate: 
“In fact, this is the debate where the public management perspective and the people-centred 
perspective in urban development studies meet.”305 
Törnquist (2002) for instance focuses on how to link democratisation with development 
efforts and suggests an alternative conceptualisation of ‘substantial democratisation’.306 
2.3.1.1 NGOs as the interface between third sector and civil society 
The term NGO was first used by international organisations embracing all organisations 
outside government. This catch-all application was criticised by scholars as it lacks char-
acteristics outside its negative definition and thereby comprises a wide range of different 
organisational structures.307 
The development discourse adopted the term NGO for organisations which outside, or in 
cooperation with the state, took over development tasks (also referred to as Non-
Governmental Development Organisations). Mitlin defines NGOs as: 
“NGOs are defined as professional, non-profit, non-membership intermediary organizations 
that are independent of the state and which undertake a range of activities in order to further 
development.”308 
The experience of global interrelated problems has stimulated the emergence of an ‘inter-
national civil society’ characterised by NGOs entering in international policy arenas. It is 
argued that globalisation has influenced NGOs which have become actors on multiple 
levels with multiple linkages.309 More recently also locally based NGOs from the Global 
South are representing their constituencies in international arenas. 
Particularly the reorientation of development policy in the 1990s resulted in declarations 
and programmes such as Habitat II and Agenda 21 appreciating NGOs as the bearer of 
hope or a ‘magic bullet’ followed by numerous studies on their evolution and perform-
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ance in development aid.310 
The reason for the rise of NGOs was related to the post cold war ‘New Policy Agenda’: In 
the face of criticism of the state-driven development aid NGOs received recognition sup-
plementing or complementing state tasks. Development policy thereby followed neolib-
eral trends to shift state tasks to other non-state actors. 
‘Non-Governmental Organisation’ (NGO) is a loose term which, depending on the theo-
retical perspective, holds different definitions. Furthermore, NGOs were both interpreted 
as a third sector between market and state or from a civil society perspective as an expres-
sion of an emerging civil society.  
From a third sector perspective NGOs function as a formal and modern form of self-
coordination outside state and market coordination.311 NGOs are seen as being double 
embedded (“doppelter gesellschaftlicher Anschluss”) in society towards the recipients and 
towards the supporter.312 This intermediary position distinguishes them from self-help or-
ganisations and government.313 
Uphoff argues that the characterisation of NGOs as a ‘third sector’ is incorrect as the in-
stitutional space between public and private sector belongs to people’s associations and 
membership organisations. Uphoff puts forward that the difference lies in the way to 
whom these institutions are accountable. As most NGOs are service organisations they are 
not accountable to members.314 
Fowler (2002) stresses, that the three sector separation is not useful for analysing Non-
Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs). They integrate characteristics of 
state, market and civil society and therefore are anchored in civil society without belong-
ing to it. Instead he suggests a fourth position to NGDOs which is grounded in ethics and 
values and provides the competence to interact and mediate between state, market and 
civil society. According to Fowler, linkages are two-ways:  towards the state they are 
characterised as policy influence and watchdog in return for demand for legitimacy and 
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accountability. Relationships to civil society are characterised by NGDOs receiving le-
gitimacy and accountability and resources through grassroots, in exchange for innova-
tions, articulation of interests, mediation and negotiation.315 
From a civil society perspective NGOs cannot be distinguished from the state and market 
as a third sector. The argument is that boundaries are much more fluid and NGOs there-
fore cannot be understood as integral to civil society. Instead it was argued to differentiate 
between policy-oriented and operational NGOs although being acknowledged that in real-
ity mostly mixed forms dominate.316  
The central argument is that NGOs could only be understood through their relationships 
to social movements and other social arrangements.317 NGOs in this context can function 
as cores of movement networks referred to as ‘movement organisations’. This constitutes 
an interface between new social movement research (in civil society discourse) and re-
search on non-profit organisations (in third sector research).318  
Some scholars argue that NGOs are dualistic in themselves since they are required to take 
on informal structural elements of social movements and to include elements of organisa-
tions such as formal rules, inclusion of members and control mechanisms. Stucke con-
cludes that this exposes them to the dilemma of combining formal and informal organisa-
tional structures in order to be capable of acting vis-à-vis formal organisations and their 
membership base.319 
Comparative advantages of NGOs 
The comparative advantages credited to NGOs entail numerous assumptions about their 
relation to the target group, knowledge of local conditions, potential for mobilising self-
help and self-initiative, facilitating participation, commitment and motivation, trust and 
acceptance by the community, long-term engagement, non-bureaucratic flexibility and 
cost efficiency.320 
Comparative advantages are increasingly critically reviewed: Central questions emerged 
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around their independence, their orientation towards the media and neoliberal agenda, 
their impact on reducing mobilisation capacity, the growth of uncontrollable networks and 
their legitimacy.321 
The shifting NGO discourse can be summarised as follows322: 
a) In order to scale up impact from localised projects to systems, support was extended to 
institutional development and advocacy of NGOs.323 
b) By scaling-up NGOs became more dependent on donor budgets. This resulted in ques-
tions about their performance, accountability and relations with funding sources. There-
fore performance monitoring and accountability were increasingly promoted (see figure 
2.8).324 
c) NGOs were increasingly questioned as agents for democratisation.325 Instead it was 
feared that they disempower other civil society organisations. As a result, the focus 
shifted towards ‘radical’ empowerment methods. NGOs were promoted to also work out-
side the aid system and to lobby for restructuring of the aid system. In the 1990s the shift 
to ‘good governance’ gave NGOs access to policy processes.326 
d) By the end of the 1990s the democratisation efforts were contrasted by a changing 
global context. The shift towards a poverty reduction agenda (MDGs) resulted in chang-
ing donor priorities aligned to a return of a delivery focus. Central criticism regarding 
these shifts is that the increased aid flow to NGOs depoliticises the sector, negatively af-
fects the relationship between NGOs and social movements and marginalises smaller 
NGOs with no capacity to deal with bureaucracy.327 
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Fig. 2.8:  NGOs in the aid chain, Source: adapted from Fowler (2002b), p. 294. 
e) Since 2000 the question has shifted to whether NGOs are still existent. This question 
was posed by Bebbington et al (2008) against the normative understanding that NGOs 
have to offer an alternative to the dominant development model. In the context of neolib-
eralism, aid agenda and survival needs of organisations, the authors therefore asked if 
NGOs could still practice alternatives. Although NGO scope for action was constrained, 
the authors indicated that horizontal relationship between NGOs and movements, a criti-
cal role of NGOs in public debates and a role of NGOs to facilitate the space for interac-
tion between grassroots and the state, constitute new ways of ‘alternative’ development 
practice.328 
f) Further, they note a trend towards a ‘new’ security agenda (‘Global War on Terror’) 
which links issues of security to development. As a result aid flows become aligned to the 
security strategy. It thereby limits an alternative or counter-hegemonic position of NGOs. 
The understanding that external structural changes have impacted the NGO agenda, has 
particular relevance since the development discourse also shifted to urban development 
related problems. Since the Habitat II conference in 1996 a broad range of reports and 
studies refer to the urban context as the new entry point for development initiatives. 
Service delivery was particularly criticised for taking over state functions and undermin-
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ing the critical role of civil society organisations. Fowler (2002) argues that NGDOs need 
to reconceptualise delivery as the tool to leverage systemic changes. Learning for leverage 
has become the new mandate and strategy by NGOs (see figure 2.9). 
“In other words, the immediate shift needed in NGDO thinking is to learn in order to apply 
leverage on others […].”329 
 
Fig. 2.9: Shift in NGDO strategies and roles, Source: adopted from Fowler (2002c), p. 354. 
NGO Typologies 
The term NGO embraces a wide range of different forms of organisations. Concepts vary 
on how to categorise NGOs.330 A general differentiation is made between NGOs focusing 
on cultural issues from those active in the development context. The latter are referred to 
as Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs).331 
A further differentiation in the development context is made between civil society organi-
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sations in the Global North or South based on the fact that Northern NGOs might work in 
the South but at the same time they are embedded in the Western civil society.332  
Typologies according to the type of activity and function333 appeared not to be a practica-
ble typology for empirical research. Korten instead suggested an evolutionary model of 
NGOs to illustrate the transition from relief and welfare (first generation) to local self-
help (second generation) to changes in institutions and policies (third generations) to or-
ganisations which develop alternative development strategies.334 
The evolutionary model was applied in various contexts and described, for instance, how 
African NGOs transcended from colonial Christian welfare organisation to second or third 
generation NGOs in the 1990s. 335  
However, certain pitfalls appeared as NGO transition does not appear in phases but is 
rather a steady expansion of their field of activity.336 Moreover, scholars showed evidence 
that there is no linear progression as NGOs move back and forth along Kortens typol-
ogy.337 
Further criticisms concerning the evolutionary model put forward that it would be diffi-
cult to empirically relate to the ideal typology.338 Instead, a continuum of NGO method-
ologies is suggested which can, but not necessarily have to emerge in progressive process 
over time.339 
A different approach was made by not focusing on the NGO activity or evolution, but on 
their embeddedness in society.340 Glagow stresses that NGO performance is based on 
solidarity and not on state or market mechanisms.341 He differentiates the solidarity con-
tribution between the one from society and the one which goes into society. This process 
he defines as double embeddedness in society.342 
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Based on this concept Neubert (1992) developed four ideal types of civil society organisa-
tions which combine the criteria of the kind of activity and the beneficiary of activity:343 
- articulation of interests of members: lobbying  
- articulation of interests of non-members: advocacy 
- support function for members: self-help 
- support function for non-members: service and welfare 
Concerning NGOs Neubert (1994) only counts those organisations as NGOs which have a 
primary orientation towards the common good (outside help) and excludes those organisa-
tions which have a primary orientation towards self-interest (self-help). NGOs can there-
fore be differentiated between service or advocacy NGOs.344 
For NGDOs in the urban context a further differentiation is offered by Aina (1997) be-
tween urban-based organisations and organisations with a focus on urban development. 
Mitlin stresses that whilst many organisations are urban-based only a small proportion 
have a focus on urban development issues (such as housing).345 Arrossi et al (1994) dis-
tinguish community (services and empowerment) and city level (influencing policy and 
practices) activities.346 Mitlin stresses that many NGOs do both recognising the comple-
mentarity of activities at both levels.347 
2.3.1.2 Grassroots Organisations 
Grassroots Organisations (GROs), also referred to as Community-Based Organisations 
(CBOs), are defined as: 
“Grassroot organizations are membership organizations which are also independent of the 
state. As membership organizations, the risks, costs and benefits are shared among the mem-
bers, and the leadership may be called to account by members. Most are non-profit although 
some operate as cooperative commercial enterprises. Many are informal and operate as 
loose associations.”348 
With increased criticism of NGO legitimacy and accountability and the rise of ‘good gov-
ernance’ principles related to social capital/ empowerment of local communities, Grass-
                                                 
343 See Neubert (1992), pp. 30f. 
344 See Neubert (1994), p. 195. 
345 See Mitlin (1999). 
346 See Arrossi et al (1994), pp. 48-50. 
347 See Mitlin (1999), p. 29. 
348 Mitlin (1999), p. 5. 
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roots Organisations entered the international development field. Whereas NGOs were 
perceived as more accountable to their donors (‘upward’), GROs were seen as being more 
accountable to members (‘downward’).349 
Local organisations, it is assumed, are more needs based and flexible to meet the chal-
lenges of (urban) poor households. Bottom-up community initiatives were therefore per-
ceived as the new approach to building sustainable urban settlements.350 The UN Millen-
nium Project Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers particularly promotes 
that slum dwellers and their organisations must be recognised and engaged with as devel-
opment partners.351 International agencies thus focused on capacity development and em-
powerment of local actors as an important component of community development (see 
chapter 2.1.2).352 
The relevance of GROs for poverty reduction and civicness has been critically reflected. 
The ‘Global Report on Human Settlements 2003’ outlines that there is a tendency in ide-
alising community cohesion neglecting the heterogeneity and conflict in grassroots groups 
as well as their at times undemocratic structures and practices. Moreover, despite all part-
nership rhetoric, the report stresses that poor communities have few bargaining power.353 
Dreier provides some answers to the two limitations: With regard to community fragmen-
tation, he stresses the significance of grassroots to change attitudes within the entire 
community beyond single interests. Bargaining constraints, he argues, can be solved by 
intermediary institutions and horizontal relationships and learning.354 
“Thanks in part to the work of these intermediary institutions, community-based development 
organizations have become increasingly sophisticated in terms of finance, construction, man-
agement, and other key functions. This has been accomplished […] by enabling groups to 
learn from one another, build on one another’s successes, and form partnerships and coali-
tions.”355 
                                                 
349 See Edwards/Hulme (1996b), p. 11; UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 151. 
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In the development context the call to support Grassroots Organisations was accompanied 
by advising these organisations to build collective bargaining power beyond the commu-
nity level and to access support outside local government.356 Thus research has increas-
ingly taken a combined governance and collective action perspective. 
Mitlin refers to three activity options for grassroots within development: using existing 
opportunities, challenging the present opportunities or challenging the system.  
By using the existing opportunities Grassroots Organisations build up social relationships 
with external actors to ensure resource allocation (e.g. land). These relationships can ex-
pose the problem of patronage (by local politicians and state officials). Furthermore, the 
dependency on leaders can cause low motivation to be involved and active by residents.357 
With regard to successfully challenging the present opportunities Mitlin refers to the In-
dian alliance of the NGO Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), 
Mahila Milan and the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation. Through its link with the 
grassroots SPARC gained credibility with policy-makers and succeeded in being involved 
in policy-making. Other examples for grassroots participation in policy-making are joint 
decision-making boards or participatory budgeting processes. Mitlin puts forward that all 
these forms of integration have been criticised for low participation and exclusion of the 
poorest parts of society. She therefore concludes that: 
“[…] policy changes (at the city, province and national level) are possible but they may be 
limited and implementation of the desired changes maybe difficult. Moreover, the poorest and 
most vulnerable community members do not participate equally and are often unrepre-
sented.”358 
Finally, challenging the system can be achieved by either claim-making or alternative de-
velopment practices by Grassroots Organisations. The latter includes the transformation 
of relationships between the poor and the state as part of a more radical grassroots agenda.  
Typology of Grassroots Organisations 
There is a limited general overview on Grassroots Organisations. Mitlin stresses these or-
ganisations are prevalent in urban areas. They have very diverse types of organisations. A 
common characteristic, according to Mitlin, is that these organisations coexist in local set-
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357 See Mitlin (1999), p. 47. 
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tlements and that many have evolved through collective need. They therefore engage in a 
wide field of activities which Mitlin subsumes to land, infrastructure and services, hous-
ing and income generation.359 UN-Habitat (2003) distinguishes two common types of 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs):  
a) Local development associations representing the entire community, and 
b) Interest associations representing specific groups.360  
2.3.1.3 New social movements 
Internationalisation and the connection between global and local problems required a new 
organisational and structural approach to enable action at diverse levels. Thus interest was 
drawn to New Social Movements (NSM) and their relational logic. The rise of their trans-
national networks was consequently interpreted as a reaction to globalisation.361 
New social movement theory and research are very diverse and concentrate on various 
aspects.362 A particular interest is in the analysis of networks, interaction with the political 
and administrative system363 and political opportunity structures364. This focus obviously 
exposes an extended overlap to governance research.  
Urban social movements are hardly covered in new social movement theory,365 although 
in the 1960s the urban space as a location of conflict and of alternative civil society, gave 
rise to Neo-Marxist accounts of urban social movements. Urban studies tried to explain 
the dynamics of urban growth by locational and infrastructural needs (consumption). Cas-
tells, in his work ‘The Urban Question’ argued that cities are products of capitalist proc-
esses. 366 Later, in ‘The City and the Grassroots’ (1983), he took into account that urban 
social movements emerge as powerful non-class alliances around collective consumption 
issues.367 The assumption was that political action can modify some constraints of capital-
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361 See Klein (2000), pp. 320f; Klein (2001), pp. 319f; Appadurai (2000), p. 23. 
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isms. Irrespectively whether this can be taken as a ‘radical departure’368 from his earlier 
Marxist analysis or as an adaptation of urban social movement theory369, it essentially 
means a rapprochement to Lefebvre who argued that space is a social construct370by ac-
knowledging the importance of collective identity creation. 
Parker stresses the relevance of urban movements in a globalising context: “[…] as urban 
activists begin to act locally they also start to think globally.”371 This understanding of 
movements also indicates a trajectory from a micro level activity to macro level activism. 
According to local political studies the integration of social movement organisations to 
municipal programmes has however harnessed their ‘reform energy’372. On the other 
hand, the expanded urban polity increases the opportunities for movement input. There-
fore, Mayer (1998) concludes, that proactive movements which are integrated into gov-
ernance arrangements, are “contradictory and complex agents”. 
“They have to deal with the new fragmentation within the movement sector as well as with 
massive marginalization and social disintegration processes characteristic of urban life.”373 
2.3.1.4 The rise of civil society networks and alliances 
Discourses on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Grassroots Organisations 
(GROs) and social movements reveal their interdependence in matters of policy reform. 
NGOs need GROs to work on micro level and to gain legitimacy. GROs overcome their 
lack of accountability to donors through NGOs.  
“[…] CBOs frequently require the support of NGOs or other CBOs if they are to develop and 
implement strategies that build their power base and maximise their access to resources.”374 
Therefore, the focus of interest shifted to alliances between grassroots, intermediary 
NGOs and others. In the urban sector field NGO networks such as Habitat International 
Coalition (HIC) or horizontal networks between GROs and alliances with NGOs under 
the umbrella of Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) are prominent examples. 
Various scholars focused on the integration, effectiveness and accountability of multior-
                                                 
368 See Ward/McCann (2006), p. 192. 
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373 Mayer (1998), p. 75. 
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ganisational alliances. Their complexity has been analysed in terms of how interests, par-
ticipation and power are balanced among members. Competing interests between different 
actors within alliances and problems of organisational structures have been outlined as 
key challenges.375 
Wallace et al (2007) argue that donors are increasingly encouraging alliances and net-
works both between the donors and NGOs376 as well as between NGOs and organisations 
and movements at grassroots level.  
Hulme (2008) argues that the NGOs and grassroots present rather fluidity of analytical 
boundaries: 
“Defining NGOs and precisely separating them from social movements may be less impor-
tant than exploring the relationships between entities that seem to have NGO or social-
movement characteristics.”377 
The relationships between NGOs and grassroots are characterised as manipulative: NGOs 
seek to legitimise their advocacy work on the one hand and local leaders seek to access 
NGO resources on the other. NGOs primarily work through leaders and only establish 
giver/recipient relations to the community itself. This results in a lack of clear understand-
ing of community needs.378 
The increased awareness of NGO dependency and domination in alliances has led to al-
ternative approaches by NGOs and grassroots to cooperate. Bolnick outlines that with 
SDI, grassroots determine the kind of partnership. However, grassroots autonomy is 
threatened by the formal context whereby NGOs manage grassroots resources:  
“Having struggled to secure their autonomy as subjects in command of their own struggles, 
they are forced to relinquish this important space and turn professionals into their own gate-
keepers.”379 
2.3.1.5 Interface between civil society and the State 
Interface between state and civil society actors differ (from indifference, market-like ex-
                                                 
375 See for instance Glagow (1992); Fowler (1992); Covey (1996); Kirsch (1994); Herrle/Jachnow/Ley 
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change or cooperation). They are characterised by the constitution of the civil society or-
ganisations and the orientation of the political system. Grindle (1996) names the strategies 
by civil society towards the state from opposition, negotiation, bargaining, substitution of 
state functions, and disengagement.380 
The state can also apply a range of strategies: control and regulation (e.g. by formal regis-
tration), integration, infiltration and cooptation (e.g. by creating financial dependency or 
establishment of quasi NGOs), ouster (e.g. by integrating unions to a political party sys-
tem), disruption (e.g. by using differences/conflicts within member-organisations), coer-
cion and oppression. The choice of strategy is informed by how the state deals with a gen-
eral dilemma: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Grassroots Organisations 
(GROs) contribute to delegitimising the state. Some of them directly question the reliabil-
ity of the state and others indirectly question the legitimacy of the state by taking over 
state responsibilities. Government therefore has either to accept deligitimisation through 
civil society organisations or renounce  using  their resources.381 
Relationships with the state are discussed controversially: The rise of new civil society ac-
tors in governance has resulted in a discourse on their legitimacy and accountability. A 
principle constraint is the democratic deficit caused by exclusionary governance regimes 
(see also chapter 2.2.1). A lack of linkages as well as a tight coupling to the state exposes 
problems for civil society. Benz and Papadopoulos therefore suggest that “[…] a kind of 
loose coupling between democratic institutions and networks would be an adequate solu-
tion.”382 
2.3.1.6 Shack/Slum Dwellers International 
A prominent and widely discussed transnational movement of Grassroots Organisations 
are Slum/ Shack Dwellers International (SDI). Robins (2005) outlines that SDI is referred 
to as ‘grassroots globalisation’. Its networks, according to Robins, “[…] are recognised as 
playing a crucial role in the creation of international civil society representing the needs 
of the poorer 80 percent of the population of the world […].”383 
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The SDI network consists of homeless and landless people’s federations and was 
launched in 1996. In 2006 fifteen federation affiliates were active in countries such as 
Cambodia, India, Namibia, Nepal, South Africa, Thailand and Zimbabwe. It has mobi-
lised two million women and 250,000 families have accessed secure tenure, sanitation and 
impacted policy.384 The SDI approach was developed in India and is based on a common 
understanding of the structural realities which impact the federation members. They share 
the discontent of their living conditions and experience with state, social movements, do-
nors and NGOs. This shared experience represents a catalyst of change, according to Bol-
nick.385 Slum dwellers are confronted with various uncertainties due to their informal 
status. The federation’s approach, also described as ‘rituals’, is a way to cope with the in-
stable situation. The aim is to empower communities by building trust networks of federa-
tions. Thus SDI strongly promotes the building of social capital in order to strengthen the 
negotiation capacities of federations vis-à-vis external agencies. SDI affiliated federations 
are organised in local savings schemes which constitute city-wide and national federation 
networks. Interaction is produced by practicing daily savings and horizontal exchanges 
within and amongst saving schemes. The techniques are advanced by self-enumeration, 
house-modelling and building exercises. Horizontal exchanges enable ways for direct 
learning of these techniques and demonstrate a ‘governance from below’ which consti-
tutes the basis for engagement with the state. Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004) outline: 
“What this suggests is that democracy will not deliver for the urban poor unless they are or-
ganized and have the capacity to identify improved urban development processes; make de-
mands; and develop their own autonomous actions, as well as work with formal agencies (in-
cluding local government, higher levels of government and international agencies).”386 
The spread of federations aligned to SDI attracts notice to both policy-makers387 and re-
searchers388and led to the question of whether they represent new options for responsive 
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governance. Promoters of the SDI model claim that poverty needs to be framed compre-
hensively including voicelessness and powerlessness. Empowerment, they argue, is a 
form of poverty reduction. Thus housing is seen as a means of connecting livelihoods. It 
provides an understanding “[…] that they are part of an urban reality”.389 Promoters stress 
that the SDI model has contributed to an increased collective solidarity and organisation 
of the urban poor. 
Furthermore, Mitlin (1999) argues that alternative development strategies are more inde-
pendent from external support as well as more proactive by setting precedence. SDI seeks 
to find innovative ways to influence public policy. For instance they communicate to gov-
ernment through data collection (referred to as ‘politics of information’).390  
Robins (2005) argues that the practice as a shifting of power and knowledge from the 
state to federations demonstrates the ‘autogovernmentality’of federations. The larger 
transnational networks then function as a “catalyst for cross-cultural reflection”.391 
Concerning its engagement with the state the federation pursues a more collaborative ap-
proach. It outlines mutual interest and acknowledges state deficiencies to provide pro-
poor strategies.392 This ‘Politics of Patience’ (Appadurai, 2001) is criticised for its non-
confrontational engagement with the state. Representatives from right-based or radical 
democratic approaches argue that the federation’s ‘feel-good’ organising ignores local 
corruption and the need for confrontational politics.393 Satterthwaite (2006) instead main-
tains that the federations refuse informal payments and use various engagement tactics 
comprising also protest.  
“The general impression is of a fast game of ice hockey, with players constantly tumbling in 
and out of the most active roles in response to shifting needs and game plans.”394  
Furthermore, since the federations experienced that confrontation has often not resulted in 
benefits, they prioritise partnerships and negotiations with government. Satterthwaite 
stresses: 
“[…] developing less antagonistic relationships with city government […] is central to re-
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ducing this vulnerability. As the slum and shack dwellers’ federations have recognized, it can 
also build a new basis for “slum” policies.”395 
A further critique is concerned with its democratic value. Appadurai argues that the fed-
erations reflect the meaning of ‘deep democracy’ as they direct their own development, 
engage with outside key actors and build-up a horizontal solidarity-network. Thus they 
reconstitute citizenship and represent a ‘governmentality from below’. Muller and Mitlin 
(2007) put forward that the federation challenges the governmentality of conventional 
poverty reduction approaches. It decentralises decision-making to autonomous ‘commu-
nity-federated-networks’ and thus extends beyond self-help functions. The building of or-
ganisational capital, it is argued, is key to challenge the state. 
“[…] self-help is not seen as a replacement for government. Rather, it is seen first as a nec-
essary catalyst and then as an ongoing mechanism to safeguard the autonomy of people’s or-
ganizations.”396 
Other scholars are sceptical about the governmentality from below. Appadurai himself 
acknowledges the threat of self-surveillance taking Foucault’s auto-governmentality397 
into account. Swyngedouw, without specifically referring to the federation, argues that the 
state must necessarily respond to actors which withdraw from ‘governance-beyond the 
state’ on multiscalar levels. The seemingly innovative horizontally organised arrange-
ments might just be a “[…] Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates ‘the market’ 
[…].”398 
Muller and Mitlin (2007) argue instead, that the federation practice has strategic and prac-
tical outcomes which are “[…] being used as a platform to avoid Foucauldian governmen-
tality and to build an institution that is accountable and able both to represent its members 
and challenge the higher echelons of state power.” The key to the renewed understanding 
of self-help is not the focus on state provision, but on redistribution of its resources and 
functions to the organised poor.399 
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Particular reference is made by some authors to the enumeration process which tradition-
ally is a mechanism by the state to exercise control and authority. The argument is that by 
own data gathering exercises federation members keep the “locus of learning” in the 
community, construct their own knowledge and control development.400 
2.3.2 Civil society in South Africa 
Civil society in the African context differs from more Western-Eurocentric notions. 
“Prevailing ethnic and kinship structures, the legacy of colonialism, the pattern of economic 
development, and authoritarian forms of political rule gave rise to civil societies that differ 
markedly from the voluntary associational form characteristic of the United States and West-
ern Europe […].”401 
What is characteristic in the South African context is a different application of typolo-
gies402 and terminology with regard to civil society organisations. The South African con-
ceptualisation of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Grassroots Organisations 
(GROs)/ Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) is broadly based on Uphoff’s differen-
tiation between sector of activity and geographic level.403 
Firstly, in South Africa the term ‘Community-Based Organisation’ (CBO) functions as an 
umbrella label and comprises a range of structures such as local NGOs, civic organisa-
tions, stokvels (saving clubs) and cooperatives. However, discussions reveal ambiguity 
about the boundaries of CBOs. What all CBO definitions have in common is the “com-
munity-based” geographic location of the organisations. They differ with regard to other 
characteristics. Whereas Mabin equates the term CBO with the South African term ‘civ-
ics’404, Pieterse (1994) stresses that civics are just one form of community organisation 
under the comprehensive term CBO. He defines CBOs as community organisations that 
have a membership base, elected leadership and are active in a specific geographic 
area.405 Huchzermeyer (2004), however, refers to civic organisations as representative 
committees in contrast to membership-based structures.406 Thus CBOs either also include 
non-membership-based structures or have to be differentiated from civics. 
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Secondly, the South African understanding of NGOs is narrower than the international 
usage of the term. NGOs in South Africa are defined as non-profit service organisations 
with professional and paid staff which provide services to constituencies such as CBOs.407  
The state of civil society in South Africa 
The 1990s in South Africa meant extensive changes for civil society. Previously it was 
characterised and unified by the opposition to the apartheid regime. An important counter-
hegemonic structure was represented by the United Democratic Front (UDF).408 It func-
tioned as a substitute of the ANC which was banned at the time.409 Kößler (1992) takes 
the UDF as a case in point for a civil society from below with overlapping civil society 
structures.410 
The assumption that civil society has a democratic potential, led donors to shift their fund-
ing to civil society in Africa, especially NGOs in advocacy.411 In the 1980s and 90s South 
African NGOs therefore grew on the background of political liberalisation aligned to the 
anti-apartheid movement.412 
In the post-apartheid period the organised structures in civil society had great influence in 
shaping policy. The immediate post-1994 time was perceived as an unprecedented col-
laboration and alliance between state and non-state actors.  
However, Robinson and Friedman note a shift from public participation during the first 
post-apartheid administration to a focus on implementation and therefore decline in struc-
tured engagement since the second post-apartheid administration (1999).413 
With the shift to neoliberal politics in 1996 non-state actors started to address deficiencies 
and showed increasing opposition to privatisation and liberalisation.414 
In the beginning of the 2000s two important research projects were commissioned: one by 
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the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO)415 and another one by the Centre for Civil 
Society (CCS)416. Both reflect different thinking of the role of civil society in South Af-
rica. 
Whereas the CCS report assessed size and shape of civil society, the SANGOCO report 
also focused on values and impact of the sector. The CCS report was based on non-profit 
sector definitions and differentiates NPOs between developmental, survivalist and opposi-
tional. The study indicated that there are about 99,000 non-profit organisations across all 
sectors. More than half (53%) are less formalised community-based associations. The 
study also highlights that many NGOs fail to directly engage with these communities.417 
Pieterse and Meintjies (2004) therefore call for a better understanding of the diversity of 
the sector. They criticise that government and other formal organisations simplify the sec-
tor and neglect to channel resources also to local organisations in marginalised 
neighbourhoods.418 
The SANGOCO report revealed that ordinary citizens are not adequately represented by 
civil society organisations and that the majority of CSOs feel they have insufficient influ-
ence over government. 
Habib and Kotzé (2002) criticised the limitations of both approaches. They see a general 
romanticising of civil society in South Africa based on the anti-apartheid movement. The 
authors feel that NGOs have become implementing agents for government and thus 
caused scepticism from donors and communities. As a result, the civil society sector, ac-
cording to Habib and Kotzé, is fragmented and conflictual.419  
 “A key finding is that while most civil society organisations acknowledge the importance of 
engaging in public policy, few demonstrate a consistent level of direct involvement in the pol-
icy process and fewer still have a significant impact on policy outcomes.”420  
Social capital also gained prominence in the South African discourse. Research was un-
dertaken by the University of the Witwatersrand through a SIDA421-funded project (‘De-
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mocracy and Social Capital in Segmented Societies’). Harrison (2002) outlines that refer-
ence to social capital is made in South African policy (e.g. in the White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998) but has not been translated into practice. She argues that social capital 
could be a useful resource for local government. However, she puts forward that Putnam’s 
concept of social capital (see chapter 2.3.1) needs to be reconfigured in the South African 
context. Harrison feels that social capital in South Africa is illustrated by informal sur-
vival or coping mechanisms in the absence of local government delivery. To build on this 
existing social capital as a development resource, the author recommends, local govern-
ment should first of all gain an understanding of its citizenry and proactively identify op-
portunities for interaction and relations between state and society.422 
Later a Norwegian-South African research partnership focused on trust relationships in 
South Africa. The collection of empirical studies edited by Askvik and Bak (2005) analy-
ses the trust between citizens and public institutions. A key outcome was that distrust 
from the apartheid era continues and lack of trust characterises the interactions between 
citizens and public institutions. Moreover, non-delivery on promises being made (around 
land, housing or services) by the political leadership has contributed to increased distrust 
of the new government.423 
“[…] the findings point to the importance of efficient and effective service delivery by public 
institutions and their role-bearers in generating experiential trust among the public.”424 
Further, Robins argues that social capital is not always normatively good and moreover 
left open to interpretation. He illustrates that the perception of poor communities in South 
Africa shifted from a normatively good to a negative connotation of social capital and 
community solidarity in the context of dysfunctional, violence and crime-ridden commu-
nities and patronage networks.425  
In 2005 a discussion paper by Robinson and Friedman summarised results of a research 
project on the contribution of civil society organisations to democratisation in Africa. 
With regard to the characteristics of South African civil society organisations the authors 
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point out the following finding426:  
a) Less than 10% of civil society organisations (CSOs) are engaged in empowerment 
and promotion of democracy and participation. 
b) The majority of CSOs are urban-based. 
c) CSOs reflect social cleavages and are mostly middle-class. 
d) CSOs are mostly exclusionary for poor and unemployed. 
e) Few CSOs have achieved important policy influence. 
f) Mass membership or internal democracy are not pre-requisites for policy influence 
but are helpful for resource mobilisation and leadership accountability. 
g) A close proximity to the state can have contradictory effects. 
h) CSOs depend on internally generated resources receiving income via membership 
fees or private donations. 
Robinson and Friedman put forward that few civil society organisations have a stable 
level of involvement and few make a difference to policy outcomes. Instead the internal 
governance of CSOs to empower citizens and their relationship to the state are more deci-
sive factors. The authors therefore promote to differentiate democratic influence between 
a) direct policy influence and b) enhancing democratic practices: 
“Its capacity to offer citizens a say in decisions and to enhance pluralism may be as impor-
tant as the ability to influence decision-making and demand accountability from state ac-
tors.”427 
Pieterse argues that civil society should not be used to explain their democratic value but 
as a sociological and descriptive concept to study collective practices and interactions 
which intend to pursue group interests vis-à-vis the state. He therefore calls for an empiri-
cal understanding of social patterns and argues:  
“The value of civil society as a conceptual construct is first and foremost to help us under-
stand better what is actually going on and, secondarily, how social dynamics can be shaped 
to advance more equitable and socially just policies.”428 
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Jenkins (2002) also takes a broader perspective on African civil society. He stresses that 
in contrast to Europe two forms of public realms prevail: one dominated by a state elite, 
the other traditional based on ethnic or religious horizontal ties. Jenkins’s criticism is that 
by predominantly funding formal institutions such as NGOs the international donor com-
munity misses to tapping into the potential of the other part of horizontally aligning civil 
society.429 
2.3.2.1 Changing role of NGOs in South Africa 
In South Africa NGOs were interpreted as a vehicle for the development of civil society 
embedded in an anti-apartheid identity. The civic movement’s resistance was supported 
by progressive planning academics and professionals who founded Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) by the mid to late 1980s such as Planact in Johannesburg, the Built 
Environment Support Group (BESG) in Durban and the Development Action Group 
(DAG) in Cape Town. At the time the number and size of these urban sector organisations 
increased due to international funding.430 Hundsdörfer (1994) outlines the dilemma for 
NGOs at the time to provide professional competence and thereby threatening self-
organisation and empowerment of civics.431  
Harrison (2001) refers to the connection between the planning NGOs and the civic 
movements as a ‘progressive planning movement’.432 He stresses their role for shaping of-
ficial policy in the post-1994 democratic elections and for discussing local government 
and planning issues.433 
Since the mid 1990s structural changes affected NGOs with staff moving over to govern-
ment and with decreasing international donor funding. NGOs at the time were forced to 
commercialise their activities434  or reduce staff and activities if not to close down. Beck 
and Demmler (2000) assert NGOs became the losers in the transition.435 
Pieterse puts forward that the professionalisation, which was induced by donor funding, 
led to hierarchical organisational structures of NGOs. Instead he promotes more horizon-
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tal structures as nodal points which would allow decentralisation and flows of information 
(see figure 2.10).436 
 
Fig. 2.10: Re-conceptualisation from a hierarchical to a decentralised NGO structure 
Source: Pieterse (1995), p. 17. 
Moreover, the political changes in 1994 implied that NGOs had to reposition themselves 
in their relation to state and society.  
“It is only by ensuring that there is a strong civil society, and by co-operation between the 
state, CBOs and NGOs, that the development challenges facing South Africa can be ade-
quately tackled.”437 
Urban sector NGOs shifted from an exclusive advocacy role to a development and sup-
port role of community organisations in housing development. For them the projects rep-
resented a vehicle to increase community empowerment. 
In 2000 there were between 2000 – 20,000 active NGOs. The NGO sector represented the 
second largest employer in the country.438 In the development discourse two key concerns 
were revealed: in how far do NGOs represent the values of those they claim to represent 
and to whom are they accountable?  
The various research reports on the state of civil society in South Africa outlined that it is 
mostly the urban middle class represented in NGOs, whereas the urban poor remain ex-
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cluded. The recommendation by many was therefore to focus on the community level for 
representation of local interests.439 
The collaboration with the state resulted in a dilemma for NGOs how they could play a 
role in political opposition whilst cooperating with the state. The close ties to government 
allowed a degree of policy influence. However, when government became more interested 
in implementation, NGOs “[…] were caught between their role as contracted agents to 
implement programmes and their accountability to their constituents”.440 
2.3.2.2 The role of the grassroots in South Africa 
Huchzermeyer differentiates between two types of community organisations concerned 
with everyday development issues: Firstly, civic organisations as representative and 
elected committees which are active in entire settlements and organised in smaller struc-
tures (in block and street committees). Secondly, membership-based structures repre-
sented by the Federation aligned to Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI). The latter 
presents local structures based on daily saving practices (see chapter 2.3.2).441 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) have a strong tradition in South Africa as they 
had a leading role in the anti-apartheid struggle. Jenkins (2001) stresses that the resistance 
against removals and awareness of social issues led to a transition from community level 
to wider social movements.442 Smit (2001) puts forward that this influenced the emer-
gence of a specific political CBO type as ‘organisations of resistance’ in the early 1980s 
known as civic associations. These were democratically elected organisations which func-
tioned both as Grassroots Organisation and part of the liberation civic movement.443 
Smit (2001) contradicts the general assumption that civics were representative of the ex-
isting diversity within the entire community. Nevertheless, many scholars agree that the 
leadership of civic associations was recognised and accountable to the communities. Their 
lack of legitimacy was perceived as secondary in the aim to unify against apartheid.444 
Since non-whites did not have access to government their self-organising structures and 
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collective practices of bargaining and disobedience substituted government and repre-
sented alternative power structures in many communities.445  
With the political changes since the 1990s government negotiated with civic associations 
in local forums.446 Mabin argues that the civic movement faced difficulties in influencing 
discussions due to the increasing expertise and time needed to participate in the forums.447  
In 1992 civics formed the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). They 
had to fundamentally redefine their role either as ‘watchdogs’ or development agents. 
Many civics shifted from lobbying activity to community-based non-profit organisations 
with a development focus.448 
SANCO adopted a centralised, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure. This setup was 
criticised for a lack of democratic elements and for excluding local branches from deci-
sion-making. Leadership struggles and co-optation by government finally led to a de-
creased role of civics.449 
After the first democratic local elections in 1995-1996 the role of civic associations fur-
ther complicated. They were either integrated in institutionalised participation systems 
(development forums) or sought to become autonomous.450 
Alexander regrets the roll-back of civic structures as the basis for grassroots democratic 
practices and indicates that new social movements might be able to recall these practices 
as a learning platform.451 For Swilling (1998) the decreased role of civics has a positive 
aspect as it allowed a return of local associations and an emergence of new independent 
structures as “[…] indications that a new and diverse civil society is emerging.”452 
Pieterse suggests using the opportunity to re-conceptualise hierarchical community-based 
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structures to horizontal structures (see figure 2.11).453 
 
Fig. 2.11: Re-conceptualisation from traditional to horizontal structures of CBOs 
Source: Pieterse (1994), p.16 
One prominent new structure was represented by the Federation groups. They constituted 
self-organised Grassroots Organisations with a development focus. In contrast to civic as-
sociations these grassroots were women-driven, non-political, with a voluntary member-
ship, and a housing delivery focus (see table 2.11). 
 Civics Federation 
Issues and inter-
ests 
Civics mobilised around local socio-
economic demands as front against 
apartheid 
Federation seek to realise socio-
economic demands within new democ-
ratic political context 
History Emergence through local context of op-
pression 
Inspiration from international discourse 
Political context Affiliation with ANC through SANCO Political autonomy: Loosely connected 
network of autonomous local groups 
Organisational 
form 
Hierarchically organised with elected 
representative committees 
CBO autonomy and equal participation 
of all members 
Tab. 2.11: Comparison between civics and the Federation 
Source: based on Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003), p. 463 
2.3.2.3 New social movements in South Africa 
The anti-apartheid movement has been a focus of interest for many scholars. Thörn even 
argues that it represented an early emergence of transnational social movements by organ-
ising its opposition internationally.454 
Since many civics and unions allied with the ANC government post 1994, they were no 
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longer in a position to represent interests outside the state.455 
Although demobilisaton of civil society was assumed after 1994, Robins (2005) argues 
that South Africa is no exception from global trends towards globally connected, multi-
level new social movements (NSM). 456 Local-global activism in South Africa is exempli-
fied by Abahlali Base Mjondolo (ABM), the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), Anti-
Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) (formerly 
know as ‘South African Homeless People’s Federation’). 
Government reacted with hostility when confronted with the new movements. Robins 
(2005) argues that the state interprets the solidarity of new social movements as a threat to 
government.457 Some of the movements have therefore been stigmatised as ‘ultra left’ and 
undemocratic although the majority of the movements are focused on survivalist, local 
struggles and single issues and not driven by ideological interests.458 Housing and basic 
services is a key aspect in this context. The movements withdraw both from the constitu-
tional right towards adequate housing as well as government’s commitment to participa-
tory democracy. 
Activists and academics on the other hand tend to colour the new social movements as 
spaces for participatory democracy and organisational alternatives to party politics.459 
Desai (2002) for instance draws a very positive imagery of the emerging community 
movements as poor people unite around bread-and-butter issues and practice solidarity 
confronted with neoliberal state practice.460 Ballard et al are less optimistic, but assert that 
the emergence of NSM has provided a new political climate for a more responsive South 
African government.461 
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Fig. 2.12: The reinvention of South Africa’s social movements, Source: Ballard et al (2006), p. 15. 
Many authors increasingly question the assumptions of a hegemonic movement. They 
rather stress that the new movements are characterised by heterogeneity, diversity of is-
sues, various forms and scales of organisations and activism.462 Fakir stressed: 
“Many organise at the local level, some in non-formal, non-traditional formations, others as 
community-based structures which have a distinct leadership and membership. Their modes 
of organisation are different, with some functioning as survivalist agencies while others are 
more politically oriented […].”463 
Against this background Ballard et al offer the following definition: 
“Social movements are thus, in our view, politically and/or socially directed collectives, often 
involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of 
the social, political and economic system within which they are located.”464  
Ballard et al (2006) argue that the movements can be distinguished in two ideological 
streams: right-based with the aim for state reform and counter-hegemonic opposition with 
the aim for fundamental transformations.465  
But beyond direct action Fakir (2004) also asserts a ‘quiet encroachment’ as households 
are driven by ‘bread and butter issues’. According to Fakir, these are not the working-
class but the ‘lumpen proletariat’, arising as part of the movement to boycott service 
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charges.466 
Ballard et al (2006) argue that community struggles lack the ideology of other social 
movements. Their aim is rather direct relief on specific issues. As they do not focus on 
opposing government’s economic agenda, they might also engage with the state in certain 
circumstances: 
“Struggles in post-apartheid South Africa respond, in the first instance, to particular mani-
festations of exclusion, poverty and marginality. They are very often local and immediate; 
they are pragmatic and quite logical responses to everyday hardships […].”467 
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that these local struggle movements can still challenge 
existing power relations. They argue that in contrast to the international new social 
movement discourse, in the South African case, both identity and distributional questions 
are drivers for the movements.468 
“Social movements are thus an avenue for marginalised people and those concerned about 
their interests to impact on material distribution, and social exclusion, and to claim a certain 
degree of influence and power over the state itself.”469 
Deriving tactics are characterised by a continuum of engagement with the state. Whereas 
some movements apply ‘in-system collaborative interactions’, others are aligned to ‘out-
of-system adversarial relations’. However, the distinction between in-system and extra-
system tactics cannot be drawn in reality. Oldfield and Stokke illustrate with the case of 
the Anti-Eviction Campaign that within one movement different groups apply a coexisting 
mix of different strategies and tactics.470 
Fakir outlines the juxtaposition of social movement activities characterised by coopera-
tion with government for improvements in the communities and simultaneous opposition 
against privatisation and liberalisation. The latter is illustrated by community-based and 
citywide campaigns against local government politics particularly around service 
charges.”471 Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) question the legitimacy and capacity of such 
movements. Key questions which need to be resolved for movements are, according to the 
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authors, how they link their mobilisation tactic with the basic needs of members and if 
they are able to open a democratic space.472 
2.3.2.4 Civil society alliances in South Africa 
The interdependence of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-based 
or Grassroots Organisations is also stressed in the South African context. With regard to 
the urban sector Smit concluded:  
“Strong civil society needs to consist of autonomous CBOs, supported by strong NGOs, op-
erating in a voluntary pluralist mode, sometimes co-operation with and sometimes acting in 
opposition to the state.”473 
However, the political divide between NGOs working within the system and CBOs who 
challenge it, has led to a neglect of their interdependence in reality: 
“NGO’s need to recognize that they only have a seat at the systemic table because rulers and 
elites fear the CBOs that threaten or have the potential to ultimately undermine the system. 
CBOs need NGOs seat at the systemic table to facilitate the reforms that they so need to sus-
tain their mobilization in the long term.”474 
Bond and Guliwe (2003) argue, that effective civil society alliances have merged like the 
Jubilee movement (focused on apartheid debt), the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) 
and the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF).475 
Against the assumption that NGOs demobilises masses, Bond and Guliwe argue, in South 
Africa many NGOs work with grassroots and movements and are “organically connected 
to social movements”.476 
The SDI affiliated federations and support NGOs similarly constitute an alliance across 
different organisational forms. NGOs themselves have aligned in coalitions such as 
SANGOCO (South African National NGO Coalition). In the urban sector the Urban Sec-
tor Network (USN) was active as an umbrella body for NGOs until 2005. 
2.3.2.5 Interface between civil society and the state in South Africa 
During apartheid black civil society organisations (CSOs) were suppressed and discour-
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aged.477 Post-1994 civil society-state engagement shifted to a collaborative relationship. 
The state introduced institutionalised participation for civil society organisations and 
funding through the National Development Agency.478 The Constitution provides for the 
right to free association (Chapter 2, Section 18) and the Non Profit Organisations Act479 
outlines the environment for non-profit organisations to emerge. 
However, Habib and Kotzé outlined that the ANC understood its role as taking control 
over development. This attitude contradicted World Bank and IMF thinking at the time 
and is referred to as ‘South African exceptionalism’. As a result, CSOs were sidelined and 
people-centred development remained rhetoric, according to the authors.480 
Forums to integrate civil society have declined since government moved away from pol-
icy formulation to implementation. 
“This go-it-alone stance, especially on policy issues, seems to be the dominant mode of the 
last few years. While after 1994 many NGOs were closely involved in developing policy in 
areas such as housing and justice and reconciliation, these days they are mostly estranged 
from government.”481 
The South African state is confronted with the contradictory approaches of delivery and 
downsizing the state. It is characterised by ‘pragmatic manoeuvres’ which civil society 
actors use for local governance.482  
Shearing and Wood (2005) understand this improvisation as innovative use of ‘govern-
ance disparity’ in South African society. Harrison (2002) shows that there exists an in-
creasing informalisation of governing outside of and in competition with formal manage-
ment systems of local government.483 
Given the background that integration into formal processes has not been realised, Simone 
and Abouhani argue to focus on the differentiated social practices and organisations 
which constitute the survival strategies and identities in cities.484 The authors assert that 
ephemeral institutions for collaboration and more effective formal governance arrange-
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ments emerge: 
“Distinct groups and capacities are provisionally assembled into surprising, yet often dy-
namic, intersections outside any formal opportunity the city presents for the interaction of di-
verse identities and situations.”485 
With regard to the dynamics of urbanisation, Simone criticises that development and gov-
ernance interventions hardly take into account informal practices and institutions. Instead 
of analysing the capacity of urban management, he calls for understanding of the overall 
social arrangements or “knowing how cities are lived”.486 
Simone argues that new urban social formations became important for urban manage-
ment. These formations are “[…] being rehearsed, revised, discarded, renewed, collapsed 
into conventional associations, mobilised to collapse conventional associations.” The aim 
is to realise and move on “before positions can be solidified and manipulated, before offi-
cers are elected, membership forms distributed […]”. This process refines “a new genera-
tion of urban capacities”.487 
This is aligned to a shift from a state-centred to nodal governance. Shearing and Wood 
argue that concepts of ‘citizenship’ do not comprise this shift and suggest a less state-
centred conception of ‘denizenship’ as power beyond the state is expressed in new forms 
of ‘communal space’. They characterise the shift from citizens to denizens as follows: 
“People now live within a world of criss-crossing memberships that operate across and 
through multiple and layered governmental domains.”488 
Zuern argues that while literature on social movements tries to distinguish them as indi-
rect or direct challenges to the state by non-institutional and autonomous spaces, in reality 
social movements as well as civil society actors in general are not that distinct from the 
state.489 
Also, Mhone and Edigheji (2003) call for transcending “the divide between civil society 
and political society” by “politics based on alliances”.490 
“[…] what is without doubt required is the need to transcend the false divide that has 
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emerged between opposition and engagement in South Africa. For without this transcen-
dence, civil society is going to remain divided, and perhaps incapable of developing the so-
phistication to deal with advancing the interests of marginalized communities in today’s neo-
liberal global environment.”491 
Swilling argues the search to maintain a coherent sense of community is contradicted by 
the broad cross-community networks which are highly fluid and changing. Instead of see-
ing state and society as separate entities, he suggests that: 
“Those lines that formally define the outlines of “weak” administrative functions and civil 
society organisations may instead act as “internal” markers of rather solid arrangements 
that take place over a broad set of diverse actors, territories and identities.” 492 
2.3.2.6 Federation discourse in South Africa 
There is an ongoing debate in South Africa on the relevance of the Federation aligned to 
SDI. The considerable growth of federation activities in sub-Saharan Africa493 has called 
the attention of international agencies and government.  
Urban problems such as poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, lack of infra-
structure and HIV/AIDS relate, according to Federation perspective, to limitations in local 
organisations. Local organisations, it argues, include formal organisations such as gov-
ernment and civil society organisations as well as informal associations. The challenge is 
seen in organising the poor to influence decision-making. Federations in this context are 
understood as a mechanism to strengthen horizontal networking and creating pro-poor in-
stitutions. 
„Perhaps more than anything else, as a first stage, what is needed in urban areas in Africa 
are strong examples of how to support the development of pro-poor organizations that ad-
dress poorer groups’ needs and are accountable to them.”494 
Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) suggest that the Federation in South Africa gives an example 
how movements can link mobilisation with the needs of members.495 Millstein, Oldfield 
and Stokke analysed strategies and capacities of the South African Homeless People’s 
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Federation (SAHPF) and concluded that it has the ability to function as a social move-
ment and thus has the capacity to promote and negotiate their aims.496 
“[…] Homeless People’s Federation seem to be more adept at understanding the use value of 
direct action to shape agendas and make room for provisional solutions that will in future 
become the focus of further mobilization, renegotiation and even incorporation by the state 
[…]”.497 
It is argued that the Federation’s methods create a more equal relationship between poor 
communities and other agencies. They demonstrate the capacity of urban poor groups and 
their possible contributions to making government initiatives more effective.498 
The federation’s practices are not supposed to substitute the state. Instead of autonomous 
development the federations seek to engage with government around redistribution.499 
Although they, similarly to right-based positions, criticise the hostile mentality of gov-
ernment towards the urban poor in implementing its housing policy, they stress that this 
derives from a technocratic and inadequate urban governance system.500  
“This hostility, however, is not political, intellectual, or emotional: it is systemic. There are 
very few bureaucrats or politicians who actually do not want to serve the poor. They honestly 
believe they are doing so, even when they evict slum dwellers or tear down their unauthorised 
dwellings.”501 
Therefore engagement with the state, according to SDI, has to be created outside the for-
mal and dysfunctional institutional spaces and oriented towards changing the system. The 
argument is that social learning through development projects can increase democratic 
citizenship and further the understanding of how the state functions. Practices such as in-
formation gathering are interpreted as an indicator of the federations’ profound under-
standing of the mechanisms of the modern state. Robins stressed: 
“By appropriating these rituals of bureaucratic state power, the Federations acquire lever-
age in their negotiations with the state to secure resources such as housing and health.”502 
Moreover, the federations are assumed to demonstrate alternatives to the state.503 This 
                                                 
496 See Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003). 
497 Pieterse (2005b), p. 153. 
498 See Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f. 
499 See Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f. 
500 See discussion in chapter 2.1. 
501 SDI (2006a). 
502 Robins (2005b), p. 130. 
503 See Pieterse (2005a), p. 156. 
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practice is believed to shift institutional arrangements: 
“Don’t confront authority head on. Instead of storming the citadel, infiltrate it…Play judo 
with the state – use its own weight to roll it over”.504 
Representatives from right-based or radical democratic approaches argue that the federa-
tion’s non-confrontational politics reduces resistance and enables co-optation of lead-
ers.505 
Swilling agrees that cooptation is a constant threat for the federation, but a “tiger that’s 
being ridden”.506 
Bolnick et al stress that the avoidance of political affiliation creates disadvantages for the 
federations. Politicians prioritise support to those community groups affiliated to their 
party. Nevertheless, by its apolitical position, according to the authors, the federation re-
mains independent and open to everyone. Its ‘politics of patience’ by negotiating and 
building alliances “[…] allows them to negotiate and work with whoever is in power lo-
cally or nationally.”507 
Robins instead outlines that despite its apolitical ideology in reality Federation leadership 
tends to be aligned to the ANC. The South African federation perceived government as 
“[…] a powerful patronage machine that could be accessed through party political con-
tacts and channels”. Moreover, the members believed in a technocratic state which is con-
tradictory to the SDI agenda of resisting the expert – client relationship.508 
Furthermore, Khan and Pieterse (2006) specifically stress, that the federation enhances a 
neoliberal rationality by idealising self-help approaches. They take the People’s Housing 
Process (PHP)509 as a case in point for a “colonisation of civil society” by the state. With 
PHP, they argue, the state has taken over an innovative participatory practice into its poli-
cies and then reworked it to its own values.510 
SDI instead holds that constant mobilisation and self-organising through savings is the 
                                                 
504 Quoted from Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 162. 
505 See Khan/Pieterse (2006). 
506 Swilling (2006c). 
507 Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f. 
508 See Robins (2005b), p. 131. 
509 PHP was inspired by federation practice and adopted in 1998 by the National Housing Policy which ex-
tended the housing subsidy scheme with an option of sweat-equity contribution by beneficiaries. 
510 See Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 172. For a review of PHP see chapter 2.1. 
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key “to build the critical mass” and to capacitate negotiation as the basis for state en-
gagement. According to SDI, continuous mobilisation prevents institutionalisation and 
dominance of the formal system: “In other words, […] for the SDI model to achieve 
change, it has to institutionalise change itself […].”511 
NGO-Federation alliance – conflicting ideologies at play 
Bolnick et al argue that the local groups face difficulties in ensuring their leadership role, 
because dynamics in development practice tend to re-shift control to the state. Given this 
context, local federations and their support structures need to cooperate to ensure that the 
federation members are empowered to negotiate with the state. 512 
Millstein, Oldfied and Stokke (2003) stress that NGOs mediate to the formal system. 
Thereby “[…] local Federation groups can maintain their informal and flexible charac-
ter.“513 
Key for the SDI alliance is to limit dependencies of grassroots groups on NGOs. NGOs 
are supposed to scale up, allow autonomy of federations and facilitate their horizontal 
networks.514 
Robins focuses on the discrepancy between SDI ideology and reality of practices and 
cleavages with the South African Homeless Peoples Federation (SAHPF) and its support 
NGO (People’s Dialogue) in Cape Town. The two structures showed a competing under-
standing of development which resulted in conflict. The SDI/ People’s Dialogue ideology 
of avoiding state product-driven housing delivery and conventional NGO-CBO relations 
was not shared by Federation members, refer Robins.515 
Social capital in the face of competition and conflict 
SDI ideology particularly stresses the relevance of social capital which is created by fed-
erating. Savings schemes are assumed to build social capital instead of a house product. 
Wilson and Lowery (2003) for instance assert a building of deep democracy through a 
process of changing awareness by federation members.516  
Robins (2005) critically reflects the assumption that organisational structures and strate-
                                                 
511 SDI (2006a). 
512 Bolnick et al (2006), p. 44. 
513 Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003), p. 464. 
514 See for instance Bolnick (2008). 
515 See Robins (2005b), p. 132. 
516 See Wilson/Lowery (2003), p. 62. 
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gies of the federation enable trust relations (and thereby social capital) amongst the poor. 
He instead criticises the normative conception of social capital as it “[…] fails to ac-
knowledge the embeddedness of local hierarchies and patronage networks”.517 
The centralised South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF) leadership re-
sulted in patronage and gatekeeping networks, according to Robins. This caused distrust 
amongst Federation members and contributed to the collapse of many saving schemes. 
 
 
“Despite the creative and sustained efforts by SDI Federations – from Cape Town to Cal-
cutta – to build social capital and communities with long-term commitments, the urban poor 
often have to deal with high levels of distrust and conflict that undermine these social ties and 
solidarities.”518 
A general contradiction persists between the NGO which promotes social capital whilst 
SAHPF members are more interested in the house product. Unlike the Federation in India, 
they did not practice daily savings or other rituals.519 
Huchzermeyer argues that the individual entitlement through the state’s capital subsidy 
system has reduced the Federation to house construction and “[…] distracted the Federa-
tion’s collective and radical development activities into endeavours to achieve the largest 
possible individual housing product […].”520 
The pledge by the national housing minister of 6,000 subsidies to the Federation is there-
fore seen to exacerbate the focus on numbers and construction of houses. It is argued that 
by entering the ‘politics of deal-making’ the Federation has abandoned its collective ap-
proach.521 
The NGOs recognise the deficiencies to aim at creating solidarity whilst working within 
the subsidy system.522 Bolnick et al acknowledge that the federations, as any large-scale 
movement by poor people, have had failures or limited successes such as the break-up of 
community organisations and loan-repayment schedules. However, the authors stress that 
an essential role of the federations is “to learn how to cope with these problems, and how 
                                                 
517 Robins (2005b), p. 124. 
518 Robins (2005b), p. 134. 
519 See Robins (2005b), p. 131. 
520 Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 121. 
521 Personal communication with Marie Huchzermeyer, 04.09.2006 and with Ahmadi Vawda, 05.10.2006. 
522 See Bauman/Bolnick (2001), p. 110. 
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to avoid them in the future.”523 The extension of its development agenda beyond housing 
has been acknowledged as a primary challenge by the Federation itself.524 
                                                 
523 Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f. 
524 See FEDUP (2006), p. 5. 
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2.4 Theoretical perspective and conceptual model 
The previous discourses have revealed a shifting understanding of housing, governance 
and civil society which can be summarised as follows: 
1. Planning and housing issues are increasingly discussed as a governance matter. Ap-
proaches have become less regulatory and project-oriented and more participatory and 
comprehensive. In this context, the role of the state has shifted from a providing to an 
enabling role. Deriving strategies in the development context have turned out to be 
more complex interpreting governance differently: Poverty reduction frameworks re-
turn to neo-rational and interventionist strategies and interpret governance in terms of 
efficiency and rule of law. From a pro-poor perspective governance has become a cen-
tral concept in the form of partnerships and alliance-building with non-state actors and 
particularly the poor. Against this background, self-help is seen as building the collec-
tive capacity of the poor to interact with the state. In South Africa the juxtaposition of 
state-driven interventionist, market enabling as well as community enabling ap-
proaches, results in governance gaps. Thus the translation from policy into practice 
leaves space for interpretation. It depends on its willingness and institutional capaci-
ties, if local government enhances community-enabling self-help approaches. 
2. Coordination functions shifted from central to local government and from government 
to horizontal governance. The governance discourse revealed that in terms of horizon-
tal governance the inclusion of civil society leads to new governance arrangements. 
The state resorts to ideal and normative governance models. In reality, complex, multi-
tiered and heterogeneous links are at work. The dysfunction of formal mechanisms (as 
in the housing field) has resulted in an increased relevance of informal structures – 
some of them private or illegal initiatives; some of them referred to as organised civil 
society. This fragmented landscape of players requires multi-player and relational 
models for analysis. In South Africa decentralisation in terms of ‘developmental local 
government’ and the emergence of new civil society structures lead to new forms of 
interfaces also characterised as relational webs. 
3. Given this context, it seems to be relevant to understand the role of civil society or-
ganisations in the habitat field. Particularly in housing processes Grassroots Organisa-
tions (GROs) and grassroots movements use Non-Governmental Organisations 
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(NGOs) as intermediaries to influence policy processes. There has been a general shift 
from NGOs to grassroots structures and to alliances between the two as development 
partners. A general concern is the dominance of NGOs over grassroots initiatives. 
However, the boundaries between grassroots and NGOs are increasingly seen as 
blurred. Thus focus is given to relationships within alliances. There are tensions be-
tween different concepts of the role of civil society actors in development: the one po-
sition stresses the role of civil society organisations in reforming interventions to en-
hance development efficiency whereas the other holds the relevance of people-centred 
initiatives for structural change in development. Self-help approaches in the latter con-
text are criticised for being politically irrelevant. From an alternative development 
perspective collective self-help is seen as the interface between efficiency and people-
centred perspective. According to this view, collective action builds the basis for ne-
gotiating with the state. South Africa is characterised by extensive transformations in 
the civil society sector. A general shift from drivers for democratic change to imple-
menting agents was noted in the post-apartheid period. Since the late 1990s opposition 
against neoliberal policies has gained momentum by the emergence of new social 
movements. They influenced the return of democracy related concerns. The goodness 
of civil society actors is questioned and the focus on organised structures criticised. 
Instead, two observations are being made: firstly, an increased relevance is given to in-
formal structures outside of and in competition with formal management systems; sec-
ondly, boundaries between the state and civil society become fluid and are rather char-
acterised as nodal governance.  
Obviously each domain of discussion exposes specific aspects of transformation. Never-
theless, the three discourses share a central concern in new roles for actors and new inter-
agency relationships. Deriving concepts and strategies have in common a focus on access 
to decision-making for the poor, new arrangements and relationships between the state 
and civil society actors. Constraints involve inadequate institutional channels for partici-
pation, a lack of capacity or arising new forms of exclusion. Given this context, network 
governance is seen as more flexible and a solution to the governance crisis. It is assumed 
that new actor networks expand the degree of citizen involvement.  
Multi-organisational relations between grassroots, intermediary NGOs and others are 
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fairly complex. The research will therefore take a sociological perspective deriving from 
an actor-centred institutionalism and network theory in the field of housing. The challenge 
is to adopt a concept that integrates the structuring effects of organisations (as collective 
actors) and networks for their interaction with the state. 
Categories for analysis are: 
a) Organisations as collective actors 
b) Networks as relations between collective actors 
2.4.1 Organisations as collective actors 
Actors are characterised by capabilities (to achieve outcome), perceptions and preferences 
with regard to a policy problem (action orientation).525 Precondition to resort to organisa-
tions as collective actors would be that they are intentional actors whose interests and 
control of resources are determinable. Jansen (1997) argues that there is empirical evi-
dence that organisations and not individuals are powerful actors and shape society.526 
From a sociological institutional perspective organisations are defined as social entities 
with membership and differentiated roles which are oriented towards a purpose and or-
ganised systematically.527 
According to Mayntz, organisational development derived from specific preconditions in 
modern society (such as technical progress and social differentiation). Sociology is there-
fore interested in the correlation between the specific characteristics of an organisation 
and the realisation of goals.528 
This allows organisations to be described as intentional actors. Moreover, Mayntz stresses 
that the term also includes informal organisations and therefore applies to voluntary asso-
ciations as much as to bureaucratic structured institutions.529 
This understanding complies with Weber’s assertion of the existence of illegitimate 
power. According to Weber, the state is one formal framework of decision-making in so-
ciety that enables the deployment of interests through the social relations of “power“ 
                                                 
525 See Scharpf (1997), p. 43. 
526 See Jansen (1997). 
527 Mayntz (1963), p. 36; Etzioni (1973), p. 12. 
528 See Mayntz (1963). 
529 See Mayntz (1963). 
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(“means of administration“). He stresses that beyond this formal framework there exist 
separate and powerful associations (“conjuratio“) as a result of political socialisation de-
spite or against the legitimate power. 
The integration of informal organisations as collective actors will help to analyse beyond 
formal organisations such as local government or Non-Governmental Organisations, also 
voluntary associations. Thus, following Scharpf, different organisational structures can be 
analysed as collective actors in the political process: 
“This allows us to simplify analysis by treating a limited number of large units as composite 
[…] actors with relatively cohesive action orientations and relatively potent action re-
sources.”530 
2.4.2 Networks as relations between collective actors 
Organisations (as a collective actor) present clear system boundaries. According to net-
work theories networks present no organisational boundaries. Instead, they are formed by 
individual network relationships and are characterised as informal, decentral and horizon-
tal self-controlling mechanisms which have a degree of openness.531 
Thus networks consist of relations between a set of elements (nodes). They are defined as: 
“A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, 
objects or events […]. The set of persons, objects or events on which a network is defined 
may be called the actors or nodes. These elements possess some attribute(s) that identify 
them as members of the same equivalence class for purposes of determining the network of 
relations among them.”532 
Bommes and Tacke (2005) disagree that system boundaries dissolve with networks. In-
stead they argue that networks are a secondary form of order in society. Precondition for 
their formation would be other social systems such as organisations.533 
Furthermore, Bommes and Tacke argue that organisations provide necessary resources 
and signal inclusion for networks.534 On the other hand organisations can capitalise on 
networks. For instance they use networks for their problem dimension, since networks 
                                                 
530 Scharpf (1997), p. 12. 
531 See Dirk Messner (2000). 
532 Knoke (1991), p. 175. 
533 Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 284. 
534 In the case of scientific community they state: “[…] an organizational address that signals to others 
their inclusion in a scientific achievement role”. Scientists outside these organisations are perceived as less 
relevant. See Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 294. 
 115
provide knowledge relations and reduce risks. This is achieved by ‘double inclusion’ of 
individuals as members of organisations and participants of networks. Double-inclusion, 
the authors put forward, is the basis for coupling networks with organisations. Coupling 
they argue, means that networks influence organisations and vice versa.535  
These positions reveal the interdependency between networks and organisations. More-
over, they refer to networks as distinct to organisations. The distinction, however, is rather 
inaccurate when considering attempts to set boundaries between the notion of organisa-
tions and networks.  
Altvater (2000) differs networks between a) a permanent and stable institutionalised co-
operation and b) a situational alliance system. He therefore refers to relations between a 
confined number of established actors with a specific issue-focus and homogeneity as 
‘organisation-like’ networks (such as associations).536 
Bommes and Tacke, on the other hand, stress that networks that function on the basis of 
universal criterion of participation (e.g. membership of organisation) are not totally open. 
Associations are then organisations which serve the objective of networking.537 
Therefore it needs to be stressed that networks are not that clearly distinguishable as as-
sumed by idealised abstractions.  
2.4.3 Research assumptions 
The focus of the research is on an in-depth understanding of civil society organisations, 
their alliances (intra-relationships) and their interrelationship with government institu-
tions. The research is rooted in the understanding that actors and relationships shape pol-
icy, policy-making and policy implementation. Grounded in theories of actor-centered in-
stitutionalism and network theory the guiding research assumptions are as follows: 
1. Policies and political opportunity structures are dynamic. The local contexts are char-
acterised on the one hand by a change of political opportunity structures through insti-
tutional reform and decentralisation of functions to local government and, on the other 
hand, by shifting opportunities for participation at local level such as between delivery 
                                                 
535 Taking the case of alumni networks they illustrate that the position in organisations make network par-
ticipants relevant. See Bommes/Tacke (2005), pp. 297-299. 
536 Altvater (2000), pp. 15ff. 
537 See Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 297. 
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focused and people-centred development in housing policy. 
2. Policies and institutions shape one another. Civil society organisations and their net-
works form different constellations confronted with the political opportunity struc-
tures. Thereby they constitute different institutional mechanisms to influence policy 
and the mode of governance. Vice versa policies influence the institutional mecha-
nisms of civil society actors. 
3. Different patterns of organising coexist. Both networks and organisations have struc-
turing effects. Instead of distinct networks and organisations, it is assumed, the reality 
is closer to hybrid structures which cannot be clearly assigned to the one or other con-
cept. 
4. Organisations and networks are dynamic. Different levels and phases of governance 
result in dynamics of networks and organisations. Collective actors become ‘moving 
targets’ in flexible relationships.   
5. Actors interlink in sometimes network-like, sometimes organisation-like arrangements 
in the context of changing relationships and modes of governance. As a result, this is 
the hypothesis,  structures are oscillating in governance arrangements. 
From these assumptions a range of questions derive to analyse the South African case 
study: 
1. What are the political opportunity structures for participating in the housing process? 
2. What approaches are characteristic for civil society actors who try to influence the 
mode of governance? 
3. What organisational structures and relationships are characteristic of civil society alli-
ances? 
4. How do these civil society alliances organise internally and relate with government on 
a strategic level? 
5. How do they organise internally and relate with government on a project-based level? 
6. How do these relationships shift between levels (strategic and project-based) and 
phases (land, project preparation, housing development)? 
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2.4.4 Conceptual model 
The units of analysis are local policy processes in the field of low-income housing exem-
plified by the interface of local government and organised civil society in Cape Town. 
The research is based on four concepts:  
1. The first research topic is aligned to the housing discourse and examines the planning 
and housing issues with a specific interest in policy gaps. Inquiry focuses on housing 
challenges, policies and strategies and their implementation. 
2. The second research topic is local governance revealing both the level of decentralisa-
tion and institutional frameworks for horizontal inclusion. 
3. A third topic is aligned to the role of civil society as illustrated by the actors involved 
in the housing process.  
4. The fourth topic is on actors and networks at work. Focus of analysis is on organisa-
tions as actors, their relationships and interactions with the state. The inquiry focuses 
on how they perform and function on strategic levels and in different phases of settle-
ment processes. 
 
Fig.: 2.13 Research framework, Source: Own design 
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3. Methodological considerations  
The previous chapters have revealed the relevance of actors and networks within govern-
ance structures. Based on this understanding, this chapter will introduce the research 
methods applied for analysis. The intention is to clarify the specific organisational logic 
of civil society actors, their alliances and their relationships in governance processes. 
Thus, focus is given to an institutional perspective on governance and to a specific field of 
governance (housing process) in order to avoid misleading generalisations and to establish 
differentiated findings. 
The research involves an analysis of civil society alliances (organisations and networks) 
that are involved in people-driven housing processes through case study research. The re-
search is faced with the challenge of analysing actors and their relations on different lev-
els and to understand process-related changes of these elements. The aim is to reveal the 
actors’ perceptions of the emerging relationships and processes. Therefore analytical 
strategies based on qualitative research methods were chosen for data collection and 
evaluation.  
3.1 Selection criteria for case studies 
Cases are civil society alliances active in local and people-driven housing processes. The 
case study selection was based on the criteria that the alliances have similarities in terms 
of being active in people-driven housing processes in the same locality and likewise in-
terface with the same municipality. Further, cases were chosen which exposed reason-
able access to data given the constrained time schedule of the field studies. 
Two cases have been selected. One is an alliance between community-based grassroots 
organisations and NGOs (Alliance Type A). The other is an alliance between federation 
groups aligned to Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and NGOs (Alliance Type B). 
Both alliances are analysed in terms of their internal relationships and interaction with lo-
cal government. Here, relationships and interfaces with the City of Cape Town were cho-
sen as a common point of reference. This meant restricting the time frame to the period 
after the year 2000 when the Unicity of Cape Town as one municipal structure was in 
place. 
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Micro-cases as reference points within the larger two case studies have been identified 
which illustrate situations of interfaces between local government and the two civil soci-
ety alliances. Micro-cases were selected to facilitate a differentiation between strategy-
related interfaces and project-based interfaces. Further, project-based interfaces have 
been structured along three phases of the housing process (access to land, project 
preparation and development) to illustrate the dynamics at work.1 
The project-based interfaces are further differentiated into Greenfield and upgrading 
projects since this has an important impact on the constitution of Grassroots Organisa-
tions (for arrangement of case studies see figure 3.1).2  
 
Fig. 3.1: Arrangement of case studies, Source: Own design 
                                                 
1 The particular process phases are aligned to the definition of phases by the City of Cape Town. The land 
process comprises: need identification, land identification, land release and project approval. The project 
preparation process entails housing finance (subsidy application submitted and approved) and planning 
(urban layout submitted and approved). The housing development process is confined to land bulk servic-
ing, site surveying, internal servicing, house design, house construction, house occupation, building ap-
proval and transfer of title. See City of Cape Town (2006d). 
2 Upgrading projects involve established area-based community organisations and Greenfield projects in-
volve more dispersed issue-based community organisations. 
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3.2 Methods of data collection 
The data collection focused on three aspects: firstly, the political opportunity structure; 
secondly, the organisational structure and intra-relationships of civil society alliances and 
thirdly, changing intra-relationships and inter-relationships between the two types of alli-
ances and local government.  
In the first part (Chapter 4) statistical data was used for an analysis of the local housing 
and governance context. This was supplemented by qualitative data from secondary litera-
ture and from expert and key stakeholder interviews to capture how actors perceive the 
political opportunity structures in the housing process. 
The second part (Chapter 5) is introduced by a stakeholder analysis. Some statistical 
data and secondary literature was used to give a background of local government and civil 
society organisations as actors. In-depth interviews with key actors of the organisations 
were then carried out to understand the relationships within an alliance of civil society or-
ganisations.  
A further section focused on a process analysis to reveal how these alliances function in 
housing projects when interfacing with government. Secondary literature was used for 
background facts on the particular micro-cases. Emphasis was given to in-depth inter-
views with key stakeholders to understand their perception on the specific interface prob-
lematic and evolving interrelationships.  
Field studies were conducted during March 2006 and from September to November 2006. 
During this period 52 interviews were held. Questions depended on the role of the infor-
mant in the relevant process. A leading questionnaire ensured that the broader themes 
were covered during the interview (see Annexure). 
The key informants included the councillor who chairs the portfolio committee for hous-
ing, local and provincial government officials (12 interviews), representatives of NGOs 
(19 interviews) and leaders of community organisations and federation groups (9 inter-
views). As the focus was not on the community perspectives, the interviews are limited to 
leaders within the community organisations who were involved in negotiations with local 
government. Each interview lasted for about an hour and was tape recorded with the 
agreement of the respective respondent. 
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Furthermore, 12 experts were interviewed (in the form of informal personal communica-
tion) who as academics and consultants were familiar with the field and could give an 
outsider perspective. This also entailed research both at the University of Cape Town 
(UCT) and University of the Witwatersrand to access local publications and connect to 
the scholarly debate in South Africa. 
In order to triangulate the findings from the interviews and the secondary literature re-
view, research methods also included visits to each of the organisations, local government 
departments as well as 9 site visits to settlement-based projects and 15 participatory ob-
servations at meetings of stakeholders.3 
In March 2008 the findings of the field study were reflected by meetings with the direc-
tors of the key NGOs involved. 
3.3 Data interpretation and generalisation 
The analysis of the data collection is based on the Grounded Theory approach by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) which generates theory from empirical 
data not in a linear research process but through a circular research model. Thereby theo-
retical presumptions are used which are reflected and expanded in an iterative process 
through empirical data.4  
The proposition was that new forms of interaction and relationships (phenomenon) 
amongst civil society actors and between them and the local state would emerge. The 
units of analysis therefore comprise: 
1. An analysis of the political opportunity structure 
2. An actor analysis which comprises the quality of the organisational form (meso 1) and 
the quality of the intra-relationship within civil society alliances (meso 2)  
3. A process analysis which refines the aspects of relationships in terms of dynamics at 
work and the quality of the inter-relationship with the state (meso-macro). 
                                                 
3 See annex for the leading questionnaire and the detailed list of respondents, meetings observed and site 
visits. 
4 See Flick (2006), pp. 69ff. 
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Fig. 3.2: Framework for data interpretation, Source: Own design 
3.3.1 Analysis of political opportunity structures 
In a first step the evaluation will describe the institutional frameworks in place as they in-
fluence inclusion of other actors into decision-making. Institutional frameworks differ ac-
cording to policy domain, level and context. This analysis will focus on local level institu-
tional frameworks in terms of housing policy-making which is also influenced by national 
and regional government regulation.  
The institutionalised channels of public participation within the housing field are provided 
through City Development Strategies (CDS) and Integrated Development Planning (IDP) 
in terms of strategic planning and the People’s Housing Process (PHP) in terms of im-
plementation. Both policy areas highlight aspects of participation at the local level. 
Hence, they well illustrate to what extent the integration of local actors has been institu-
tionalised. Recent research and evaluations showed some of the successes and pitfalls be-
tween policy and reality. In the following this will be complemented by the perceptions of 
key stakeholders in the local context of Cape Town. Moreover, it will take into account 
aspects above the formal institutional system and integrate further elements of political 
opportunity structure.5 The analysis intends to reveal differences in the understanding and 
perception of requirements in the housing process. The aspects for analysis include: 
1.  Institutional frameworks in housing 
2. Intergovernmental aspects (contestations within political sphere, relation between the 
political sphere and administration and the state capacity) 
                                                 
5 For a discussion on political opportunity structures see Törnquist (2002), p. 12; Stokke (2002), p. 17. 
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3. The perception of participation and of the civil society actors by local government rep-
resentatives  
4. Civil society actors’ understanding of inclusion through institutional channels 
Further, the analysis will differentiate between different policy domains within the hous-
ing process (land, project preparation and housing development) to illustrate how govern-
ance varies within these institutional frameworks and affects the level of inclusion of civil 
society actors. 
3.3.2 Stakeholder analysis 
Organisations as collective actors 
The second aspect will be specified by an analysis of actors revealing the orientation and 
setup of organisations. Stakeholder analysis will be applied to differentiate between or-
ganisational characteristics such as background, relation to target group, members and 
staff. The orientation of organisations will be framed by characteristics as vision and mis-
sion, kind and field of activity. To classify the different organisations a typology of civil 
society organisations will be applied which is based on Neubert’s embeddedness to soci-
ety. The classification is according to two central categories: a) who benefits from their 
activity (members/ non-members) and b) what kind of activity they pursue (advocacy / 
development activity).6  
The South African definitions of civil society organisations are less comprehensive (see 
Chapter 2.3.2). This could result in misunderstandings when applying civil society termi-
nology. The research is interested in analysing NGOs beyond the narrow understanding of 
the term in South Africa (as service organisations) but in contrast to the notion of mem-
bership-based and partly informal Grassroots Organisations (GROs). Therefore some 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in the South African terminology could (based 
on their characteristics) be classified as local NGOs.  
To not confuse terminology (South African versus international notion of NGOs and 
GROs/CBOs) I will apply the differentiation used by Kirsch (1994). Kirsch refers to 
NGOs at the primary organisational level as People’s Organisations (PO). He differenti-
ates self-help organisations (SHO) from People’s Organisations at grassroots level. Ac-
                                                 
6 Classification according to Kirsch (1994), p. 70; Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
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cording to Kirsch POs integrate both intermediary, advocacy and self-help functions. 
NGOs are then secondary (NGO-South) and tertiary organisations (NGO-North) which 
support structures at grassroots level.7 This leads to the application of the following ty-
pology: 
 Type of Civil Society Organisation Characteristics 
G
ra
ss
ro
ot
s 
 le
ve
l Self-Help Organisation (SHO) Community-based, member-oriented/ primar-
ily development 
People’s Organisation (PO) Community-based, member-oriented/ devel-
opment and advocacy 
Association of People’s Organisations (APO) Member-oriented (POs)/ primarily advocacy 
N
G
O
 le
ve
l 
Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO) Non-member beneficiaries/ advocacy and/or 
development (empowerment) 
Service-Oriented Non-Governmental Organi-
sations (SONGO) 
Non-members beneficiaries/ service-delivery 
focus 
Association of NGOs (ANGO) Member-oriented (PONGOs) and primarily 
advocacy 
Tab. 3.1: Typology of civil society organisations  
Source: Own design based on Neubert (1992); Kirsch (1994) 
Intra-relationships of civil society alliances 
Furthermore, the focus is on the relationships and form of organisation between different 
organisations which align in an alliance confronted with a hierarchical bureaucratic state 
and the formal housing institutional framework. Emphasis is given to whether these alli-
ances can be assigned to a specific organisational structure. This requires an explanation 
of these intra-alliance relations which will be differentiated according to the following cri-
teria: 
1. Continuance of alliance (permanent or situational) 
2. Strength of link (weak or strong) 
3. Key influence organisation (NGO-centered or Grassroots-centered)  
                                                 
7 See Kirsch (1994), p. 70. 
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3.3.3 Process analysis 
The third analysis concentrates on the relation-building at strategic and project-level in 
the local housing process. The focus is given to the dynamics of the civil society alliances 
and to the interface between the alliances and local government.  
Dynamics of intra-relationships within alliance 
Firstly, the analysis of the process shows whether dynamics of the civil society alliances 
can be identified between the strategic and project-level and between different phases of 
the housing process. The question is whether the constitution of the civil society alliances 
changes at different levels and during the process 
Dynamics of inter-relationships with the state 
This leads to the second aspect of the influence of the form of the alliance on the rela-
tional webs with the state. The focus of analysis is on interfaces between the civil society 
alliances and the state.  
The description of the micro cases will be evaluated by: 
1. Identifying the (changing) roles of the stakeholders in the process 
2. Characterising the (changing) relationships between the actors 
3. Evaluating the closeness of civil society organisations and alliance to state institutions8 
3.3.4 Generalisation 
According to Glaser and Strauss theoretical sampling consists of a selection of respon-
dents which would allow theoretical saturation. The selected case studies, however, can-
not arrive at a theoretical sampling and saturation.9 Nonetheless, the selection of two case 
studies allows a high degree of density in description.  
Since the field study reveals the perception of the process, it does not allow generalisa-
tions about outcomes in terms of effectiveness or degree of inclusion. Instead, the re-
search intends to explore the quality of organisational form and relationships in the proc-
ess. Internal validity within the case study is to be achieved by reappearance of responses 
                                                 
8 The categorisation of roles withdraws partly from Hamdi/Goethert (1997). See tables in annex for 
evaluation criteria. 
9 See Schambach-Hardtke (2005), p. 23. 
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which permit a degree of generalisation of the case itself.  The external validity is 
achieved by an interpretative step whereby the case study is analysed in terms of its simi-
larities with and deviations from general trends. It thereby allows generalisations to deal 
with the theoretical assumptions and some conclusions about the implication for govern-
ance arrangements in the context of housing discourses. 
3.4 Political and ethical implications 
Housing represents a sensitive, controversial politicised topic in South Africa. It is some-
times used for patronage or causes conflicts within communities and against state institu-
tions. Reviewing housing policy and its implementation can be misinterpreted as taking 
sides against government. Therefore, it was important to stress the exclusive academic re-
search focus during the fieldwork.  
Moreover, although all respondents were willing to record the interviews, I am committed 
to protect their identity. Their answers could compromise the fragile relations between ac-
tors. Identity is only revealed where the position is aligned to one identity and it is a rep-
resentative function. Also, comments made during meetings that I attended as an observer 
were kept as minutes to understand perceptions and interrelations, but were not quoted. 
My position at a German university and department with a focus on related issues, as well 
as my previous work in Cape Town, allowed me to get easier access to City officials and 
NGO staff. However, it also meant that interviewees were expecting that one would take 
their side or that specific perceptions need not be explained explicitly.  
With regard to community and federation leaders it was clearly my international back-
ground and link to the relevant NGOs which facilitated access. My investigations, how-
ever, required some effort to clarify that I was not representing a donor agency and could 
not offer anything in return for their time and effort to give insights. However, my age 
and gender allowed a degree of trust by the exclusively female leaders which was re-
vealed by giving insights to their personal situation. Also, my position as a foreigner 
helped that matters were explained in a mode of teaching and revealing perceptions, since 
I was not assigned to one specific (ethnic) group. 
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3.5 Limitations of study 
Concerning data generation the inquiry included a number of constraints. Firstly, the Fed-
eration alliance could not be observed with one and the same micro case throughout the 
three phases of the housing process. The Federation had split in 2006 and in the time be-
fore (about 2003-2006), projects had been stalled. Alternatively, different micro cases 
were chosen which were characteristic for the Federation approach and therefore could 
reduce the constraint by representing typical interface situations within the three phases. 
Secondly, the field research was carried out at a time of political instability in Cape Town. 
The executive mayor system was to be expelled through interventions by provincial gov-
ernment. Councillors were engaged in meetings and debates confronted with this situation 
and were therefore not accessible for interviews. To capture their perception about hous-
ing issues and involvement of civil society, information was generated by following 
statements in newspapers, by attending a housing portfolio committee meeting and by in-
terviewing the chairman of the specific committee. 
Thirdly, interviews with community organisations and federation groups were confined to 
leaders. It must be acknowledged that thereby not the views of all members were cap-
tured. Nonetheless, the interviews were attended by other members. Thus a certain degree 
of safeguarding the adequacy of statements can be assumed. 
In terms of data interpretation and generalisation this study does not attempt to reveal nei-
ther impacts nor a universal representation of local governance. Instead, it is rather ex-
plorative and provides general lessons and validity with regard to the framing questions. 
Since it is restricted to an indepth understanding of the organisational structures, relation-
ships and interfaces on local level and within a specific period of time, it must be stressed 
that the same study in a different locality or at another time would have led to other re-
sults. The general lessons generated therefore require further research to be more indica-
tive outside one specific context. 
Also, the specific account is interpreted along aspects of organisational structures and re-
lationships. Other aspects of interest to governance are left untouched. These include im-
portant questions about trust, legitimacy and accountability exposed in the interface situa-
tions. 
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4. Housing, governance and civil society in Cape Town 
4.1 Housing challenges, strategies and practice 
This chapter will introduce the context of Cape Town as a basis for the following case 
study exploration. It will present some of the key urban development trends and strategies 
and then introduce governance aspects with particular interest to housing and the options 
for participation which are given through the institutional frameworks. Moreover, it will 
bring about some of the views of key actors in local government and civil society organi-
sations on the implementation of housing strategies and the options for participation. The 
section on civil society in Cape Town will reflect on the key positions of civil society ac-
tors in the housing field towards state engagement. It will illustrate that civil society ac-
tors strategise on other areas of engagement within local housing projects. Finally, the 
chapter will reflect on some of the key factors which influenced the relationship between 
the City administration and civil society organisations during 2006. This is seen as an es-
sential background to understand particular aspects of state-civil society relations revealed 
in the case studies. 
4.1.1 Urban development trends of Cape Town 
With the postapartheid transition the requirement to restructure the built environment was 
high on the agenda for planners in Cape Town. They were confronted by interrelated chal-
lenges: the urban context was rapidly changing with a globalising economy, increasing 
poverty and social differentiation. 
Current urban development characteristics and trends in Cape Town have a reciprocal re-
lation to housing and governance related issues. Five (historical, demographic, economic, 
social and spatial) of these are outlined here which have a particularly important influ-
ence.  
4.1.1.1 Historical context 
The urban environment in Cape Town continues to be affected by the legacy of apartheid 
planning. Cape Town was established in 1652 as a provisioning station for the Dutch East 
India Company and evolved to be the first permanent urban settlement in South Africa. 
Due to the impact of intercontinental trading Cape Town’s population derived from very 
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heterogeneous backgrounds. Already prior to apartheid, especially since the early 20th 
century, Cape Town was characterised by spatial segregation between different ethnic 
groups. Municipal housing for coloureds and Black Africans was established and restric-
tive legislation, for instance concerning labour policy, was implemented. When the Na-
tional Party came into power in 1948 apartheid became an official state policy and segre-
gation a means of ensuring the separation of different racial groups.  
The Group Area Act (1950) enabled a remodelling of Cape Town’s residential quarters. 
Spatial zoning was imposed and non-white residents relocated from proclaimed ‘white’ 
areas to the distant Cape Flats. Relocated families were exposed to both a decline of qual-
ity in housing and physical location as well as loss of community cohesion. Western ar-
gues that the experience of removals has still today filled Cape Town residents with fear 
for their physical safety.1  
After having completed most of the group area removals the municipality then turned to 
give priority to eradication of squatter settlements. In the 1950s Cape Town was declared 
a Labour Preference Area for ‘Coloureds’ and since 1966 no further housing was sup-
plied for Black Africans.2 As they had to illegally find space within the city, informal set-
tlements expanded in the Greater Cape Town area. Crossroads is a significant case in 
point and known for having established its own self-government and informal economy. 
In a response, the apartheid government decided to develop new Black African townships 
and move the Crossroads community there. Khayelitsha is a prominent example which at 
the same time exposed the strategy of large site-and-service schemes. Haferburg (2007) 
stresses that during this period state intervention and planning were central to implement 
the social and spatial segregation.3 
The city-scale apartheid planning slowly lost momentum from the late 1980s. According 
to Haferburg the transition in Cape Town was characterised by a new suburbanisation of 
well-off citizens and the decline of the inner city.4 Informal settlements were tolerated by 
then as ‘transit camps’.5 
                                                 
1 See Western (1996), p. 235. 
2 See Bickford-Smith (1999) p. 182. 
3 See Haferburg (2007), p. 164. 
4 See Haferburg (2007), p. 150. 
5 See Saff (1998), pp. 91ff. 
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Although official transition to democracy was not until 1994, the transition from the 
apartheid to postapartheid city started in 1990/91.6 Group Areas were abandoned and 
homelands abolished. In the following, postapartheid city planning tried to reorient devel-
opment by promoting integration, confining urban edges and promoting activity corridors. 
However, Saff questions the reality of integration. New elites, according to Saff, influ-
enced the emergence of class-based city structures which continued the unequal and ra-
cially distorted socio-economic urban environment.7 
Residential segregation perpetuated outside political enforcement infused by high prop-
erty values and ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) syndrome. Gated communities and iso-
lated shopping and office buildings as well as migration to low-income areas further dis-
integrate and reinforce the spatial division between the well-off and poor.8 
Time Characteristics 
Apartheid city  
(1950s-1970s) 
Racial-based city structure, Group Areas, forced removals, municipal 
housing 
Period of transformation 
(1970s- 1990s) 
Expansion of informal settlements, relocation into new townships on the 
periphery, site and service schemes 
Political transition 
(1990-1994) 
Suburbanisation, decline of inner city , integration ideal, class-based city 
structure, tolerance of transit camps 
Postapartheid City 
(since 1994) 
Suburbanisation, gated communities, shopping malls, expansion of infor-
mal settlements, inner city renewal, mass-housing delivery 
Tab. 4.1: Transitions of Cape Town – key trends and state responses, Source: Own design 
4.1.1.2 Demographic trends 
Demographic changes impacted on the urban development characteristics of Cape Town. 
In 2006 Cape Town had a population of about 3.2 million9. Cape Town cannot be consid-
ered an emerging Megacity with regards to its number of inhabitants. Nevertheless, it ac-
counts for 64% of the population of the Western Cape Province10 and, in the period be-
tween 1996 and 2006, it had to accommodate a population increase of 700,000 at a dy-
                                                 
6 See Haferburg (2007), p. 150. 
7 See Saff (1998). 
8 See for instance Turok/Watson (2001); Robins (2003). 
9 See Romanovsky (2006), p. 9. 
10 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 8. 
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namic annual growth rate of about 3%.11 When influx control to Cape Town was finally 
done away with a large number of unemployed Black African migrated from the Eastern 
Cape to Cape Town. Cape Town had the highest net migration of all major urban areas in 
South Africa in the period from 1997 to 2001 with an average of 3,638 persons per month 
moving into the city.12 Demographic pressures at such a scale produced large informal 
settlements in the Cape Flats. Migration still has a high impact since 58% of population 
growth is constituted by migration. However, informal settlement growth is currently pre-
dominantly constituted by growth inherent to the city itself. 
A slow down of population growth can be noted with a growth rate in 2006 of 1.6% p.a.13 
The declining rate of population growth is due to the impact of HIV/AIDS14, decreasing 
migration15 and reduced fertility.16 As projections for urban growth trends are highly un-
certain, scenarios of population sizes range from 3.4 to 4.1 million for 2021.17 
Two factors, however, need to be taken into consideration: Firstly, population growth is 
not distributed evenly between different ethnic groups. In future the Black African and 
Coloured population will grow at a higher rate than the white group and thereby change 
the proportional makeup (see figure 4.1). Since previous residential segregation continues 
to shape the location of specific ethnic backgrounds, population growth will therefore 
primarily take place in the Metro South-East (Cape Flats) and thus poorer part of the 
city.18 
Secondly, household numbers are increasing more dynamically than population numbers. 
In 2001 the household size was at 3.6 with 760,000 households.19 A further 300,000 
                                                 
11 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 14. 
12 See City of Cape Town (2006e), p. 18. 
13 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 14. 
14 HIV/AIDS will be the cause of deaths for 50% of the deaths in the City by the year 2013. See Dorring-
ton (2006), p. 18. 
15 High in-migration was informed by out-migration from the Eastern Cape Province. The pool of poten-
tial group to out-migrate from the Eastern Cape has diminished. See Romanovsky (2006), p. 5. 
16 See Dorrington (2006). 
17 See Dorrington (2006), p. 14. 
18 The Black African population group constitutes 35% of Cape Town’s population. With an annual 
growth rate of 0.7% p.a. it is projected to make up 36% by 2021. Similarly the Coloured population will 
grow at 0.6% p.a. and will constitute 47% (46% in 2006) by 2021. The white group is projected to de-
crease from 18% (2006) to 15% in 2021. See Romanovsky (2006), pp. 9f. 
19 See Dorrington (2006), p. 17. 
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households are projected up to 2021.20 
 
Fig. 4.1: Graph population projections per ethnic group 
Source: adapted from Dorrington (2006), p. 15. 
4.1.1.3 Human and social development characteristics 
South Africa is faced with a declining Human Development Index (HDI). In Cape Town 
there is an increase of poverty within the city with about 38% of households living below 
the household poverty line in 2005.21 Also, the unemployment rate (at 21% in 2005) is in-
creasing.22 De Swardt et al (2005) stress, that poverty in Cape Town is related to migra-
tion from the Eastern Cape. This migration, they argue, appears not only due to the pull 
factor of jobs but as a strategy to reduce vulnerability.23 
Living conditions are impeded by an increasing HIV prevalence and tuberculosis inci-
dence rate.24 Furthermore, the social situation is affected by high levels of violent crime, 
especially murder and rape cases. Cape Town ranks among the ‘high-risk’ cities accord-
                                                 
20 See Romanovsky (2006), p. 13. 
21 Compared to 25% in 1996, see City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32. 
22 Compared to 13% in 1997, see City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32. 
23 See De Swardt et al (2005). 
24 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32. 
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ing to UN definition.25 Dramatic increase is recorded in drug-related crimes which is as-
sociated with deteriorating socio-economic conditions.26 
Although Cape Town has a high economic growth rate its pattern of inequality persists. A 
number of scholars therefore suggest that the social polarisation of the apartheid era is re-
produced by globalisation trends and reflected in a continued spatial division of the city.27 
The social disparities are characterised by differences in income distribution, work status, 
health status, housing quality and access to services and housing. For instance inequality 
is reflected in income distribution with a large number of people living with a little over 
R12 a day (17%) and about the same number living with over R90 a day (18%).28 Ine-
quality within the city becomes further apparent taking into consideration that 20% of the 
worst off areas, which comprise 40% of the population, have an unemployment rate of be-
tween 40-58% (68% of total unemployed).29 Poorer areas also have a higher rate of tuber-
culosis incidence and of HIV prevalence due to unsanitary conditions, higher vulnerabil-
ity and increasing risk-taking behaviour in a context of social disintegration.30 Moreover, 
the number of households in informal settlements has increased to about 115,000 in 2005 
(compared to 23,000 in 1993).31 About 14% (448,000) of all population is classified as 
living in informal settlements.32 These settlements are affected by lack of services. Al-
though all formal and 74% of households in informal settlements have access to safe 
drinking water, only 37% of informal households have access to sanitation services and 
are therefore more likely to be affected by diseases.33 The spatial differences in living 
conditions are illustrated in the map below (see figure 4.2). It illustrates that poverty is 
concentrated in the Cape Flats in the South-East of the city.34 
                                                 
25 See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 27. 
26 See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 54-56. 
27 See for example Beall/ Crankshaw/Parnell (2002); Saff (1998); Bond (2003b); Wilkinson (2004). 
28 See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 40. 
29 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p.32 
30 Whereas in average Cape Town has a HIV prevalence rate of 15.7 highest prevalence can be found in 
Nyanga (28.1) and Khayelitsha (27.2). See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 33. 
31 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p.15. 
32 See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 32. 
33 See City of Cape Town (2005c), pp. 30f. 
34 The socio-economic status index is based on a composite indicator which includes the proportion of 
households earning less than R19,200 p.a., the proportion of adults (20+) with highest educational level 
less than matric, the proportion of the economically active population that is unemployed and the propor-
tion of the labour force employed in elementary/unskilled occupations. See Smith, K. (2005), p. 33. 
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Fig. 4.2: Socio-economic status index per suburb, Source: City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 16. 
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4.1.1.4 Economic development characteristics 
Cape Town has a high and increasing economic growth rate with an average annual 
growth in GGP (Gross Geographic Product) of about 4% since 1993 according to the 
Cape Town Sustainability Report. However, the report stresses that it needs 6-7% to re-
duce unemployment.35 It is an important economic driver generating 76% of the region’s 
and 11% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).36 Osmanovic (2000) stresses that 
75% of Cape Town’s GDP is related to domestic demand. Foreign markets therefore do 
not represent the export basis for the city.37 Economic drivers are primarily small busi-
nesses.38 
Although it represents a diversified economy, Cape Town follows the general trend of 
growth of the service sector whilst other sectors, such as the manufacturing sector for 
low-skill employment, are declining.39 
As a result of its booming economy, Cape Town is attracting people. However, it provides 
mostly formal employment in the high-skilled sector. A large share of the workforce re-
mains unutilised as about half of the population has not completed matric.40 Thus many 
lack skills and education for high-skilled jobs.41 As the urban economy fails to provide 
formal employment to them, they are accommodated by an informal economy which, 
nevertheless, is also linked to a formal job market.42 
However, official statistics and strategic documents do not cover this issue. Wilkinson 
(2004) indicates that in 2000 22% of the economically active population were employed 
in the informal sector.43  
The following figure illustrates that the gap between economic growth and unemployment 
rate in Cape Town is widening. 
                                                 
35 See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 38. 
36 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 8. 
37 See Osmanovic (2000). 
38 50% of economic output and 40% of employment are generated by the 93% small businesses. See City 
of Cape Town (2006b), p. 37. 
39 In 2004 the largest contributor was the finance and business sector (33.7%). Manufacturing (19.4%) and 
construction (3.7%) are declining in proportional terms. See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 38. 
40 Final exam at high school level in South Africa 
41 See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 36. 
42 See De Swardt et al (2005). 
43 See Wilkinson (2004), p. 219. 
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Fig. 4.3: Unemployment and economic growth rate,  
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 38 
4.1.1.5 Spatial development characteristics 
Since the mid 1980s there has been a 40% increase in the developed land area character-
ised by large new shopping centres, new industrial areas and new residential suburbs.44 
Cape Town develops at an average rate of 1232 hectares p.a. This is associated with its 
low-density peripheral development and urban sprawl.45 With about 2644 people per 
square kilometre Cape Town has a relatively low urban population density. Highest densi-
ties associated with overcrowding are found in the low income areas in the Metro South-
East.46  These areas lack access and respectively imply long commuting distances to job 
opportunities. The ‘Planning Future Cape Town’ draft report even goes so far as to indi-
cate:  
“This is resulting in huge internal tensions within communities and reinforces the patterns of 
exclusion and polarisation between rich and poor. Ongoing tensions and pressure arise from 
the continual densification of poor areas through in-migration. The competition for access to 
public land, housing and resources is intense and sparks regular conflict.”47 
The report highlights that Cape Town’s expansion potential has reached its limit. It indi-
                                                 
44 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 14. 
45 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 25. 
46 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 26. 
47 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 42. 
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cates that with this continuous pattern of settlement development, all land suitable for 
housing will be developed in a 50-60 years time frame. 48 
These spatial development trends impact upon the ecological capacity of the city. Grow-
ing land and resource consumption as well as the dominating use of private cars and in-
adequate public transport contribute to waste accumulation and account for the deteriorat-
ing air quality, water scarcity and pollution.49 Furthermore, the constraints in water and 
electricity consumption over the last years have illustrated the limited capacity of the met-
ropolitan area to cater for its growth.50 
Influence Characteristics 
Historical influence Racial zoning during apartheid resulted in segregated communities 
Relocation destroyed social cohesion 
Demographic pressure Urban growth rate at 1.6% p.a. (declining) 
Population growth rates not distributed evenly 
Increasing numbers of households 
Socio-economic  
disparities 
High (and rising) poverty rate at 38% (2005) 
Increasing violence and crime rate 
Worsening health situation: e.g. HIV- prevalence rate at 15.7% 
Inequality and highly segmented living conditions 
Growth of poorly-serviced informal settlements 
Growth without  
employment 
Strong economic growth 
Economic growth does not meet need for employment opportunities 
Tertiarisation of city economy: jobs mainly in highly skilled categories 
Low skill levels 
Strong informal sector – 22% work in informal sector 
Sprawling city and urban 
disintegration 
 
Continuing fragmentation and segregation 
Low-density urban sprawl, limitation of expansion potential 
Overcrowding in low income areas 
Lack of access, long commuting distances 
Increasing resource consumption and pollution (waste, water, air) 
Tab.4.2: Key urbanisation characteristics of Cape Town, Source: Own design 
                                                 
48 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 41. 
49 For detailed data see City of Cape Town (2006c); City of Cape Town (2005b). 
50 See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 41-42. 
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4.1.2 Housing trends of Cape Town 
4.1.2.1 Housing backlog and demand 
The housing backlog in Cape Town has increased continuously from 150,000 (1998) to 
245,000 (2002)51 to 300,000 in 2005.52 
New household formation which occurs due to natural population growth and migration, 
results in an estimated increase in housing needs at 18,500 units p.a.53 There are about 
8,000 housing units p.a. provided through the state subsidy scheme. Thus the backlog is 
increasing by about 10,500 units annually. 
The housing backlog is made up of households in shacks in informal settlements and 
households in inadequate housing conditions such as in shacks on serviced (formal) sites, 
in over-crowded housing and in backyard shacks.  
Due to high migration rates informal settlements have increased rapidly since 1996. By 
2005 there were more than 200 informal settlements accounting for approximately 98,031 
shacks housing about 400,000 people (13% of total population).54 The majority of infor-
mal settlements are still concentrated in former Black township areas. Khayelitsha for in-
stance comprises 13 informal settlements with 42,170 shacks.55 
A comparison of the backlog composition between 2002 and 2004 reveals that whilst the 
number of shacks in informal settlements is declining, the number of inadequately housed 
families is increasing. A new phenomenon has occurred: the growth of informal settle-
ments is no longer aligned primarily to migration of newcomers into the city. Instead, it is 
aligned to the spill-over from existing settlements. These households occupy vacant land 
within the existing areas and, not as previously, adjacent to them. A senior housing offi-
cial stressed: 
“We have to understand the spatial implications to the numbers and how it [informal settle-
ment growth] has moved from what was previously a migration-driven process it is now in-
herent to the city’s growth process.”56 
                                                 
51 See City of Cape Town (2002), p. 89. 
52 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 15. 
53 See City of Cape Town (2006e), p. 67. 
54 See City of Cape Town (2006a), pp. 5ff. 
55 See City of Cape Town (2006a), p. 6. 
56 City official 2 
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 2002 2004 
Shacks in informal settlements 100 000 +/- 96 200 
Shacks on serviced sites (or inadequately housed) 25 000 +/- 28 600 
Households in over-crowded housing stock 51 000 +/- 59 800 
Backyard shacks (or inadequately housed) 64 000 +/- 75 400 
Total 240 000 260 000 
Tab. 4.3: Composition of housing backlog in Cape Town 
Source: Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p.32 and City of Cape Town (2006a), p. 6 
Whereas 13% of all households in Cape Town live in shacks in informal settlements, the 
share of households within the subsidy bracket is much higher. 41.6% of all households in 
Cape Town fall into the subsidy income category and are therefore eligible for housing 
subsidies. A further 16.1% of households fall into the so-called ‘gap’ since they are not 
eligible for subsidy, but do not qualify for housing loans. With the expected growth of in-
comes the share of households eligible for subsidies will decrease while gap-housing in-
creases.57 
Again this situation is mostly concentrated in the former Black but also Coloured com-
munities. Cape Town, unlike Johannesburg, has few inner city slums and is more charac-
terised by poor living environments on the Cape Flats periphery. Davis even refers to the 
whole of this area with a population of 1.2 million as a ‘megaslum’.58 
However, not all households making up the backlog are looking for a physical structure. 
For many of them location and provision of services are more important. In terms of 
physical structures the most pressing housing issues named are provision of low income 
housing, upgrading, housing quality and access to land.59 People sell state provided RDP 
houses and move back to squatter camps – an evidence that the formal structure is not the 
priority need, but survival which is often interlinked with well-located land close to in-
come opportunities. 
                                                 
57 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 28. 
58 See Davis (2006), p. 28. 
59 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 35. 
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4.1.2.2 Housing conditions and density 
The physical condition of housing is characterised as poor and deteriorating.60 14% of the 
housing stock in 2005 was classified as informal.61 However, uneven distribution ac-
counts for suburbs in the Cape Flats having up to 100% informal dwellings.62 
Low-income housing areas are differentiated between informal settlements, public hous-
ing areas and low-income (state-subsidised) private housing areas. In the formal housing 
areas informal dwellings in backyards or on smaller pockets of land are also included. 
Generally, the socio-economic conditions in informal areas and backyard shacks are 
worse in comparison to other low-income areas. The disparity becomes specifically evi-
dent in basic service provision. About half of the households in informal settlements are 
not serviced whereas the majority of households in formal housing areas have access to 
services.63 
For those in backyard shacks the situation is even more difficult as they mostly do not ap-
pear in official statistics and often do not profit from upgrading projects. One City coun-
cillor explained: 
“[...] in the informal community living in the backyard – those people are the most desperate 
because they are not seen as a squatter community. They are hidden away.”64 
4.1.2.3 Land availability for housing 
The need for strategic land developments has become a concern since current housing 
projects have shown to be unsustainable in terms of settlement patterns and inappropriate 
to households in housing need.65 A government official outlined the challenge: 
“[…] the only land that is available is at the outskirts of the city. If the poorest people live at 
the outskirts, you are going to have problems in terms of transport, in getting them to job op-
portunities. If you do not have transport you are actually exacerbating the economic need of 
those people.”66 
                                                 
60 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 43. 
61 This figure is estimated to be higher in reality. Informal housing is defined as according to building 
standards and includes serviced and unserviced structures as well as backyard shacks. “An informal house 
is defined as a wood and iron structure which does not meet basic standards of safety in building.” City of 
Cape Town (2006e), p. 67. 
62 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), pp. 16-17. 
63 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), pp. 19-20. 
64 Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006. 
65 See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 41-42. 
66 City official 8 
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However, City officials perceive the shortage of land for Greenfield developments as the 
biggest housing constraint.67 A situational analysis on the status of land for housing re-
vealed that Cape Town has some of the highest land prices in South Africa. Between 2000 
and 2005 house prices increased by 20% p.a. and buyers of land realise profits of up to 
100% within a year.68  
The land market in Cape Town is characterised by strong inequalities where most of the 
well-located land is owned by affluent (mostly white) South Africans and foreigners. The 
booming land and property market impacts on the allocation of land for low-income hous-
ing which continues to be located on the periphery. 
Although 48% of land available for housing is in public ownership, this supply will only 
last for another 3-5 years. The development of suitable land parcels in well-located areas 
is, however, often met by resistance from local residents (NIMBY) against low-income 
housing.69 
Informal settlements are predominantly situated on public land. However, the City is con-
fronted with an increasing invasion on privately owned land and faced with the dilemma 
of holding no land for relocation.70 
Characteristic Tendency 
Housing backlog High (and increasing): 300,000 (2005) 
Quality of housing Poor (and deteriorating): 14% informal 
Cost of land High (and increasing) 
Availability of land for low-income housing Low (and decreasing) 
Tab. 4.4: Key housing characteristics of Cape Town, Source: Own design 
4.1.3 Strategic planning documents 
Cape Town is facing interrelated challenges of social inclusion, service and housing de-
livery, urban economic development, poverty reduction, spatial restructuring and envi-
ronmental sustainability. 
                                                 
67 See Graham (2005), p. 49. 
68 See DAG (2007), p. 16. 
69 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003), pp. 23-25. 
70 In 2005 informal settlements were located on land which was 25% in private ownership, 65% in City of 
Cape Town ownership and 10% in the ownership of the Western Cape/State. See van Niekerk (2006). 
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The required institutional responses on a city-wide level were first addressed by the Unic-
ity Commission.71 It specifically stressed the socio-economic deficiencies in Cape Town 
as a result of social divisions and promotes: 
 “[…] to build a unified city and take bold and innovative steps to significantly improve our 
position as a relevant, socially just and globally competitive city.”72 
4.1.3.1 City-wide Spatial Development Framework (SDF) 
In 2006 a long-term City Development Strategy (‘Cape Town 2030’) and its spatial com-
ponent (‘Future Cape Town’) were still underway. A draft document (‘Planning for Fu-
ture Cape Town’) was published to inform city-wide and district Spatial Development 
Frameworks (SDFs) as part of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP).73 Through spatial 
planning the City seeks to identify constraints and to suggest priority location for upgrad-
ing and restructuring thus giving direction for future investments in terms of transport, 
environmental and settlement development.74 
Planning Instrument Content 
Cape Town 2030 City Development Strategy 
Future Cape Town Long-term spatial component of Cape Town 2030 
Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF) Spatial component of the IDP 
District Spatial Development Plans 
(SDPs) 
Application of SDF strategies and policies at district scale, 
e.g. identification of new development and urban upgrading 
areas 
Tab. 4.5: Spatial planning instruments for Cape Town, Source: Own design 
With the City Development Strategy spatial perspectives are integrated into a broader un-
derstanding of development objectives. The draft document ‘Planning for Future Cape 
Town’ pays tribute to intergovernmental and institutional constraints and comprises an 
understanding of social and economic forces. It moves away from isolated single projects 
and a spatial concept of nodes and activity corridors which was formerly outlined in the 
                                                 
71 The Unicity Commission was established in 1999 as a multi-party body to supervise the transition to the 
Unicity and give recommendations for its strategic direction. For an overview of the evolution of the 
Unicity model see Pieterse (2002a). 
72 The Unicity Commission (2001), p. 3. 
73 The City is divided into eight planning districts which have individual Spatial Development Plans 
(SDPs) under a broader Spatial Development Framework. 
74 See City of Cape Town (2008b). 
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Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF). Instead, the CDS aligns different 
strategies and understands the city within its region beyond municipal boundaries. Fur-
thermore, it suggests economic zones and containment of urban growth as well as identi-
fication of infill sites and of open and public spaces as spatial elements (see figure 4.4).75 
 
Fig. 4.4: Proposed integrated settlement plan for Cape Town 
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 40. 
                                                 
75 See City of Cape Town (2006b). 
 145
The City Development Strategy and its spatial component represent a continuity of ra-
tional planning approaches. In the 1990s the Metropolitan Spatial Development Frame-
work (1996) and Municipal Spatial Development Framework (1999) were based on the 
consensus that the city was to be reconstructed according to new spatial planning ideals 
(compact city with activity corridors) and in line with redistribution aims of the national 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). However, in reality the spatial 
framework failed and has not been fully endorsed by council. One key deficiency was that 
it tried to direct private investment to the poorer areas in the Metro South-East.76 Critics 
state that the spatial framework demonstrated an interventionist, technocratic and simpli-
fied approach based on a dual city conceptualisation between areas of opportunities and 
lack of opportunity. Watson specifies that the rational planning of an ideal urban future 
was superimposed and inadequate.77 Moreover, a number of scholars stress that institu-
tional constraints were not taken into consideration.  Watson illustrates that spatial plan-
ners were sidelined and had to redefine their role given the shift to Integrated Develop-
ment Plans and intergovernmental competition and power games. Scholars also stress that 
the planners overlooked social, economic and political realities in Cape Town.78 Market-
driven development processes and not planning determined the urban development char-
acter.  
The new draft spatial perspective of Cape Town has to a large extent moved away from 
simplified strategies and taken into account many of the institutional and market-driven 
constraints. It, however, still lacks reference to the dominating informal processes at work 
and therefore leaves open how the long-term spatial plan can be implemented. 
In this context, Harrison’s identification of competing rationalities shaping South African 
cities still hold true and can be used to describe Cape Town with its urban integration 
ideal contrasted by the reality of decentralised shopping malls and gated communities, its 
compact city focus contrasted by low density urban sprawl and, more generally, by its 
spatial design contrasted by informal activity. Harrison’s conclusion still has relevance: 
The spatial frameworks represent only ideals neglecting the reality of everyday lives.79 
                                                 
76 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 29. 
77 See Watson (2002a); Watson (2003a), (2003c). 
78 See for example Wilkinson (2004); Haferburg (2007); Pieterse (2006); Watson (2002a). 
79 See Harrison (2002). 
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4.1.3.2 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
While the City Development Strategy (CDS) and spatial frameworks are still underway 
institutional responses to the urban development challenges are summarised in the Inte-
grated Development Plan. The IDP is the strategic document for guiding planning and in-
vestment within a five year time frame. For the financial year 2006/2007 it promotes five 
interlocking strategies that translate in strategic documents80 and lead themes: 
- Integrated economic development and jobs 
- Integrated access and mobility 
- Integrated communities 
- Integrated settlements 
- Environment 
Criticism is raised in terms of the adequacy of the Integrated Development Plan. The 
overall criticisms stated in terms of IDP instrument (see Chapter 2.2.3) also allude to the 
Cape Town IDP document. Concerns raised are around the inadequacy of New Public 
Management approaches in a context of administrative restructuring, political instability 
and lack of cooperative governance as well as the lack of political will for meaningful in-
stitutional participation.81  
Criticism has been also raised around the content and orientation of the Cape Town IDP. 
Scholars stress the contradictions of municipal strategies arising from both economic-
growth orientation and developmentalism. It is envisioned that in terms of its economic 
development Cape Town will become a globally competitive city. This is to be achieved 
by investor friendly initiatives, public private partnership approaches and increasing ac-
cess to economic opportunities for the poor.82 With an increasing understanding that eco-
nomic growth takes place without a ‘trickle-down’ effect benefiting the poor, the City has 
shifted to a call for shared economic growth.83 It is, however, argued that the contradic-
tions between a pro-growth and pro-poor orientation have not been resolved in the IDP.  
                                                 
80 The strategic documents comprise: Economic Development Strategy, Building Strong Communities, In-
tegrated Human Settlement Strategy, Transport/Mobility Plan, Infrastructure and Development Plan, Fi-
nancial Plan. See City of Cape Town (2006e). 
81 This aspect will be further detailed in the chapter on governance in Cape Town. 
82 See City of Cape Town (2001a), p. 10; City of Cape Town (2006c). 
83 See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 4. 
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“It seems self-evident that commitments such as that to alleviating poverty will be likely to sit 
somewhat uneasily alongside, for instance, the commitment to promoting tourism as devel-
opment priorities and that, inevitably, some trading-off between them will be required. A col-
lective political rationality to govern the terms of that trade-off is exactly what appears to be 
missing from the current situation so that the inherent tensions between “pro-growth” and 
“pro-poor” agendas in the city will tend to persist rather than to be resolved.“84 
Key stakeholders in the City fear that economic disparities will increase despite institu-
tional aims of integration.85 According to Osmanovic, the ‘Going Global’ strategy and the 
investments made in corresponding infrastructure have lead to the neglect of poverty. He 
cautions against the threat of a vulnerable specialised industry such as tourism, structural 
instability due to loss of social cohesion and aligned distribution struggles.86 
Seekings (2006) argues that although one can observe a neoliberal urban regime in Cape 
Town it does not mean that the municipal practice is only growth-oriented. Instead he as-
serts redistributive elements in service provision and illustrates his argument taking prop-
erty taxes as a case in point.87 Moreover, he argues, that existent boycotts and non-
payment of service charges represent a massive redistribution to the poor. Furthermore, he 
points out that welfare initiatives by local government are even exceeded by national gov-
ernment grants and pensions representing a massive cross-subsidisation. As a conse-
quence, he concludes, that Cape Town is still developmental but with "a poor understand-
ing of what effective and integrated development would mean".88 
This ambiguity is reflected in IDP documents which lack setting of priorities with aligned 
budgets. One provincial official therefore commented that the first cycle of IDP in Cape 
Town was not strategic: “Strategy does not mean nothing, if it is not able to shift re-
sources.”89 
                                                 
84 Wilkinson (2004), p. 225. 
85 See Haferburg (2007), p. 307. 
86 See Osmanovic (2000). 
87 Property taxes are raised according to property market value. Therefore none of the informal settlement 
household and almost none of the formal township areas pay any property related rates. 
88 Seekings (2006), pp. 11-15. 
89 Provincial official 2  
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4.1.3.3 Integrated Human Settlement Strategy (IHSS) 
Housing management had been a fragmented responsibility within the administration until 
2002 with the release of a draft first city-wide housing plan.90 
The first Integrated Human Settlement Strategy (IHSS) was published in 2005. The plan 
is one of the strategic documents as part of the IDP. Its aim is to give strategic direction to 
the housing process and investment. Furthermore, the document is aligned to the national 
housing policy ‘Breaking New Ground’ and other provincial frameworks such as the 
Western Cape Spatial Development Framework (see following figure). 
 
Fig. 4.5: Alignment of government housing strategies in Cape Town 
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 7. 
Key objectives of the City’s housing strategy are summarised as follows91: 
- to reduce the number of people in informal settlements between 2004 and 2014 
- to address housing needs of people in backyards and overcrowded conditions 
- to improve living environments 
                                                 
90 See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 4. 
91 See City of Cape Town (2005d). 
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- to locate new low-cost developments closer to the urban core 
- to create an enabling environment for developing settlements 
- to support communities and enable participation 
It proposes in terms of spatial planning the strategic identification of land and the devel-
opment of an urban core by densification and mixed use. Housing delivery itself is to be 
accelerated through increasing the number of new developments (from 8,000 to 20,000 
p.a.) and through an Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme (UISP) with a focus 
on insitu. 35% of informal settlements are supposed to be relocated and all others are to 
be upgraded by 2014. These initiatives are supposed to be accompanied by an increase in 
financial allocation and diversifying of funding sources.92 
A shift in the political orientation is reflected through the Integrated Human Settlements 
Strategy. Firstly, the City now also focuses on gap housing. Its target group are people 
with an income above the subsidy eligibility but who cannot access credit. 
Secondly, the City now officially admits that it cannot provide a housing unit for every-
one. Instead of delivering housing units, the City intends to provide a larger number of 
housing opportunities as outlined in the Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme 
(UISP). This programme provides serviced sites through an area-based, not subsidy bene-
ficiary, approach.  
“With the old subsidy programme if people did not qualify for a subsidy – what did you do 
with them? You could not integrate them to the project. The UISP says everyone qualifies for 
the minimum of a site. Not a house.”93 
The shift to site-and-service schemes seems to be a return to previous practices. Neverthe-
less, this shift is appreciated within the municipal administration. One City official com-
mented on the necessity of site-and-service programmes: 
“Certainly there has been a shift from the mayor’s point of view in saying the priority is not 
to give people brick and mortar houses, the priority is to give people housing opportunities so 
to give them land and services and give them a kick start. […]People laugh, because that is 
the kind of old methodology. But I think it is the right thing.” 
This new mechanism is hoped to increase the subsidy-based housing opportunities. 
                                                 
92 See City of Cape Town (2006f), p. 22; City of Cape Town (2005d). 
93 City official 4 
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“If we can only do sites, we can probably do two sites […) per subsidy and then come with 
the housing later. Maybe people will build their own houses, maybe some consolidation sub-
sidy later on for those people who do qualify.”94 
The innovativeness of the approach could also be interpreted as giving up looking for 
other alternatives. One official expressed: 
“But the reality is that the site-and-service scheme is the only option for the poorest of the 
poor and that means it is large tracks of land at the edge of the city. […] The tragedy is that 
when you do site-and-service it will always be very far away. But I suppose it is better than 
nothing. “95 
A fear of city councillors is that previous RDP beneficiaries will move into these settle-
ments and then benefit a second time.96  
One critical aspect highlighted by scholars is the technical and standardised approach to 
site-and-service schemes which are often implemented as roll-over schemes instead of in-
situ upgrading. The upgrading approach seems to neglect that site-and-service schemes   
have failed before and many of these settlements have not consolidated. The experience 
made by the communities therefore fuels resistance to the approach. One councillor out-
lined the dilemma: 
“We cannot provide RDP type of housing for people on the waiting list. We simple do not 
have the financial resources to do that. In situ upgrading of squatter communities therefore is 
not only an option; it becomes a necessity. There are quite a lot of individuals in the squatter 
communities who do not appreciate that. Their demand is at least a RDP house”97  
In terms of the housing challenge the Integrated Human Settlement Strategy has intro-
duced a paradigm shift to more integrated approaches. It moves away from standard re-
sponses to the housing problem and promotes two key interventions with informal settle-
ment upgrading and social housing. Nevertheless, in reality the majority of public housing 
projects are still low-cost delivery on the periphery. More innovative approaches are 
tested as pilots, but these have not yet been translated on a higher scale. 
                                                 
94 City official 4 
95 City official 7 
96 Comments at portfolio committee workshop, 13.10.06. 
97 Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006. 
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4.2 Local governance in Cape Town 
Given the planning and housing challenges in Cape Town, governance related questions 
become essential as to what contributes to the failure of policy implementation within the 
sphere of government and as to what opportunity to influence policy-formulation and 
practice is given to other actors. 
4.2.1 Intergovernmental cooperation 
Housing functions are dispersed over all levels of government – both in the political and 
administrative spheres (see table 4.6). National government pursues housing provision as 
a poverty reduction strategy and therefore gives an interventionist role to the local state 
level. At the same time higher spheres of government hold vested powers and determine 
housing policy and finance. As discussed before, the autonomy of local government is 
therefore limited in terms of delivery pressure from higher spheres of government. The 
central state can affect local policy-choice by transferring functions and by limiting or 
providing financial resources (see Chapter 2.1.3). The devolution of responsibility for 
housing delivery is therefore characterised as ‘unfunded mandates’. Local government is 
limited in strategically selecting and prioritising projects as the subsidy procedure domi-
nates the housing process. Nevertheless, with the multi-year planning process and a hous-
ing chapter in the IDP, option of accreditation and taxation the scope for municipal action 
is broadened. 
Level Government Administration 
National Minister of Housing, Parliament Department of Housing (DoH) 
Provincial Member of Executive Council (MEC), 
Council 
Western Cape Department of Local 
Government and Housing 
Metropolitan 
Council 
City of Cape Town Municipal Council/ 
Mayoral Executive Committee 
(MAYCO), Executive Mayor/ Portfolio 
committees 
City of Cape Town Municipality (CCT) / 
Executive Directorates / Directorates / 
Branches 
Areas Subcouncil, Subcouncil chairperson Regional offices, Subcouncil manager 
Ward Ward Council Regional offices 
Tab. 4.6: Different levels of government with housing functions, Source: Own design 
The need for intergovernmental alignment and cooperation has been addressed since 2006 
 152
by an Intergovernmental Relations Policy and an action plan.98 Vertical governance issues 
become also more evident for housing. Improvement of intergovernmental coordination is 
seen as the key for urban renewal, settlement planning and housing management tasks. An 
important initiative by the City was the accreditation for administering housing funds by 
end of 2006.99 Beforehand it refrained from accreditation as this required extensive ad-
ministration for the identification of beneficiaries, payment of subsidies and management 
of the housing stock.100  
Therefore, the City of Cape Town acts as the developer on behalf of the Province and the 
Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing administered the housing 
programmes. The funding for housing of about R 400-500 million comes from national 
level via the Province. This finance covers 8,000 housing units per annum. In addition to 
this housing budget the City is responsible for providing underground services and has to 
finance this from its own municipal budget (about a further 120 million Rand).101 The 
ward councillor submits beneficiary names to the municipality which forwards the list to 
the provincial level for subsidy application. In terms of the People’s Housing Process 
(PHP) projects are financed from Province and the City acts as account administrator. 
This dependency on finance from national and provincial level causes resource constraints 
for the City of Cape Town concerning its delivery responsibility. One official explained: 
“If you look at our track record we are required to build between 20,000 and 22,000 houses 
a year to address the backlog. The availability of funding has actually caused us to build less 
than 7,000 houses average a year. So the backlog is growing.”102 
The dependency is particularly difficult in Cape Town since the different levels of gov-
ernment are affiliated to different parties. The difference is that the Democratic Alliance 
(local government) is more demand-driven whereas the ANC (provincial and national 
government) is more supply-driven when it comes to housing.103 
Of specific concern to the administration is that higher sphere of government are taking 
over local government competency.  
                                                 
98 See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 60. 
99 Although accreditation has not been finalised in 2008. See SACN (2008). 
100 See Graham (2005), p. 48. 
101 See interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006. 
102 City official 8 
103 City official 7 
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“Sometimes Province has land on the edge of a city and […] what they used to do is to de-
velop a housing project and say to local authority: “Right. Here it is. You do the water, sani-
tation, refuse removal.” […] There is quite a struggle because the City will have its own 
plans, but provinces hold actually the strings at the moment.”104 
A case in point for taking over local authority’s competency was highlighted by the con-
tested N2 Gateway project which is a presidential lead housing project. In 2006 the pro-
ject was handed to an agency aligned to national government. It was suspected that the 
project was taken away from the City when it became apparent that the ANC might not 
win local elections.105  
Political conflicts also delay approval processes. One Housing official outlined: 
“It takes us eight months to get a project approval by Province and since the DA is in power 
the Province has not given us one project approval. Housing and politics just do not go to-
gether.”106 
Given these power games, national and provincial housing strategies are not translated 
into municipal practice. One City official stated that: 
“No, for me it is high in the sky and has not filtered down where I am. Provincial and na-
tional government are very good at coming out with new strategies. Wait another two years 
and they will have another strategy.”107 
Since housing is on the political agenda, the implementation of the strategy is also chal-
lenged by the relations between the administrative and the political sphere in the City. The 
reality of political decision-making illustrates that strategic approaches by the administra-
tion often lack a corresponding political commitment. The IDP plan therefore remains a 
generalised document. Specific recommendations outlined by the officials will be general-
ised once it has to go through Council approval. One City official stated: 
“[…] it [the IDP draft] goes to the portfolio committee which is the first set of political body 
for housing […]. They look at it and they generalise it even further. Then it goes to the may-
oral committee which is the senior politicians. They again generalise it. By the time all the 
specifics have been cut out, just so it does not offend absolutely anyone. Then it hits the press 
and then it goes in the public domain and everybody giggles, because it does not say very 
much.”108 
                                                 
104 Interview with Mark Napier, 7.11.2006. 
105 City official 3 
106 City official 1 
107 City official 3 
108 City official 1 
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The housing portfolio committee is the monthly forum where officials and councillors 
come together. Moreover, informal committees have been established to facilitate com-
munication between the political and administrative sphere. Three councillors and the 
mayor meet the key senior officials from various departments in a ‘Housing Action 
Committee’ every second week. Also, the councillor responsible for the housing portfolio 
meets the senior housing officials on a monthly basis in a kind of ‘shadow meeting’. 
These informal meetings are perceived as critical to enhance the interface between poli-
tics and administration.109 
The relationship between officials and sub-council level, however, was characterised by a 
lack of communication. In 2006 officials were therefore located to specific sub-councils. 
Differences between the political and administrative sphere continue to determine the 
practice on the ground. One key aspect is the political resistance against upgrading ap-
proaches whereas the administration opts for a paradigm shift to in situ upgrading and 
area-based approaches with regard to informal settlements. 
“We need to reconfigure the problem. Because delivering units is not going to solve the prob-
lem. […] Informal settlements are part of the urban environment and will remain so.”110 
This understanding, however, has not yet been fully translated into the political sphere. 
Initiatives are resisted particularly by ward councillors who rather opt for augmenting de-
livery rates of RDP houses to expand their constituency. Specifically the shift from an in-
dividualised to an area-based approach is highly contested. Instead, council still states it 
can house all the people and that it will eradicate all informal settlements by 2014. This 
contradicts positions within administration towards in situ upgrading and security of ten-
ure. One housing official states his concern: 
“Eradication of informal settlements is the wrong approach. It is anti-developmental and a 
middle-class attitude towards the poor. Informal settlements are networks of survival.”111 
The delivery approach to housing promoted by council is perceived as failure also to City 
planners. 
                                                 
109 Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006. 
110 City official 6 
111 City official 2 
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“The council, when they come in they say: we need another Mitchells Plain. Where do we 
find another Mitchells Plain? We find another Mitchells Plain out there and if there is an-
other kak place to be, it is out there, because there is no public transport, there is no 
nada.”112  
Dewar even refers to government’s delivery agenda as a “Religious belief to provide peo-
ple with development”.113 This delivery approach puts government officials under such 
pressure to concentrate on outcomes that more strategic approaches are sidelined. One 
City official recalled: 
“Every single politician was shouting at us about land. They were screaming at Planning. 
They were screaming at Housing. It was just manic. Every single official in the building was 
mobilising around finding land and finding information on land and bugger all else. It was a 
disaster.”114 
Proactive approaches are also threatened by political patronage. City officials are frus-
trated with promises made during election periods: 
“I am always coming back to the issue of politics causing more problems than anything. Just 
before the time of elections a lot of people are allowed to invade, […] because they are going 
to vote in a certain way. […] But it leaves us with a big problem. We must babysit all this.”115 
Additionally, the implementation of municipal housing strategies is constrained by lack of 
coordination and capacity within the administration. The importance of inter-departmental 
coordination in order to integrate aspects such as economic development, job creation and 
transport and mobility, is increasingly acknowledged.116 One critical aspect is around ca-
pacity constraints. As one housing official put it: 
“I am battling to find people to run critical projects. […] Isn’t housing top of the agenda of 
government? If it is, then allocate the proper resources to do that. […] The resources are 
there. It is just that they are not distributed correctly.”117 
As a result of the capacity constraints, housing officials feel reduced to crisis manage-
ment. Another housing official stated: 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 City official 7 
113 Personal communication with David Dewar, 27.03.2006. 
114 City official 7 
115 City official 3 
116 See City of Cape Town (2006f), p. 22; City of Cape Town (2005d). 
117 City official 3 
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“Just because of the shear work load that I have currently got I am just seriously not coping 
with all the projects. […] It is crisis management which is far from ideal.”118 
Given this context, the housing backlog is growing while capacities to deliver are decreas-
ing (see following figure). 
 
Fig. 4.6: Housing backlog and housing delivery in Cape Town 
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 43. 
The lack of resources also translates into a competition between different departments for 
their share of the budget.119 Particular internal tensions emerge between departments that 
hold the revenue services and those having to receive finance for their operations.120 
This aggravates the already existent silo approach within the administration. Therefore the 
managerial approach of the IDP has been specifically questioned by Wilson. He stresses 
that in reality local government continued to work in line function which contradicts the 
integrated approach of the IDP.121 
                                                 
118 City official 5 
119 The City of Cape Town has only 20% of its capital budget (about 250 million Rand) to play with. See 
City official 6. 
120 City official 3 
121 See Wilkinson (2004), pp. 224ff. 
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As a consequence, IDPs in Cape Town were rather a compilation of what was happening 
anyway in the line departments than to come to an agreement on strategic priorities. As a 
provincial official outlined, Cape Town was specifically characterised by it’s failing in-
tergovernmental and interdepartmental relationships.122 
Therefore the IDP did not serve as a strategic direction for housing officials. Instead, they 
felt reduced to provide reports on delivery rates. One official commented: 
“To me the IDP was a static thing that I just fed into. And I did not know further than that. 
Whoever processed that info was able to monitor and evaluate on progress and that was not 
fed back to me to see if we are on target or falling below.”123 
The restructuring of local government further aggravated the silo approach. This also 
complicated an integrated approach for servicing of informal settlements. Whereas previ-
ously one official was in charge for a whole area, this task was now divided into line 
functions. For instance the directorate for water would now exclusively look at water ser-
vicing. One housing official criticised:  
“You can not go into a settlement and only deliver one service. This restructuring meant a 
move back to the silos. We are back to where we were 10 years ago.” 124 
The silo approach also complicates interdepartmental communication. This results in 
doubling of work. The same official indicated that statistics, particularly on informal set-
tlements, vary between different departments. 
“We would count from aerial photographs the number of households and we mapped the in-
formal settlements. But Human Settlements would also do their own counting […]. Province 
also have their own stats. Even before we go to Province let’s just go next door to Solid 
Waste and just go around the corner to Water Services. They would do their own counting. 
Now which is the official number?” 
In 2006 the importance of working relationships between the different directorates has in-
creasingly been acknowledged. An interdepartmental task team aligned to the IDP was es-
tablished consisting of representatives from each directorate. Interdepartmental task teams 
have also been created for housing: 
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“It was really a good impetus to bring in a structure to coordinate and it is at its infancy 
stage but I think it is a very important tool and a lot of us are really committed to pushing it 
and making it work. Because it is a joint thing and it is about getting a proper understanding 
about what the housing need is and then coming up with a programme […].”125 
The same official expressed the hope that the interdepartmental cooperation towards a 
joint housing program would reduce political patronage: 
“That is why it is so important to have a very clear articulated housing program, so it cannot 
be influenced by politics, which is probably naive but ideal.”126 
Nevertheless, tensions persist also between officials within the Human Settlement Direc-
torate. Often different professional approaches (engineers, community facilitators and in-
spectors) lead to conflict. A housing official explained: 
“It is a big simplification that an official is an official and they are always part of the state. 
We have got project managers, often civil engineers. We have got community facilitators, 
they […] really deal with people, they speak the local language. […] They are quite happy to 
tell the project manager to get lost. […] And then we have the third kind of guys working: the 
[…] kind of inspectors. Making sure when we put out contracts, before we pay the bills, they 
go and check that it was done accordingly. […] Between these three functions there is a lot of 
tensions.”127 
4.2.2 Horizontal integration of civil society 
Land and housing plans and budgets are determined by the IDP (with the housing strategy 
as one component) which is required to provide citizen participation. Participation on pro-
ject-level takes place through sub-councils, ward committees and project steering commit-
tees.  
4.2.2.1 Participation within the IDP Process 
With the establishment of the Unicity, opportunities expanded to the participation in the 
City Development Strategy and the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process.128 
The IDP process is the formal channel to influence the priorities for land allocation within 
the city. Housing and well-located land set out as priorities in the IDP should guide the 
budget spending of the line departments. 
Participation mechanisms within the IDP process have shifted considerably due to politi-
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cal instability. Since the two parties which alternately take over local government favour 
different participatory approaches, administration is left with having to constantly shift 
the engagement processes. One official explained: 
“That makes it a bit difficult in planning our public engagement processes, because there is a 
distinct difference between the ANC way of engagement and the DA’s way of engagement it-
self. So we have been redefining our engagement virtually every year […].”129 
The ANC prefers to engage larger groups of people especially in the marginalised and 
poorer communities. The first cycle of IDP (2000/2001 – 2005/2006) process was struc-
tured at ward level and debates centred on service delivery. This was organised by a pub-
lic engagement office through participation of ward committees and large public events 
(‘Mayors Listening Campaign’). There people could raise their issues which were then 
fed into the IDP process. This approach was highly criticised by officials as the outcomes 
were predictable and defined by local issues. One City official commented on Cape 
Town’s listening campaign:  
“The tendency was that aunty Bloem […] would still complain about the shebeen next door, 
focused on local issues in-my-street type of thing, whereas we would try to focus on citywide 
corporate issues.”130 
With the change in local government in 2006 both the ‘Listening Campaign’ and ward 
committee participation was abandoned. Instead the DA-led government established a 
system of sub-councils. Public engagement mechanisms in that year were not in place yet. 
However, council decided that in future multi-stakeholder forums would be the space for 
participating within the IDP process. A government report stressed: 
“The challenges facing the city will only be adequately addressed if there is an effective sys-
tem of governance in the city, based on the concept of ‘city’ leadership by all relevant stake-
holders in the city, rather than leadership by the City of Cape Town only.”131 
Multi-stakeholder engagement is supposed to be facilitated through each of the sub-
councils which will provide participation by civil society organisations and business. The 
focus will be on citywide issues instead of sectoral or local issues. Participation is facili-
tated by invitation. The municipality has therefore established a database of all NGOs and 
CBOs in the city. The outcome of this process will then go for comment to the public on 
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ward-based levels. After consultation the key strategic issues decided upon will go into 
council for approval. Then the City will develop a strategy and draft budgets which will 
be given to the public for comment and then for final budget approval by council. The 
budget is then made available to the public and monitoring and reporting systems are ini-
tiated. 
A provincial official commented on this shift to multistakeholder forums: “Currently the 
City is starting to move out of its shell.” At the same time, criteria as to who is invited to 
participate and who is excluded, is not transparent. With the first IDP process in 2001 the 
City counted about 4,900 non-governmental entities which included both business and so-
cial organisations with very different sizes of staff or members. The bulk of these entities 
were civil society organisations active in environmental and social issues. However, the 
same official indicated that the City could not manage the multistakeholder process. This 
will in future affect the legitimacy of decisions being made in these forums. The same of-
ficial asked: “What kind of forum do we have which can officially be viewed as ratifying 
the IDP?”132 
4.2.2.2 Participation in the housing process 
Horizontal coordination with affected communities in housing projects is outlined as ‘In-
tegrated Community and Human Development: Partnership Building Support’. This com-
prises the improvement of community communication and cooperation between officials 
and ward committees.133 
The resistance against participation in decision-making is also reflected in the City’s pol-
icy for participation in the housing process. It requires participation only after a project 
has been approved, funding has been allocated, beneficiaries have been identified and 
their subsidy application approved. Once all these steps have been covered, local govern-
ment invites beneficiaries to a meeting. A project facilitator organises the public participa-
tion process, working closely with the ward councillor and the committees. These facilita-
tors are often private consultants. At the meeting the beneficiaries elect representatives for 
a ‘Project Steering Committee’. Thus project steering committees are the link to the 
community on project-level in housing developments. The objective of the committee is 
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to agree upon the allocation of sites, to discuss problems during project implementation, 
to ascertain at the end if the original beneficiaries occupy the houses, and hand over 
‘happy letters’134. 
Local government does not provide any earlier participation to avoid community con-
flicts. One housing official explained: 
“So there is no fight about who gets in and who does not. That is usually the worst fight that 
we leave well before the creation of the committee. Then it is just a case of: There is the lay-
out plan; there is my list of people, who is going where […].”  
The same official indicated that previous experience has shown that early participation 
with the community leads to blocked projects: 
 “I don’t know how many projects are on our capital budget but it must be close to about 
eighty which are just dead, they are not moving. Why are they not moving? Because we in-
volved community politics way too early.”135 
Other City officials claim that blockages emerge particularly due to the lack of early par-
ticipation. They question the accountability of ward councillors and the legitimacy of pro-
ject committees and feel frustrated as they have to deal with political-driven housing con-
flicts. Ward councillors, as the legal community representatives, select who in the com-
munity is going to be a beneficiary. Therefore ward councillors are referred to as ‘entry 
points’ or as ‘gate keepers’ to the community. As a result housing developments are po-
litically driven since many ward councillors put their supporters on the beneficiary list 
and exclude other residents from both the project and project committee. This leads to 
conflicts within the community and blockages of housing projects. Groups which are left 
excluded will break away and oppose the development taking place. 
“To kick-start a housing project through project committees is not always the best way of do-
ing things. […] We know a ward councillor is a member of a political party. […] Now those 
people that belong to another political party tend to be excluded from the beneficiary list. So 
housing becomes a political vehicle to achieve an ends.”136 
One senior official outlined the shift in participation envisaged for area-based upgrading: 
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“We survey and register as early as possible and try to engage with communities. So they re-
alise that there must be cooperation. […] If there is a group in a community that will not be 
part they will destabilise the whole project.”137 
City officials feel restricted in their communication with the communities and question 
their role. 
“It is so difficult to define our role with communities. I believe in being partners with the 
communities. So if we ourselves cannot have formal lines of communication with the commu-
nities and struggle with other bodies within government on a horizontal level, it is diffi-
cult.”138 
Therefore, City officials agree with initiatives by the mayoress to take away power from 
the ward councillors when it comes to housing projects. 
Some City officials try to overcome the limitations of the prescribed participation. One 
way is to address problems with ward councillors at sub-council meetings.  
“So if there is any problem that we have with that councillor we can at least take it up to that 
subcouncil to state our side of the story […] the subcouncil chairman can call that ward 
councillor to order or take other steps.”139 
Another option to ensure participation is through ‘Community Development Workers’ 
(CDWs). Two to three community development workers are located per sub-council 
structure and are under supervision of an area manager. The CDWs are from the local 
communities and nominated by the people. They are employed to connect citizens with 
government concerning any level from local projects to strategic processes. Focus is given 
to poor areas “[…] where more local conflicts are and more disinformation and more non-
understanding what the game is about, because the people in that area are not very mobile, 
do not have access to information […].”140 According to officials they are playing a piv-
otal role in housing since they can prevent projects from blockages. 141 
Beyond these regulative steps some officials even take proactive measures. One approach 
is to organise participation in different phases which would not only start with the ward 
councillor and project committees. As a first step City officials would consult the com-
munity about the subsidy application.  
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“We would do a beneficiary list, we screen it, we workshop the people, we tell them what the 
housing subsidy is and how do you qualify, what it is for and what you can get out of it.”142  
Another attempt is to try to constitute a broader project committee by inviting all repre-
sentative bodies within a community. 
“It takes much longer, but at least you do it right the first time. […] He [one housing official] 
knew that he was not breaking the law but extending it. He was not allowing the ward coun-
cillor to lead the way.” 
Taking alternative approaches constitutes a risk for officials. One City official stressed 
that it is difficult for local government officials to work outside the ward councillor sys-
tem as the legitimate forum for participation “[…] because you would easily be accused 
of giving preference to one group and excluding another group.”143 
Participation through Project Steering Committees is also seen as a capacity problem. The 
City therefore had moved away from regular interaction. Officials also feel that they have 
to comply with regulations and therefore decisions in the committees might contradict 
policy. One City official explained: 
”The intensity of the interaction is too great. At the end of the day myself as a council official 
I have to comply with the Municipal Finance Management Act and the Procurement Proc-
esses. […] That is why it is quite stressful because you get squeezed from the community and 
the politicians and you get squeezed from the technical as well as administrative side.”144 
The People’s Housing Process (PHP) is understood to be a vehicle in this regard. One 
hope aligned to a PHP process is to shift development responsibility to the people them-
selves. This attitude is reflected by the statement of a City official who stressed the advan-
tages of PHP: 
“It takes some pressure of us. We are so totally flooded with housing demand and hotspot all 
over the city […]. If there are groups that can do their own thing and organise themselves 
and we with minimal input can assist them that would be useful.”145 
However, assistance and participation through the PHP process by the City has been lim-
ited and a PHP unit was not operative until 2007. Firstly, the City lacks criteria to select 
and prioritise PHP applications. One senior official outlined: 
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“[…] how do we evaluate and prioritise different PHP applications from different saving 
groups? […] do we for instance prioritise a group that has savings above a group that does 
not save?”146  
Secondly, there is disagreement between higher sphere of government and local govern-
ment about the participative nature of PHP. City officials fear the red tape aligned to PHP. 
A senior housing official stressed: “People would just be concerned how you can work 
around it.”147 Another official indicated that problems with PHPs are aligned to lack of 
capacity to support the community groups. He stressed that NGOs are an option to techni-
cally support the groups. 
Also, City officials are worried that the PHP policy will insist on self-building. They ar-
gue that this form of PHP would fail due to a lack of technical capacities within the com-
munities: 
“We have seen it time and time and time again. […] They have got four houses and the rest 
of the group will never get a house. Or they built twenty large houses and only to wall heights 
and the house is never finished […].”148 
More progressive officials agree that this kind of self-help approach is inadequate, but in-
stead promote a community-managed process. A senior official outlined: 
“It is a romantic ideological approach to think that people are building their own houses. 
[…] but they are in charge of the process. They decide who is going to be the brick layer, 
where I will buy my cement, what roof am I putting on, how is my front door going to look 
like. They take those decisions, they decide on the design of their house, but they would not 
do the work physically.”149 
In general local government is very reluctant to work with the PHP process. It however 
holds discretionary power in terms of promoting contractor-built against people-driven 
housing projects, to hold back or release subsidies and to insist on the compliance with 
building regulations or to also approve lower standards. 
4.2.2.3 Role given to civil society organisations 
The City runs a public engagement office. This office is responsible for linking with civil 
society and for facilitating workshops and capacity building. Housing officials would re-
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ceive information on which groups to contact in an area.150 
However, since participation in the housing process is organised through ward council-
lors, the role for community organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations has not 
been taken seriously.151 
City officials working on project-level would try to integrate and cooperate with Commu-
nity-Based organisations. According to them this initiative causes conflict with the ward 
councillors.  
“The ward councillors do not want them there. […] they [community organisations] want 
everything to be equitable. So the ward councillors become threatened by their presence.”152 
Furthermore, local government fears that if they give too much voice to local organisa-
tions these will try to exclude outsiders from planned developments within the commu-
nity. A councillor explained: 
“The problem with Community-Based Organisations […] is that they become very territori-
ally. So that if you have […] got a piece of land that you wish to develop or you wish to do an 
in situ upgrade, the local community will always say we don’t want outsiders [from the wait-
ing list].”153 
With regards to NGOs, the role given to them is limited to technical assistance, mediation 
or as research consultants. Some officials show a high degree of mistrust towards NGOs. 
A housing official even accused them of causing blockages: 
“In fact the NGOs just cause more confusion and false expectations. That is what I mean by 
these eighty [blocked] projects. There are expectations on those projects which are simply 
impossible.”154 
A further constraint to cooperation with NGOs is the fear that competition between NGOs 
will block progress of projects. A housing official gave an example: 
“The one quasi NGO and the other proper NGO were always on the other’s toes. And the 
City then was involved in sitting in the middle. We were just trying to get the project going 
for the sake of our politicians, because that was the instruction.”155 
Other officials are more sceptical about the empowerment agenda of NGOs. Therefore, 
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they are of the opinion that NGOs should only provide technical assistance to communi-
ties as this is where they can add value to the housing process.  
Cooperation with NGOs in the field of policy and research is characterised by contractual 
arrangements. The contractual arrangements are seen by officials as an opportunity to 
overcome the lack of capacity within the municipality. However, one City official also 
critically remarked that NGOs are commissioned so that money can be spent: 
“We would use them to say we are too busy doing what we must do – deliver on service. You 
come in as an independent observer and just take a bird’s eye view of how we are doing 
things, looking through all the four regions and put together a report and sit down and dis-
cuss it. But sometimes reports are commissioned to spend money.”156 
On a project-level NGOs are often just invited to mediate in conflict situations. The N2 
Gateway project is taken as a case in point by officials: 
“Only when it gained momentum […] they were called in. They had a big problem: The City 
has already planned everything, the framework is already set. I remember that Joel Bolnick 
was very involved saying: “Why do you need us? Do you just want us to rubberstamp deci-
sions that you have already made? To say that you have consulted with civil society?””157 
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4.3 Civil society organisations in Cape Town 
As outlined in the chapter on civil society in South Africa the political changes resulted in 
shifting positions within the civil society sector (see Chapter 2.3.2). During apartheid re-
sistance by civic structures in the black communities was assisted by NGOs particularly in 
the urban sector. In Cape Town the Development Action Group (DAG) is a prominent ex-
ample of these professional NGOs. With the political transition in the 1990s civics and 
NGOs became supportive of the state and experienced a changing role. As a result the 
former civic movement is now aligned to the ANC government. Other civic associations 
formed Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and focused on development work. 
Given this context, urban sector NGOs such as DAG shifted from an exclusive advocacy 
role to a support role of CBOs in housing development. For them the projects represented 
a vehicle to increase community empowerment. They supported the communities with or-
ganisational development, technical advice and project management. 
When the South African Homeless People’s Federation started in the early 1990s it fol-
lowed a non-collaborationist approach. Non-collaboration, according to Federation lead-
ers, was significant at the time as it enabled mobilisation around a shared identity, and the 
emergence of a movement of the urban poor.158 This approach was characterised by land 
invasions and resistance to removal. In the mid 1990s the Federation then shifted towards 
a partnership approach with government.159 
Furthermore, since the late 1990s new urban social movements emerged which operate 
outside geographically defined areas, are issue-based and have voluntary memberships. 
Most of these social movements such as the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign fol-
low a radical tradition with a focus on opposing state politics.  
Also, there are numerous organisations, often affiliated to Northern NGOs such as ‘Habi-
tat for Humanity’, which follow a welfare approach to housing delivery.  
Then there are a number of NGOs in Cape Town which aim to contribute to the develop-
ment debate like the ‘Isandla Institute’, the ‘Sustainability Institute’ or the ‘Foundation for 
Contemporary Research’ (FCR).  
In the housing sector two further positions became apparent: a right-based represented by 
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the Development Action Group and an alternative development view held by the Federa-
tion and its support NGOs. 
 Radical Right-based Alternative      
development 
Welfare 
Grassroots 
level 
Landless Peoples’ 
Movement 
Western Cape 
Eviction Campaign 
SANCO 
Community-Based 
Organisations 
FEDUP  
Poor People’s 
Movement 
 
NGOs  The Kuyasa Fund 
DAG 
uTshani Fund 
CORC 
Habitat for Human-
ity 
Rooftops Canada 
Nial Mellon Town-
ship Initiative 
Tab. 4.7: Classification of orientation of civil society organisations in Cape Town, Source: Own design 
4.3.1 Ideology and positions 
Both right-based and alternative development advocates share the common understanding 
that the City has a redistributive responsibility. They differ in what conclusions they draw 
for their engagement vis-à-vis the state. NGOs like DAG take a right-based position and 
started to integrate watchdog and advocacy role vis-à-vis the state beyond their direct 
support to communities in housing projects. For them resource inequality represents the 
key problem. DAG argues, that since the City becomes economic growth oriented and at-
tracts further people, local government has an obligation to plan for its citizens. 
“If you want the magic 6% [economic growth] you have to accept that there is a growing city 
and then you have to plan for it and don’t say you don’t have resources to plan for the peo-
ple. […] if you want a growing city, if you want to grow the economy, you must find the re-
sources to house the people. Otherwise you will have a big city, making money and you drive 
in an armed vehicle.”160 
For DAG it is essential that people organise to counter-balance the influence of elitist 
groups and to influence the state in order to enable development.161 A prerequisite in this 
respect is that people are enabled to use the space of engagement. 
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 “[…] in order to claim and exercise rights, people require an understanding of their rights, 
be provided with opportunities to become actively involved in the development and imple-
mentation of laws and policies, and have the confidence, skills and know-how to hold elected 
representatives accountable.“162 
DAG’s strategic objectives for 2006-2008 are: a) inclusive participatory development 
through capacity building within civil society to influence practice, and b) pro-poor urban 
development praxis to influence state praxis by demonstrating alternatives and critical 
partnership.163 
“So the house itself that is built at the end of the day or the land that is occupied is not the is-
sue to DAG. What we are about is to build strong citizen, we want to build people and com-
munities that are able to enforce their rights, they are able to protect those rights and they 
are able to participate and lead in an informed development process.”164 
In contrast to the right-based position the Federation (the South African Homeless Peo-
ple’s Federation, later Federation of the Urban Poor) and their support NGOs are ori-
ented towards an alternative development approach. They agree with the right-based posi-
tion that the state has redistributive responsibility. However, in their perception both state 
and civil society have rights and responsibilities. Similar to the right-based position they 
also realise that the state is influenced by an aggressive private sector and that interests 
need to be balanced. Nevertheless, they disagree with sole claim-making vis-à-vis the 
state. According to the coordinator of a FEDUP-aligned NGO the state is not committed 
to transfer resources to the poor. Insisting on balancing resource distribution, he argues, 
makes people remain reluctant to take their own initiative as they believe that the state 
will eventually deliver. He stressed: 
“The problem is the resources are there to keep this developmental and paternalistic state 
going, but it is not enough to solve the problem. They say: “Stand in the queue and you get a 
house.” In Pakistan they would laugh about it. But here people still believe in what they are 
saying. The bureaucracy creates its own world view.”165  
Also, claim-making, the Federation argues, will result in formal sector interventions 
which often do not work for the lowest-income category and moreover diminish the social 
organisation of the poor.166 Critical (claim-making) engagement with the state, so the 
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Federation, is run by professional NGOs sidelining grassroots civil society. If grassroots 
organisations make claims, then government will use a welfare approach and drive the 
development. As a consequence, technical and inadequate solutions further disempower 
the urban poor. 
Instead, the Federation-centred alliance argues that beyond the resource inequality, power 
inequality represents the key problem. Alternative development practice involves the need 
for resource-building to strengthen empowerment. The Federation thereby stresses the in-
terrelationship of housing and governance. Positive ties with government, according to the 
Federation, have the two-fold aim of sharing the burden of development and bringing re-
distribution of power. The Federation and its support NGOs are therefore committed to 
form partnerships with state institutions as a means of interacting with formal institutions 
especially at local government level. 
The vision is to enable solidarity, capacities and collective learning amongst poor com-
munities, so that they will be empowered to interact with the formal world. Housing 
represents an entry point for learning and engagement with the state. The strengthening of 
access to the political sphere should result in pro-poor solutions which can only evolve 
through building-up the self-reliance and self-organisation of the poor.167 
The Federation advocates working from grassroots levels and seeing the entry point 
through the everyday practices of Federation members. By means of the methods prac-
ticed by Federation members they believe they can influence the institutional arrange-
ments which determine the implementation of policy.168 
4.3.2 Perception of political space 
4.3.2.1 Grassroots perspective 
The interviewed community organisations and local federation groups generally have a 
low perception of government capacity and accountability. Often they have experienced 
long delays in the housing application. A grassroots leader outlined: 
“When I moved here, the next year I put myself on the waiting list. Those eight years on the 
waiting list were eight years of being in the struggle. […] Sometimes you die and your name 
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is still on the waiting list.”169 
According to grassroots groups the delays are aligned to the inability of the state to de-
liver. 
“I think the housing backlog they cannot go on with that. They can never give people the 
houses what they say they are giving. […] For me it is like this: They are making the rules 
and they cannot even obey their own rules.”170 
Many felt that the communities are misused as vote banks for election purposes. Specifi-
cally ward councillors are perceived as not accountable to their constituencies. A Federa-
tion leader stressed: 
“The process of elections is corrupt and South Africa is no exception.”171 
The dominant perception is that government is not delivering on promises being made. 
One grassroots leader explained: 
“[…] they [government] only use the people when it was voting time. Ministers and whoever, 
councillors, went into people’s houses and speak to them. […] after they made a cross, they 
moved out and people will never see them.”172 
Often councillors are also blamed for not informing the people about development plans.  
“You don’t need a workshop to teach you to respect people. Because calling people and let-
ting them know: “I am going to put a pipe here next to your houses” - it is just an issue of re-
spect and accountability and letting people know. This is sometimes lacking with some of our 
councillors here in South Africa […].”173 
4.3.2.2 NGO perspective 
From the NGO and movement perspective a number of reasons are given for the lack of 
accountability of government’s commitment to participation in the housing process. First 
of all, housing is a highly politicised matter. 
Secondly, political leaders are not trusted as they are perceived to be gate keeping and 
corrupt. 
 
“[…] often there is lots of gate keeping [by the councillors] and all sorts of trading that takes 
place. If I say trading, I mean it in the literal sense of the word: money gets passed from hand 
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to hand. I know that on the N2, only just to get your name on the [beneficiary] list or move up 
the list there was money going around.”174 
Thirdly, politicians interested in being re-elected want short-term delivery of houses and 
not a participative process.175 The director of DAG outlined: 
 “[…] it is typically that the ward councillor and his cronies meet and then they say they have 
consulted their ward and move on.”176 
Moreover, the Development Action Group (DAG) questions the effectiveness of public 
engagement as responsibility for participation constantly changed within local govern-
ment.  
“[…] the last few years the City every five minutes has changed its mind about who is re-
sponsible for consultation or stakeholder engagement. […]. We reach the point where we do 
not get excited about public engagement. It becomes very whimsical which is why it is not 
very effective.”177 
Furthermore, there is criticism that participation is increasingly realised through ‘Imbizos’ 
which are perceived to not improve inclusion of people in decision-making.178 The 
‘Mayor’s Listening Campaign’ in Cape Town is seen as a typical example of this. The 
limitation of the listening campaign, according to the organisations, is that it only ad-
dresses parochial interests of the people. A staff member of DAG explained: 
“Every night for a few weeks there will be a meeting where people come to and people say 
their problems like “I don’t have a house” or “no school” in the area and then the officials 
will analyse that and say 53% of the comments were about housing, 23% about schools. 
There is nothing anybody can engage with.”179 
DAG stresses that the channels for influencing the IDP and city-wide planning are very 
narrow. 
“But directly influence the content and the strategic direction of the IDP is very difficult be-
cause it is so detached from civil society. It happens in the corridors of officials.”180 
Given the political delivery mandate, innovative housing policy, many argue, has not 
trickled down to the administrative level which has to implement the policy. 
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“In the name of speedy delivery, policy and common sense are too frequently set aside. This 
fixation on the delivery of numbers leads to the ongoing creation of concrete slums.”181 
DAG particularly claims that the new City housing plan lacks commitment for commu-
nity participation and that in many projects communities are not consulted about devel-
opments.182 It specifically stresses that the N2 Gateway project in Cape Town is indicative 
of reduced options for participation in general.  
 “The lack of space for community participation in planning and decision-making with re-
gards to the N2 development points to a bigger, more systemic political problem, that of lim-
ited – and shrinking – space for citizens’ engagement in development processes.”183 
In housing processes, they argue, the welfare approach by the local administration trans-
lates into a paternalistic approach to development. Therefore, they question government’s 
commitment to participation also in housing development. The director of DAG stressed: 
“But at a practical level what we have realised is that the government is trying to implement 
a certain approach to development. We see that is not necessary the development that maxi-
mises the capacities and experiences of our communities.”184 
The coordinator of the Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) outlined the 
problem: 
“The problem is rather the developmental state which thinks it must deliver solutions to prob-
lems. Take the policy around PHP. What is PHP all about? It is about people responding to 
the failure of the state and the market. Now the developmental state tries to appropriate what 
civil society does.”185 
Therefore, local government officials would be very reluctant to work with civil society 
structure with an empowerment agenda. Again the CUP coordinator disclosed: 
“The officials are also not pro our approach. They still support the welfare approach. They 
do not necessarily support the political leadership. But they do not believe in the people’s 
participative approaches. They believe in the welfare approach and “We will do things for 
you. We will build you the old RDP houses and you should be thankful for that.””186 
Instead, local government would favour mostly constructor-built RDP housing develop-
ment to ensure fast track delivery. According to the director of People’s Environmental 
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Planning (PEP):   
“Local authorities do not want the Peoples Housing Process to work in their area. It is a hell 
of a lot easier for them to get their buddy, the local contractor, in to build a hundred 
houses.”187 
DAG also criticises the prioritisation of contractor-built houses by local government. 
“The model for government is a very simple model: handing over the project to a contractor 
and few months down the line handing over the keys to the beneficiaries.”188 
This constructor-driven model has also infiltrated PHP projects. The organisations claim 
that these ‘managed PHP’ reduce participation to a limited choice in house design and 
sweat equity. As a consequence of the ‘managed PHP’ and contractor-driven model 
communities remain passive beneficiaries. The director of DAG explained: 
“Way back then and even now it [government] sees housing as a technocratic, technically 
driven process. Where it is about identifying the biggest piece of land, putting in services and 
then providing mass housing using a contractor driven model. People are not at the centre, 
but the recipients of housing.”189 
Moreover, some argue, progressive approaches by individual officials are hindered by the 
bureaucracy. According to DAG only a few officials work outside the bureaucratic re-
strictions.  
“There are obviously individuals in the City and in the province that are playing a positive 
role, but you don’t see them when you are outside.[…]there are lots of people that fall into 
the classic paper pushing bureaucratic kind of role.”190 
The director of PEP stressed the risks for officials to act outside the prescribed routine: 
“The city officials do have their hands tight to a certain extend. They have to work within 
certain parameters, they do have certain rules. If they give us the space to do things slightly 
differently and it all goes wrong, they are the ones who are ultimately responsible. No civil 
servant anywhere in the world is rewarded for innovation and risk taking.”191 
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4.4 Influencing factors 
4.4.1 Political instability in Cape Town 
Power struggles and political instability also impacted on the analysed housing projects. 
Interviewees often referred to challenges and blockages of projects due to political leader-
ship conflicts within the communities.  
While the ANC is in power nationally since the first democratic elections in 1994, there 
has been a constant change in terms of which party is governing the Western Cape Prov-
ince and Cape Town (see table 4.8). The change of ruling parties results in political dy-
namics displayed between the different spheres of government. If these spheres of gov-
ernment are of the same political party or not, determines whether the spheres are closer 
linked or characterised by contestation of power. 
Year 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
National ANC 
Province NNP DA NNP & ANC ANC 
City X X ANC DA NNP & ANC ANC DA
Tab. 4.8: Political Dynamics in the three spheres of government, Source: Own design 
Also at City level there is a constant contestation of local power between the ANC, repre-
senting the more disadvantaged sectors of the population (primarily black South Afri-
cans), and the Democratic Alliance (DA), seen by many to represent the white and 
wealthier coloured sectors of the population.192 Between 2004 and 2006 the City was gov-
erned by ANC-mayoress Nomaindia Mfeketo, who was accused of unauthorised spending 
and corruption.193 This aggravated the disenchantment with politics of primarily black vot-
ers who were already disillusioned by local government delivery.194 During the third local 
elections in March 2006 voter turnouts in the black township areas such as Khayelitsha 
were very low.195 After the elections the City almost faced a hung council.196 Finally, in a 
coalition between the DA and six smaller parties, a DA-led government was formed under 
                                                 
192 See Wilkinson (2004), p. 223. 
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194 Makuzeni (2006). 
195 See Cape Argus (2006), p. 18. 
196 The DA won 42% of all votes, followed by the ANC with 37% and the Independent Democrats (ID) 
with 11% of the votes. See Essop/ Phillip/Bailey (2006), p. 1. 
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Helen Zille as mayoress. Subsequently, the political situation remained unstable since the 
majority in council had been threatened by floor-crossing197 or smaller parties being ex-
pelled from the ruling coalition.198  
Furthermore, the local government system was highly contested. The DA changed the 
system from ward-based to a system based on redemarkated sub-councils. The ANC ac-
cused the DA of redemarcating the sub-councils along racial lines.199 It raised concerns 
that the executive mayoral system is not representative of the majority of coloureds and 
blacks. In September 2006 the ANC-led provincial government therefore attempted to 
change the local government system from a mayoral executive to an executive committee 
system in Cape Town.200 With an executive committee system the ANC would have re-
gained a position of power. Whereas some argued that the executive committee system 
can help to overcome political divisions201, others questioned the political motivation be-
hind it and accused the ANC of interfering in local government autonomy202. It was 
feared that a change in the mayoral system would lead to an executive paralysis in the 
context of almost power balance in Cape Town.203  
In the following month various protests were held in favour of one or the other position 
and political party. At the same time violent taxi protests broke out. Taxi drivers barri-
caded roads, buses were stoned and people attacked.204 Following this, the DA accused 
the ANC of being behind the concerted action, whereas ANC leadership claimed that the 
protests reflected the dissatisfaction of citizens with local government’s service delivery. 
The conflict around the local government system was later resolved with an agreement, 
that the ANC would receive two additional sub-council’s chairmanships in ANC con-
trolled areas. In return the mayoral system was retained. 
                                                 
197 Floor-crossing allows local and national government representatives to change to another political party 
without losing their seats. 
198 See Merten (2006a), (2006b); Mail & Guardian online (2007). 
199 See Dentlinger (2006b). 
200 Ironically, the executive mayoral system was adopted by the ANC and at the time criticized by the ID 
and DA for lack of transparency and giving too much power to the mayor. Whereas with the mayoral sys-
tem the mayoress is empowered to draw up legislation and by-laws, the executive and decision-making 
power is with the committee in an executive committee system. 
201 See Parks (2006). 
202 See Essop/Dentlinger (2006), pp. 1f. 
203 See Essop (2006). 
204 See Mnyakama/Nicholson (2006). 
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Whereas these power struggles rather reflect on disputes between different parties and 
parts of the City, other struggles were aligned to inner ANC factionalism and translated 
into conflicts within ANC dominated areas. Power struggles within the ANC at the time, 
both nationally and provincially, had lead to a division in the ANC-camp. One division 
was along supporters of President Thabo Mbeki and supporters of former deputy presi-
dent Jacob Zuma. The friction in the alliance between the two leaders emerged in June 
2005 when Mbeki laid off Zuma due to allegations around corruption and rape. This 
caused power struggles within the party and was only partly resolved with the election of 
Zuma as ANC president at the party congress in late 2007.205 
The leadership struggle also filtered down to provincial and local level. In 2005 Ebrahim 
Rasool (in support of Mbeki) as provincial Premier was not re-elected as ANC leader in 
the province. Instead Mcebisi Skwatsha (in support of Zuma) became the Western Cape 
provincial secretary. This split led to a conflict between a Rasool camp and Skwatsha 
camp amongst ANC councillors in Cape Town and highly impacted on local housing pro-
jects. A government official stressed: 
“So the critical political divide I would call the Skwatsha - Rasool divide. We have got an Af-
ricanist approach to development which is aligned with Skwatsha whereas Ebrahim Rasool is 
more inclusive. […] The strength of me is that I am managing politics a lot of the time. Is that 
my role? But if you are the one who is stuck with the contractional claims, where the contrac-
tor can’t work. So you are the one with the pressure and you have to find a solution.”206 
The power struggles in 2006 illustrated the fragile political stability in Cape Town. More-
over, the dispute about who has power over the local government system was aligned to 
housing and service delivery issues and arguments about racial discrimination. Develop-
ment, primarily service delivery and housing, seem to be the issues against which local 
government performance is measured.  Political disputes thus translated into conflicts 
within the communities and blockages of housing projects. 
According to local government officials this has made Khayelitsha almost unmanageable. 
The tension has extended to the development forums which were supposed to be apoliti-
cal. In theory the development forums report to the ‘Khayelitsha Development Forum’ 
(KDF) which is supposed to stabilise and ensure development implementation. But with 
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municipal elections in spring 2006 new ANC councillors emerged who, according to 
some officials, are more aligned to one ANC camp (Skwatsha) and tend to destabilise by 
not recognising the development forums and the KDF. Local government officials have to 
mediate between the new councillors and development forum representatives in the steer-
ing committee meetings.  
“So you have got these huge fights and all these project committees have been a disaster. 
[…] So these groups are now demanding the disbandment of that group. Now who do you 
work with? […] What happens is that we get stuck in the middle, the project gets stuck in the 
middle and the projects gets used as battle ground for power.”207 
Officials feel they are constrained by the dynamics taking place in Khayelitsha. The po-
litical instability impacts negatively on service delivery and the confidence of officials. 
“As officials we get caught in between. Some of us are accused of wrong doings. We get ac-
cused of not expediting the process. This is to ignorance sometimes and deliberate political 
game for particular ends. So we are battling to get where we want to get to. And those con-
flict [SANCO] in the community impact on the work of the whole government. We cannot say 
as officials: It is not our business. That would be a lie because it will impact. Before you get 
physical onto the ground, you must have spoken to the groups.”208 
 
4.4.2 Administrative complexity and restructuring 
The administration of Cape Town is under constant transformation and characterised by 
institutional restructuring which affects both service delivery and council transforma-
tion.209 The restructuring process was delayed several times by political changes in local 
government and opposition by City officials, and in 2006 the transformation process had 
still not been fully completed.  
“We had three cycles of restructuring now with the City with 24.000 staff and even as we 
speak the final integrities of this 6-7 year process has not really sorted itself out.”210 
Furthermore, the administrative system was affected by political changes. From 1999-
2006 Cape Town experienced four changes of government which is linked to the removal 
of city managers and senior officials from their positions. Also, changes of government 
often imply shifting of priorities of projects and changing modes of delivery and partici-
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pation. As a result of the restructuring and politisation of the administrative process, the 
administrative structures are characterised by instability. This again affects local govern-
ment functions such as housing and service delivery. The constant reorganising in the 
City of Cape Town obviously also impeded the relationships between officials and civil 
society organisations. An NGO member commented on the situation: “At the moment I 
do not have a lot of confidence in the bureaucracy to deliver.”211 
 
4.4.3 Civil society restructuring 
In 2006 the civil society sector active in the housing process was highly characterised by 
weaknesses of the organisations and shifts of leadership and networks.  
The years 2005 and 2006 were a time of considerable restructuring and rebuilding within 
the civil society sector. Organisational structures around two key players in the housing 
sector dissolved.  
The Development Action Group and the People’s Organisations were affected by the 
break-up of the Urban Sector Network and the People’s Housing Networking Forum as 
their inter-organisational structures.  
The Urban Sector Network (USN) dissolved in 2005. USN consisted of affiliated South 
African urban sector NGOs with a right-based understanding of housing such as the De-
velopment Action Group in Cape Town, Planact in Johannesburg or the Built Environ-
ment Support Group (BESG) in Durban. The network was funded by the European Union 
and operated from an office in Johannesburg. It became a vehicle for the various NGOs to 
access resources from government and international donors.212 
Although referred to as a network it was rather a formal association of like-minded 
NGOs. Membership was confined to a specific number of NGOs and relationships be-
tween them under the USN umbrella remained formal. In 2005 USN dissolved due to 
mismanagement. As a consequence, funding discontinued and NGOs under its umbrella 
suffered high losses of financial resources. A DAG member commented that in future 
these NGOs intend to rebuild a less bureaucratic and less formal network, which can 
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lobby collectively about urban development issues.213 
Also in 2005 the People’s Housing Networking Forum (PHNF) dissolved after only three 
years of activity. It was established by DAG as a platform for 58 People’s Organisations 
which were active in housing projects affiliated to DAG. The aim of the platform was to 
facilitate lobbying and advocacy in the housing sector.214 
PHNF also did not present a network in the conceptional understanding of the term. It was 
based on an elected leadership and formal organisational set-up with office and secre-
tariat. The People’s Organisations themselves were supposed to lobby and advocate their 
concerns and claims with DAG offering leadership training and assisting in exchanges. 
PHNF closed down in 2005, because it was not functioning effectively. Elected leaders 
had faced problems in dealing with the dynamics of the different organisations and to get 
them to cooperate.215 A key problem was that DAG was driving the platform instead of it 
evolving from the grassroots.216 One DAG staff member recalled: 
“We did not approach it in a way that people felt it was their network. It was what we wanted 
to discuss.  It was a very structured network. So it did not develop organically out of what 
people wanted.”217 
The organisations aligned to Shack/Slum Dwellers International in South Africa experi-
enced vigorous transformations. Here the split of the Federation and closure of People’s 
Dialogue led to a resolution of the Alliance between the Federation, uTshani Fund and 
People’s Dialogue. 
Originally, the South African Federation emerged in 1991 as the South African Homeless 
People’s Federation (SAHPF). Since 2002 internal conflicts increased because a system 
of patronage had developed. Leaders with access to power and money misused their posi-
tion as gate keepers.218 
A report by People’s Dialogue revealed that the organisation was in crises in terms of ac-
countability. As a consequence, the director of PD started a process of democratising the 
federation. A former Federation leader recalls: 
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“[…] we used to serve as leaders of the Federation but have not been democratically elected 
by the Federation […] we have been linked with a stipend from the NGO Peoples Dialogue. 
Because of that we were not accountable according to the people […].”219 
In 2003 therefore elections were introduced and new leaders came forward. In the follow-
ing conflicts emerged around financial management. The Federation tried to employ their 
own fulltime positions to be more independent from the NGOs. Therefore, according to 
the view of a former Federation leader, an agreement was made that the Federation needs 
to be registered. However, one faction opposed this move and challenged the decision ar-
guing that bottom-up systems were not in place yet.220 
The Federation then separated into two wings – a Cape Town based ‘Patricia faction’ 
(later the section 21 company) and the ‘Patrick and Rose faction’ (later FEDUP). Each 
claimed to be the real Federation and have the real savers.221 
The coordinator of the Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) even argues 
that it is misleading to speak of a split since it was rather a small number of leaders, de-
tached from the grassroots group, who tried a ‘hostile takeover’ of the Federation’s re-
sources.222 The other faction accused CORC of having interfered in the internal govern-
ance of the Alliance between PD, uTshani Fund and the Federation by providing support 
to only one faction.223 Others argue that the South African federation model was based too 
much on the Indian model and did not take into account differences in democratic tradi-
tion and culture.224  
In 2005 one faction of the Federation aligned to one leader (the ‘Patricia faction’) estab-
lished a section 21 company under the name of the South African Homeless People’s 
Federation. The other faction perceived this as hijacking their name and capital fund.225 
In 2006 it therefore established the Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) and reintro-
duced the SDI model and practices. FEDUP is perceived as the successor of SDI practice 
and Federation-building in South Africa. Some argue that the promotion of FEDUP 
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against the other faction is based on strong relationships between the FEDUP leaders and 
the coordinator of the Community Organisations Resource Centre (CORC). 
 “[…] FEDUP has become the prominent partner because those leaders are very close to 
Joel and the split group always had a very conflictual relationship with Joel and has been 
alienated.”226 
The Western Cape Federation is in the process of rebuilding since the split of the Federa-
tion. Established local federation networks like in Site C and Ekupumleni which are 
mostly affected by the Federation crisis are less present at regional level. Instead, there 
has been a shift to new established groups in Macassar, Athlone, Strand, Stellenbosch and 
Manenberg. 
In the 1990s People’s Dialogue (PD) facilitated the space for exchange with Indian SDI 
members and thereby had a key role in establishing the Federation in South Africa. PD 
formed the legally registered body which was responsible for fund raising for Federation 
activities and represented a channel to the formal political system. Millstein, Oldfield and 
Stokke stress the importance of PD’s intermediary role: 
“PD plays a key role as a mediator between the Federation and the formal political sphere, 
making formal political procedures, politics and bureaucracy intelligible to local Federation 
groups while also communicating and explaining the Federation’s grievances and practices 
to politicians and bureaucrats […].”227 
Leadership and financial management crisis within the Federation led to a reassessment of 
goals and structures in 2002.228 Confronted with the factions, PD set an ultimatum to the 
Federation to unify saying it would otherwise close down which then happened in 2005. 
The coordinator of CORC subsequently questioned the motivation behind closing PD: 
“Did the People’s Dialogue Board really have the bigger picture in mind when they decided 
to close the NGO, or were they simply tired of being out of their depth and had run out of 
ideas as to how to resolve the governance and financial management problems that had be-
gun to bedevil the agency?”229  
He criticises that the closure involved the termination of donor funding to the Federation 
which meant that members were cut off from resources.230 
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According to some City officials and NGO representatives, the closure of People’s Dia-
logue had left a vacuum for social facilitation of housing projects aligned to the Federa-
tion. Also, it affected the role of CORC. One City official indicated that whereas CORC 
had previously been open to any group, it now concentrated on the Federation and had 
taken over the role of People’s Dialogue.231 
The split of the Federation and closure of People’s Dialogue led to a restructuring of 
goals and practices of the Alliance. In terms of organisational structures this was per-
ceived as an opportunity by many within the organisations. A former PD member com-
mented: 
“That split was inevitable. In terms of the organisation of the Alliance itself, it was a healthy 
split at the time.”232 
However, even after the split the leadership conflicts resulted in power dynamics and in-
stability within the local communities. In 2006 uncertainties emerged around legitimacy 
and accountability both within the community as well as for other institutions such as lo-
cal government. Officials commented that they were unsure which faction to approach as 
the successor of SAHPF. Often both frictions claimed to be the successor and accordingly 
the representatives of specific projects and housing funds. 
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5. Actors and networks at work 
5.1 The actors 
Governance aspects of the housing process can only be understood against the back-
ground of how local government and civil society organisations in the development proc-
ess are constituted. Therefore the following analysis outlines the present political and ad-
ministrative structure of the City of Cape Town as well as two key alliances of civil soci-
ety organisations active in securing land and housing in Cape Town. 
The first alliance is connected to the right-based positions and consists of development 
NGOs and People’s Organisations with elected committees. The second alliance is 
aligned to the SDI model of alternative development and comprises the Federation of the 
Urban Poor (FEDUP) as a social movement organisation, its affiliated local saving 
schemes and its support NGOs.1 
5.1.1 The City of Cape Town 
Local government has to be understood against the background of the re-demarcation 
process. The 69 independent and racially-based municipalities in the Cape Metropolitan 
Area (CMA) were restructured in the 1990s into a two-tier local government structure 
with 40 Transitional Local Councils and a Transitional Metropolitan Council. The re-
demarcation process continued in order to enable cross-financing and redistribution of tax 
revenue by bringing together affluent and poorer areas of the City. This process was final-
ised in 1996 when six Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs)2 and an overarching Cape 
Metropolitan Council (CMC) came into being. Following the national decision to estab-
lish single-tier metros (see Chapter 2.2.3) in December 2000 a further amalgamation took 
place and the City of Cape Town as a single-tier (Unicity) structure was established.3 
5.1.1.1 Political structure  
The City is made up of 105 wards which are clustered in 23 subcouncil areas. The sub-
                                                 
1 For a detailed account of the individual organisations see stakeholder analysis in annex. 
2 Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg 
Municipality, South Peninsula Municipality 
3 A detailed overview on Cape Town’s local government evolution is given in Pieterse (2002a). 
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council entity was established as a decentralised municipal structure4. Subcouncils consist 
of both ward and proportional councillors. Their function is to make recommendations to 
Council and power can be delegated from Council to subcouncil level. A subcouncil is 
managed by a local government official (subcouncil manager) and chaired by a councillor 
(subcouncil chairperson).5 
The City of Cape Town Municipal Council consists of 105 proportional and 105 directly 
elected ward councillors. The council is chaired by an Executive Mayor who has exten-
sive decision-making powers. The mayor is supported by a Deputy Executive Mayor and 
a Mayoral Executive Committee (MAYCO) on which all seats are held by the ruling city 
coalition. The eleven MAYCO members hold portfolios according to the administrative 
structure. They are supported by advisory portfolio committees. 
 
Fig. 5.1: Political structure of Cape Town, Source: Own design 
5.1.1.2 Administrative structure 
The municipality is run by about 24,000 staff members.6 In 2006 the municipality was 
made up of nine Executive Directorates which are supervised by a City Manager as the 
head of administration. Executive Directorates comprise various Directorates which oper-
ate a number of branches. 
                                                 
4 Subcouncils are substituting the previous ward committee system. 
5 See City of Cape Town (2008a). 
6 See City of Cape Town (2005c), p. 5. 
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Housing related interventions are located within the ‘Human Settlement Services Direc-
torate’ or ‘Special Programmes’ (such as Urban Renewal and Development Support) un-
der the ‘Operations Executive Directorate’ (see figure 5.2). 
The Directorate of Housing has been renamed Human Settlement Services (HSS). In 2006 
this directorate was under way to being pulled up to an Executive Directorate (ED) and 
former branches to move up to directorates. 
 
Fig. 5.2: The administrative structure of the City of Cape Town (highlighted the location of responsibility 
for housing interventions), Source: Own design based on City of Cape Town (2005c)  
The branches comprise New Settlements, Existing Settlements (old rental housing, flats), 
Policy and Research, Land Restitution and Finance. Within the ‘New Settlements’ branch 
the City is divided into four regions which are managed by regional coordinators. Under 
the regional coordinators individual project managers manage specific projects where the 
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City is the developer. The ‘New Settlements’ branch comprises above the regional-based 
units also three issue-based units (social housing, informal settlements and, since 2005, a 
PHP unit).7 
 
Fig. 5.3: The organisational structure of the Human Settlement Services directorate, Source: Own design 
5.1.2 Civil society alliance A 
5.1.2.1 Development Action Group and The Kuyasa Fund 
Development Action Group 
The Development Action Group (DAG) was established in 1986 by professional planners, 
architects, engineers and academics that were linked to the democratic movement at the 
time.8 It works primarily with poor community groups. DAG sees its own role as a cata-
lyst in a collaborative engagement with the state. DAG’s strategic objectives are inclusive 
participatory development through capacity-building within civil society to influence state 
praxis by demonstrating alternatives and critical partnership.9 In line with a strategic shift 
in 2006 work is organised in impact areas which comprise:  
- Informal settlement upgrading (promoting incremental upgrading and in situ), 
- Municipal-wide planning (promoting participation and an integrative approach), 
- Medium density housing (promoting mixed-income medium density on well-
located land), 
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8 See DAG (2008a). 
9 See DAG (2006a), p. 3.  
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- Value capture10 (promoting value capture instruments by the state) and 
- Citizenship and participation (promoting CBO networking and participation in ur-
ban development issues).11 
DAG specifically stresses that it is committed to social justice and therefore to a research, 
advocacy and watchdogs role.12 Since 2005 it also outlines its catalyst role for develop-
ment. However, it realises that this role can imply a broad continuum of activity from 
community mobilisation to cooperation with government in delivery. The different kinds 
of activities comprise:  
- Advocacy and lobbying 
- Assist communities in doing their own advocacy and lobbying 
- Research and setting precedents through projects to influence government with re-
gard to policy and implementation 
- Consulting and training for different levels of government concerning the housing 
process 
- Training, information, technical and social support in community housing projects 
Following Neubert’s typology of civil society13 DAG can be classified as both an advo-
cacy NGO and development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (advocacy 
and development activity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-
members of DAG). Therefore the term Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO) can be applied. 
The Kuyasa Fund 
The Kuyasa14 Fund was a project established in 1999 by DAG in order to support poor 
households which are excluded from access to credit in the formal banking sector. At the 
time DAG promoted savings groups in its projects as the basis for a loan scheme.15 Since 
2003 the Kuyasa Fund is a non-profit organisation independent from DAG. The aim of 
                                                 
10 Value Capture mechanisms such as fiscal and regulatory instruments are used so that the state can gen-
erate additional resources and direct development. A share of benefit from land development is captured 
for community benefit. See DAG (2007), p. 16. 
11 See DAG (2007), p. 3. 
12 See DAG (2004), p. 5. 
13 See Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
14 Kuyasa means „New Dawn“ (Xhosa). 
15 See The Kuyasa Fund (2004), p. 8. 
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the Kuyasa Fund is to develop a financial sector for the poor. Therefore, Kuyasa provides 
access to housing finance for low-income households. As an end-user micro-finance or-
ganisation it promotes savings and provides credit for housing improvements. 
Following Neubert’s typology of civil society16 the Kuyasa Fund can be classified as a 
development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (mostly development activ-
ity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-members of Kuyasa). It will 
therefore be termed as a Service-Oriented Non-Governmental Organisations (SONGO). 
Characteristics of the Non-Governmental Organisations 
The organisational characteristics of DAG and Kuyasa Fund are very similar: Both are 
registered as associations not for gain incorporated under Section 21 and registered as 
non-profit organisations with the Department of Welfare. 
Both have similar organisational structures with professional staff, executive management 
and board of directors interlinked in a bureaucratic-like manner. 
 
Fig. 5.4: Organisational set-up of the Development Action Group, Source: Own design 
Both have similar staff size, similar donor dependency and both stress that they self-
generate income. 
Also, until recently their scale of activity (mostly Cape Town) has been similar. Since the 
Kuyasa Fund is moving to work nationally this has changed slightly. 
Concerning their orientation both organisations are based on the same right-based phi-
                                                 
16 See Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
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losophy and could be described as like-minded organisations. However, whereas DAG 
has a pro-poor community-centred perspective and is concerned with urban development 
matters, the Kuyasa Fund is mostly concerned with the financial sector for the poor. Its 
target groups are primarily individual clients taking a loan. DAG’s target groups are entire 
communities. 
 Development Action Group The Kuyasa Fund* 
Historical Background Established in 1986 
Anti-apartheid movement 
Established in 1999 by 
DAG (since 2003 independent) 
Total income (2006) About R 4,33 million (increasingly 
dependent on consultancy work 
for government due to decreas-
ing donor funding) 
About R 12,85 million (85% self-
generated, continuous donor 
funding and finance through for-
mal banking sector) 
No. of Staff (2006) 20 (with high staff turnover) 23 (high staff increase) 
Scale of activity Cape Town and Western Cape Cape Town and Western Cape 
(recently also nationally) 
No. of housing projects (2006) 7 6000 savers (1200 loans) 
Type PONGO (DAG) SONGO (Kuyasa Fund) 
Mission Community-centred settlement 
development and pro-poor policy 
promotion 
Establish a financial sector for 
the poor for housing improve-
ments 
Field of activity Informal settlement upgrading 
Municipal-wide planning 
Medium density housing 
Value capture 
Citizenship and participation 
Housing finance 
Kind of activity Advocacy and lobbying 
Research and setting precedents 
Consulting and training  
Technical and social support 
Promote savings and provide 
loans 
Tab. 5.1: Characteristics of the Development Action Group and the Kuyasa Fund 
Source: Own design, *The Kuyasa Fund (2006), p. 23 
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5.1.2.2 People’s Organisations 
People’s Organisations working with DAG are situated in communities within the West-
ern Cape Province. In 2006 DAG was working with seven housing projects in Cape 
Town.17 
The organisations have evolved by themselves either as an organised land invasion claim-
ing for tenure rights and upgrading (as with the Freedom Park project), as organised 
backyard dwellers to negotiate with the state for land (Netreg) or as organised domestic 
workers to pressure for inner city housing (as with the Rainbow Housing Cooperative). 
The People’s Organisations working with DAG are formalised and registered organisa-
tions. Their members are predominantly previous backyard shack dwellers. They rely on 
the same activities such as representing the community in negotiations with government 
officials and mobilising the community. 
The Netreg Housing Project (NHP) and Freedom Park Development Association (FPDA), 
which will be analysed further, are community-based and membership-based organisa-
tions. Their organisational aims are both development and issue-driven advocacy ori-
ented. They aim at organising the communities around their claims for land, housing and 
social development. They consist of elected committees which represent the community 
at negotiations with government. 
Background Goal No. of member 
households 
(2006) 
Internal organi-
sation 
Kind of activity 
Backyard dweller 
(NHP) 
 
Informal settle-
ment residents 
(FPDA) 
Issue-based: 
land, housing and 
social develop-
ment 
150 (NHP) 
 
300 (FPDA) 
Registered volun-
tary association 
with elected ex-
ecutive commit-
tee and sub-
groups 
Negotiations 
Representation of 
community 
Mobilisation 
Tab. 5.2: Characteristics of People’s Organisations, Source: Own design 
                                                 
17 Nomzabalazo (Wallacedene); Netreg (Bonteheuwel); Freedom Park (Tafelsig); Lavender Hill/ Cuban 
Heights; Ndabeni; Rainbow; Delft 
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5.1.2.3 Intra-alliance relations 
Relations between People’s Organisations 
The People’s Organisations interact from time-to-time when the Development Action 
Group (DAG), organises exchanges and common seminars. A more formal structure for 
interaction has disappeared (People’s Housing Networking Forum, see Chapter 4.4). Nev-
ertheless, DAG stresses the value of networks between the People’s Organisations to ad-
vocate for their interests. It regards the establishment of networks as its third approach 
above research and project implementation.  
“So as a third leg of the pot is that type of building a movement that can be representative of 
the poor, that can speak for the poor and advance the agenda of the poor. Because what is up 
against the poor is organised middle class corporate class […]. So through the CBO network 
we hope to counter that [elite interest] or at least tip the scale a bit in our favour by getting 
people to be able to respond to these lawyers and these town planners and architects that 
speaks from a value system that is different.”18 
Since PHNF dissolved in 2005 DAG supports community networking and horizontal 
learning on a project-basis. ‘Project Partners Network’ workshops have been introduced 
to enable the exchange of experience amongst representatives of communities with a fo-
cus on housing and mobilisation related issues. DAG stresses horizontal learning lever-
ages mobilisation and focuses on facilitating the space for horizontal exchanges which 
will eventually lead organically to a grassroots forum. The focus of DAG is therefore less 
on setting-up an organisational structure, but to strengthen relationships between groups 
and build up more platforms for a CBO network to evolve.  
“So our aim is not to get a chairperson and a media spokesperson for the network and then 
get an office. Our aim is to […] to create the frame within which this energy can be chan-
nelled or brought to the fore.”19 
The executive director stressed the change of focus of DAG towards a more strategic ap-
proach. Amongst the impact areas, it wants to establish both a network of poor communi-
ties to lobby the state and a network of role-players which lobbies pro-poor urban devel-
opment.20 
In 2006 it therefore employed an expert on social mobilisation to find out how to mobilise 
                                                 
18 NGO member 9 
19 NGO member 9 
20 Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.3.2006. 
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people on the ground to start engaging with their own voices. For DAG this means a 
stronger valuation of establishing networks. The loose network which has been operating 
since the closure of PHNF, however, continues to be dependent on DAG and participation 
in the network has not yet been made transparent.  
“It is difficult to determine who represents communities, and DAG is in the uncomfortable 
position of becoming a gatekeeper through determining criteria for participation in the net-
work.”21 
 
Fig. 5.5: Horizontal interrelations between People’s Organisations 
Over and above the horizontal exchange of experience DAG wants to connect this every-
day experience to the strategic level where it can affect politics and policy. According to 
DAG this would contribute to overcoming the lack of legitimacy NGOs face when mobi-
lising people for their own cause. In 2006 DAG organised an event with regard to the UN 
World Habitat Day and provided a platform for community groups to report on their ex-
periences.  
“Often these things [empowerment] are undermined by the way NGOs approach it. Often we 
try to mobilise people at the bottom end but we do not give them any autonomy, we do not 
really empower them, we just want them to pitch up. We call this “rent a crowd” – where 
there is an issue and people are behind you and they go back to their normal life tomorrow 
and they do not grasp the issue. The important part of our CBO network is that people can 
connect their everyday experience at a high strategic level.”22 
Relations between Non-Governmental Organisations 
Since the closing of the Urban Sector Network, the cooperation between the two NGOs is 
characterised by the personal relations. DAG and Kuyasa Fund refer to themselves as sis-
                                                 
21 Heyns (2007), p. 4. 
22 Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006. 
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ter organisations and support each other on strategic levels in terms of advocacy for pol-
icy change. On the local project level they are working within the same communities but 
DAG with a focus on community organisations and Kuyasa working with individual 
households. Working relations on this level only emerge from time-to-time where there 
are overlaps. 
Relations between Non-Governmental Organisations and People’s Organisations 
The orientation of the NGOs and People’s Organisations differ in that the NGOs envisage 
broader aims such as a financial sector for the poor or community-centred housing devel-
opment. The People’s Organisations goals are more issue-driven. They are concerned 
with access to land and housing for their constituencies.  
All People’s Organisations working with DAG share that they have first organised and 
started the negotiation process before approaching DAG for assistance. DAG stresses that 
it works in partnership with communities.23 DAG works on a request basis when these 
communities seek assistance to access land, housing, tenure and services.24 The Kuyasa 
Fund only enters later and for a specific period into a relationship with these organisations 
in order to promote savings. Later these relations are limited to individual households (as 
clients). 
The NGOs are aware of the differences in interest between NGOs and communities and 
therefore do not represent the communities. A DAG staff member explained: 
“CBOs and NGOs you need to see them as different types of civil society organisations with 
own agendas. They do overlap in some ways. DAG has its own strategy and communities 
have their own strategies. We try to align them in some ways. Both have interest in commu-
nity driven development. […] Communities are involved in broader long-term process with a 
whole lot of different organisations. We may not be involved in all aspects and relationships. 
[…]We have to accept that communities have their own strategies, own interests, own rela-
tionships.”25 
Some POs were unsure of the motivation of NGOs and presumed a profit for them in the 
support for communities. Relations take place on local project level but are not taken up 
to strategic level. 
                                                 
23 See DAG (2004), p. 7. 
24 See for example DAG (2002), p. 8 and p. 16. 
25 NGO member 6 
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5.1.3 Civil society alliance B 
5.1.3.1 Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC), uTshani Fund and           
People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) 
Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) 
The Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) comprises approaches from ena-
bling learning and advocacy to development support. This is either handled by CORC it-
self, through project management teams or through contracted support organisations and 
consultants.26 Since 2005 CORC has also housed the secretariat for Shack/Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI). 
CORC’s philosophy is based on the principle that the poor themselves direct develop-
ment, engage with the state and exchange on horizontal levels. Consequently, the role for 
an NGO was seen as creating the opportunity for exchange and learning and that invest-
ments would go to the establishment of networks instead of delivery outcomes.27   
It works through two grassroots networks of poor communities – the Alliance of Rural 
Communities (ARC) and the Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP); primarily with the Fed-
eration of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) as part of CUP. Its target groups are the local affili-
ates of the Federation. Activities are centred on building relationships within the social 
movements and between them and formal institutions such as the state. As the relation-
ship-building is greatly focused on accessing housing subsidies, these activities have also 
been labelled ‘pragmatic’.28 The different kinds of activities comprise: 
- Finance administration 
- Facilitation of exchange between social movement affiliates 
- Facilitation of exchange between social movement affiliates and state institutions 
- Facilitation of strategic working groups in housing development projects  
CORC is registered as a voluntary association in terms of the Non Profit Organisation 
Act, 1977.29 As a formal organisation CORC consists of a board and an employed profes-
sional staff team.  
                                                 
26 CORC (2006a). 
27 See Wilson/Lowery (2003), p. 50. 
28 See for example Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 158. 
29 CORC (2006b). 
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Following Neubert’s typology of civil society30 CORC is both an advocacy NGO and a 
development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (advocacy and development 
activity) and according to who benefits from its activity (non-members of CORC). It 
could therefore be classified as a Policy-Oriented Non-Governmental Organisation 
(PONGO).  
However, it reveals a very specific kind of internal organisation. Work is organised in 
administration and overall coordination as well as in seven greatly independent pro-
grammes within CORC. These operate from decentralised programme offices and receive 
their own funding, but are administered through CORC and are managed through mutual 
decision-making. They are therefore independent to a degree, but rely on overall coordi-
nation and gain legal status through CORC.31  
 
Fig. 5.6: Organisational set-up of the Community Organisations Resource Centre, Source: Own design 
                                                 
30 See Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
31 Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006. 
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Moreover, outside this polycentric organisation CORC also emphasises that it comprises 
both professionals and grassroots activists “[…] who think independently yet plan and act 
collectively. It is the hub of a new synergy between intellectual pioneers and collective 
action.”32 Given this context, CORC also employs grassroots activists as social facilitation 
field staff to interact with the social movements.33 This synergy represents an overlap be-
tween the NGO and membership based grassroots structures. 
The uTshani Fund 
In 1995 the Federation established the uTshani Fund34 as a revolving fund for housing 
and later micro-business loans and which was subsequently institutionalised as a Section 
21 Company incorporated to the NGO People’ Dialogue. In 2002, after a financial and 
management crisis, uTshani was restructured and became an independent entity. 
Its aim is to build and protect financial assets for the Federation. It provides a financial 
tool to groups practicing savings in order to leverage state and donor resources. 
Until 2006 it exclusively provided services to Federation groups. It then (in theory) ex-
tended its services to all groups practicing savings. The uTshani Fund is subdivided into 
accumulated funds, an operating fund and a project and revolving funds. The latter is not 
owned but administered by the uTshani Fund.35 This revolving fund is capitalised by state 
and donor grants and member contributions. 
In 2006 it was decided that the revolving fund would be managed in new regional funds 
to avoid conflicts amongst regional federation leaders around one national fund.36 The re-
gional funds will gradually contribute to a national Urban Poor Fund. The amount of 
capital in regional funds will be doubled by uTshani. The uTshani Fund administers both 
regional and national funds.37  
After an internal management and accountability crisis saving practices have only been 
revived after FEDUP structures were put into place in 2006. Data on the total number of 
active saving groups are still being captured.  In 2006 there were six FEDUP groups in 
                                                 
32 CORC (2006c). 
33 See CORC (2007), p.26. According to NGO member 3 the payment of grassroots field staff dates back 
to old contracts and is not further practice of CORC. 
34 “uTshani” is a Zulu word for „grass“.  
35 See Utshani Fund (2005a), p. 8. 
36 People’s Dialogue (2003). 
37 See FEDUP (2006). 
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Cape Town active with savings (Athlone, Macassar, Manenberg, Site C, Eerste Rivier, 
and Strand). 
Formally the uTshani Fund is an association not for gain incorporated under Section 21. 
The uTshani Fund consists of a board of directors and an employed professional staff 
team managed by an executive director. 
Following Neubert’s typology of civil society38 the uTshani Fund could therefore be clas-
sified as a Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO) according to its kind of activity (development 
and advocacy activity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-members 
beneficiaries). 
However, the uTshani Fund is a particular entity and cannot easily be associated with a 
support NGO as it, at the same time, functions as a membership-based association for the 
Federation. FEDUP national leader, Patrick Magebula, referred to the uTshani Fund as 
being the formal side of the Federation: 
“uTshani is actually the formal side of the federation. It is like a coin: Utshani is the other 
side of the coin. On the other side of the coin you have someone who talks nice English and 
uses the right words.”39 
A professional staff member pointed out that the fund belongs to the Federation. There-
fore, they as professionals would only interpret the decisions made by FEDUP: 
“The Fund is the Federation and we are just employees of the fund. They are actually the 
fund. They are the board members in the majority. They are the decision makers; they are the 
fund raisers in their informal way. We as professionals only put all their needs in nice words 
in the reports but they are the fund.”40 
However, the fund is still controlled to a large extent by professional staff to ensure ac-
countability: 
“If they can change their mindset around not control, but ownership of the fund, the fund 
would benefit. There is still too much control by professionals. For good reasons in terms of 
accountability and rules and regulations set up by the donors. But there is a much bigger role 
for the Federation to play in the fund if they would take more ownership.”41 
                                                 
38 See Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
39 Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006. 
40 NGO member 13 
41 NGO member 13 
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People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) 
People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) started in 1998 and was officially registered as a 
public benefit organisation, NGO and educational trust. PEP provides technical support, 
training and advice around appropriate housing technology. It specifically stresses the di-
vision of labour: CORC is responsible for social facilitation and PEP addresses technical 
issues. It refers to its target group as clients which are primarily FEDUP groups.42  
PEP could be referred to as a Service-Oriented NGO (SONGO) following Neubert’s ty-
pology of civil society43 as it is development-oriented and non-members benefit from its 
activities. 
However, it is rather a quasi independent organisation. It is referred to by CORC as a 
CORC programme. PEP sees itself as independent from CORC. However, it acknowl-
edges its dependency on the close relation to CORC and SDI as an opportunity to secure 
funding.44 
Characteristics of support organisations 
The NGOs supporting the Federation share organisational characteristics such as staff 
size, donor dependency and scale of activity (nation-wide). Whereas CORC is organised 
polycentric with decentralised programme offices and a coordination office in Cape 
Town, the uTshani Fund operates from a head office in Cape Town with branch offices in 
different provinces. PEP, smaller in size and functioning more as a non-profit company, 
has a single office in Cape Town operating nation-wide. The organisations could be de-
scribed as like-minded organisations with their roots in the work of People’s Dialogue. 
PEP and the uTshani Fund evolved out of PD, CORC is coordinated by a former PD di-
rector and took over intermediary functions of PD after its closure. 
All NGOs share an intermediary role in the way they work with FEDUP. However, 
whereas CORC focuses on the establishment of networks and learning, PEP and the uT-
shani Fund are, in addition, involved in project-based technical and financial management 
support. Their target groups are primarily Federation groups and their saving schemes. In-
ter-organisational relations between the NGOs are strong both in terms of strategic posi-
                                                 
42 See Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
43 See Neubert (1992), p. 30. 
44 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
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tions and in project contexts. 
All NGOs acknowledge that their organisational structures have formal elements but also 
overlap with other organisational structures, and therefore, in a way lack clear boundaries. 
 CORC uTshani Fund* PEP 
Background Established in 2002 
Catholic Church 
Established by People’s 
Dialogue in 1995, since 
2002 independent 
Started by People’s Dia-
logue in 1998, independ-
ent since 2000 
Total income (2006) R 7,910,358 (constant) 479,853 R (donor and 
self-generated) 
- 3928780 R (debt) 
Unknown 
No. of Staff (2006) 13 (high staff turnover) 8 6 
Scale of  
Activity 
Local-national National (head office in 
Cape Town) 
National (Cape Town 
based) 
No. of projects in 
Cape Town (2006) 
9 Unknown 9 
Type PONGO+ Hybrid SONGO+ 
Mission Enable networks 
amongst poor communi-
ties and interaction with 
formal world 
Social capital formation Community ownership of 
housing process 
Field of Activity Land Programme 
Sustainable Develop-
ment Project 
Community Microfinance 
Network (CMN) 
Sizakuyenza 
New Media For Social 
Change 
Co-Connected 
Waste Programme 
Finance Housing design and con-
struction 
Kind of activity Finance administration 
Facilitation of Federation 
exchanges 
Facilitation of exchange 
between FEDUP and 
state 
Strategic working groups 
Account administration 
and loan finance 
Training and design 
workshops, assistance in 
business plan, house 
modelling and construc-
tion, consultation, inter-
mediary 
Tab. 5.3: Characteristics CORC, uTshani Fund and PEP, Source: Own design, *UTshani Fund (2005a) 
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5.1.3.2 Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) and Federation of the Urban Poor 
(FEDUP 
Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) 
The Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) is an umbrella body of Grassroots Organisations 
and social movements such as the Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) and the Poor 
People’s Movement (PPM). In 2006 CUP included about two hundred affiliates across 
South Africa.  
CUP is based in Cape Town at CORC offices and represented by one coordinator. Besides 
own donor funding, other finance is being sourced through CORC and the uTshani Fund.  
Members of CUP are encouraged to organise within their own communities. CUP stresses 
that it does not intend to set up a hierarchical leadership structure. Decision-making is re-
alised through action plan meetings. The member organisations set goals, evaluate pro-
gress and make recommendations to CORC, community stakeholders and funders.  
“We encourage community groupings to meet in their own networks and not to meet in net-
works of the coalition. Because […] when you start a new structure like CUP people tend to 
forget about their own house where they come from and want to join this new castle and be 
part of the leadership.”45 
CUP’s intention is to empower communities by enabling exchanges and enumeration. 
Both networking and gaining information are seen as a basis for interaction with the 
state.46 
However, CUP is still evolving and in reality the cooperation is mostly limited to FEDUP. 
FEDUP is linked to CUP through a ‘Strategic Learning Group’. CUP has largely facili-
tated the promotion of SDI methodology within the Western Cape. This was due to the in-
ternal leadership conflicts within the Federation which resulted in activities stalling lo-
cally. Since the Federation has restructured, CUP activities represented a conflict of roles 
and responsibilities amongst CUP and FEDUP. FEDUP leaders stress that CUP needs to 
withdraw from its approach because it is FEDUP which constitutes the principal Federa-
tion mobilisation activities. CUP, according to both Federation and affiliated professional 
organisations, has to redefine its role and establish a network between the Federation and 
                                                 
45 Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006. 
46 Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006. 
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other groups.47 
CUP can be classified as an Association of People’s Organisations (APO) as Grassroots 
Organisations are members and its aims are both development and issue-driven advocacy 
oriented. However, its membership base is not clear. Some critics even argue that CUP 
simply functions as an instrument of CORC. In any case a strong organisational overlap 
between CUP, CORC and FEDUP can be seen.  
Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) 
The Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP)48 is aligned to the transnational movement of 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) (see chapter 2.3.1.6). Since 1991 the SDI ap-
proach has been replicated in South Africa with the South African Homeless People’s 
Federation (SAHPF). After a substantial crisis and subsequent rebuilding process, in 2006 
FEDUP was initiated as a successor of SDI practice in South Africa. FEDUP is active in 
all provinces; primarily in urban areas. It is made up of saving schemes.49 Since its re-
building process accurate numbers are not available. Nevertheless, estimates indicate a 
membership of about 40,000 in about 700 settlements around the country.50 Members are 
85% women earning less than R1,00051 per month.52 Federation members were mostly 
from site-and-service schemes. This has been shifting towards increasing number of land-
less members joining the Federation.53 
For the Federation the delivery of tangibles such as housing is perceived as an entry point 
for mobilisation of the poor, but not as an organisational goal as such. The aim of the 
Federation is to establish a network of local groups which is empowered to negotiate with 
the state. 
FEDUP is organised at different levels with a flat leadership structure. It is based on local 
leadership with regional and national structures which have a facilitating and advocacy 
role. Since the leadership crisis within the Federation the need for more transparent work-
                                                 
47 See for example NGO member 3 
48 This abbreviation by the way is no coincidence as it is time and time again used when challenging gov-
ernment representatives with the slogan “We are FEDUP!”. 
49 After the crisis of UTshani savings practices had to be reintroduced and are only slowly advancing 
again. 
50 See for example Podlashuc (2008), p. 8 and SDI (2007a). 
51 About 107 Euro 
52 See Bay Research and Consultancy Services (2002), p. 12. 
53 See Bay Research and Consultancy Services (2002), p. 15. 
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ing structures and less monolithic and centralised leadership has been acknowledged. The 
director of CORC considers the decentralised leadership as “the popcorn-popping effect 
as opposed to centralised leadership”.54 
At the same time these requirements result in a dilemma for the Federation: on the one 
hand it aims to prevent centralised decision-making and leadership structures by promot-
ing bottom-up processes. On the other hand, there is the need (in terms of accountability 
requirements imposed by donors and the state) for a structured decision-making process 
with clear roles and responsibilities. 
At a national Federation meeting in August 2006 the internal networking in terms of re-
porting/ planning and resource allocation was outlined as follows: 
At community level the mobilisation into the Federation is based on the formation of sav-
ing groups. Through daily savings members are enabled to provide credit to other mem-
bers. They also pay into an Urban Poor Fund (UPF) which pools external resources and 
local contributions for the Federation. Members pay R750 and R5 monthly into regional 
UPFs which will contribute to a national UPF.  The fund is administered by the uTshani 
Fund. An uThshani project coordinator stressed the relevance of UPF as a mechanism to 
show affiliation to the Federation: 
“They are not allowing you to go on exchanges or travels or meetings if you are not in the 
Urban Poor Fund. It is like saying: Here we draw the line. Here you show your true affilia-
tion to the federation.”55 
FEDUP facilitates the horizontal exchange of groups and enables them to scale up their 
activities. The Federation stresses that they differ from microfinance self-help groups 
since it is not the financial aspect, but empowerment and changing relations to one an-
other and the state, which is fundamental. A common slogan they use is: “We collect peo-
ple, not money.” Saving schemes consist of 10-20 members. These saving schemes have 
legal status as voluntary associations and thereby can enter into contracts and administer 
member’s savings. Often members of the local FEDUP networks were members of other 
local stokvels saving schemes, community groups or women’s associations before and 
they continue to participate in other local structures.  
                                                 
54 Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006. 
55 NGO member 13 
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Local networks are composed of groups of savings schemes which are also referred to as 
‘Centres of Learning’. Saving groups interact in quarterly coordination meetings and sup-
port each other in negotiations. Planning is based on action plans which express needs and 
priorities agreed upon in the local networks.56 Coordinators are identified by savings 
schemes and accountable to them. Their responsibility is to monitor implementation, en-
sure networking and communication between regional and local networks.  
In 2006 local networks affiliated to FEDUP were situated in different communities within 
Cape Town such as Site C (Khayelitsha), Ekupumleni (Philippi East)57 and increasingly in 
coloured communities such as Macassar (Sommerset West), Manenberg, Athlone and 
Strand. In 2006 these networks were involved with about nine housing projects in Cape 
Town. 
Local Network Background Goal Estimated No. 
of member 
households 
(2006) 
Internal  
organisation 
Activity 
Klipfontein 
Glebe  
(Crossroads) 
Residents of 
informal set-
tlement, 
FEDUP since 
2005 
Establish net-
works (strate-
gic) and land, 
housing and 
social devel-
opment (issue-
based) 
200 affiliated to 
FEDUP, some 
saving 
schemes but 
non-operative 
Negotiations 
Mobilisation 
Internal net-
working 
Exchanges 
Savings 
Data gathering 
Macassar  
(Sommerset 
West) 
Backyard 
dwellers or 
subtenants, 
FEDUP since 
2006 
200 Organised in 
20 active sav-
ings schemes 
Site C/ Kuyasa 
(Khayelitsha) 
Residents of 
site-and-
service 
scheme, 
FEDUP since 
early 1990s 
250 25 (estimated) 
saving 
schemes 
Ekupumleni 
(Phillippi East) 
Former resi-
dents of site- 
and-service 
scheme, 
FEDUP since 
1994 
200 20 (estimated) 
saving 
schemes 
Tab. 5.4: Characteristics of selected FEDUP local networks, Source: Own design 
                                                 
56 See FEDUP (2006), pp. 5ff.  
57 The Ekupumleni group though was highly affected by the split in the Federation and did not consider 
itself at the time of the research to be part of neither of the two structures. However, it continues on the 
SDI practices. 
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On a regional level FEDUP is organised in nine regions. Local networks identify repre-
sentatives for regional coordination meetings where their local action plans are handed in 
for approval and resource allocation. Regional meetings in the Western Cape take place 
on a monthly basis. Also, regional coordinators (four in the Western Cape) and pro-
gramme coordinators (e.g. for the Urban Poor Fund and savings activities) are appointed 
at these meetings. Regional coordinators produce reports as feedback to local networks 
and pass on prioritised action plans to national level programme coordinators. The re-
gional networks identify where their local affiliates need support in their process to access 
land or housing subsidies.58 
On a national level coordination is divided in coastal (Western Cape, Northern Cape, 
Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal) and inland (Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North Western 
Province, Free State and Limpopo). National programme coordinators collect reports 
from regions, give feedback to regions and report to a treasurer. They also visit local net-
works on a monthly basis to assist with report preparation. Programme and budget deci-
sions for Federation activities are made at national forum meetings. The national forum 
consists of three savings scheme representatives per region.  
At national level FEDUP has a trust referred to as uDondolo Trust which finances activi-
ties such as advocacy, exchanges and documentation. The trust consists of the two na-
tional coordinators and eight trustees from NGO and government and private sectors 
backgrounds. The trust is managed by a treasurer. 
At an international level the Federation is aligned to Shack/Slum Dwellers International. 
Federation members within this global network of federations visit each other on ex-
changes which are used as a vehicle for horizontal learning. SDI addresses international 
organisations and institutions. It also opens doors for FEDUP members to participate and 
advocate at an international level. SDI is, for instance, a member of the Cities Alliance to 
promote strategies for urban poverty reduction.59 
The figure below seeks to depict the governance structure and mechanism of the network. 
Characteristic elements for network coordination are action plans, reporting and resource 
flows. However, the organigram only reflects an abstract understanding of the organisa-
                                                 
58  Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006. 
59 See Cities Alliance (2005). 
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tional set-up. It highlights a bureaucratic organisation and fails to illustrate the network 
characteristic and organisational overlaps inherent in the organisational structure. 
 
Fig. 5.7: Organigram Federation of the Urban Poor, Source: adapted from FEDUP (2006), p. 9. 
The legal status of the Federation causes confusion for outsiders. Saving schemes have a 
legal status as voluntary associations and can enter into contracts and administer member 
savings. But the Federation itself has no legal standing. It is rather a governance mecha-
nism to decide upon resource distribution within the network. 
Still it is a confined network of local saving schemes and organised on various levels. Its 
local networks of saving scheme members are, in terms of size and scale of activity, simi-
lar to People’s Organisations and their aims are both development and issue-driven advo-
cacy oriented. The inaccuracy of terminology and difficulty of description is further com-
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plicated when taking into account that activities within the network go beyond its ac-
countability process of action plans, reporting and resource flows. Links within the net-
work are also informal and circumscribed by the term ‘federating’. The membership-base 
is also difficult to define since it is officially based on saving schemes which in reality are 
often not active. Furthermore, the formal organisational element of the Federation shows 
organisational overlaps with other organisations. The Federation constitutes of the uT-
shani Fund, NGOs are members of the uDondolo Trust, the Federation is a member of 
CUP and SDI, which are both located at CORC offices. 
FEDUP is not formalised or registered as an organisation. Its organisational setup as a so-
cial movement is characterised by horizontal and vertical networks of federation groups 
which go up to transnational level through its affiliation with SDI. Interorganisational re-
lations between local networks are therefore strong. Their members are saving schemes as 
the formal registered units which are constituted by urban poor with various housing ten-
ure backgrounds. 
FEDUP is critical of the deficiencies of state housing delivery. However, instead of mak-
ing claims, the groups adopt a collaborative strategy and mobilise communities to Federa-
tion practices such as savings and exchanges. Through these practices the Federation in-
tends to create strong networks as a basis for negotiation with the state. The model for 
mobilisation and negotiation is based upon alternative development strategies which 
comprise: 
- ‘Federating’ by establishing horizontal connections in and between communities 
- A multiscalar organisation building from Shack/Slum Dwellers international to lo-
cal communities 
- The construction of an autonomous space by savings and loans by slum dwellers, 
exchanges between slum dwellers and setting precedence 
- The construction of a non-class identity by “rituals” which bind the members to-
gether 
The relationships between Federation groups are determined by the set-up of FEDUP it-
self which, as outlined above, is neither exclusively an organisation nor a network. As ex-
plained the establishment of the network and the form of governance within the network 
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constitutes its aim and function. FEDUP structures mobilise communities on the ground 
which then constitute saving groups as the basic unit of mobilisation. Horizontal ex-
changes and continuity in relations are characteristic element of the activities. 
Principal underlying understanding is that saving schemes are in need of a collective 
structure and local organising process. This structure and process represents a mechanism 
to overcome the isolation of individual communities and forms the basis of engagement 
with local government.60 
 
Fig. 5.8: Horizontal relations within FEDUP, Source: Own design 
 
5.1.3.3 Intra-alliance relations 
Relations between support organisations 
The NGOs supporting the Federation have no formal cooperation structure but very 
strong working relations both in terms of project implementation as well as strategic plan-
ning. The Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) is at the core of this poly-
centric configuration and seen as a network of NGOs with different degrees of affiliation.  
CORC sees itself as: 
“[…] best positioned to become the core of this new configuration, bringing together urban 
development specialists from various agencies to form a new pro-poor platform. […] How-
ever relationships will be more fluid with a focus on sharing experience, knowledge and ca-
pacity in contrast to an emphasis on organisation building and structure.”61 
This fluid configuration comprises relatively independent programmes within CORC 
which gain legal standing and often financial resources through CORC as well as uTshani 
Fund and People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) as independent partner organisations 
of CORC. In practice this fluid relationship is reflected in mutual strategic meetings, shar-
                                                 
60 See for example: Bolnick et al (2006), p. 64. 
61  See CORC (2006c). 
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ing of office space with, for instance, CORC staff sometimes being accommodated at uT-
shani offices as well as staff members often working in teams within local projects. 
Moreover, as has been shown above, the NGOs share organisational overlaps. These can 
be summarised as follows: 
- Representatives of each NGO sit on the others board of directors.  
- The executive manager of the uTshani Fund simultaneously acts as a supervisor to 
the Community Microfinance Network (CMN) which is a CORC programme. 
- PEP constitutes both as an independent NGO and a programme of CORC. 
Relations between support organisations and the Federation 
The federations are assisted in their bargaining and financial management process by 
NGOs. The NGOs and FEDUP groups have a fragmented understanding of the housing 
challenge (e.g. upgrading vs. single free standing house). This is specifically revealed in 
local projects where Federation groups are more issue-driven. Nevertheless, they share a 
common understanding that the key challenge lies in power inequality. They are therefore 
together committed to resource building by grassroots with the long-term aim of empow-
erment (“power is knowledge and money”). 
The relationship between NGOs and the Federation is characterised by two shifts: firstly 
by a shift from exclusive relations to a continuum of partnerships. Secondly, by a chang-
ing approach of CORC from direct funding and social support in projects to supporting 
networking. 
Shift from an exclusive to an open alliance 
Firstly, for a long time NGOs supporting the Federation worked exclusively for the Fed-
eration. This working arrangement of mainly three components (the Federation, uTshani 
Fund and People’s Dialogue at the time) was referred to as the ‘Alliance’. It represented a 
new relationship between NGOs and social movements in South Africa.62 However, as 
Bolnick outlines, with the financial mismanagement and leadership struggles within the 
South African Homeless Peoples Federation at the time, People’s Dialogue withdrew its 
support and closed down. As a result the Federation was cut-off from donor funding. Bol-
                                                 
62 See Ballard et al (2006), p. 17. 
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nick, stresses, that this demonstrates a particular constraint inherent to all SDI alliances: 
donor regulations get transmitted through NGOs. The resource control by NGOs contra-
dicts the federation’s search for independence and autonomy, thus Bolnick: 
“For the Federation we as professionals tasted sweet, but were poisoning. We are neither 
community nor state.”63 
Therefore, FEDUP embarked on a reform of CBO-NGO relationship. It established a trust 
which puts it in a position to decide whether to continue or close contracts with their sup-
port NGOs. The difference, according to Bolnick, is that the Federation now has leverage 
over the NGO and moreover, that it will result in dynamic decision-making in a contin-
uum of partnerships.64 
The shift might better reflect a changing mindset than yet a new practice. In 2006 almost 
all NGO activities where aligned to Federation projects and almost all Federation groups 
used CORC, uTshani Fund and PEP as their professional support structures. For instance 
the uTshani Fund stresses that it extends its support to all groups practicing savings. In 
reality it is still primarily confined to Federation groups. And even if the professional 
support arm of the uTshani Fund expands its target group, uTshani and the Federation 
cannot be understood as independent entities since the uTshani Fund is constituted by 
FEDUP.  
Also, CORC officially supports a variety of grassroots networks, but in reality its activi-
ties are centred on FEDUP. In the same way the Community Microfinance Network 
(CMN) is meant to combine all savings-based social movements and their NGO support-
ers in the field of microfinance.65 The CMN savings coordinator stresses that:  
“[…] savings is a ritual of SDI and the federation, but CMN works also with other groups 
that are saving with the aim of assisting them and then they can join the FEDUP as well.”66 
The statement that CMN seemingly mobilises savings groups into the Federation is part of 
a general concern that microfinance institutions and initiatives undermine their different 
approaches by taking over the support for groups. As a result there is a great reluctance to 
                                                 
63 Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006. 
64 See Bolnick (2008), pp. 229ff. 
65 See CMN (2006). 
66 NGO member 4 
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collaborate in networks like CMN.67 Obviously this tendency also characterised CMN 
which, in 2006, was largely affiliated to uTshani Fund activities. 
Shift from direct funding to support of networking 
Whereas the uTshani Fund acts as an intermediary in terms of financial management and 
technical support (assisted by PEP) and therefore employs professional field staff, CORC 
has changed its approach. The partner organisations to CORC specifically stress the dif-
ference from CORC to People’s Dialogue’s approach. CORC provides support through 
learning centres and networks, not through funding of local groups.68 
In 2005 CORC in some ways took over PD’s intermediary role and activities when it 
came to fund raising and handling administrative matters. However, it does not employ 
field staff interacting with housing development projects. This is partly realised through 
the set-up of various programmes under the CORC umbrella. However, there are concerns 
that the PD closure left a capacity vacuum for social support.69 
Within the different CORC programmes activities are centred on building relationships 
within the Federation and between the Federation model and professionals. CUP, or 
FEDUP as its main constituent, receives support from CORC in two different ways: One 
form of support is through learning and advocacy. CORC facilitates experience sharing 
through exchange programmes between these affiliates or by bringing them together to 
engage state institutions to secure resources. The second way NGOs are engaged is 
around delivery. In terms of decision-making within this configuration of NGO-
Federation a ‘Strategic Learning Group’ has been established which is constituted by 
CUP, FEDUP, CORC and the uTshani Fund and sometimes other professional support 
organisations. This forum lacks decision-making power, but provides strategic alignment 
and identifies synergies amongst the stakeholders.70 
Furthermore, NGOs and Federation are linked through their affiliation to the international 
SDI network and common activities and exchanges coordinated from the secretariat 
which is based at CORC. This relationship entails multiscalar and multilevel activities. 
Also, there is a direct link through employment of grassroots activists by CORC. It must 
                                                 
67 See Interview with Tony Florence, 18.10.2006. 
68 See Utshani Fund (2005b). 
69 NGO member 13 
70 NGO member 3 
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be stressed that this is a sensitive issue. In the past employment has caused friction within 
the Federation. Therefore the NGOs aim to cease employment. In reality, however, some 
old contracts see to an employment of FEDUP national coordinators. Also, CUP is finan-
cially dependent on CORC. As a result its facilitator seems to be more in a quasi freelance 
position.  
Over and above the working relations NGO staff and Federation activists often share per-
sonalised relations. These informal connections are sometimes referred to as being part of 
the ‘SDI family’ which reflects a common identity and more complex interface beyond 
project-based cooperation. 
Bolnick stresses the importance of NGOs as intermediaries, but as a determining condi-
tion the autonomous position of SDI federations. This independence, according to Bol-
nick, has to evolve from below. While savings groups grow stronger, they increasingly 
take over more tasks which Bolnick refers to as a ‘value-laden progress’. This progress in 
empowerment implies that the relationship between the groups and their support NGOs is 
also in flux. 
“Part of the relationship is a shared understanding that the collective experience and per-
spective of the urban poor is central; as a result the specific roles within the relationships are 
in permanent transition.”71 
Therefore, the working relation can only be summarised on a general level. Its character-
istics will only come into effect in specific arrangements. 
                                                 
71 Bolnick (2008), p. 328. 
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5.2 Perceptions of the housing process 
Both from a right-based and alternative development point of view the urban trends in 
South Africa are characterised by the effects of HIV/AIDS, the growing unemployment, 
an increasing housing backlog and restricted land availability.72 Also, both positions share 
the understanding that the urban challenge is determined by increased social inequality. 
They argue that whilst the integration of the South African economy into the global mar-
ket has contributed to economic growth, it has not provided resources to overcome the 
uneven urban development. Instead, the social fabric is characterised by a widening gap 
between rich and poor which progressively undermines the stability of the country.73 
As a result, both sides argue, dynamic urbanisation in Cape Town is characterised by in-
formal survival mechanisms and the incapacity of governments to regulate a more even 
development path. 
Both right-based and alternative development supporters stress that the political instability 
has an impact on housing delivery. Firstly, the different spheres of government block each 
other and thus cause delays in housing development. The coordinator of the Coalition of 
the Urban Poor (CUP) explained: 
“So it is difficult to get a housing development on the ground, because the land that should be 
provided should come from the local authorities and the subsidies come from the national 
and provincial government. It is quite difficult to get them around one table. One would block 
the other.”74 
According to both positions the growing informality does not emerge due to a lack of 
housing, but as a component of poverty which is linked to low incomes and unemploy-
ment. They therefore criticise government for its large scale slum eradication efforts and 
mass low-income housing delivery. The mode of implementation is criticised for its quan-
titative and technocratic approach based on formal institution delivery as it further mar-
ginalises the poor as objects of development.75 
                                                 
72 DAG (2002), p. 6. 
73 See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001) and (2004); DAG (2004), pp. 4f. 
74 Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006. 
75 See DAG (2004), pp. 6f; DAG (2007), p. 10; Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2004). 
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5.2.1 Accessing land 
The first phase of the formal proscribed housing project cycle is referred to as ‘Land Iden-
tification Phase’. Here data is made available on vacant land for housing development, 
land is released, consultants conduct an analysis of the site which includes a geotechnical 
survey and cost estimates and finally, if needed, land is purchased.  
Local government perceives land identification for low-cost housing as an exclusive re-
sponsibility of the state. Since pressure for housing delivery is high, the tendency is to-
wards identifying Greenfield sites on the periphery. Any proactive initiatives such as oc-
cupation, identification or private acquisition are perceived as outside the formal process 
and illegitimate. Government officials fear that negotiations will open the channel for 
jumping the queue on the housing waiting list.  
On the other hand the NGOs aligned to DAG or the Federation see the access to well-
located land as one of the primary challenges for a successful housing approach. They 
criticise the effects of the housing subsidy system which links access to subsidies to the 
proof of legal tenure and reinforces housing development on the periphery.76 
DAG criticises inequality in the land market and argues that it is government’s responsi-
bility to ensure access to well-located land for low-income housing.77  
“Public land is public land and has to be used for the public good. If we do not have the vi-
sion how […] to make the city accessible to the poor, that opportunity will get lost. The kind 
of informality we see now is nothing compared to what we will see in ten years time if we do 
not do something now.”78 
DAG argues that local government should increase its resource base to address the issue 
of land inequality. 
“If they [government] say they do not have the resources, it means they are not taxing prop-
erly […]. In a situation where we have a rampant property market and we have the very up-
market areas there is something wrong with our revenue base.”79 
The Federation agrees that government has responsibilities in terms of accessing land. 
However, faced with the reality of the incapacity of the state to fulfil its mandate, the pri-
                                                 
76 See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), p. i. 
77 See DAG (2005), p. 21. 
78 NGO member 11 
79 NGO member 11 
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mary option for poor households would be to take own initiative by accessing land out-
side the formal route and then finding ways to negotiate further development. 
Both stress that the reluctance to engage with communities, forces these communities into 
illegal activities because local government refuses to include them in decision-making 
around land allocation.  
For the Federation groups as well as the People’s Organisations working with DAG, ac-
cess to land was perceived as the only option to overcome the overcrowded conditions 
they have been living in. They are particularly interested in accessing land within their 
community or in a location close to job opportunities. 
 
Fig. 5.9: Problem perception of accessing land for housing development, Source: Own design 
 
5.2.2 Project preparation 
The formal project preparation phase comprises the site planning process, the project ap-
proval process (including beneficiary approvals), the rezoning process and the tendering 
and appointment of contractors.  
NGOs criticise that this phase, particularly the subsidy application process, is often de-
layed and represents a bottleneck. For PEP the political divide between provincial and lo-
cal government in Cape Town had particularly impacted on the approval of projects. Ac-
cording to PEP it is not a technical, but a political issue as to why the provincial govern-
ment refused to approve and release the subsidies.  
The NGOs hold that poor people are excluded both from subsidy and credit-linked hous-
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• Inequality in land market 
• Delayed land allocation by 
state 
• Housing subsidy scheme 
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ing. Also, they argue, that the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries are too narrow.  
A further technical constraint stressed is that owners of an RDP house find it difficult to 
trade their house in order to climb up the housing ladder. The Kuyasa Fund argues that 
RDP houses do not have a value in the property market. Microfinance for home im-
provements would enable access to mortgages and the property market and thus contrib-
ute to poverty eradication. Home improvements, Kuyasa argues, creates a bridge between 
the subsidy beneficiary market and the affordable housing market.80 
A more social constraint is emphasised with regard to the delivery of a housing product 
which does not take into account the wide range of community concerns. DAG agrees in 
principle with the People’s Housing Process (PHP) policy but criticises the variations of 
how it is implemented on the ground. DAG acknowledges that the new national housing 
policy includes a different approach, but that this would require an advocacy approach to 
hold government accountable to implement it.81 DAG stressed: 
“I want to emphasise the point that DAG does not see the house as the thing. […] in the pre 
project phase and during the project there is a type of consciousness that we want to create 
around what are the other elements to make this community be a community.”82 
An uTshani Fund staff member underlined the development concern: 
“The role of the local authority for me is to work very closely with communities. […] For me 
development is not a product. There is a process to the product. “83 
The uTshani Fund sees the challenge in finding solutions which take into account the 
livelihood strategies as an asset and in enabling communities to participate in decision-
making.84 
The grassroots organisations were interested in participatory housing development both 
due to lack of finance and to interest in community empowerment. The chairperson of one 
committee explained their reasons for opting for PHP: “We want homes, not houses.”85 
                                                 
80 See The Kuyasa Fund (2004), p.16; van Rooyen/Mills (2003), pp. 5-6, The Kuyasa Fund (2006a), p.8f. 
81 See DAG (2005), p. 17. 
82 NGO member 8 
83 NGO member 12 
84 See Baumann (2003b), pp. 85ff. 
85 PO member 2 
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Fig. 5.10: Problem perception of project preparation, Source: Own design 
5.2.3 Housing development 
The formal housing development process comprises land bulk servicing, site surveying, 
internal servicing, construction, house occupation, building approval and transfer of title. 
Participation of community organisations is confined to project steering committees to fa-
cilitate implementation.  
A general concern is the fixation on a house product which distorts any efforts for in situ 
upgrading to so-called ‘rollover’ schemes. DAG sees the delivery focus in the political 
patronage of housing: 
“They [politicians] want to see houses. Houses you can cut ribbons and you can get recogni-
tion. […] Even if you only build ten houses it gives you more mileage than a thousand people 
having access to water and sanitation.”86 
The People’s Housing Process (PHP) prescribes a standardised intervention framework 
for people-driven development which largely reduces NGOs to technical support organi-
sations and the participation of community organisations to house design, management 
workshops and self-built developments. 
In reality, many of the interviewed local People’s Organisations and federation groups 
stressed their preference to implement PHP as a community-managed, but not necessarily 
self-built process. 
Also, from an NGO perspective a number of critical points were raised. For them housing 
should be a people-driven process which is believed to enhance social capital and build 
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capacities in the communities. Criticism around PHP arises largely around its local im-
plementation. A key criticism by NGOs is that participation is not facilitated upfront. 
Firstly, the NGOs disagree with the ‘managed PHP’ approach and criticise that the City 
contracts consultants who do not have the capacities to enable participation. 
“We started to get involved in a lot of blocked projects which were set up by private compa-
nies as PHP projects – a managed PHP. Those companies never did proper participation so 
the project has gone to a hold.”87 
In the view of the Federation alliance government had copied the PHP process from the 
Federation but then had become antagonistic to the process itself. They relate the man-
aged PHP to both the delivery pressure of government and personal gains to be made by 
contracting developers.88 
Secondly, NGOs argue that there are capacity constraints and lack of commitment at local 
government level. PEP argues that local government is very reluctant to work with the 
PHP process. 
“At the project level we always fight with local authority officials to make the process inclu-
sive. It is from simple things as making information available, getting communities to be part 
of a technical team to looking at different house types, different options and so on.”89 
The uTshani Fund accuses government of misinterpreting the role of the NGO support 
organisation. As a result federation groups would become too dependent and then accuse 
uTshani for not driving the development. One project coordinator pointed out: 
“They [government] want to see someone there who can speak their language. I am saying:” 
[…] If I am there it is […] Utshani’s Housing Process but not the People’s Housing Proc-
ess.” They just don’t get that. […] In an ideal situation we would be the support organisation 
and our role would only be to facilitate the accessing of the subsidies, ensure that supplies 
are paid and it is used to construct houses. Everything else should be done by the federa-
tion.”90 
Thirdly, a concern which all NGOs raised was that households struggle to meet building 
standards requirements. According to DAG, technical requirements put beneficiaries in a 
dependency to external builders in construction related decision-making.91 
                                                 
87 NGO member 6 
88 NGO member 5 
89 NGO member 8 
90 NGO member 13 
91 See DAG (2006), pp. 13f. 
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Also, the Federation experienced that inspectors had become more insistent that people-
driven development has to conform to norms and standards. The federation groups face 
difficulties in complying with regulations. An NGO member warned that the people-
driven process is stifled by instituting bureaucratic requirements.92 An uTshani Fund pro-
ject coordinator maintained that it is particularly difficult for Federation projects since 
many units had been constructed upfront and then they have to comply with formal re-
quirements afterwards. The project coordinator referred to the difficulty they face as “put-
ting a square box into a round hole”.93 For People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) rigor-
ous insistence on regulations seemed absurd in a situation of people-built houses. 
“This is a report from the local building inspector […] These houses were built five to six 
years ago. People have been living in them. Now they won’t sign them off. […] For God’s 
sake they are holding back the subsidy because there is no window sill in the kitchen!” 
Approval depends to a large extent on the willingness of building inspectors. PEP even 
stressed: 
“If you get the guys on your side, they will go out of the way and make life very easy for you 
– the local authorities building inspectors.”94 
An uTshani Fund project coordinator also stressed the flexibility inspectors have: 
“Your one inspector in one municipality wants the beneficiary to write an affidavit that they 
are aware that the house is not built according to plan. […] Then he will issue the occupation 
certificate. His colleague in the same municipality will not accept that.”95 
 
Fig. 5.11: Problem perception of housing development, Source: Own design 
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94 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
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5.3 Interfaces between the State and Alliance A 
Alliance A is concerned with both strategic level interfaces and project-based interfaces 
with the state. Whereas strategic engagement is revealed by the diversity of activity areas, 
at project level relationships are illustrated through case studies. The Netreg project ex-
emplifies negotiations and interfaces in Greenfields developments. The Freedom Park 
project illustrates the variety of engagements in informal settlement upgrading. 
 
Fig. 5.12: Map of Cape Town with location of People’s Organisations96, Source: Own design 
5.3.1 Perception of alliance A by local government 
The Development Action Group (DAG), the Kuyasa Fund and People’s Organisations are 
not perceived as one alliance. State actors perceived People’s Organisations working with 
DAG as any issue-based Community-Based Organisations aligned with the corresponding 
opportunities and limits of partnerships with them (see Chapter 4.2.2.3). 
The Development Action Group (DAG) and Kuyasa Fund are referred to as urban sector 
NGOs. In general officials felt that local government has good relations with them. They 
specifically stressed DAG’s contribution to research and to technical support of the com-
munities. A government official pointed out that DAG is the most actively involved NGO 
with local government.97 Some housing officials are of the opinion that NGOs should 
only provide technical assistance to communities as this is where they can add value to 
                                                 
96 Highlighted are the micro-case studies. 
97 City official 1 
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the housing process. In this context DAG is seen to be providing this technical assistance. 
Its ‘empowerment agenda’, however, is questioned in terms of its relevance for the people 
on the ground. Some commented that empowerment is superimposed on groups. 
“In Khayelitsha with the first kind of PHP project that DAG ever did […] the community 
turned around saying: “We are sick and tired of your projects. We actually just want 
houses.”98 
Another official specifically pointed out that the advocacy role of DAG often leads to 
blockages in housing projects. Taking a project in Kuilsriver as a case in point he felt that 
DAG exaggerated possibilities and that this lead to a standstill of the project.99 
“If DAG is advising the community group then DAG gets trusted, my project managers don’t. 
And then it just stalls, it does not go anywhere. It would be good if the NGOs in general had a 
funnel effect whereby they organise all the pre project politics and conflict and then eventu-
ally organise it into clean and neat development projects.”100 
5.3.2 Strategic advocacy by Alliance A 
There are three entry points how the Development Action Group (DAG), the Kuyasa Fund 
and its affiliated People’s Organisations seek to influence the housing process on a strate-
gic level: Advocacy, establishing a network of People’s Organisations (CBO network) 
and setting precedents. Their strategic influence on different levels of government is char-
acterised by the Development Action Group (DAG) as the driver of activities. 
5.3.2.1 Advocacy  
The Development Action Group (DAG) tries to establish a ‘critical engagement’ or ‘criti-
cal partnership’ with government.101 
“[...] for us to play an effective role in urban development a robust advocacy and lobbying 
approach must be adopted. This can move from being decidedly aggressive, to engaging 
more collaboratively from time to time as is dictated by project needs.”102 
DAG and the Kuyasa Fund make policy recommendations to national, provincial and lo-
cal level of government. They influence policy debates to promote access to land and the 
People’s Housing Process (PHP) or to address property-market related issues. DAG ob-
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101 See DAG (2006a), p. 10. 
102 DAG (2004), p. 17. 
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jects particularly to ‘managed PHP’ projects and advocates for a community-managed 
housing approach.103 Advocacy activities are based on research findings which inform 
proposals and comments on policy, position papers and presentations.104 
At national level DAG was involved in the evaluation of the Housing Subsidy Scheme and 
in the National Department of Housing’s Policy and Research Agenda process in 
2003/2004. In 2005 DAG played a central role in the development of new PHP guidelines 
and reconstitution of the People’s Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT)105. It participated in 
the NGO PHP Reference Group and Extended Interim Policy Working Group at the na-
tional Department of Housing to revise PHP.106 
DAG has strong and stable relationships also with provincial government. The executive 
director was a member of the Western Cape Housing Partnership Council which was ini-
tiated as an advisory body to the housing minister.107 
In 2005 DAG was part of the provincial and national land summit and of the Human Set-
tlements Reference Group (a provincial advisory board). This was followed in 2006 by 
participating in the writing team for the Western Cape Sustainable Human Settlements 
Strategy (WCSHSS).108 The partnership with the Province released R 24 million in subsi-
dies for twelve blocked PHP projects.109 
A DAG staff member commented that on local government level within recent years op-
portunities to influence policy have arisen. However, on a local level and particularly in 
housing projects, relationships are still limited: 
“Our relationship is better the higher you go [in the hierarchy]. There are a lot of conflicts 
which arise in the actual projects [...]. Our relationship with senior level people [in local 
government] is quite good; on the research and policy side very good. But [...] often policies 
and relationships does not arrive down on the ground to the people who we are working with 
in the projects. So they often don’t buy to any of the things the senior people are writing.”110 
                                                 
103 See The Kuyasa Fund (2006a), p. 15; Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.2006. 
104 See for instance Thurmann (1999); USN (1998); Manie (2004); Western Cape Department of Housing 
(no date). 
105 PHPT is an agency set up by the National Department of Housing to support self-help housing. 
106 See DAG (2006a), p. 21 and DAG (2007), p. 7. 
107 See for example DAG (2004), p.22; Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.06. 
108 See interview Anthea Houston, 15.03.2006 and Western Cape Department of Local Government and 
Housing (2006). 
109 See DAG (2007), p. 6 
110 NGO member 6 
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Therefore, DAG explicitly decided to improve their relations with local councillors and 
officials and to focus on strategic partnerships.111 
DAG collaborated in the formulation of the City of Cape Town Housing Plan. It also 
aimed to strategically influence policy-making through the value capture programme by 
identifying champions within local government for this approach.112 
DAG’s relationships to government are also often determined by personal relations to 
government actors. Staff turnover at DAG is seen as an opportunity to have like-minded 
professionals in key positions at local and provincial government level.113 In 2006 former 
DAG staff and board members were found in such positions as the mayoress of the City of 
Cape Town, the Deputy Director for Provincial Department for Community Safety, a sen-
ior official and a regional head at the municipal housing department. 
Generally, DAG finds itself increasingly in a contractual relationship with government 
working as consultant in research, evaluation and training. DAG directly shares its views 
and experiences with government officials by providing training courses, information 
seminars and manuals to different levels of government. 
DAG describes this involvement as an opportunity to advocate for its housing aims and 
integrate them to policy and strategies. This, according to DAG, will eventually filter 
down and open up the municipal Integrated Development Plan process. 
“What we are trying to do as a NGO is to influence policy. And hopefully policy will guide 
decision-making on an IDP level. That is why our work in the Western Cape Sustainable 
Human Settlement Strategy was an important advocacy and lobbying platform.”114 
However, contractual relationships represent a shift from donor to state dependency. As 
NGOs are in need of alternatives to donor funding, their policy work increasingly be-
comes commissioned research. The Kuyasa Fund is less affected by this tendency than 
DAG. Studies commissioned by government to DAG include the right-based approach to 
housing policy for the National Department of Housing Policy and Research Agenda, 
case studies of PHP projects for PHPT, situational analysis of housing trends and a study 
                                                 
111 See DAG (2006a), pp. 10f, DAG (2008a) and (2008b). 
112 See DAG (2007), p.16. 
113 See DAG (2002), p. 4. 
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of best practices for the City of Cape Town Housing Plan.115 
5.3.2.2 Establishment of a CBO network 
Over the years the Development Action Group (DAG) and the Kuyasa Fund experienced 
contradictions in partnerships with government. They became increasingly aware of the 
pitfalls of critical engagement:  
“So we realise at a theoretical level it is quite a leap to try and ask government to engage dif-
ferently. Maybe the thing to do is to use the space that there is and through the use of that 
space demonstrate the value that engagement with the community has […].”116 
By the end of 2006 DAG openly questioned its collaborative approach and addressed the 
need for pressurising government through networks.  
“The more impatient we become, the more responsible government can become. If we do not 
shout, ask and demand, then it will not happen.”117 
Given the decreasing options for community participation, DAG has further emphasised 
the need of claim-making and putting pressure on government. The innovation is that 
DAG intends to increasingly build networks between communities to enhance their 
chances for inclusion in decision-making. The difference to previous approaches is that 
DAG itself would not be the driver of this process:  
“There is a general awareness in the organisation, that we have not been aggressive enough. 
[...] We want to do it more differently. We have always been in the frontline to do that. We 
want to get communities to do that.”118 
Through networks of People’s Organisations (CBO networks), DAG believes, people will 
be enabled to pressure at a local level and influence policy-making on a strategic level.  
“Our influence can only be through the relationship we have with the communities on the 
ground. […] If we have a very strong civil society, a very organised civil society and in-
formed civil society, that will automatically happen. Through that process we will hold offi-
cials and politicians more accountable and the level of engagement with communities will be 
far more strategic. […] That is for me the turning point. It is going to be a grass thing, a bot-
tom up thing.”119 
The UN World Habitat Day on 2 October 2006 was one such occasion. DAG organised a 
                                                 
115 See DAG (2004), p. 20. 
116 Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006. 
117 Anthea Houston at World Habitat Day, 02.10.06. 
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seminar for policy makers and representatives of civil society. At the event the different 
groups gave an account of their struggle to access land and housing.120 
 
Fig. 5.13: People’s Organisations at World Habitat Day, Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006 
Since the dissolution of the People’s Housing Networking Forum (PHNF) networking op-
portunities have been limited to the workshops facilitated by DAG (see Chapter 4.4.3). 
These are irregular platforms for communities to exchange experiences on their housing 
process. 
“DAG would take us to trips where we would interact with other communities and projects – 
especially in black areas and with women building themselves.”121 
DAG sees a CBO network as an opportunity to shift from consultation by NGOs (for in-
stance to favour the PHP route) to direct exchange of experience and mutual advice be-
tween community groups. 
“[…] there are communities out there who have been through that and they understand and 
                                                 
120 See DAG (2007), p. 8. 
121 PO member 1  
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they are far better to advocate, than we are.”122 
A case recalled by both DAG and the People’s Organisations is about a group of backyard 
shack dwellers who needed assistance in how to access a piece of land. 
“Yes, Grace and Auntie Helen [names changed] encouraged the other community of Laven-
der because they were scared to put shacks up on the field there. They said: “Don’t be 
scared. Get the community together and put up shacks. They [government] cannot put you 
off.” Then they did that and now they have 5,000 shacks there. We meet each other on the 
leadership trainings by DAG. There you can tell about your experiences and DAG gives in-
formation.”123 
However, DAG is interested in impacting beyond the project itself when facilitating an 
exchange between People’s Organisations: 
“Getting Freedom Park and Netreg and other projects to work is just a small drop in the 
ocean in terms of what is required. So how can we upscale and have effect on a far more 
strategic level? […] maybe there is a CBO network that plays a role of doing all the training 
and access their own funding.”124 
Since these networks are not in place yet, People’s Organisations are limited to claim-
making on a day-to-day basis.  
5.3.2.3 Setting precedents 
The Development Action Group (DAG) increasingly uses projects as precedents to dem-
onstrate alternatives and through them inform policy-making: 
“I think we should concentrate more on disseminated lessons learned of projects. We are 
planning to do more case studies in the year or two ahead, document those and to try and 
lobby and get more commitment to people-driven processes.”125 
In 2006 it started a pilot project for in situ upgrading through a partnership with the In-
formal Settlement Upgrading Department at the City of Cape Town. DAG assessed 
planned upgrading projects in Cape Town. As a result it identified one informal settle-
ment community to pilot an in situ approach.126 
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5.3.3 Accessing land projects by Alliance A 
5.3.3.1 Request to release land in Netreg (A1) 
1992 Identification and request to release land 
1996 DAG gets involved 
2000 Provincial administration agrees to release bulk of land 
2000 Land alienation process and first plan for social housing development 
2000 Land release process reopened as new findings provided that land is owned by municipality 
2001 Municipality links land release to the condition that it will act as developer 
2001/02 DAG facilitates negotiation process 
2002/03 Preparation of PHP project application 
2003 NHP addresses Minister of Housing for support 
2004 Final approval of housing development (and thereby land release) 
Tab. 5.6: Timeline of land access in Netreg, Source: Own design 
Landownership  Local Government 
Housing Backyard shack dwellers 
Size of area 3.6 ha 
Project Request for land allocation for Greenfields housing development 
Members 150 households 
Tab. 5.7: Key facts of the Netreg project, Source: Own design 
Netreg is part of Bonteheuwel situated on the Cape Flats. Bonteheuwel has a population 
of about 55,707127. Because of its proximity to the airport, central Cape Town and other 
job opportunities in the area, it is described as a well-located area. It was established in 
the 1960s as part of a new residential township for the coloured working class at the time. 
The housing conditions are characterised as dense and overcrowded. There are poorly 
maintained municipal-owned rental housing units and numerous backyard shacks.128 
The living conditions are characterised by social problems such as gang related crime, 
                                                 
127 See City of Cape Town (2001). 
128 See Wicht (1999), p. 9. 
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violence, rape and drug abuse.129 The unemployment rate is high: 37.5% of the population 
in Bonteheuwel is economically inactive and of those considered economically active an-
other 33.87% are unemployed.130 Those with formal employment work in low paid jobs. 
Many work in the informal sector selling goods or providing services such as sewing or 
collection of recycle material.131 The poorest households have to rely on grants and social 
networks to survive.132 
The Netreg Housing Project (NHP) represents 150 backyard shack dwellers from the area 
which identified a 3.6 ha piece of land along the Modderdam Road/N2 interchange (see 
figure 5.14). Since the 1990s they have addressed government to release the land for 
housing development. Initially the local administration rejected the request and suggested 
providing land in a low-cost housing development at the periphery. The Netreg Housing 
Project, however, objected to the proposal and decided to prepare an alternative plan and 
feasibility study for housing development to readdress local government.133 
 
Fig. 5.14: Satellite image of Netreg Housing Project, Source: adapted from Google Earth (2006) 
                                                 
129 See Wicht (1999), p. 10. 
130 See City of Cape Town (2001b). 
131 See DAG (2004), pp. 24f. 
132 65% of the households have at least one grant recipient. See DAG (2004), p. 26. 
133 See Wicht (1999), pp. 10f. 
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In 1996 the group approached the Development Action Group (DAG) for assistance to se-
cure the land for development. DAG conducted an initial feasibility assessment of the 
project and a survey on the community conditions. Meetings were set up with the Tyger-
berg Local Authority134, Netreg community and DAG to negotiate further procedures.135 
However, the group often did not agree with DAG’s development facilitator about how to 
engage with government. Instead the Netreg community organisation arranged appoint-
ments without the facilitator: 
“[…] there were a lot of fights because she was not doing what we would like and we could 
not get response from government. So we organised and made appointments without her and 
go there and speak to someone and she was teaching us otherwise.” 
In 2000 the provincial administration agreed to release the bulk of land for housing. Sub-
sequently, DAG was involved in the land alienation process and appointed an architect 
and engineering consultant to prepare development plans and infrastructure design. In the 
meantime provincial government rectified its previous findings and reopened the land re-
lease process by declaring that land ownership was with local government.  
From 2001 onwards the land request was made contingent upon approval of housing de-
velopment. The municipal department responsible for land release informed the Netreg 
Housing Project that housing development could only take place, if integrated to other 
housing projects with the administration acting as developer.  
At the time the assistance of DAG lost momentum due to staff turnover and a lack of mo-
tivation and interest by the group.136 
Furthermore, at the time the Netreg group was affiliated to a local SANCO branch which 
is aligned to the ANC. Showing this political affiliation proved to be problematic. Con-
flicts arouse because the ward councillor was from a different political party and refused 
to support the project. 
The negotiations between the group and local government were very tense. The account 
of the chairperson of the Netreg Housing Projects reveals the tensions and aggressive 
claim-making at the time: 
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“We thought: We are coming from the struggle. It takes too much time. […] everything was 
standing still. We wanted pressurising government. So we set up meetings over the phone and 
if the secretary hinders us, we would just go there.”137 
However, the group realised that their claim-making needed a lot of follow-up to achieve 
a response. The chairperson recalls: 
“It was constantly fighting. When you come there, they [government] would make promises. 
We understand that it was not only Netreg. When they took too long with the promises, we 
would follow up. And then after second or third time follow-up, we would get a reaction.”138 
During the negotiations with the City the group even took one official hostage. As a result 
the Tygerberg municipality refused further negotiations and took the project off their pri-
ority list. It revealed that project development would have to be postponed until 
2004/2005 due to capacity constraints.  
DAG then got involved again to mediate between the City and the Netreg community. In 
2002 a further DAG staff member came in to facilitate organisational and individual ca-
pacity-building for the community. In the following DAG organised leadership work-
shops and assisted the group to develop a constitution and formally register as a voluntary 
association. DAG sees its role as advising the committee: 
“DAG staff go out almost every day. The community organisations have lots of meetings like 
frequent general meetings, executive committee meetings, subcommittee meeting, savings 
meetings, workshops around project issues. […] We are just participating and attending. […] 
We would raise concerns. Ultimately our role is assisting community organisations. It is the 
committee who takes the decision. If there is a decision which is fundamentally impossible for 
us we would look at partying ways.”139 
The group formally constituted as a voluntary association in 2002.140 Since then, members 
elect a committee at annual general meetings. The committee works on a voluntary basis 
and is chaired by a chairperson.141 
“We have a constitution where we set out the rules and regulation how to behave and what 
we would like to do as the committee and the beneficiaries.”142 
Leadership in the group has not been without conflict. Leaders often did not receive rec-
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ognition in the community. Also, decision-making in committee meetings and who is rep-
resenting the community presented a struggle amongst the committee members. 
“In going out a lot and speaking to the people I learned a lot. I knew more than they [the 
committee members] knew. I am taking in and I am using in the community. They did not like 
that very much, because it would cause conflict. There were times when I resigned and came 
back many times.”143 
DAG advised the Netreg Housing Project to use different strategies to engage with gov-
ernment and remain apolitical to avoid further blockages. The chairperson explains:  
“Sandra [name changed] would say […] we must not focus on one thing. If we write a letter 
to this one, we must check out some other way which would get the same result. Which 
worked well. […]. We decided let’s keep politics out because that is where the blockages 
come from. Let’s do this non political. We are different people with different political views. 
It is not going to benefit us, if we go there thinking politics.”144 
During long periods of negotiations the group, with the assistance of DAG and appointed 
technical experts, prepared its own project application for the People’s Housing Process 
(PHP) to speed up the process. However, they were confronted with reluctance and scep-
ticism on the part of the local administration.  
Finally, the leadership of the Netreg Housing Project decided to approach the national 
and provincial government and lobby for their interests. They were blamed for undermin-
ing the minister’s authority. The chairperson recalled that the group reminded the Housing 
Minister of voting promises which had been made and seemingly achieved some conces-
sions.  
“I wrote a letter direct to the minister and she was so angry. Because we accused her of not 
being interested in our project, because it is in an area where they are not interested as ANC. 
[…] She set up a meeting with us. […] So she said I am undermining her – how can I write 
her like this? […] But it did not stop me and I was not scared, because it was still right. Ne-
treg has been existent for 40 something years and in that years nothing went on. That is also 
what I said: they only use the people when it was voting time. Ministers and whoever, coun-
cillors, went into people’s houses and speak to them. […] after they made a cross, they 
moved out and people will never see them. That is what I said and she did not like that. That 
is when we started seeing results.” 
The change of commitment might also be a result of the ambitious aim of the Unicity at 
the time to foster the N2 Gateway project and use the Netreg project to demonstrate inno-
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vations in infill land development.145 
“He [advisor to national housing minister] was also the guy that came to Netreg saying: “I 
know that this was not part of the N2 but we will hijack this project and make it part of the 
N2.” What can we do? It was very depressing to hear that. After all the hard time – the com-
munity appealed for 20 years to get that piece of ground.”146 
 
Fig. 5.15: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A1), Source: Own design 
5.3.3.2 Land occupation in Freedom Park (A2) 
1998  Planned invasion of site and eviction order by the City 
1998  Appeal to eviction order by Legal Resource Centre (LRC) 
1998 – 2003  High Court order and mediation process 
Since 2000  Involvement of DAG 
2003  Withdrawal of eviction order and decision for in situ upgrading 
Tab. 5.8: Timeline of land access in Freedom Park  
Landownership Local Government 
Housing Squatter settlement 
Size of area ca. 6 ha 
Project Security of tenure 
Members about 300 households 
Tab. 5.9: Key facts of Freedom Park project 
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Freedom Park is an informal settlement in Tafelsig located on the Cape Flats in approxi-
mately 30 km distance to Cape Town’s Central Business District (CBD). It is part of 
Mitchell´s Plain which was established as a coloured township in 1975. Families were re-
located there under the Group Areas Act (see Chapter 4.1.1). There are about 47,540 peo-
ple in Tafelsig of which about 1,375 people live in temporary shelters in Freedom Park.147 
The socio-economic conditions in Freedom Park are characterised by a high rate of un-
employment (74%). Most people (64%) depend on government grants or pursue other in-
come generating activities such as begging, low-wage factory work, domestic work or 
subletting. Social vulnerability is aggravated by single parenthood, domestic violence and 
alcohol and drug abuse.148 
 
Fig. 5.16: Aerial photography of Freedom Park in 1998 
  Source: MCA Urban and Environmental Planners (2005) 
In 1998 seven hundred backyard shack dwellers from Tafelsig occupied a vacant piece of 
municipal land in the area which had been earmarked as a school site. The occupation of 
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148 See Bender (2005), p. 31; PO member 1. 
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Freedom Park149 was supported by the neighbouring community which wanted to prevent 
further social deterioration of the area by criminal activities. The invaders setup their own 
criteria for who was allowed to occupy land to ensure stability and to enhance chances for 
government support: People had to be from Tafelsig and registered on the City’s housing 
waiting list. Furthermore, the occupiers organised the invasion to conform to layout prin-
ciples concerning emergency access, the size of plots and arrangements of shacks.150 
The City took a hard stance against the unlawful occupation as it feared weakening its au-
thority and inspiring further invasions. It applied for an urgent eviction order which was 
granted by the High Court. The eviction itself, however, was prevented by the residents 
and their supporters. The squatters then appointed the Legal Resource Centre (LRC)151 
which advised the group to formally register. Subsequently, the Tafelsig People´s Asso-
ciation (TPA) was formed. The LRC then represented the group and put in an objection to 
the eviction order. Finally, the High Court allowed the objection and the matter was trans-
ferred to a mediation process between the City of Cape Town and the occupiers as pre-
scribed by the regulations of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occu-
pation of Land (PIE) Act. By the end of 1998 a sociologist from the University of Cape 
Town was appointed as an external mediator.152  
Subsequently, a five year (1998 – 2003) mediated negotiation process between the City 
and the community followed. This process was supported by the Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC) for legal advice and representation of the community. Also, the City appointed a 
private attorney for its legal representation. The LRC at the time tried to delay the process 
as a tactic. The previous case (Grootboom) had shown that the longer a group stayed on 
the field, the more difficult it was for the City to evict them. 
In 2000 both parties agreed to appoint the Development Action Group (DAG) to conduct a 
feasibility study for housing development. DAG recommended PHP delivery but outlined 
that implementation would depend on the access to available land through the City and 
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subsidy approval by the provincial housing board. 
By the end of 2000 the mediator suggested approaching the newly formed Unicity for 
servicing of the site. Subsequently, the residents of Freedom Park submitted a compilation 
of reports and asked the Unicity Executive Committee to reconsider decisions by the pre-
vious administration. In June 2001 the Council agreed to provide temporary emergency 
services and garbage collection, but continued to decline housing development.  
At the time internal conflicts and power struggles in the community emerged when a fur-
ther community organisation, the Freedom Park Squatters Association (FPSA), was es-
tablished, claiming to represent the community.153 Thus, in 2002 DAG and the City’s ur-
ban renewal coordinator of Mitchell’s Plain advised the adversarial community groups to 
elect a new, more representative, committee which would consist exclusively of people 
residing in Freedom Park.154 
Following this, a substantive change occurred: the urban renewal coordinator invited the 
newly constituted Freedom Park committee to participate in the meetings of the Urban 
Renewal Programme (URP)155. The chairperson recalls how they were invited to give 
their opinion: 
“He [urban renewal programme coordinator] sent us a letter and said that every time other 
people come in from the outside and are talking on behalf of Freedom Park and he didn’t like 
this […] So he asked why don’t Freedom Park people come in and talk for themselves. He 
would like to hear from them what is the situation. […] And then we went to him and told him 
what we want.”156 
A window of opportunity for the initiation of housing development in Freedom Park 
opened when the City identified Freedom Park as a possible development for low-cost 
housing.157 DAG used the opportunity and conducted a survey on community needs 
which was presented at a Multi Sectorial Action Team (MSAT) meeting of the Urban Re-
newal Programme. Furthermore, in a progress report to the City, DAG advocated that the 
site be rezoned for housing. This request was supported by the mediator who suggested 
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 237
implementing an upgrading project.158 
At the time DAG also provided various workshops in the community on leadership, or-
ganisation building and communication skills. The chairperson outlines the empowering 
effects of the workshops: 
“I think we could not have made it without DAG. I didn’t know nothing about taking on the 
City for housing and things like this. I used to work on the taxi. So what did I know about 
fighting for houses and going to the City for this piece of land? Then DAG came in by giving 
us leadership workshop. I would say the conflict resolution workshops were great, because 
people living in poverty has all this anger and we had to deal with all this anger. […] We be-
came self confident that we can do this.”159 
At the end of 2002 an urban renewal strategy was released which prioritised, amongst 
other items, housing development in Freedom Park. In February 2003 at a meeting be-
tween the City officials, DAG and the LRC the officials suggested that they would advise 
Council to give up on eviction and instead opt for in situ upgrading. After further negotia-
tions around the specifications of housing development, both the community and the City 
accepted the proposal. Subsequently, the City withdrew its eviction order in June 2003 
and the Council made the land available for housing development. The outcome has been 
critically reflected by one City official as follows: 
“It’s not a win-win situation. It’s a situation where the city has been compromised and the 
land invaders have won.”160 
 
Fig. 5.17: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A2), Source: Own design 
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5.3.4 Project preparation by Alliance A 
5.3.4.1 Speed up project preparation in Netreg (A3) 
2001 Municipality only willing to support housing development on the condition that it is inte-
grated to larger housing developments with administration as developer 
2002 Decision to construct individual housing units via PHP 
The Kuyasa Fund conducts savings workshops and provides individual loans 
2003 Netreg project is re-drafted  
Development proposal and PHP business plan are submitted  
Officials are lobbied to speed up approval process 
2003-2004 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is concluded and approved 
2004 NHP and DAG conduct livelihood study  
Final approval of layout planning and of subsidies by provincial government 
Tab. 5.10: Timeline of project preparation in Netreg 
At the request of the City of Cape Town the Netreg community, with assistance of the De-
velopment Action Group (DAG), re-drafted their development plans.161 At a workshop on 
tenure options the group opted for individual housing through the People’s Housing 
Process. The decision was influenced by the need for additional funds for construction 
and by the strong wish to be more empowered. The chairperson recalls: 
“That is also when we decided to go PHP because we wanted to have a say in how we want 
our houses and the planning and all that kind of stuff. We were thinking not only developing 
the piece of land but also develop ourselves. People have lived there for 40 years, but nothing 
is changing inside. We come from shacks where most of the people pay rent, but they don’t 
know the difference of being a homeowner and the responsibilities around them. We thought 
of developing us. We want to move in there with a totally different frame of mind.” 
Subsequently the community interviewed various professionals such as engineers and 
planners to design the development plan. However, it had to find professionals who were 
willing to work at their own financial risk. 
“We thought because of so many struggles to manage the project ourselves. But we did not 
have the experience. So we had to find someone with experience and who was going to work 
for us without payment first. […] we went around to speak to different companies and then 
we decided on one and asked him to be our project manager. He was so kind and he worked 
several months without any payments from us.”162 
                                                 
161 See DAG (2002), p. 19. 
162 PO member 2 
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The backyard shack dwellers set up a database of beneficiaries with the assistance of 
DAG. The council argued that it would cost too much to develop the difficult piece of 
land. The technical experts therefore advised them to put more people on the beneficiary 
list to make the land viable for housing development. As a result the committee decided to 
extend the list from 156 to 190 beneficiaries and to reduce the individual plot sizes. The 
Netreg Housing Project then contacted households in the area to join the project.163 
Furthermore, since about 2002 the Kuyasa Fund has been giving workshops about sav-
ings. Savings are a precondition for individual households to access loans with the Ku-
yasa Fund. A saving sub-group was formed with a treasurer and collectors. The NHP 
chairperson refers to the change in attitude towards savings: 
“If you would ask me two years ago about the difference of getting something and being bor-
rowed, I would have taken the give.” 
The Netreg Housing Project, together with DAG and the appointed town planner, re-
addressed local government. The officials at the municipality, however, were very reluc-
tant and questioned if the community would be in the position to implement a PHP pro-
ject. The group perceived this scepticism as arrogance.  
“[…] he was so arrogant [City official] – would we be able to pull this thing through and 
how are we going to pay, are we going to pay services? He was concerned we would end up 
failing. We gave him the insurance that we will, if they will give us the piece of land.” 
As the local authority lacked the capacity it suggested that DAG took over the role of the 
implementing agent in the development. DAG, however, stressed that it was neither in a 
position to do so, nor was it in line with their social development aims, to pursue this 
role.164 
During the long period of waiting for project approval by the Provincial Housing Devel-
opment Board (PHDB), the professionals started to proactively enter into the rezoning and 
tendering phase and conducted the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), set up ten-
ders for construction and drew up the business plan. By mid 2003 the community also 
managed to get a private company to take over the role of an implementing agent. The 
chairperson recalls that they had perceived the process being delayed by government:  
                                                 
163 PO member 2 
164 See DAG (2003), pp.11f. 
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“[…] things went so slow, because we would send out stuff and they [government] would de-
lay them.” 
The private consultants and DAG helped to pressurise for the process to be sped up.  
“[…] the project manager, he would not take No for an answer. If they [government offi-
cials] said you must go there tomorrow, he would go there tomorrow. [...]we would go with 
[DAG staff member] to some other high authority and speak to them to speed up the 
things.”165 
In 2004, DAG conducted a livelihood study together with the Netreg Housing Project. 
The aim was to establish a more detailed understanding of household types and their live-
lihood activities in Netreg.166 DAG points out: 
“Already, the local residents involved in this assessment have a richer understanding of the 
problems in their community and have started working with its preliminary findings.”167 
Also, in 2004 DAG organised so-called ‘Project Partners Network workshops’ which 
were supposed to enable an exchange between community groups in regard to their ex-
periences of accessing land, services and engaging with government.168 
At the end, through lobbying at ministerial level, the group received approval for project 
development. In 2004 the development plan and PHP business plan were submitted and 
Provincial Housing Development Board (PHDB) approved the project for PHP subsidy 
funding.169 
 
Fig. 5.18: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A3), Source: Own design 
                                                 
165 PO member 2 
166 See DAG (2004), p. 24 
167 DAG (2004), p. 27. 
168 See for example DAG (2005). 
169 See DAG (2006b); NGO member 10. 
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5.3.4.2 Influencing project preparation in Freedom Park (A4) 
1999 Introduction of savings schemes and collapse after 3 months 
2000 Reintroduction of saving schemes and support by the Kuyasa Fund 
2001 DAG takes over role as PHP support organisation 
2002 Collapse of saving schemes because of power struggles 
DAG conducts housing workshops and beneficiary survey 
2003 Council agreement for in situ as part of the Urban Renewal Programme 
Establishment of Freedom Park Housing Committee 
Consultants appointed 
Beneficiary subsidy application 
2004 Superblock negotiations 
Agreement to integrate additional 193 families 
Approval of general layout plan 
Tab. 5.11: Timeline of project preparation in Freedom Park 
In 1999 the residents of Freedom Park established the first saving scheme which collapsed 
short after inception as a result of limited trust between the saving groups. In 2000 the 
community reintroduced the savings scheme with the assistance of the Kuyasa Fund.170 
In 2001 the Development Action Group (DAG) was approached by the Freedom Park De-
velopment Association (FPDA) to function as the PHP support organisation171 in housing 
development. DAG prepared a report to the Executive Committee of the Unicity of Cape 
Town outlining the options for PHP delivery. 
Subsequently, the Freedom Park Development Association (FPDA), assisted by DAG, 
conducted a survey to find out how many residents would qualify for a housing subsidy. 
Through various workshops DAG provided information on the housing subsidy and ten-
ure options. Also, first layouts were drafted with the community. 
In the meanwhile, the conflicts between the two committees in Freedom Park (see Chap-
ter 5.3.3.2) made it “[…] almost impossible for external organisations to work with the 
                                                 
170 The following account is based on Bender (2005) and PO member 1 
171 PHP support organisations are contracted by beneficiaries and required to establish a housing support 
centre and give technical, financial and administrative assistance. See also the glossary and annex D. 
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community of Freedom Park. “172 
Since the opposing committees contributed to divisions within the community, the saving 
scheme collapsed again in 2002. As a result the confidence in savings was undermined. 
In 2003 City officials proposed in situ development for Freedom Park. The Legal Re-
source Centre (LRC) consulted with the community which agreed, with reservations, that 
the City would later accept PHP housing delivery. Additionally, the City decided to inte-
grate a further eighty beneficiaries from the housing waiting list into the development. 
FPDA accepted the proposal on condition that the current inhabitants of Freedom Park 
would receive the same beneficiary status. The City agreed on condition that those with-
out beneficiary status would get the opportunity to purchase a plot and that those occupy-
ing a plot after May 2002 would have to vacate the site. DAG discussed this proposal with 
the community. However, after trying to obtain further information about the planned de-
velopment, it felt excluded from information and feared reservations by the responsible 
City official. The City seemingly perceived DAG as having a biased position in favour of 
PHP which would subsequently influence the beneficiaries.173 Therefore, DAG requested 
the LRC to continue the discussions with the City. Finally, the decision on in situ upgrad-
ing174 as part of the Urban Renewal Programme passed Council.  
In 2003 a multi-stakeholder forum, the ‘Mitchell´s Plain Phase 1 Housing Project’ com-
mittee, was established which consisted of Freedom Park and three sites within the Tafel-
sig area. As its decision-making competence had been perceived as limited, an agreement 
was reached to set up an additional Freedom Park Housing Committee with the City, 
DAG and FPDA as members. However, roles and responsibilities had not been clarified 
upfront. The City perceived the committee as an institutional space with advisory function 
whereas DAG and FPDA understood that the committee had its own decision-making 
competence. The resulting conflict was resolved when the City outlined that it did not 
have the capacity for a separate project. It argued that it would make the project more cost 
efficient if it were integrated into the larger development. Both parties then agreed to 
leave decision-making with ‘Mitchell´s Plain Phase 1 Housing Project’ committee. 
                                                 
172 See Bender (2005), p. 65. 
173 See Bender (2005), p. 92. 
174 Freedom Park is not in situ but a roll-over type of development. 
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A further misunderstanding emerged when FPDA felt it had been given authority to ap-
point their own consultants. Instead, the City had already appointed consultants. A com-
promise was found: The City approved that the community would appoint a town planner 
for the layout planning whereas the other consultants were appointed by the City. 
This was followed by further negotiations as the town planner advised against in situ de-
velopment. He argued it was unaffordable within the subsidy amount and suggested a 
Greenfields development. As a result, discussions between the town planner, FPDA and 
the City continued. The City then suggested building superblocks175. The community felt 
that their needs had not been taken into consideration. The chairperson of FPDA recalls 
how they were approached in a paternalistic manner: 
“They did not know how to work with communities. […] But here they have to work closely 
with communities on the ground. At the beginning they told us: “If you don’t take this, then 
there is nothing.” 
The superblock solution was refused by the community with the support of the DAG. But 
the Freedom Park Development Association (FPDA) feared that the City would not give 
the community an alternative.  
 “The committee even felt they want to give up. They don’t want to go on with this and forget 
about DAG and tell DAG thank you for your help, but we just are thinking about our commu-
nity, because if we tell the community that they are not going to get houses, it is going to be 
bad.”176 
Also, the FPDA committee felt that DAG had tried to influence them. It meant quite an 
effort on the part of the FPDA to decide against DAG’s advice: 
“I told them: You cannot tell us anymore what to do. We will set up a meeting and decide on 
our own. Then we decided to take the superblock. We called DAG in and thanked them for all 
their help. But we are thinking that the community is relying on us as leaders.”177 
Thus DAG was confronted with balancing to empower but not to superimpose their ad-
vice. The director recalls: 
“Freedom Park is an example of DAG’s approach. DAG would not speak for the community 
but help them articulate for themselves confronting government.”178 
                                                 
175 See Huchzermeyer (2003c). 
176 PO member 1 
177 PO member 1 
178 Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.06. 
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In Freedom Park DAG advised the committee not to give in right away, but to wait and 
see what the City would suggest to them at the next meeting. 
“Then they said it is our decision, but before we go in there don’t say anything. Let them first 
talk. If they still have the same attitude you can do your thing. Then they [City officials] said 
it is fine. […] You can go on with your PHP.”179 
Obviously the bargaining had in the end contributed to a solution in favour of the com-
munity’s needs. However, the community also made concessions since it was agreed that 
an additional 193 families from the housing waiting list were to be integrated into the de-
velopment. 
The beneficiary application was finalised by 2003 after two investigations by the City’s 
Informal Settlement Unit and a survey by FPDA/DAG. By 2004 both the town planning 
and beneficiary list were submitted and approved.180 
 
Fig. 5.19: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A4), Source: Own design 
                                                 
179 PO member 1 
180 See Bender (2005), pp. 80ff. 
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5.3.5 Housing development projects by Alliance A 
5.3.5.1 Controlling housing development in Netreg (A5) 
2004 Appointment of project manager by City 
DAG takes over role as PHP support organisation 
Establishment of steering committee 
Tender of infrastructure delivery 
Appointment of civils contractor 
PHP workshop and house design workshops 
2004/05 Skills development 
Agreement on allocation criteria by members 
Conflict resolution in saving groups  
2005 Support by Niall Mellon Township Trust (NMTT) 
Infrastructure and housing development 
2006 Houses finished and handed over 
Tab. 5.12: Timeline of housing development in Netreg 
Following the subsidy approval in 2004, the Netreg Housing Project (NHP) addressed the 
municipality which agreed to the prioritisation of Netreg for housing development. NHP 
proposed appointing those consultants as project managers who had been working with 
the community since 2003. While this was accepted by the municipal procurement com-
mittee, the City was adamant that one of its officials was appointed.181  
The Netreg Housing Project could still make a number of its own decisions: it employed a 
marketer to work with the beneficiary list and to assist in accessing services. It also ap-
pointed the Development Action Group (DAG) as its support organisation.182  
In 2004 the City established a steering committee for all stakeholders. The committee 
consisted of NHP representatives, the City project manager, the development facilitator 
from DAG, the engineer, planer and marketer.183 The idea was to coordinate the land de-
velopment and construction process and discuss the progress of the development through 
weekly meetings. 
                                                 
181 The account is based on DAG (2006a), pp. 13f.; DAG (2006b); Moodley (2005); NGO member 10, PO 
member 2 and direct observation from a steering committee meeting. 
182 PHP support organisations are contracted by beneficiaries and required to establish a housing support 
centre and give technical, financial and administrative assistance. See also the glossary and annex D. 
183 PO member 2 
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“[…] we wanted everybody on board who will take the project forward. We as the [NHP] 
committee, who did not have the necessary abilities, would like to have other people so we 
can learn.”184 
In 2004 DAG provided workshops about the People’s Housing Process (PHP). At the 
time the Netreg Housing Project agreed upon the criteria of allocation of the plots; own-
ers of horses and carts for instance were allocated larger sites close to open spaces. NHP 
also decided to self-manage the development, but not to self-build the houses. 
“Our people are not used to PHP. With the help of DAG we wanted people to help us to set 
up, so beneficiaries would not need to go out themselves physically. Because we knew it 
would never work out and we would never finish the project, if it depends on them.” 185 
Furthermore, the role of DAG entailed facilitating the participation of beneficiaries in the 
house design process. Following an agreement in the community to build semi-detached 
houses, DAG submitted the house designs to the municipality. Related to this process 
DAG criticised the insistence of the municipality to adhere to disproportionate submission 
requirements.186 
DAG also provided information to the beneficiaries on what they could expect from pro-
fessionals. Moreover, in 2004 skills training was provided in partnership with the national 
Department of Labour. Subsequently, 104 jobs were created for members of the commu-
nity. 
“With the project there are opportunities for the people: They got training and they got jobs. 
[…] We as the housing committee registered ourselves as a CBO. So we are going out to ten-
der and use that to create jobs in the community. So they can be able to pay their rates and 
services.”187 
DAG set up a Housing Support Centre (HSC) with construction controllers188 and local 
Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). Learning from experiences in other projects the Ne-
treg Housing Project agreed upon a CLO who was not a beneficiary in order to avoid 
conflict in the community. 
During the infrastructure development in 2005 the project was confronted with long de-
                                                 
184 PO member 2 
185 PO member 2 
186 See DAG (2007), p. 21. 
187 PO member 2 
188 These construction inspectors were Cuban engineers and based at DAG through a bilateral agreement 
between the Western Cape Province and the government of Cuba. 
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lays which were caused by tight regulations, a lack of supervision by the municipality and 
a number of repairs which were needed. DAG and the Netreg Housing Project had to 
pressurise the City project manager to hold the contractor accountable for the completion 
of outstanding infrastructure development.189 
“In a normal contract, in a civils contract, […] they [government] must be on site when the 
electrical guy comes, so they can monitor and make sure that the work is not damaged. […] 
They give all these strangest conditions for housing, but they would not apply it to their own 
infrastructure.”190  
From 2005 the Niall Mellon Township Trust (NMTT) joined in as a partner of the devel-
opment. NMTT is a house building charity, which was established in 2002 by an Irish 
property developer who resides in Cape Town. Netreg represented the second project 
which the charity had been involved with. The NMTT approach, referred to as ‘Township 
Challenge’, involves volunteers from Ireland who raise funds and participate in an annual 
‘Building Blitz’ which is a week of house construction in the townships of Cape Town.191 
The house construction process started in 2006: In January builders from Imizamo Yethu, 
a settlement where NMTT had implemented its first project, transferred their skills to 
builders from Netreg. In March, the rugby club of the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
volunteered for a day laying foundations for nine houses.192 
NMTT also provided additional funding so that the quality and size of the housing units 
were improved using higher quality material and providing geysers and solar panels. The 
chairperson of the Netreg Housing Project reflected the initiative: 
“That is a great thing that Niall Mellon initiative. […] we are fortunate because we don’t 
need to pay back the money.” 
However, she mentioned shortcomings of the approach and critically remarked: 
“If I had to choose to educate our people, as I see the many difficulties now, I would like 
them to rather pay back. Give them some sort of loan, […] so they would be more responsi-
ble. It adds value to that house. I am not complaining. But I would like to see Niall Mellon 
initiative to change the charity.”193 
Furthermore, DAG later outlined that this partnership compromised community control of 
                                                 
189 See DAG (2007), p.21. 
190 NGO member 11 
191 See NMTT (2006). 
192 See NMTT (2006). 
193 PO member 2 
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the project. In its 2006/07 annual report it openly addresses: 
“Although the material gain was substantial, the loss in terms of the empowerment of the 
community was substantial too. Throughout the period, we witnessed how the role and re-
sponsibility of community leaders reduced as the partnership became increasingly disem-
powering.”194 
Moreover, the resource transfer through NMTT seemingly discouraged saving groups. At 
the same time problems occurred with accountability within the saving groups. As a result 
savings discontinued in 2006. 
Community approaches were also neglected since the project was under extreme time 
pressure. The construction schedule had to be shortened because subsoil drains and foun-
dations had to be finished before the winter season. In April 2006 the first two homes 
were handed over during a ceremony with the Minister of Housing. She stressed that gov-
ernment had taken so long to match their commitment and pledged further subsidies to the 
community.195 
 
Fig. 5.20: Finished semi-detached houses in Netreg, Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006 
                                                 
194 DAG (2007), p. 21. 
195 See DAG (2006a), pp. 13f. 
 249
By October 2006 all 191 houses were completed and occupied. At the time the steering 
committee continued its meetings to discuss unresolved finishing problems. A key con-
cern was the outstanding building approvals. Only if both the beneficiaries and the City’s 
building inspector signed the so-called ‘happy letter’, would subsidies be released from 
Province. However, building approvals were not signed as the water meters connection 
was lacking. The steering committee was concerned that connection of the water meters 
would be delayed if the billing sub-system was not in place.196 The steering committee 
was in complete agreement that they had to search for alternatives to ensure subsidy re-
lease. It discussed different options to either fast track the installation as soon as the sub-
system is in place or to put in temporary connections so that the inspector would agree to 
sign the ‘happy letters’. 
 
Fig. 5.21: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A5), Source: Own design 
5.3.5.2 Rollover development in Freedom Park (A6) 
2004 Start of rollover scheme 
Plot allocation process 
2005 PHP workshops by DAG 
PHP prioritisation process 
2006 NMTT provides financial support to PHP 
House design workshops and construction-related training by DAG 
Tab. 5.13: Timeline of housing development in Freedom Park 
                                                 
196 The problem with the water meters exists because the City needs people’s details on subsystem. But on 
the list of beneficiaries there are no street addresses. So council does not know where to send the bill to. 
This problem exists all over Cape Town. The previous government did not look at the payment but the DA 
is very strict with the water meters. The payment system is now holding up the project. 
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Fig. 5.22: Satellite image of Freedom Park at time of rollover development, Source: Google Earth (2006) 
In 2003 land was made available for housing development in the Freedom Park informal 
settlement. The project was supposed to accommodate 493 households with 300 living on 
site at the time. In 2004 the Freedom Park Development Association (FPDA) registered as 
a non-profit organisation. In 2006 its executive committee consisted of twelve members 
working on a voluntary basis.197 Members of FPDA also organised in different sub-groups 
which comprised housing related issues and broader community needs.198 
Since FPDA decided to self-manage the project, one of the executive committee members 
was selected as the Community Liaison Officer (CLO). The CLO was responsible to link 
up with the municipal project manager and monitor progress of implementation and the 
quality of work by contractors. The Development Action Group (DAG) took over the role 
of the support organisation for the housing development. DAG focused on capacity build-
ing and community empowerment. The project coordinator of DAG perceived herself as a 
link between the City, the donors and the FPDA. Together with the Kuyasa Fund she as-
                                                 
197 See DAG (2006b); Freedom Park Housing Project (2006). 
198 Sub groups active in 2006: Housing Support Centre, Savings, Community Safety, Materials Supplier, 
PHP Application, Freedom Park Profile/Newsletter, Solid Waste & Recycling, Abuse Project, Beneficiary 
Information, Construction Skill Training and Disaster Management. 
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sisted with the building of saving schemes.199 There are about ten active saving groups. 
Members either pay in weekly or monthly to a savings group coordinator. 
The City had appointed private consultants such as a land surveyor and an engineer for in-
frastructure delivery. Project management was carried out by City officials. The initial 
project manager was perceived as a gate keeper both by FPDA and DAG. He was accused 
of denying access to key information such as the beneficiary list and of not integrating the 
community to decision-making. In 2006 he left and other City officials took over his func-
tion as interim contact persons. Although at the time no project management was in place, 
the contact persons were perceived as more open and making an effort to take up commu-
nity concerns. The DAG project coordinator highlighted that they would sign applications 
within a day and willing to hand out information. She stressed: 
“Cooperation means that not everyone just wants to accomplish their own interests.”200 
In 2004 the sites were surveyed and pegged. Then the rollover scheme was implemented. 
The community had to move some of their shacks to free the way for service delivery. 
DAG assisted to develop principles for plot allocation to limit the relocations and main-
tain community networks. DAG stressed the deficiencies of rollover projects and criti-
cised the unwillingness of the City to pursue in situ upgrading projects. In its 2004/05 an-
nual report it stated: 
“Whilst an in situ upgrade in Freedom Park was possible, professionals and City officials 
were unwilling to consider it, putting forward technical reasons such as the need to do 
earthworks and the high cost of infrastructure, should the layout not be reconfigured. As a 
result, all households on the site will have to break down and rebuild their homes at least 
once and some would have to do this several times before eventually moving into their new 
homes.”201 
While road construction was under way, temporary toilet facilities and water stand pipes 
were provided by the City. Soon the community complained about the companies con-
tracted by the City. The delivery of temporary services was progressing slowly and turned 
out to be defective. FPDA reported the claims to the Legal Resource Centre (LRC) which 
advised the community to negotiate directly with the contractors.202 A leader of FPDA re-
                                                 
199 NGO member 7 
200 NGO member 7 
201 DAG (2005). 
202 See Bender (2005), p. 64. 
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called the tensions in the community caused by the delays: 
“For us not having sanitation, electricity and water – this would have been people’s comfort 
zone. They would have been more relaxed than they are at the moment.” 
She stressed the importance to raise awareness by City officials: 
“They had to put themselves into our shoes. They [contact persons at City] came out a lot 
and could see the conditions we live in […]. We said the process got delayed and they al-
ready had tell us to start this month. We said we have already given feedback. You come out 
and face these people and tell them, because tomorrow the community is not going to believe 
the leaders they put into place.”203 
 
Fig. 5.23: Temporary services in Freedom Park, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
The DAG project coordinator recalled that the community was strong in negotiations. 
DAG and FPDA would sometimes split their roles in good cop/bad cop in negotiations.  
“One has to be very conscious of which compromises one would allow. A clear idea about 
the own aims are most important.”204 
While FPDA was strong in negotiating with outside actors, internally its committee was 
                                                 
203 PO member 1 
204 NGO member 7 
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affected by leadership conflicts. According to the DAG coordinator, this often influenced 
their cooperation. Also, at the time the community was confronted by numerous endeav-
ours by ward councillors to influence the development.205 
During the infrastructure delivery phase DAG provided a number of workshops on the 
People’s Housing Process (PHP), house design and office management and offered lead-
ership seminars and construction-related training. One key outcome was that DAG had in-
fluenced FPDA to opt for medium-density, row and semi-detached housing. 
Nonetheless, PHP became unaffordable to most households due to material price increase 
and inflation. Therefore, only two hundred beneficiaries opted for PHP housing delivery 
whereas the other three hundred chose conventional contractor built homes. In 2006 the 
set back of PHP negotiations was overcome by a private initiative. The Niall Mellon 
Township Trust (NMTT) signed a multi-stakeholder partnership agreement with FPDA 
and offered financial support to PHP housing. The support included the provision for lar-
ger houses (42m²) with improved finishing and solar panels and influenced all beneficiar-
ies to reconsider their housing delivery choice in favour of PHP. 
NMTT further offered a loan to those who were not eligible for housing subsidy. DAG 
and FPDA executive committee members consulted the eleven affected households to 
form small saving groups in order to prove their track record. However, the project coor-
dinator stressed that it was difficult to promote savings in a situation where the house-
holds were aware that they would not be forced to repay.206 
The PHP business plan and application had to be amended several times since all house-
holds had opted for PHP through the NMTT initiative and since costing had to be recalcu-
lated with increased material price costs. Also the call for tender for marketer and con-
structors had to be re-advertised. During this period the DAG project coordinator held ir-
regular meetings with the City to speed up the tender processes. 
The FPDA at the time had started numerous other projects such as home-based crèches, 
neighbourhood watch, a waste programme and food gardening.207 
Also, the Mitchell’s Plain urban renewal programme provided income generation oppor-
                                                 
205 See Bender (2005), p. 87. 
206 NGO member 7 
207 PO member 1 
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tunities to FPDA and in 2005/06 eighteen beneficiaries were employed as labourers.208 
Although bulk earthworks and infrastructure were envisaged to be completed by Septem-
ber 2006, slow progress and the liquidation of the contractor contributed to a nine month 
delay.209 
According to the DAG coordinator, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) was very good 
at keeping up relations with the contractors and the City officials and at the same time 
pointing out deficiencies and requesting them to take over responsibilities for delays.210 
FPDA asked the engineer to join a meeting with the community. The CLO recalled the 
negotiations: 
“We told him: “You come out and tell them”. He said in two weeks time [work will restart]. I 
said to the community: “Don’t take the two weeks. Leave it for a month.””211 
 
Fig. 5.24: Meeting with engineer in Freedom Park, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
By end of 2006 infrastructure development was almost complete. Also the PHP business 
                                                 
208 See DAG (2006a), p. 15. 
209 NGO member 7 
210 NGO member 7 
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plan and application and tender had been finalised and approved. Housing construction 
was about to start in 2007. 
 
Fig. 5.25: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A6), Source: Own design 
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5.4 Interfaces between the State and Alliance B 
Alliance B pursues pragmatic interfaces with the state both on strategic and project level. 
Strategic engagement is characterised by a variety of partnership agreements. Case studies 
at project level illustrate the extent to which these relationships filter down. The Macassar 
and Ekupumleni projects exemplify negotiations and interfaces in Greenfields develop-
ments. The Klipfontein Glebe, Site C and Kuyasa projects illustrate the variety of en-
gagements in upgrading and consolidation of settlement projects. 
 
Fig. 5.26: Map of Cape Town with location of local FEDUP networks, Source: Own design 
5.4.1 Perception of alliance B by local government 
Many housing officials tend to give a technical support role to NGOs. In this context 
NGOs aligned to the Federation are questioned. 
“The kind of the question to the FEDUP group is […]: Where are you getting the technical 
assistance from? The technical assistance is so vital in sense of empowering the community 
to have a successful housing project.”212 
Some officials were sceptical about the exclusive relationship that the Community Or-
ganisation Resource Centre (CORC) and the uTshani Fund have with the Federation of 
                                                 
212 City official 5 
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the Urban Poor (FEDUP).213 Their poverty focus which sees housing as a by-product is 
questioned. A City official stressed that in reality it is the house itself which attracts peo-
ple into the Federation: 
“[…] they join the Federation to get a house. You can bet that they are on all the other lists 
as well and whatever comes up first they go for it. Some people do engage with the Alliance 
in terms that they gain so many skills and opportunities to empower and build social capac-
ity. […]But it is really the dye hards which stick around afterwards. Once they have got a 
house there is this genuine kind of: Now I have to rest and now I have to focus on other 
things.”214 
City officials were also sceptical about the resources allocated to the Federation and ques-
tioned its capacity to deliver. CORC was specifically criticised for not implementing a 
project to its end. 
“I would love for him [CORC coordinator] to just run one project, so that he gets the sense 
of – “yes the world is messy and there is lots of things” – but at the end of the day you have 
to stabilise things and you have a sequence of actions you have to pull through.“215 
By attracting subsidies and land, it is feared; resources will be blocked to go for other de-
velopments. Government officials argue that the Federation lacks capacity and is con-
strained by internal conflicts to develop the sites. Thus it would be irresponsible of the 
Federation to hold on to the sites instead of relinquishing them to government.216 
“If they don’t have the capacity for 6,000 subsidies, the subsidies are not going somewhere 
else. Now you cannot really complain about it in Cape Town, because government is not de-
livering either.”217 
Outsourcing tasks to the Federation such as enumerations would mean first building ca-
pacity within the Federation and, consequently, that local government shifts from a deliv-
ery orientation to building social capital: 
“The principle is good: Poor people talking to poor people to mobilise. […] it depends on 
what the governments approach is. Is government about building social capital?”218 
Also, there is the perception of undemocratic practices and patronising leadership. Some 
officials felt uncomfortable to be aligned to the Federation and criticised its claim for ex-
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clusive partnerships with the City: 
“You cannot just go in partnership only with the Alliance. And that is what the Alliance al-
ways wanted is that exclusive flagship partnership with the Cities. But the reality is that Cit-
ies cannot do that. They can say: Yes, we are going into partnership with you, but we are also 
going into partnership with any other community that comes along and wants to engage with 
us. But of course a partnership like the Alliance which has resources and international con-
tacts and kind of profile will command more from local government, because it has the ca-
pacity, not like the local communities, to lobby for attention.”219 
Moreover, the engagement with the local Federation groups is perceived as difficult as 
they do not represent an entire community. Officials feared that by favouring FEDUP 
groups they would sideline other organisations. Particularly in the housing process there is 
a concern that local Federation groups are exclusionary and do not want to participate in a 
housing project with other people outside the saving groups.220 A City official stressed:  
“Smaller groups can become quite marginalized in the face of all this international Hoo-ha 
[…] that comes with the Alliance. It makes me a bit uncomfortable. They do embrace bully 
tactics. They strategise and that is their strength, but that means that your other organisa-
tions that are not on board are pulled on the wayside. Maybe that is life. For government it is 
difficult.”221 
Furthermore, there were statements about irresponsible practices of the Federation. Offi-
cials accused the Federation of having built too large PHP show houses at the cost of in-
frastructure connection and thus raised unrealistic expectations.222 There is a feeling that 
local government should hold the federation accountable; particularly in face of the 
changes within the Alliance. 
“I suppose as local government you don’t really have the time to understand what the hell is 
going on there. So you just kind of engage with whoever wants to engage with you. But […] 
we should start – maybe that is patronising – but holding the Federation to account saying 
you have got some significant land holding. […] Cape Town allocated budget to the Federa-
tion and whether this has been drawn down I don’t know. I doubt it. So there would need to 
be a level of accountability.”223 
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5.4.2 Strategic partnerships by Alliance B 
The Alliance B seeks to gain strategic influence on access to land, subsidy allocation and 
housing development outside the formal route. FEDUP pursues a relational logic: It tries 
to develop its social ties with various levels of government. The strategy is to single out 
those in government who are interested in engagement. The strategic tools can be summa-
rised as: Learning, resource mobilisation and partnerships. The interventions have in 
common multilevel interfaces with external actors and a focus on grassroots autonomy. 
“You have to work through the community, municipal, provincial and national level and the 
same with the church. You have to work with all of them; and levels change as people are dy-
namic.”224 
In terms of grassroots autonomy CORC stresses its role of facilitating meetings with gov-
ernment, but of leaving the lead to the Federation: 
“If I go to a meeting alone and I keep all the information to myself, it does not empower. You 
just open the door and let them take the lead after that.”225 
5.4.2.1 Learning 
Key is to capacitate Federation members to gain their own understanding of the housing 
situation. The Federation compiles its own data on informal settlements, proactively iden-
tifies land and assesses viability of sites. In 2006 national government financed a profiling 
of informal settlement in the Cape Town metropolitan area. This research exercise was 
conducted by the Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) and primarily FEDUP as its affili-
ate. The profiling team, made up of sixteen young local slum dwellers, was assisted by 
CORC. The objective was to build capacity through information gathering and report 
compiling. Moreover, the exercise was meant to give ownership of information to the 
poor and address deficiencies of official data as a tool to influence policy decision-making 
and engage with government on upgrading processes.226  
“This document [informal settlement profile] was used for lobbying and advocacy. With the 
support of SDI, because Jockin [SDI leader] works very closely with the ministers and the 
provincial departments.”227 
                                                 
224 NGO member 5 
225 NGO member 4  
226 See CORC (2006a). 
227 NGO member 5 
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Fig. 5.27: Informal settlements profiling team, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
CORC stresses the difference to official data being sourced. The objects of research be-
come researchers on their own situation which CORC refers to as ‘radical subjectivity’. 
This, according to CORC, provides new insights about how the poor themselves perceive 
their situation.228 The head of housing of the City of Cape Town acknowledged the ap-
proach as a vehicle for partnerships between the City and the communities: 
“The Community Organisation Resource Centre’s project of profiling 200 informal settle-
ments within the Cape Town Metropolitan is a giant step towards the laying of a solid foun-
dation of a partnership between the City and the informal settlement communities.”229 
Although the document was made available to local government, it hesitated to take it up. 
The exercise rather led to suspicions that the profiling was part of the political power 
games between the different levels of government. City officials stressed: 
“I think it is a problem for an organisation to secure funding from national government and 
march into a local government context […] So from local government perspective it feels like 
they are interfering in our competencies. On the other hand for the reality check we do not 
have the capacity and should take up what someone else is doing. One should not really fight 
                                                 
228 See CORC (2006a), p. 7. 
229 Maqethuka in CORC (2006a), p. 6. 
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about that. Our aerial photograph informations are very good on the informal settlements; 
together with the Federation stuff it would be interesting to match the two.”230 
5.4.2.2 Resource mobilisation 
In 1996 partnership agreements with the state led to a grant of ten million rand by the De-
partment of Housing and to an agreement with the National Housing Board that the uT-
shani Fund would act as a conduit for housing subsidies (‘uTshani Agreement’).231 How-
ever, the uTshani Fund claims that difficulties emerged with provincial governments not 
paying out the subsidies which still constitute a large share of uTshani’s debt situation.232 
In 2005 the uTshani Fund administered 13.5 million rand233 in subsidies for government.  
The share of housing subsidies by the Western Cape Province amounts to a total of 6.3 
million234 of which 2.3 million was disbursed in 2005.235 The government subsidies are 
under the jurisdiction of the uTshani Trust which consists of government representatives, 
two Federation members and seven representatives of affiliate organisations. Release of 
trust funds to the Federation must be approved by a majority of the trustees.236 
In February 2006 FEDUP, SDI, and the uTshani Fund negotiated a deal with the National 
Housing Board to provide one hundred subsidies. Part of the agreement was to prove that 
through the People’s Housing Process they could build one hundred houses in a month as 
long as national level could apply enough pressure on provincial and local authorities in 
the Western Cape to remove all obstacles. 
“The normal bureaucratic things submitting plans, having plans approved before you start 
building, ensuring that there is infrastructure on site before you start building houses and all 
of a sudden when it came to a crunch not even national housing board get the provincial and 
local authorities to meet those demands.”237 
In May 2006 an international slum dwellers conference organised by Shack/Slum Dwell-
ers International (SDI) and the Department of Housing took place in Cape Town. At the 
occasion the national Minister of Housing committed 6,000 subsidies per annum (at a cur-
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231 See National Housing Board/uTshani Fund (1996). 
232 uTshani Fund (2006b). 
233 See uTshani Fund (2005a), p. 14. 
234 About 674,100 Euro. 
235 See uTshani Fund (2005a), p. 20. 
236 See Baumann et al (2001), p. 9. 
237 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
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rent value of US $35 million) from national and provincial governments to the Federation 
(referred to as ‘the Pledge’).238 
The pledge and hundred-houses pilot constitute a pressure to scale up delivery for the uT-
shani Fund. With the pledge finance the uTshani Fund aims to move away from PHP as a 
self-build process. The uTshani Fund, CORC and the national Federation leaders decided 
not to comply with the formal PHP route. Instead of PHP support centres they intend to 
work through the saving schemes. The idea is to implement a Community-Construction 
Management Team (CCMT) model whereby saving schemes and the Federation consti-
tute a housing association. This housing association then contracts a technical supervisor 
and community contractors. Community contractors hire building teams. An important 
aspect is that board members of the housing association are not allowed to act as commu-
nity contractors in order for them not to profit from the development.239 
The uTshani Fund is of the view that it can showcase a new kind of community-led proc-
ess which the City can take up to shape policy. Therefore uTshani intends to speed up the 
process and prove to government that the Federation is able to build one thousand houses 
a year. 
The Federation also promotes donations by private land owners. The Methodist Church of 
Southern Africa (MCSA) has committed itself to dispose of land as part of their recon-
ciliation vis-à-vis impoverished communities. Subsequently, FEDUP members conducted 
a land audit and assessed the viability of vacant sites for housing development. In Cape 
Town the focus is on the development of a 67ha site in Klipfontein Glebe (see Chapter 
5.4.2.2).240 
A point being stressed in terms of resource mobilisation is that the initiatives are not 
meant to leverage resources exclusively for Federation members. Concerning the land 
agreement therefore, access to land would be opened to all homeless and landless groups.  
“Even if the MoU is signed with the church and FEDUP, we will not limit it to federation 
members that would be unfair. […] That is a type of unspoken agreement with the church. We 
formalized it with the federation, but not exclusively for the Federation.” 
                                                 
238 See SDI (2006c); uTshani Fund (2006b); CORC (2007) 
239 FEDUP meeting, 04.10.2007. 
240 See Bolnick/Rensburg (2005); Centre for Civil Society (2006).  
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Also concerning the pledge, the Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) sees itself as ensuring 
that the resources will not be used exclusively for FEDUP: 
“We have managed through our networking with SDI and with FEDUP to attract local re-
sources to FEDUP and we have used the coalition and its affiliates also to support FEDUP 
in this process. […] To that extend that FEDUP is prepared to also share the subsidies with 
other affiliates with in the coalition.” 
Finance is also generated locally within the Federation through an Urban Poor Fund (see 
Chapter 5.1.3). The fund is used to finance securing land, housing, water and sanitation or 
for access to locally circulated low-cost loans for income generation and shelter im-
provements. The fund receives contributions from federation members as a way of show-
ing accountability. Thus the fund also functions as a mechanism to access state subsidies 
and donor grants. Basically the fund pools financial assets of the federations and is man-
aged by FEDUP. An uTshani staff member indicated that the fund is the key to reducing 
the dependency of the Federation on the uTshani Fund: 
“[…] it [Urban Poor Fund] is something out of uTshani’s control and something out of the 
funder’s control but it is something the Federation wants to build in order to attract addi-
tional resources, that their dependence on uTshani is not so much.”241 
The uTshani Fund stresses that the Federation needs to be in the driver’s seat during de-
velopments. They understand their role as support organisations to facilitate access to 
subsidies and ensure that suppliers are paid. Everything else should be managed by the 
Federation in order to release them from NGO dependence. Thus in the construction 
process the Urban Poor Fund is supposed to constitute a strategic mechanism to facilitate 
progress outside the control and regulation which the uTshani Fund is restricted to. In the 
FEDUP inland provinces it is already functioning whereas in Cape Town, as part of the 
coastal region, in 2006 it was still in the constitution process. An uTshani Fund project 
coordinator outlined the relevance of the Urban Poor Fund to reduce the dependency on 
uTshani in the building process: 
 “They must send me a “Please call me” if they need a packet of screws. They can use that 
Urban Poor Fund. […] It is a leverage of which they have control. It is not sitting in uTshani 
and is not regimented by all the rules and regulations. It is much more flexible and it is with 
them and controlled by them and it is for them.”242 
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5.4.2.3 Partnerships 
In the early 1990s the Federation used land invasions as a tool for negotiations. This ap-
proach has subsequently been replaced by joining in partnership agreements with local 
governments. Nonetheless, there is continuous internal contention within the Federation 
how best to gain a position to negotiate with the state. Although officially the Federation 
turned away from land invasions; internally there exists a disagreement as to whether to 
use the threat of planned invasion as a basis for negotiation. A FEDUP leader outlined the 
importance of invasions to enhance a position of power for negotiations: 
“You have to negotiate from a position of power. […] They saw that if we want ten thousand 
people there, we can have ten thousand people there. With that they know they stand to loose 
more, if they do not engage and talk. […] These are the games we have to play and people 
are not playing them enough. We felt too comfortable that this is the new dispensation and 
the new government, forgetting that the government is also looking for answers after years 
and years of not doing anything.”243 
Partnerships are perceived as options to make government accountable on agreements and 
to accelerate project approval and funding. Partnership agreements entail that the Federa-
tion discontinue land invasions in exchange for the support of people-driven housing 
processes. 
The Federation’s activities have lead to outcomes such as the partnership and social con-
tract with the Department of Housing. On City level the Federation claims to have part-
nership agreements with numerous local authorities (Ethekwini, Ekhureleni, Johannes-
burg and Cape Town).244 Often partnerships provide a mechanism to expose government 
officials to exchange activities with SDI partners and government counterparts in other 
countries. Champions within local government are perceived as essential drivers and part-
ners for innovative solutions. 
The Federation contests the formal People’s Housing Process (PHP) and stresses that 
pure self-build projects are infeasible. The uTshani Fund supports this position. It particu-
larly stressed that self-build housing and resource transfer to communities groups had cre-
ated specific problems within the Federation which contradict empowerment aims. 
                                                 
243 Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006. 
244 Often these agreements are not formalised as signed agreements which cause confusion for outsiders. 
One national leader explained that for the federation it is enough proof of a formal relationship when there 
exist minutes of regular meetings and when government officials participate in exchange programmes. See 
Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006. 
 265
The uTshani Fund, however, does not believe in giving recommendation to policy reform 
as it sees the problem within the provincial and local government bureaucracies.245 In-
stead its approach is to change the state housing system from working within it.246 The 
uTshani Fund therefore promotes partnerships with government. For instance it facilitates 
support to Federation groups to engage with the housing Ministry to access subsidies and 
through them have the ability to work differently on project-level.247 
In order to translate the pledge into projects, the Federation was urged to upscale its ac-
tivities and negotiate with provincial and local government to approve projects, subsidies 
and allocate land. The process requires a high degree of social mobilisation and organisa-
tional input and has been supported by CORC. Obstacles with provincial governments 
remain around disbursing the pledge subsidies. The Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) 
realises that the allocation of subsidies is delayed by government. 
“The only problem […] is to get the money out of government. The politicians promised the 
money and we struggle now with the bureaucrats to release the money.” 
To proactively confront implementation obstacles the national FEDUP leaders and the 
CORC director have approached the provincial and national Head of Departments (HOD). 
They have agreed to form a national working group to discuss implementation issues.248 
Also at local government level partnerships are perceived as a way to overcome imple-
mentation difficulties. According to People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) it depends 
on the ability to single out officials to overcome problems of regulations at settlement 
level: 
“What we are trying to do now is instead of banging our heads against local authorities and 
officials, as we used in the past, is to try and set up partnerships and working relationships 
with the various authorities. If we have you on our side, we will do everything we have to. 
Where we have problems, you can maybe assist us. If it is your colleagues that are causing 
the problems within the City, you can see the problems we have and you can see the effect 
that that is having on the entire benefit. Maybe you can assist us in removing the obstacles 
and kind of push the process through.”249 
                                                 
245 This retreat from policy involvement has been commented on by various academics and urban sector 
NGOs as negatively impacting on attempts by right-based groups to achieve policy change. See personal 
communication with Marie Huchzermeyer, 04.09.2006 and Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006. 
246 Utshani Fund (2006b). 
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249 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.03.2006. 
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Furthermore, CORC facilitated a partnership between FEDUP and the Methodist Church 
of Southern Africa (MCSA) in terms of transfer of land. In 2006 this partnership has led to 
an initiative to form a land trust which would comprise representatives of the church, the 
national housing ministry and FEDUP. This initiative was agreed upon through a meeting 
between the national housing minister, Federation members, the CORC land programme 
coordinator and the presiding bishop of the Methodist church.250  
The NGOs see their own role as door openers for the Federation so that the Federation 
gets into a position to establish relations with government on various levels. Nonetheless, 
there are also direct relationships between the NGOs and government. The NGOs regard 
pragmatic influence of politics as central instead of participating in advisory function in 
government forums.251 To leverage pragmatic influence the NGOs establish partnerships 
and close links to champions at various levels of government. State resources resulting 
from this engagement are then intended to be used to produce alternative concrete results 
in projects. Relationships are established by the alliance through integrating government 
representatives to Federation/NGO bodies; for instance:  
- Government representatives are part of uTshani Trust, 
- A mutual land trust initiated by the alliance comprises representatives of the Meth-
odist church, the national housing ministry and FEDUP, 
- The Director of Housing of the City of Cape Town is member of the board of 
CORC. 
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251 PEP being an exception as it engages in advisory function to the board of PHPT. 
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5.4.3 Accessing land projects by Alliance B 
5.4.3.1 Request to release land in Macassar (B1) 
February – July 
2006 
Initiation of groups  and formation as a FEDUP group 
August 2006 Land identification and land survey 
Land request at Council 
September 2006 Negotiation with ward councillor 
February 2007 Approval by Council 
Tab. 5.14: Timeline of land access in Macassar 
Landownership Local Government 
Housing Backyard shack dwellers 
Size of area Unknown 
Project Request for land allocation for housing development 
Members about 200 households 
Tab. 5.15: Key characteristics of the FEDUP project in Macassar 
 
Fig. 5.28: Satellite image of identified land in Macassar, Source: Google Earth 
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Macassar is part of Somerset West and a predominantly coloured community with about 
24,500 inhabitants252. The Macassar group aligned to the Federation of the Urban Poor 
(FEDUP) represents twenty savings groups. They came together as they identified their 
common need for land and tenure. The group rapidly extended membership from its in-
ception in February 2006 with twelve members to one thousand members (about 200 
households) in September 2006. During this period they were advised by the facilitator of 
the Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) who put them in contact with FEDUP. In March 
members of the Macassar groups participated in exchanges with established Federation 
groups to learn about the savings process.253  
Subsequently, a savings coordinator of the Community Microfinance Network (CMN) ad-
vised the groups on savings administration. Also, CMN conducted a survey of savings 
groups in Macassar as part of a national survey of all savings groups. This information is 
compiled in a database of FEDUP membership. The savings coordinator stressed that this 
information will enhance the power of local groups to negotiate with government.254 
By becoming members of FEDUP the savings groups agreed to practice daily savings and 
to meet on a regular basis as part of establishing an organised local network. The Macas-
sar savings groups sent representatives to regional meetings within the Western Cape. In-
formation is given to the local savings groups at weekly meetings.255 
After its official launch as a FEDUP group in July 2006, the group addressed the Commu-
nity Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) for assistance in their process to access land. 
As the Alliance cooperates in terms of land allocation with the Methodist church, a CORC 
consultant subsequently checked the church inventory for land options. However, as no 
church land was available, the group was advised by CORC to conduct an assessment of 
land options as a basis for engagement with the state.256 Therefore, the Macassar group 
appointed a private company for a land survey. Based on the information, the group iden-
tified a piece of municipal land and addressed a land allocation request to Council. This 
activity constituted the first interface with the state. They received a letter confirming the 
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entry of their request and leaving open time lines for further steps. Some members ad-
dressed the local ward councillor directly and agreed to join in a Council meeting. On the 
day of the Council meeting however they were declined participation and advised to first 
go through subcouncil. This experience has fuelled disappointments to interacting with 
government. 
“And after we sit the whole day one of the ladies […] asked him: “What is going on? When is 
it our turn?” Then he said it was not the day for us to come in. We were very disappointed. 
[…] We were so excited because we were thinking he is going to lift a point to other council-
lors and say: “There is land for these people.”257 
In the following the group shifted its approach by inviting the councillor to their meeting 
and asked him to explain the situation. About one hundred members of FEDUP came to-
gether in and outside a small 25 m² transit house in a non-serviced area of Macassar. No 
representatives of CUP, CORC or uTshani Fund were present. The CUP facilitator out-
lined the importance that the groups themselves have to be the drivers of the process: 
“[…] with this kind of meetings I prefer them to do alone. I don’t want it to be seen as Joel 
and I are driving the process.”258 
The group was celebrating and mobilising itself through constant shouting and singing. 
For them, it already represented a success that the councillor had to come to them instead 
of their going as petitioners to him. 
An interesting aspect is that they started the meeting with prayers. Later they stated that 
this also forces the councillor to bow his head in front of a higher authority and to ac-
knowledge that somebody outside will judge his actions.  
At the meeting two positions were unfolded: the group argued that it is government’s re-
sponsibility to allocate land to them for free. The group stressed that they cannot afford 
the high rents and that housing conditions are inadequate. Thus their claim should have 
priority to private sector interests. Later, instead of exclusively stressing government re-
sponsibility, the group used arguments in terms of legitimacy of government (they repre-
senting the constituency). The group stressed their affiliation with FEDUP and revealed 
that government is not dealing with one single grouping, but with a larger organisation. 
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258 Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006. 
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The councillor on the other hand had to accommodate diverse interests. Different groups 
and businesses were interested in obtaining the piece of land. He feared being accused of 
undue preference. He tried to cross the divide by stressing the liability of higher levels of 
government for delays. 
Following the discussions with the councillor, FEDUP summoned a meeting to inform all 
savings groups. 
 
Fig. 5.29: Meeting of FEDUP group in Macassar, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
The leader pointed out that conflict within the group was hampering the land negotiation 
process. Some of the savings groups had started fund raising which is against the savings 
objective. Furthermore, not everybody was practicing daily savings. 
“It is so important to do daily savings as it brings the community together. So they know 
what is the need in the street, they know what to do, how to help one another.  Instead of go-
ing to wait for the government to do things, people in the street can change the govern-
ment!”259 
                                                 
259 Federation member 1 
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Also, the existent saving groups had been asked to restructure and to reconstitute in closer 
proximity. Since the Macassar savings groups had grown rapidly, FEDUP intended to re-
build the savings groups on a localised neighbourhood level to enhance community build-
ing. This initiative met resistance from some groups. They put forward that their group is 
based on friendship and they are not willing to reconstitute. The leader outlined that 
FEDUP had learned that savings groups of friends often end up with somebody running 
away with the money.  
The land request was still unresolved at the time of interviewing. In February 2007 the 
group, however, announced it had been allocated the land. 
 
Fig. 5.30: Interfaces in Macassar project (micro case B1), Source: Own design 
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5.4.3.2 Donation of land in Klipfontein Glebe (B2) 
2001 Methodist church agrees to handover land 
 Government suggests to sell-off land and relocate 
Community conflict 
2005 CORC mediates between community groups 
CUP mobilises for enumeration and daily savings 
2006 Mediation process fails  
Consultants negotiate with government about parcelling of land and development approval 
Tab. 5.16: Timeline of land access in Klipfontein 
Landownership Methodist Church 
Zoning Agricultural 
Housing Partly informal, partly formal. Not serviced 
Size of Area 45-63ha (ca. 350 plots) 
Project Housing provision, title deeds, secure tenure 
Members about 200 households 
Tab. 5.17: Key facts of the Klipfontein Glebe project 
 
Fig. 5.31: Site plan of Klipfontein, Source: adapted from CndV africa (2006) 
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The land in Klipfontein is in close proximity to the Cape Town International Airport and 
belongs to the Methodist church. Approximately six hundred families live there. It is a 
mixed, predominantly coloured community. The Klipfontein community has been negoti-
ating for the land to be developed for more than a century. The land was already occu-
pied, but black or coloured residents at the time could not register land. Therefore, it was 
transferred to the Methodist church in 1901 and used as an outstation.260 
 
Fig. 5.32: Existing housing on Klipfontein Glebe land, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
The majority of residents are on a waiting list for housing. In 2001 the Methodist church 
agreed to handover the land and local government consented to the land being developed. 
But the application for residential development was turned down by the authorities based 
on the high noise levels. Alternatively, government suggested selling the land and offered 
alternative sites 25 km north of Cape Town. This plan has caused friction within the 
community. One part is interested in the sell-off and relocation represented by the Klip-
fontein Communal Property Trust (a Section 21 company). Another part wants to remain 
represented by the Klipfontein Communal Committee (linked to FEDUP). 
                                                 
260 Glebe land means that it is overseen by church. 
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In 2005 the church appointed the Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) to 
facilitate a mediation committee. However, no consensus could be reached and the media-
tion process failed in 2006. Thereafter the Klipfontein Communal Committee tried to get 
an interdict which would prevent the Trust from selling the land. At the chambers they 
were advised to re-elect the trustees as the church would need a legal body to transfer the 
landownership.  
The Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) linked the Klipfontein committee with the Fed-
eration of the Urban Poor (FEDUP). The Federation assisted in conducting an enumera-
tion and in introducing daily savings schemes. The saving groups interact with the coor-
dinator of the Community Microfinance Network (CMN) and a FEDUP leader. However, 
FEDUP members in Klipfontein were sceptical as to whether saving schemes would be 
successful as they were faced with the mistrust in the community.261 
In 2006 private consultants were contracted by CORC to investigate opportunities for 
housing development. The noise contour plan, according to the consultants, allows devel-
oping a portion of land for housing, another portion can only be developed if insulation is 
provided and a third portion of land is not suitable for housing at all (see figure 5.31).262 
CUP (through CORC) appointed the same consultants to negotiate the project approval 
with the authorities on behalf of the community. The FEDUP group appreciated the in-
volvement of consultants: 
“We put our trust in consultants to sort out local government.”263 
The consultants represented the link between the project team and government. They 
stressed that they, as consultants, could use their strong relationship to officials to facili-
tate the process. One consultant outlined his intermediary role: 
“We have got a good relationship with them [government]. We can understand what they 
want. […]. For the community to go directly to the Province – unless the community mem-
bers are very knowledgeable about the processes and the technical issues – it is normally a 
bit of a problem. […] they would have a meeting with us present so we can translate if re-
quired.”264 
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At the same time the CUP facilitator formed links at a political level and to the depart-
ments at Province. A CORC staff member outlined the division of labour between the 
consultants and the CORC facilitator: 
“[…] the project management team looks at the design; [the CUP facilitator] then tries on a 
political level to link up with the department at province. […] So even though those things 
have not formalised in terms of written agreements of support, on another level the support is 
there having formed those linkages at the provincial level […] and the premier’s of-
fice[…].”265 
 
Fig. 5.33: Interfaces in Klipfontein project (micro case B2), Source: Own design 
                                                 
265 NGO member 5 
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5.4.4 Project preparation by Alliance B 
5.4.4.1 Post-development project preparation in Ekupumleni (B3) 
1994 Formation of Federation group 
1998 Land acquisition 
2000- 2003 117 houses built upfront 
2003 Geotechnical survey 
2005 Rezoning and subdivision approval 
2006 Submission of general plans to Surveyor General Office 
Tab. 5.18: Timeline of project preparation in Ekupumleni 
Land ownership uTshani Fund (until transfer of titles to Hazeldean Housing Association) 
Housing Members from site-and-service scheme to Greenfields 
Size of area  6.5 ha 
Project  208 houses to be build, 117 built upfront – conflict with formal regulations 
Members 200 households 
Tab. 5.19: Key facts of the Ekupumleni project 
 
Fig. 5.34: Satellite image of Ekupumleni, Source: adapted from Google Earth (2006) 
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Ekupumleni266 is part of Philippi East which is situated in the Cape Flats around 20 km 
from the Central Business District of Cape Town. Philippi was established at the begin-
ning of the 1980s as a site-and-service scheme. The area is therefore characterised by a 
high percentage of informal dwellings – either backyard shacks or shacks on serviced 
sites (55.3% in total Philippi and 29.6% in Philippi East). About half of all households 
have no access to water, sanitation, electricity and waste removal.267   
The demographic situation features a very high population increase (48.6% between 1996 
and 2001). 2,245 of the 110,315 residents in Philippi live in Philippi East. Philippi has an 
almost exclusive black population (94.3%). The socio-economic situation is characterised 
by high and increasing unemployment (from 15.1% in 1996 to 43.1% in 2001) and low 
and decreasing income levels.268  
In Ekupumleni the majority of members are from Site C, a site-and-service settlement in 
Khayelitsha (see Chapter 5.4.3.2). In 1994 they were introduced to the South African 
Homeless People’s Federation and started savings schemes. They identified a large piece 
of farm land in Philippi East and negotiated land acquisition with the assistance of the uT-
shani Fund and People’s Dialogue. In 2000 the farm was purchased through an uTshani 
loan and divided into three parts: communal farming, residential housing and the farm 
house itself which was later turned into a resource centre. Today the farm belongs to the 
well-known Federation projects in Vukuzenzele, Victoria Mxenge and Ekupumleni which 
at the beginning formed a triangle committee. 
To speed up the process for housing development this committee registered as a Commu-
nal Property Association (CPA) so that the land could be transferred from the uTshani 
Fund to communal ownership by the CPA as a legal entity. This form of tenure was also 
favoured in terms of saving costs to survey and register each individual plot.269 
The Federation then proactively started housing development with members who had 
saved their own money. The Federation with support by People’s Environmental Plan-
ning (PEP) decided on a basic pre-approved layout. 
                                                 
266 Ekupumleni means “rising star”. 
267 See Urban Matters (2008), pp. 23f. 
268 See University of Stellenbosch/Transformation Africa (2005), p.9. 
269 Later communal ownership caused problems once families wanted to sell since they did not own an in-
dividual plot. Therefore, later individual titles were registered. New developments with the federations are 
since then directly going for individual ownership. See Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
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PEP at the time established an office on the farm to run workshops from there and a pri-
vate engineering firm was appointed to design the infrastructure. 
In 2000 Federation members started to build first houses through uTshani bridging fi-
nance. Some of them were designed and built through the uTshani Fund and some by in-
dividual households. Up to 2003 more than one hundred houses had been completed.270 
One of the main obstacles in Ekupumleni was that government does not tolerate house 
construction before township establishment. The approval of township establishment after 
construction was hindered. A land survey revealed that a lot of the houses had been built 
over the boundary lines. The PEP director promoted adapting boundary lines to the exis-
tent situation, instead of putting down houses. He stressed: 
“My sort of attitude is: then we shift the boundary lines and if that plot is a little bit smaller 
than this plot – so be it. If those two neighbours are happy, it is a hell of a lot easier solution 
than breaking down half of the person’s house or a metre of his house to bring it back in.”271 
Basically, non-conforming developments had to be individually negotiated. For instance 
one unit had been built on land reserved for a turning circle. Local authority was willing 
to ignore the construction until the land was eventually needed for its original purpose. 
The unit would, however, be left without services. The adjacent neighbour consented to 
informally connect electricity, sanitation and water lines to serve the unit. 
As this process entailed lengthy negotiations, rezoning and subdivision approval was only 
received by 2005 and the general plans submitted to the Surveyor General Office in 2006. 
 
Fig. 5.35: Houses built over boundary lines in Ekupumleni, Source: adapted from VPM Surveyors (2006) 
                                                 
270 See PEP (2007), pp. 8f. 
271 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006. 
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Although the Federation had already started building, government could not disburse sub-
sidies as long as the land belongs to the uTshani Fund. But problems with the core leader-
ship of the Federation affected the community. The dilemma is that both the Federation of 
the Urban Poor (FEDUP) and the South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF) 
claim to be legally entitled for the land.  
Therefore the Ekupumleni community sidelined Federation leaders and took over its own 
management. The group decided to form an independent Hazeldean Housing Association 
(HHA) which then could enter into an agreement with the uTshani Fund. New elected 
leaders continued the development. In this process the Community Organisation Resource 
Centre (CORC) took over the social facilitation and PEP addressed the technical issues.272 
 
Fig. 5.36: Interfaces in Ekupumleni project (micro case B3), Source Own design 
                                                 
272 Federation member 4 
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5.4.4.2 Of resizing plots and drawing up business plans in Site C (B4) 
Since mid 1990s Formation of Federation group 
2006 FEDUP and uTshani Fund agree to cooperate in pilot project 
 uTshani and CMN field worker support business plan application 
 PEP conducts house modelling workshops 
 Conflicts between local Federation group and  uTshani Fund 
Tab. 5.20: Timeline for project preparation in Site C 
Land ownership City of Cape Town 
Housing Site-and-service scheme 
Size of area unknown (1,700 plots planned) 
Project  Request for subsidy allocation (consolidation subsidy) 
FEDUP group  250 members (192 subsidy beneficiaries) 
Tab. 5.21: Key facts of the Site C project 
 
Fig. 5.37: Satellite image of Site C, Source: Google Earth (2006) 
In the 1980s people had been relocated from various places like the Crossroads squatter 
camp to a transit camp in Site C, Khayelitsha. However, the transit camp evolved as a 
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permanent settlement. It is made up of 3,468 sites which had been serviced for twice the 
amount of households.273 Consequently, formal housing needs to be provided in a double 
plot setting. 
“But what is very abnormal in Site C is that there are two families on one plot and this has 
been like this for the last 20 years. That is why we are busy with a re-planning pro-
gramme.”274 
Since 2003 Site C is a provincial and local government priority for housing development. 
The area is divided into four blocks. For each block pilot areas have been earmarked 
where development will start. Field workers, known to the community, are appointed 
from the specific blocks. The field worker is under the supervision of a local government 
official and assists in the promotion of subsidy applications and relocation. After consult-
ing with the community a first plan to provide every household with a site and house 
within the area had been dismissed. 
“[…] the community said that it is nonsense because it means that we are going to build a 
very small house.” 275 
Subsequently, an agreement was reached in the development forums, outlining that every 
two plots would be subdivided to make three and a fourth household had to agree to relo-
cate to Kuyasa276 (see figure 5.38). This means that about 2,000 out of 7,400 households 
would have to leave Site C. The City had reserved sites for saving groups from Site C 
who are willing to participate in PHP development. The remaining households would re-
ceive titles once they have infrastructure and once they have followed the legal require-
ments.277 
For local government officials this agreement is binding as it has been reached through 
representatives and thus legitimate structures. Nonetheless, saving groups did not want to 
relocate. Local government was surprised when local residents opposed relocation. Offi-
cials insisted: 
“It is a must. If no one moves it will remains what it is. We reached an agreement with all the 
RDP structures that one out of four have to go to Kuyasa to make Site C developable.” 
                                                 
273 See Zonke (2006), p. 53. 
274 City official 9 
275 City official 9 
276 Kuyasa is a large housing project in Khayelitsha where beneficiaries from different areas of Cape Town 
have been accommodated. 
277 City official 9 
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Fig. 5.38: Plan to resize plots in Site C, Source: adapted from City official 9 
People, however, remained reluctant to move to Kuyasa as it does not offer proper infra-
structure and only provides for small plots. It is also perceived as inaccessible to transport 
and shopping centres.278 
The complex process was also affected by local political conflicts in Khayelitsha. These 
conflicts are aligned both to national and provincial level political cleavages which fil-
tered down to local level and resulted in a community division between two ANC camps 
(see Chapter 4.4.1). The situation has also affected the re-planning of Site C. Some coun-
cillors are trying to convince people that they have a right to stay in Site C. As a result 
                                                 
278 See Zonke (2006), pp. 54ff. 
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people hesitated to apply for relocation or ignored the letter for relocation. 
“Some people say to other people: “You are here since ‘85 so you are stupid to move to Ku-
yasa, because you leave your legacies behind.” That impacts negatively with development 
because we agreed with all the RDP structure this is what needs to happen for Site C to de-
velop. But power politics is causing all these constraints.” 279 
Furthermore, people do not comply with the planning and shacks are rebuilt on sites 
where people have been removed. 
“Some of them who are moving to Kuyasa are not demolishing their shacks. They deliber-
ately sell those shacks and yet we need that space. […] We requested SANCO to cooperate. 
We have requested every individual member to spy on people who have not relocated. Be-
cause it is in the interest of the whole community that this person needs to go.”280 
The situation impacts on subsidy allocation. Local government is required to present a 
general plan of Site C which outlines the number and size of plots. Only after approval of 
the general plan, will application for title deeds be possible. In other words: Without the 
general plan, government cannot transfer the plots. 
Local government project managers and facilitators who are dealing with the leadership in 
Site C are trying to resolve this on a project basis by asking the leadership not to interfere 
in the projects for the sake of the housing situation. 
“We are saying: “For Site C purposes lets forget the politics here. This is for the project and 
it will improve the people’s housing situation.” […] In some cases we do get progress but 
slow.”281 
In this conflict ridden situation local government officials increasingly realised that they 
needed to involve the community in the decision-making: 
“Site C is not homogenous. People don’t think the same. […] That is why it is imperative to 
embark on a continuous participation. […] Some people want to be leaders so there is power 
mongering which is another catalyst. And that delays. People can convince each other. They 
are powerful. Always involve people in the process.”282 
Given this context, the Federation and the uTshani Fund agreed to cooperate with gov-
ernment in the housing process. The Federation had been active in Site C since the middle 
of the 1990s and is made up of 250 Federation members. 
                                                 
279 City official 9 
280 City official 9 
281 City official 4 
282 City official 9 
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In 2006 the Federation members in Site C were involved in establishing a business plan, 
technical report and layout. Some had agreed to be moved on site and some to be relo-
cated to Kuyasa. Federation groups are scattered around the four blocks of Site C which 
represented a problem to local government. 
“Let’s assume this is a pilot project and FEDUP people are mostly distributed here and a 
few of them are here. Then there could be anger because they don’t belong to this group. It 
creates another elephant. Ach, we see when we get there.”283 
Local government officials also questioned the apolitical nature of the Federation groups 
and argued that they influence and are influenced by political organisations such as 
SANCO. One housing official explained his mistrust: 
“[...] what is their effective SANCO alignment? Are they [FEDUP members] saying […] the 
FEDUP holds greater value in terms of their approach or will they listen to what SANCO is 
saying? It is political.”284 
The difficulties with the layout plans impacted on the project approval process since they 
are required to be finalised beforehand. Also, business plans have to be submitted for pro-
ject approval. People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) was therefore contracted by the 
uTshani Fund to compile the business plan and subsidy application which involved pre-
liminary house plans for costing. In 2006 PEP facilitated house modelling workshops with 
Federation members where it displayed three house types and the quantities and costing. 
PEP stressed its technical support role: 
“I have been asked to deal with all the technical side, provide all the technical information, 
cash flows, building programmes, building plans etc. […] So I am in a nice position doing 
the technical stuff and CORC and the rest of them take care of the social stuff.” 
Staff members of PEP, Community Microfinance Network (CMN) and the uTshani Fund 
joined for site visits. The manager of PEP explained that eleven slopes had already been 
constructed informally. The problem emerged that slope sizes might be too large and that 
the subsidy would then not be enough for top-structures. 
The progress of the business plan, subsidy applications and layout plans was discussed at 
a meeting at the uTshani Fund in September 2006. PEP, uTshani Fund, CMN staff and a 
City official were present. The majority of Federation members had complied with the 
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conditions of the beneficiary list and title deeds were on their way. Since plot sizes differ, 
the City official suggested calling in a meeting to look at those households who need to 
swap their sites according to the house sizes they require. 
Concerning the business plan, tensions had, however, arisen between the Federation 
members and the uTshani Fund. The uTshani Fund was confronted by Federation mem-
bers who thought that uTshani was responsible for the fact that no applications had been 
made. Therefore uTshani Fund requested the municipal project coordinator to clarify to 
the community that subsidy applications had been delayed since the layouts were not 
finalised. 
A further problem was aligned to previous Federation practice: In the past the Federation 
gave a free choice of house types and built house sizes which the subsidy did not cover. 
This was part of the cause for the uTshani Fund crisis. Therefore, in 2006 the uTshani 
Fund insisted on a limited number of house types which makes it easier to estimate the 
costs. 
The uTshani Fund and CMN field staff stressed that they have to deal with gate-keeping 
leaders who already have houses but do not want to loose power. They mobilised the Fed-
eration members to not co-operate in the house design exercise whereas the uTshani Fund 
insists that there needs to be an agreement on housing types, if to pursue further develop-
ment. 
Local leadership was affected by the split in the Federation. A CMN staff member ex-
plained: 
“They have been sending a message to the community that uTshani Fund built big houses for 
people and that is not correct. […] They still want to do the same thing which has not worked 
out in the past. We have done a survey in Site C trying to assess if the savings that they are 
keeping aside can actually match up with the amount of subsidy that they are going to 
get.”285 
The local Federation network accused uTshani Fund of not cooperating, not attending 
meetings and not giving reasons to the group. They saw themselves marginalised by uT-
shani Fund and ultimately dismissed it as their PHP support organisation in a meeting 
held in October 2006. This meeting was also attended by the national coordinator of 
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FEDUP who mediated between the uTshani Fund and the group, as well as local and pro-
vincial government officials. Interestingly, the municipal coordinator functioned as a 
translator. However, he stressed his observer role: 
“I said to them very clear that I will not be drawn into their infights. […] as an official my 
status was an observer not taking sides. […] Patrick [FEDUP coordinator] kept on saying: 
People give us directions: do you want to continue to work with Utshani? When they said No 
it was a democratic decision. They were dismissed without my input.”286 
 
Fig. 5.39: Negotiations between local FEDUP group and uTshani Fund 
Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006 
The uTshani Fund field worker stressed that from their point of view communities can 
take informed decisions.  
“Sometimes it might happen that they need a space to think and see how they can operate 
without us which is a good idea in terms of development […].”287 
The field worker stressed that the expectations are too high in terms of what they as field 
workers are supposed to do in the communities. She expressed her frustration: 
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“They always expect more than the capacities that you have. […]The [business plan] appli-
cation that they are going to submit now, the groundwork has been done by me and [CMN 
coordinator]. I don’t expect them to appreciate this but to acknowledge it.”288 
The local government official believed that the group will appoint another organisation as 
account administrator or support organisation. He even assumed that local government 
would in a better position to provide this support.  
“It could be a consultant, a NGO or they use us as local government as their account admin-
istrator so that the money from provincial government goes straight to local government and 
from there straight to the supplier and the supplier builds. Some feel it is safer this way, be-
cause the money remains in the hands of government.”289 
 
Fig. 5.40: Interfaces in Site C project (micro case B4), Source: Own design 
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5.4.5 Housing development projects by Alliance B 
5.4.5.1 Unlocking stalled development in Ekupumleni (B5) 
Since 2000 Ongoing negotiations for services 
2003 Electricity supply 
2003 Communal toilet blocks 
2006 Post conforming to general plan (road layout) 
2006 uTshani and FEDUP “100 Houses Project” stalled due to community division 
2006 Cleavage about occupancy of 20 new houses 
Tab. 5.23: Timeline of housing development in Ekupumleni 
The Ekupumleni Federation group had neglected the formal development process by 
building upfront (see chapter 5.4.4.1). As a result they were confronted with resolving 
problems around allocation and servicing of the sites years after construction had been 
finalised. Only electricity had been brought in soon after construction.290 In 2006 the Ha-
zeldean Housing Association was still negotiating with the City to bring in further infra-
structure. In the meanwhile they had self-provided interim communal toilet blocks with 
the assistance of People’s Environmental Planning (PEP). 
In 2006 road construction was supposed to be initiated. However, the finished floor level 
of some houses was below road level exposing these to possible floodings. Thus the entire 
road system would have to be dropped below the lowest level of the finished floor. 
Moreover, the Hazeldean Housing Association (HHA) was faced with continuing the 
stalled development during continued community division. Land transfer had not been 
finalised in 2006. Nevertheless, HHA started to build further units on uTshani Fund’s 
property. This was part of an agreement between the uTshani Fund, the Federation of the 
Urban Poor (FEDUP), Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and the national housing 
ministry to showcase its ability to construct one hundred houses in one hundred days (see 
also Chapter 5.4.1.2). Subsidies through the project were supposed to be used for Eku-
pumleni to revive stalled development there. 
However, while construction started in February 2006 with project management by the 
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uTshani Fund and PEP, the conflict between the ‘old’ Federation leaders and uTshani 
Fund disrupted the project. The South African Homeless People’s Federation section 21 
company objected to the development at the provincial housing department. It claimed 
that the uTshani Fund was implementing developments which were linked to their group 
and therefore demanded compensation.291 
 
Fig. 5.41: Houses built through pilot project in Ekupumleni, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
The uTshani Fund accused the leaders of gate-keeping and of objecting in “NIMBY fash-
ion” against the construction of the smaller neighbouring houses.292 As a result of the ob-
jections, the provincial MEC of housing stopped the project. At the time only twenty 
houses were finished and could not be occupied since the community division continued 
on the question who is eligible for allocation.293 
To overcome the blockages caused by the conflict the Community Organisation Resource 
                                                 
291 See Interview with Patricia Matolengwe, 25.10.2006. 
292 See uTshani News (2006d). 
293 See uTshani News (2006c). 
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Centre (CORC) consulted FEDUP to consent to SAHPF paying out the uTshani Fund to 
develop the land. This suggestion met with resistance from FEDUP and the uTshani 
Fund. CORC outlined: 
“But we have the advantage that we are not affected by the choices and therefore can give it 
a different spin. It is a strong position by doing something weak – it will at the end of the day 
strengthen your position. Professionals should be outside of dynamics.”294 
The cleavage had not been resolved by the time of interviewing. Instead, the internal dy-
namics had stopped Federation members practicing savings. Only in 2006 when new re-
porting systems were in place and saving groups organised at street level, did members 
reconsider taking up their savings practice.295 
 
Fig. 5.42: Interfaces in Ekupumleni (micro case B5), Source: Own design 
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5.4.5.2 Completion of unfinished houses in Kuyasa (B6) 
ca. 1999 350 families access sites in Kuyasa  
ca. 2000 PHP Workshop and House Design Workshop by PEP 
2000/2001 House construction 
2003  Approval of Consolidation Subsidy 
2006 Costing for unfinished houses by PEP 
Tab. 5.23: Timeline of housing development in Kuyasa 
Land ownership City of Cape Town 
Housing Greenfields development 
Size of area Unknown 
Project  Completion of unfinished houses 
FEDUP group  350 members 
Tab. 5.24: Key facts of the Kuyasa project 
 
Fig. 5.43: Satellite image of FEDUP houses in Kuyasa, Source: Google Earth (2006) 
In 2006 People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) was involved in a number of projects to 
complete unfinished Federation houses throughout South Africa (75% in the Western 
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Cape).296 Federation houses in Kuyasa, Cape Town, were a case in point. Kuyasa is part 
of Khayelitsha and had been identified as a housing development area (100ha) for about 
5,000 units in the Khayelitsha Spatial Development Framework (1999).297 The South Af-
rican Homeless People’s Federation had negotiated sites for about 350 households within 
the development.298 PEP had been offering house modelling workshops to enable Federa-
tion members to select from a set of house types based on cost and affordability. How-
ever, many overestimated their ability to top the subsidy in order to build larger units. 
Furthermore, the uTshani Fund, responsible for subsidy administration on behalf of the 
Federation, had previously handed over the full amount to one group. Federation mem-
bers then started to build large houses. Due to this lack of financial management, all pro-
jects half-way through the building process ran out of money and houses remained unfin-
ished for years.299 
 
Fig. 5.44: Half-finished house in Kuyasa, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006 
                                                 
296 See CORC (2007), pp.18f. 
297 See City of Tygerberg (1999). 
298 See Baumann et al (2001), p.13. 
299 Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.03.2006. 
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The further blockages of the projects were boosted by a triangle of accusations. The uT-
shani Fund accused old Federation leaders, who had registered as the South African 
Homeless People’s Federation Section 21 company, of unlawfully seeking control of sub-
sidies held in trust by the uTshani Fund. Furthermore, the uTshani Fund stressed that 
these leaders are gatekeeping and profiting by having constructed too large units at the 
cost of other Federation members. 
The Western Cape Province made the uTshani Fund responsible for finishing the houses. 
The uTshani Fund felt treated as a developer and accused government of superimposing 
formal delivery responsibility for plan approval or construction monitoring to the uTshani 
Fund.300 The uTshani Fund sees itself rather as the financial intermediator between the 
subsidy scheme and the Federation groups. It argued that other professional technical ser-
vices would cut down the subsidy amount. Instead, this could be handled by the groups in 
a people-driven process.301 
Local government accused the uTshani Fund of not conforming to regulations. Officials 
put forward that the uTshani Fund, as the facilitator, had left the Federation groups with-
out technical assistance. According to them, projects need technical support in a number 
of aspects such as materials ordering, payment, running the housing support centre and 
managing the budget. One official stressed: 
“To me technical assistance is too critical for them. They are a passionate group of people. 
But I have seen it time and time again with various PHP initiatives particularly in Khayelit-
sha. […] If that is not in place those projects are going nowhere.” 
And last but not least the Federation split gave rise to accusations by ‘old’ Federation 
leaders that it is uTshani’s responsibility to finish the houses and to release outstanding 
subsidies. 
As these projects had not received a completion certificate (“happy letter”), provincial 
government refused to pay out the full subsidy amount. The uTshani Fund decided not to 
get into a legal process and instead contracted People’s Environmental Planning (PEP) to 
document all the affected projects and do a costing to finish the houses. The PEP director 
explained: 
                                                 
300 See uTshani Fund (2006b). 
301 uTshani Fund (2005b). 
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“So what we have to do is take these bigger houses, find the most practicable and cost effec-
tive point to cut them off and then finish that part of the house and say when you got money 
you can finish that yourself. Right now you will be able to move in this. […] You sign your 
‘happy letter’ and then it is no longer uTshani’s responsibility.” 
In Kuyasa out of thirty-one houses only nine were finished, nine were incomplete and a 
further thirteen had not been started at all. In this situation the uTshani Fund had to make 
additional finance available to finish the houses. Through PEP the uTshani Fund tried to 
find the most cost efficient solution to finish the construction. It also tried to top up the in-
sufficient consolidation subsidy amount by applying for additional grants.302 
The incomplete houses were not finished at the time of interviewing. 
 
Fig. 5.45: Interface in Kuyasa (micro case B6), Source: Own design 
 
                                                 
302 Site visit to Site C and Kuyasa , Khayelitsha, 26. September 2006 
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6. Emerging structures of organisations and networks 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the case study findings and link them back to the 
research questions introduced in chapter two. Firstly, what are the political opportunity 
structures for participating in the housing process? Secondly, what organisational struc-
tures and internal relationships are characteristic of the civil society alliances? Thirdly, 
how do the alliances organise internally and relate with government on a strategic as well 
as project-based level? Finally, how do roles and relationships shift between levels (stra-
tegic and project-based) and phases (land, project preparation, housing development)? 
This chapter then refers back to the research assumptions and explores to which extent 
theories on organisations and networks are applicable to understand the local processes. 
6.1 Insecure political opportunity structures 
6.1.1 Institutional frameworks: conflicting strategies and lack of implementation 
The empirical findings show that institutional responses to the housing challenge are 
highly contested. Corresponding frameworks present a juxtaposition of pro-growth and 
pro-poor orientation which has led to ‘competing rationalities’ with regard to the City 
Development Strategy and the Integrated Development Plan. 
Additionally, the findings reveal a disconnection between proactive and comprehensive 
strategies on the one hand, and isolated project-based interventions on the other. The 
latter often emerge as an immediate response to the housing crisis. This has been particu-
larly stressed as a difficulty with regard to the Integrated Human Settlements Strategy. 
Although institutional frameworks have considerably moved away from technocratic ap-
proaches, they are still linked to a normative and neo-rational understanding of plan-
ning. Confronted with the reality of extensive informality, this approach is challenged and 
criticised for its neglect of the relevance of community assets and practices. This observa-
tion is particularly relevant with regard to the Integrated Human Settlements Strategy. 
6.1.2 Intergovernmental aspects: a political-driven housing agenda 
The analysis points to three governance-related aspects which greatly affect the transla-
tion of institutional frameworks into practice: Power games within the political sphere, 
contestation between the political and administrative sphere and the lack of capacity 
within local government. 
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The findings indicate that the implementation of policy in Cape Town is constrained by 
contestation within the political sphere. Higher spheres of government still hold vested 
powers and control the type of housing development taking place within the City. Power 
games and conflict of competencies between different levels of government (which are 
aligned to different political camps in the case of Cape Town) complicate the implementa-
tion process for City officials. Much the same can be said of the influence of red tape by 
higher spheres of government on the mode of local government housing delivery. 
Moreover, at local government level strategic approaches often lack political commit-
ment. Whereas there is an emerging process-orientation within the administration, the po-
litical sphere continues to be outcome-oriented in terms of housing delivery. The politi-
cised housing agenda translates into delivery pressure for the municipal housing depart-
ment which faces difficulties to implement its more progressive upgrading strategies. 
Further, the lack of administrative capacity (evidenced by a scarcely resourced and un-
derstaffed housing department) and lack of interdepartmental relationships undermine in-
novative approaches. Often this situation is worsened by a scarce communication or co-
operation between senior level and project level housing officials. 
6.1.3 Participation: changing opportunities in the housing process 
Participation in local housing projects can be differentiated along the three phases: access 
to land, project preparation and housing development. Each phase allows for a different 
extent of participation. Therefore, opportunities for participation are shifting. As a result 
actors are at times integrated into and at other times excluded from decision-making. 
No participation during accessing land 
Since participation in the formal process (land identification through the Integrated De-
velopment Plan process and land allocation through the housing waiting list) contains a 
great deal of bottlenecks, poor households find alternative ways to access land. Activities 
to access land can comprise unlawful occupation of land in order to negotiate post-
allocation (micro-case Freedom Park), acquisition of private land (micro-case Ekupum-
leni), negotiations with the state about land allocations (micro-cases Netreg and Macas-
sar) as well as donations or allocations by private owners (micro-case Klipfontein). As al-
ternative practices are perceived as ‘jumping-the-queue’ in housing allocation, local 
government is reluctant to negotiate with all kinds of pro-active groups. 
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Restrictive participation during project preparation 
The standardised and formal preparation phase for housing development (including sub-
sidy application and settlement layout) presents a number of constraints and is character-
ised by red tape. There is no institutional space for participation of beneficiaries. There 
are only three options to influence the development process: to either agree to the devel-
opment approach and try to speed it up by own initiatives (micro-cases Netreg and Site 
C), to negotiate so that own preferences and priorities are integrated (micro-case Freedom 
Park) or to operate outside the formal development route and negotiate post-approval (mi-
cro-case Ekupumleni). As development has already been agreed upon and it is just the 
form of intervention as a negotiable, local government is more willing to interact but hesi-
tant to give preference to local choice fearing community conflicts and disputes with lo-
cal politicians. 
Standardised participation during housing development 
The participation of Grassroots Organisations during housing development is confined to 
project steering committees. The related People’s Housing Process (PHP) prescribes a 
standardised intervention framework for people-driven development which largely 
reduces NGOs to technical support organisations and the participation of Grassroots Or-
ganisations to workshops on house design and management in order to facilitate self-built 
developments. 
Options are therefore limited to either work within the institutional channel (micro-case 
Netreg), to additively organise other more comprehensive community-managed initiatives 
(micro-case Freedom Park) or not to accept the self-build limitation and prescribed roles 
and thus risking to not conform to regulations (micro-cases Ekupumleni and Kuyasa). 
6.1.4 Actors’ understanding of political opportunities: mutual mistrust  
Local government’s reluctance in participatory approaches 
While local government has created institutional frameworks for participation on strategic 
and project-level in housing, the resultant practice, according to the findings, is character-
ised by a shifting interpretation of engagement, by institutional resistance against partici-
pation in decision-making and by political patronage.  
Participation in strategic planning is central to influencing decisions on land allocation. In 
reality participation, particularly within the IDP process, was characterised by shifting 
engagement opportunities. The findings revealed that the previous mass meetings re-
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sulted in a disbelief in the effects of participatory approaches by all stakeholders. How-
ever, neither is the current shift to multistakeholder forums welcomed. Instead, it is felt 
that as long as transparent criteria for participation are lacking, these forums are ques-
tioned in terms of their legitimacy. Experts were critical of the lack of agreement on the 
institutional mechanisms for vertical and horizontal integration which thus became prone 
to political party preferences. 
At the housing project level, the findings demonstrate a great resistance by officials 
against participation.  Pro-active community initiatives are confronted with a strong atti-
tude by councillors and officials that there is no necessity to interact as development is to 
be pursued through the administrative process of housing allocation. Beneficiaries were 
not supposed to ‘jump the queue’ and make claims or even access land or build houses 
upfront. Also, once development has been approved, participation in decision-making is 
avoided in order to prevent community conflicts and blockages in housing projects. 
Thus participation in housing processes is only provided at the implementation stage con-
fined to a consultative role in project steering committees. 
Self-help approaches are highly contested and also disapproved of by many officials as 
being a superimposed empowerment agenda against the primary need of shelter. Partici-
pation, following this understanding, can be of use when communities take over devel-
opment responsibility during and after the construction phase.  
Similarly, much the same has been revealed concerning the attitude of officials towards 
civil society organisations. Activities of Grassroots Organisations and NGOs are pro-
moted in terms of taking over development responsibility in housing projects as opposed 
to influence decision-making. Deriving from this understanding there are clear roles as-
signed to them: Grassroots Organisations are supposed to contribute to community-
managed housing projects and NGOs are supposed to furnish corresponding technical as-
sistance, mediation or research. 
Process-oriented activities with a focus on empowerment are viewed rather sceptically by 
many officials. Civil society organisations are perceived as a threat to delivery. Specifi-
cally with regard to grassroots initiatives officials fear that exclusionary practices by some 
of these organisations might cause conflicts and blockages on project-level. NGOs, on the 
other hand, are mistrusted in terms of their agenda and their influence on local groups. 
This mistrust in participation is contrasted by other housing officials who have experi-
enced blockages in housing projects as a result of the lack of early participation. Thus 
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they pursue a different attitude in favour of a comprehensive participatory approach and 
seek to extend the limited participation by proactive measures. The findings, however, re-
veal that such interpretation of participation exposes a risk to officials. As housing is 
prone to political patronage, inclusion to decision-making is opposed by many ward 
councillors who try to gate keep housing delivery to their constituencies. Also, officials 
willing to pursue extended participation beyond the conventional route face lack of ca-
pacities for the more time-consuming approaches. 
All in all the findings indicate that institutional and governance-related shortcomings of 
participation are exacerbated or reduced depending on the willingness, capacities and 
risk-taking of office holders. 
 
Fig. 6.1: Summary of governance challenges, Source: Own design 
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Civil society’s low motivation to participate 
The findings reveal that civil society organisations have a detailed understanding of the 
shortcomings of the institutional channels for policy influence.  
From a civil society perspective there are hardly any opportunities for participation in de-
cision-making at substantial level in the housing process. The study indicates critical as-
pects which have been raised with regard to the political space for engagement: ineffec-
tive participation in strategic planning processes, a perceived lack of accountability of lo-
cal politicians and a paternalistic attitude by the state in housing development. 
The low motivation to participate in the IDP process is a result of a perceived ineffective 
public engagement process and little trust that government will perform adequately. 
Lack of accountability by local politicians (using the poor as vote banks, gate keeping, 
and corruption) seems to be a primary concern which translates in low expectations and 
increasing frustration about unfulfilled promises.  
The limited institutional channels for participation in housing projects have been further 
reduced by political instability and by a perceived paternalistic approach to housing de-
velopment by local government. 
Nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement that some officials take the risk to work out-
side restrictions (these are referred to as ‘progressive officials’, ‘champions’ or ‘change 
agents’). 
6.2 Approaches in influencing policy: right-based and alternative development 
In the people-driven housing sector two positions are prevalent: a right-based and an al-
ternative development view. A major finding of the research is that the different positions 
highly affect the core activities of both alliances. 
Both alliances hold the view that government has a redistributive responsibility. Also, 
both share a common criticism regarding the limitations and deficiencies of the state 
housing approach. The ultimate aim for both is empowerment. However, the Alliance A is 
historically rooted in a right-based approach to housing, whereas Alliance B is driven by a 
pragmatic approach and an alternative development agenda. From a right-based position 
empowerment is central to counterbalance resource inequality and to advocate for re-
distribution; the alternative development standpoint is that empowerment is central to 
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counterbalance power inequality and to reduce voicelessness and powerlessness of the 
urban poor. 
Therefore they differ in the strategies and tactics to accomplish their empowerment aims. 
Whereas Alliance A claims for citizens’ rights to be fulfilled, Alliance B is less interested 
in legislative rights and rather addresses institutional deficiencies. Whereas Alliance A 
wants to change policy/state action by advocacy and lobby (claim-making) to expand 
formal housing delivery to the poor, Alliance B aims to change policy/state action from 
inside by integrating their non-formal practices into the state framework. 
 
Fig. 6.2: Right-based versus alternative development position, Source: Own design 
Alliance A aims to fulfil housing rights and uses networks as an entry point for advo-
cacy to influence housing policy and in the long run politics and polity. Alliance B aims 
to balance power inequality and uses housing as an entry point to establish networks to 
influence politics and polity and, in the long run, policy.1 
As a consequence the emphasis of NGO support differs in terms of the Development Ac-
tion Group providing more direct professional expertise, whereas the Community Or-
                                                 
1 By applying this terminology the difference in governance is stressed of: policy as specific political 
strategies and actions, politics as the negotiation process and polity as the structural capacity within insti-
tutions. See: Benz (2004), p. 21. 
 302
ganisation Resource Centre offers more a platform for networking. 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: Focus of activity by Alliance A and B, Source: Own design 
6.3 Civil society organisations and alliances 
6.3.1 Organisations as collective actors: coexisting and overlapping structures 
Whereas Alliance A (Development Action Group, The Kuyasa Fund and local People’s 
Organisations) works with a conventional NGO setup operating from a head office with 
hierarchical working structure, NGOs in Alliance B (Community Organisation Resource 
Centre, uTshani Fund, People’s Environmental Planning, Coalition of the Urban Poor, 
Federation of the Urban Poor) are decentralised and characterised by the Community Or-
ganisation Resource Centre (CORC) being a joint coordination of independent pro-
grammes. 
NGOs in Alliance A are clearly distinguishable with clear boundaries and are exclu-
sively formal structures. The NGOs of Alliance B instead show organisational overlaps 
and contain informal structures. A key finding is therefore that the NGOs within Alliance 
A can be clearly classified, whereas a classification as NGOs in case B would reduce 
them to a formal and confined entity which in reality they are not. 
On grassroots level the organisations working with Alliance A can be clearly classified as 
People’s Organisations since they are development and policy-oriented and based on 
membership. Their members have other affiliations (such as savings schemes) but these 
do not constitute a precondition for membership. Moreover, they have a formal hierar-
chical structure grounded in registration, elections and setup of committees which oper-
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ate on a local level. 
In case B the Federation is constituted by saving schemes. Members might have other af-
filiations, but the affiliation to a saving scheme is the entry point to membership of the 
Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP). Savings schemes are small and local self-help 
groups. They constitute the local networks of FEDUP. These local FEDUP networks are 
similar to People’s Organisations in terms of numbers, but they are not registered hierar-
chical organisations. Nevertheless, the Federation exposes organisation-like formal and 
vertical accountability structures. Saving schemes, local, regional and national net-
works are affiliated by a formalised reporting, resource flow and accountability structure. 
Still it cannot be classified as an Association of People’s Organisations. Firstly, the organ-
isational structures of FEDUP and NGOs overlap (FEDUP constitutes uTshani Fund, 
FEDUP is member of CUP and FEDUP activists are employed by CORC). Secondly, the 
Federation is more than an organisation by constituting informal horizontal networking 
arrangements through the “federating” practices of local groups. As a result the Federa-
tion constitutes a hybrid organisational form sitting in-between or combining characteris-
tics of organisations and networks. 
These findings from the research point to the following classification of civil society or-
ganisations (see the following table). 
Type Alliance A Type Alliance B 
SHO - SHO Saving schemes 
PO Registered organisations, elected 
committee 
Hybrid FEDUP (local, regional, national or-
ganisational structure and network) 
APO - APO CUP (umbrella for social movement 
organisations, but overlap with 
FEDUP and CORC) 
PONGO DAG PONGO+ CORC (registered, independent pro-
grammes, overlap with uTshani, 
FEDUP and PEP) 
 - Hybrid uTshani Fund (professional staff and 
FEDUP board members) 
SONGO The Kuyasa Fund SONGO+ PEP (registered, clear boundary, but 
dependent on CORC/uTshani) 
Tab. 6.1: Classification of civil society organisations within Alliance A and B, Source: Own design 
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6.3.2 Basic alliance formation: multi-organisational and hybrid structures 
The analysis of the two civil society alliances provides entry points for a distinction in 
terms of their internal governance practices between a more NGO-centred, situational and 
multi-organisational alliance (Alliance A) and a polycentric, permanent and hybrid con-
stellation (Alliance B). 
Type A Type B 
Clear boundaries 
Multi-organisational cooperation 
Additive 
Separate entities 
Formal organisation 
NGOs outside partners of People’s Organisations 
with irregular interface 
No clear boundaries 
Polycentric network  
Overlapping 
Complex interfaces 
Formal/informal (organisational cores) 
NGOs with special relationship to Federation and 
regular interface 
Tab. 6.2: Basic alliance formations, Source: Own design 
Alliance A: a multi-organisational, NGO-centred and situational alliance 
The constellation of organisations in Alliance A is characterised by occasionally emerging 
loose working relations of independent organisations (separate entities). It can therefore 
be referred to as a situational alliance which is mostly confined to project contexts.  
On a grassroots level the relations between the People’s Organisations are weak and spo-
radic. Their platform for engagement is loose, free-for-all and dependent on the initiative 
of the Development Action Group (DAG). This dependency represents a dilemma for 
DAG as it puts the NGO in the uncomfortable position of unwillingly driving the relation-
ship-building whilst wanting to enhance an autonomous grassroots network. 
 
Fig. 6.4: Alliance A: multi-organisational, NGO-centred and situational, Source: Own design 
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From a case to case basis the entities within this alliance practice networking, however, 
the individual organisation is prevalent. The composition of actors within the Alliance A 
is therefore additive. Networks as secondary forms hardly exist. The organisational form 
is oriented at bureaucratic hierarchical structured institutions. 
Alliance B: a hybrid, polycentric and permanent alliance 
The NGOs and the Federation in case B stress that they embark on a less exclusive rela-
tionship than in the past. They foresee a more independent role of both the NGOs and the 
Federation. This would entail that the Federation contracts NGOs on a situational basis. 
Nonetheless, the shift has yet not been translated into practice. Their relationship contin-
ues to be characterised by a permanent alliance structure. The organisations as actors 
within this alliance constitute organisational cores of the broader structure. Centre of deci-
sion-making or power cannot be clearly defined. Therefore, Alliance B can neither be 
classified as NGO nor Grassroots-centred, but could rather be referred to as polycentric. 
 
Fig. 6.5: Polycentric overlapping composition of Federation alliance, Source: Own design 
This alliance is driven by a relational logic based on strong ties between the organisations 
up to a degree of symbiosis in a form of organisational overlaps (constituting a hybrid so-
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cial organisation). Moreover, it comprises less formalised structures which in the same 
way constitute the constellation. For instance relationships between the Federation of the 
Urban Poor (FEDUP) groups are strong beyond the formal accountability structure. Fur-
thermore, the uTshani Fund was referred to as having two-sides of one coin with a profes-
sional arm and a grassroots board. One could say that the Alliance B is constituted by 
formal and informal elements (see figure 6.5). 
6.3.3 Relationships between both alliances: dialectics of positions 
Basically both alliances buy into the savings methodology and share a common under-
standing of the deficiencies of the housing process in the City. However, their different 
positions on how to engage with the state create a degree of mistrust, suspicion, competi-
tion or even rivalry. This is mostly revealed in comments from NGOs, whereas the Grass-
roots Organisations are less aware of the differences. Comments were made about Alli-
ance A being focused on delivery, disempowering and NGO-driven and about Alliance B 
cutting deals with government in their self-interest, misusing the community for an out-
side agenda and sidelining right-based initiatives. 
 
Fig. 6.6: Dialectics of right-based and alternative development positions, Source: Own design 
This discrepancy is enhanced by a competitive situation between NGOs working in the 
same field. There are similar donors involved; some of them seemingly are not supportive 
of complementary approaches. This, according to criticism from the NGOs, is a result of 
the limited understanding of the differences in their approaches. The wish was expressed 
that both approaches could be accommodated and acknowledged. Instead, unintentionally, 
 307
a situation is created where the one is played off against the other. 
Nevertheless, the antagonistic attitudes are partly overcome in the day-to-day business 
when the NGOs in both alliances share information and cooperate on a situational basis. 
On a more general level it seemed that both alliances were to a degree learning from each 
other. Since both were in a process of rebuilding their structures, it became obvious that 
Alliance A was putting more emphasis on informal and horizontal networking as a basis 
for empowerment. This was part of the experience being made with the failure of previous 
more bureaucratic and NGO-driven structures. At the same time Alliance B had to deal 
with a legacy of mismanagement and lack of accountability and rebuild structures and 
processes so as to regain trust both within the Federation as well as with government. In a 
way this represented a form of checks and balances as both alliances would comment on 
the progress being made and reveal deficiencies by the other (see figure 6.6). 
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6.4 Dynamic interfaces 
6.4.1 Strategic level state engagement: towards grassroots networks 
Both alliances see a need to organise the poor and to build their capacity for lobbying and 
advocating the state to further their interests. Both also try to cultivate relationships with 
local government and to sensitise officials to people-driven housing processes. 
Alliance A: NGO-driven advocacy and commissioned work 
Within Alliance A the Development Action Group (DAG) is driving the strategic agenda. 
DAG and the Kuyasa Fund both see policy as deficient and are seeking policy-influence 
to improve practice on the ground (right-based, top-down change). The NGOs therefore 
create a situational alliance on a strategic level; specifically with regard to the People’s 
Housing Process. The interfaces to the state by Alliance A are characterised by NGOs 
practicing a critical engagement. This translates in a dualism of relations: in terms of be-
ing integrated to institutional spaces (stakeholder relation in forums and committees) 
and being contracted by government (principal-agent relation). 
The role of NGOs in the engagement with the state shifts between the different levels of 
government. There are strong and stable relations to national and provincial government 
and to the senior-level of local government.  Acknowledging the limited autonomy of lo-
cal government it is often higher levels of government which are lobbied. Impacts are 
then supposed to filter down to municipal levels through the intergovernmental relations.  
At higher levels of government the NGOs take over an advocacy role as they make policy 
submissions and are integrated as stakeholders in various institutional forums (provincial 
and national land summit, national NGO PHP Reference Group, national Extended In-
terim Policy Working Group, and provincial Human Settlements Reference Group). At 
the same time DAG increasingly takes over commissioned research for higher level of 
government. 
At local government level the relationship is characterised by lobbying against local gov-
ernment planning practice and by more cooperative forms of engagement. This comprises 
cooperation in policy-formulation, collaboration with champions in local government or 
commissioned work by local government. 
These collaborative relations of ‘like-minded’ professionals, however, do not translate on 
a project-level where the practice of the delivery arm of government is opposed by DAG.  
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In order to shift state practice the Development Action Group therefore intends to get 
Grassroots Organisations in the driver’s seat for claim-making. Networks of People’s Or-
ganisations (referred to as ‘CBO advocacy platform’) as an option to collectively address 
government are in their infancy stage, however perceived as key for future lobbying ac-
tivities. This indicates an emerging tendency for DAG to shift from a NGO advocacy role 
to support grassroots advocacy. As this network has not yet been established, People’s 
Organisations lack relations to state actors at strategic level (see figure 6.7). 
 
Fig. 6.7: Strategic level state engagement by Alliance A, Source: Own design 
 
Alliance B: grassroots-centred partnerships 
Alliance B avoids stakeholder engagement in government forums. Instead, it focuses on 
partnership relationships. Similar to Alliance A, strategic engagement emerges pre-
dominantly at the national and provincial levels of government. At local government level 
the alliance seeks to single out those actors whom they perceive as agents of change. 
A major finding is that governance arrangements have emerged outside the institutional 
channels of the state. Relationships are established through inviting government represen-
tatives to the informal governance space of Alliance B (uTshani Trust, land trust, na-
tional working group, CORC board, SDI exchanges). 
The strategic level is characterised by activities which take place outside the government 
sphere. Specifically, learning and networking is seen as the basis for capacitating mem-
bers to negotiate at local level. Core practices are exchange programmes between Federa-
tion groups nationally and internationally, savings to build network and access external 
funds, data gathering to gain knowledge and as a basis for negotiations, mapping to un-
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derstand a settlement situation and make informed choices.2 Resource mobilisation (se-
cure privileges) for project-level is meant to showcase alternatives. 
Negotiations on a strategic level are characterised by relationships to key champions on 
mostly higher levels of government. FEDUP lobbying and advocacy is assisted by the 
Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) in the role of that of a mentor. NGOs 
take over an enabling function and are characterised as ‘door openers’ for the Federation 
to engage with the state. The relationship between the Federation groups and support 
NGOs is shifting and characterised by different stakeholder driving the strategic agenda 
(see figure 6.8). 
 
Fig. 6.8: Strategic level state engagement by Alliance B, Source: Own design 
                                                 
2 See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), pp. 24-28. 
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6.4.2 Project-level state engagement: changing roles and relationships 
Alliance A: roles and relationships determined by regulations 
Alliance A does not connect strategic and project level of activities – only from time to 
time when projects are used as case studies and precedence to inform policy-making. 
Relationships between the NGOs are loose in project contexts. The Development Action 
Group addresses the People’s Organisations throughout all phases, whereas the Kuyasa 
Fund relates to the individual household level confined to the project preparation phase.  
It is, however, at project-level that situational alliances between NGOs and People’s Or-
ganisations emerge. The micro case studies show that projects are initiated by the Peo-
ple’s Organisations as the key drivers who either resist formal interventions (micro-case 
Freedom Park) or seek to be integrated into formal interventions (micro-case Netreg). 
Through this experience the People’s Organisations have learned to verbalise their con-
cerns. 
In both micro-cases DAG supports the People’s Organisations in securing land and fund-
ing for development. This is achieved by providing technical support or by taking over 
an intermediary function between the state and the People’s Organisations (micro-case 
Netreg and Freedom Park). External consultants collaborate with the NGO and People’s 
Organisations by providing legal advice (micro-case Freedom Park) or technical support 
(micro-case Netreg). 
The study demonstrates that People’s Organisations develop from an informal organisa-
tional structure (Freedom Park) or SANCO-aligned entity (Netreg) to independent formal-
ised organisations during the process. DAG assists the formalisation process by leader-
ship training and organisation-building. The formalisation has increased transparency 
of internal decision-making, but also caused internal leadership conflicts. 
In the phase of accessing land the interface with local government is predominantly 
competitive with local government opposing community initiative. This is illustrated by 
either dismissing applications (micro-case Netreg) or insisting on eviction (micro-case 
Freedom Park). In both cases the conflict was resolved by a change of interest at the po-
litical level to scale-up City projects (N2 Gateway project in the case of Netreg and Urban 
Renewal Programme in the case of Freedom Park). The Netreg case furthermore illus-
trates that People’s Organisations by addressing higher levels of government can speed-up 
the process through pressure on local government. The space for interface is either consti-
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tuted by local government (NGOs and POs invited to meetings) or outsourced by the state 
to an external mediator (as in Freedom Park) (see A1 and A2 in figure 6.9). 
Once land had been secured, the relationship to the City has changed from competi-
tive/confrontational to more consultative relations. The formal project preparation 
framework is acknowledged by Alliance A, but also challenged in terms of trying to 
speed-up the process. In the absence of institutional spaces for participation DAG field 
staff together with the People’s Organisations and often with the support of private con-
sultants lobbied City officials and political representatives to support projects and approve 
submissions. This has created a situational alliance between the NGO, the People’s Or-
ganisation and consultants. 
DAG has a predominant advocacy and mediation role in land access and shifts to a more 
technical and advisor role in later phases. It then supports communities in their housing 
process by providing technical support (access finance, layout plans, house designs, con-
struction programmes) as well as by skills and institutional development (e.g. in negoti-
ating and communication and financial management). 
People’s Organisations changed from principal agents in claiming for land, to stake-
holders or interest groups in project preparation. However, the micro-case Freedom Park 
demonstrated that existing communities can build up alternative self-driven initiatives 
(such as food gardening and neighbourhood watch) to sustain self-initiatives more easily 
than organisations made up of dispersed members. 
Both the Freedom Park and Netreg Housing projects revealed that the meetings with 
housing officials were often characterised by bargaining during this phase. Although local 
government was interested in enforcing its mode of housing delivery, it was also more 
willing to consult with the community and get their buy-in (see A3 and A4 in figure 6.9). 
During housing development the formal framework dictated the relationship between the 
actors. The regulatory frameworks of the People’s Housing Process defined the relation-
ship between NGOs, People’s Organisations and local government. DAG then changed its 
role to a project manager/PHP support organisation. As this rather requires technical 
skills, DAG gained a more distant position in relation to the People’s Organisations. Peo-
ple’s Organisations shifted during the housing development phase to stakeholders in pro-
ject steering committees. By being included in this institutional space, the influence of the 
People’s Organisations declined as they were reduced to a consultative role. 
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Whilst community self-reliance is high during land negotiations, during project imple-
mentation the PHP process regulates that financial coordination remains with the support 
organisation (DAG). The People’s Organisations are in the back seat in the project devel-
opment and have loose control of the development. A further noticeable finding was that 
in both micro-cases a private charity organisation provided additional finance and took 
over control of the development process. 
Government actors retreat to hierarchical coordination: The role of national and provin-
cial government is to provide resources and approve projects whilst local government has 
to care for control and regulates housing development (see A5 and A6 in figure 6.9). 
Greenfields Upgrading 
A1 
 
A2 
 
A3 
 
A4 
 
A5 
 
A6 
 
Fig. 6.9: Dynamics of relationships between Alliance A and the state, Source: Own design 
Key characteristics of the project-level state engagement can be summarised as follows: 
- The interface between state/alliance shifts from competitive to consultative to hier-
archical. 
- Space for interface is created by the state. 
- POs shift from principal driver, to stakeholder to interest group. 
- NGO shift from advisor, mediator to a technical service role. 
- Local government actors shift from a restrictive to a controlling/consultative role. 
- There is a clear boundary between all entities. 
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Alliance B: dynamic relational web 
The findings show that in the case of Alliance B the strategic and project-levels are diffi-
cult to distinguish as strategic impact is believed to be achieved by changing practice at 
project-level (pragmatic/ bottom-up change). 
The Klipfontein project was to showcase opportunities of land donations by the Methodist 
church (micro-case B2), the Ekupumleni project was integrated as a pilot for building 
‘100 houses in 100 days’ based on an agreement with the national housing Minister (mi-
cro-case B5), the Site C project was integrated to a pilot by provincial and local govern-
ment to replan Site C (micro-case B4) and the Kuyasa project was part of the South Af-
rica wide FEDUP/uTshani Fund initiative to recover subsidies (micro-case B6). 
The FEDUP members have either been living in informal settlements and are negotiating 
around tenure rights and upgrading (as with the Klipfontein project), are organised back-
yard dwellers and negotiate with the state for land (Macassar) or are living in site-and-
service schemes and are negotiating around consolidation and relocation (Site C and Ku-
yasa). Obviously the different background and shelter needs also determine the stability 
and dynamics of the local networks. Experience with Federation groups demonstrated that 
existing communities with formal tenure are quick to mobilise, but will show bias during 
the process (such as Site C). On the other hand landless groups are more difficult to or-
ganise, but more committed during the process (such as Macassar).3 
The hybrid alliance of case B is characterised by flexible relations at project-level. 
During the phase of accessing land, requests for land are primarily driven by the Fed-
eration of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) network with occasional assistance from the Com-
munity Organisation Resource Centre (CORC). The phase of accessing land is accompa-
nied by mobilising savings and enumeration activities and thus building leadership and 
organisation within FEDUP groups. The Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) has taken 
over this activity of FEDUP during its internal conflicts. NGOs are present in the form of 
social facilitation by assisting in setting up saving schemes, database, and enumeration 
processes. The local FEDUP groups advise and inform the local saving schemes and es-
tablish systems of internal decision-making and information (micro-case Macassar). 
The case studies show that differences emerge if land is to be allocated by government. 
Then the local FEDUP group drives the identification process, contracts consultants for 
                                                 
3 The correlation between the tenure form/ location of federation groups and their behaviour and dynamics 
had been already indicated in other research. See: Bay Research and Consultancy Service (2002), pp. 15f. 
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land surveys and negotiates with local government. In this case NGOs are absent in the 
direct interface with local government and just offer advice. Also, the FEDUP group pri-
marily addresses the political level for buy-in and tries to establish ties with the local 
councillor. 
The Klipfontein project represents an alternative to land requests. It reveals different roles 
and responsibilities aligned to manage the transfer and rezoning of land. Conflicts do not 
emerge between local FEDUP groups and local government, but within the community. 
CORC then adopts the role of a mediator. The interface with government is more of a 
technical nature which is addressed by consultants contracted by Alliance B (see B1 and 
B2 in figure 6.10). 
In the project preparation phase the two micro-cases illustrate differences in the inter-
face with government. The Ekupumleni case (B3) reveals a way how the formal proce-
dure is circumvented by building houses upfront prior to the approval of layouts and 
subsidies. Obviously negotiations then take place for post-approval and service delivery 
which is met by reluctance by the delivery arm of local government. Here fine-tuned 
agreements are reached through negotiations around technical matters. NGOs play an in-
termediary role translating Federation thinking to professionals and vice versa. People’s 
Environmental Planning is then contracted to represent the local interests. 
The Site C project (micro case B4) on the other hand is characterised by collaboration 
with local government to implement the rezoning plans of the state. Local FEDUP groups 
and saving schemes meet and discuss implementation with local government on a weekly 
basis. This is complemented by uTshani Fund and People’s Environmental Planning 
(PEP) which negotiate technical matters with City officials. UTshani, PEP and the Com-
munity-Microfinance Network link up with the savings schemes and FEDUP group in 
terms of preparing the business plan. This case study revealed the lack of understanding 
of the role of the uTshani Fund both by City officials and saving schemes. Conflicts then 
emerge not between the City and the local FEDUP group, but between the local FEDUP 
group and the uTshani Fund. These findings show that in such a situation FEDUP adopts 
the role of a mediator between the two (see B3 and B4 in figure 6.10). 
The formal housing development route is resisted by Alliance B. This translates into col-
laboration with champions in government who are interested in piloting alternative in-
tervention routes. The micro-case of Ekupumleni (B5) reveals that conflicts then emerge 
between the political promoter at higher level of government and the delivery arm of local 
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government. Also, the clash between local FEDUP groups translates into conflicts with 
uTshani Fund. In this situation CORC plays a mediation role. PEP assists in technical 
advice but withdraws in social conflicts.  
The case of Kuyasa (B6) illustrates that Alliance B seeks to showcase alternative devel-
opment of housing. Interface emerges by accessing the capital subsidy system. Officials 
then want to ensure that projects are implemented according to regulations and standards. 
This translates into competitive relations between the uTshani Fund and the City or Prov-
ince. Also Federation groups are confused by the uTshani Fund’s reluctance to provide 
technical support which translates into conflicts between some FEDUP members and the 
Fund (see B5 and B6 in figure 6.10). 
Greenfields Upgrading/Consolidation 
B1 
 
B2 
 
B3 
 
B4 
 
B5 
 
B6 
 
Fig. 6.10: Dynamics of relationships between Alliance B and the state, Source: Own design 
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Key characteristics of the project-level engagement with the state are as follows: 
- SDI aligned groups use their alignment to the larger network and strategic relations 
to higher sphere of government as a basis for negotiation on project-level.  
- Alliance B constitutes dynamic relational webs both internally and with local gov-
ernment. 
- Functions shift between entities not only within the alliance but also between ac-
tors in the alliance and actors in government. 
- The interface with local government is not informed by the political opportunity 
structure, but by the degree of how alternative development is in conflict with the 
formal intervention framework. 
- Relations then can be of a collaborative or competitive nature at project-level. 
- Neither state engagement nor internal governance is free of conflicts and requires 
constant negotiations.  
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6.5 Emergent patterns of moving targets and oscillating structures 
Opportunity structures are changing 
From an institutional governance perspective institutions are not static, but influence and 
can be influenced by actors and policies. In terms of institutionalised participation this 
translates into dynamics of political opportunity structures. Clearly, the case of Cape 
Town reinforces these observations in the literature. It indicates that considerable atten-
tion needs to be paid to the wider political and institutional context within which actors 
operate. 
In Cape Town conflicting planning and housing strategies constitute governance gaps. 
Powerful influence of higher spheres of government and contestations within local gov-
ernment and powerful market forces therefore determine how policies and strategies are 
interpreted and implemented on the ground. The observations indicate the relevance of a 
political economy theory to explain the aspect of power influencing policy outcomes. 
Moreover, from an urban management perspective, horizontal integration of civil society 
actors needs to be anchored in local government practice. The case of Cape Town has 
shown that participation is a matter of willingness, capacity and risk-taking of offi-
cials. Civil society actors react to ineffective engagement opportunities by low motivation 
to be included into processes. 
A central finding, which the case studies point to, is the fact that political opportunity 
structures emerge outside institutional channels provided by the state. It is then not 
only civil society actors who are integrated or excluded in governance arrangements, but 
also state actors who are at times invited to and at times ignored in governance arrange-
ments. 
Civil society approaches are influenced by and influence policies 
Actor-centred institutionalism argues that policy, institutions and options for actions in-
fluence one another. Strategies of civil society actors thus represent institutional mecha-
nisms for policy influence. The research has shown that in Cape Town both right-based 
and alternative development positions have taken effect on the mode of governance by 
insisting on people-driven processes. Vice versa policies have taken effect on the people-
driven process itself and on the civil society actors by limiting their role perception 
through roles outlined in regulatory frameworks. In the People’s Housing Process Non-
Governmental Organisations are reduced to support organisations and grassroots organi-
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sations to stakeholders in committees. Alternative development practice would contest the 
regulated roles by setting precedent. Setting precedent as a form of counteracting is also 
increasingly applied by right-based organisations. 
Emergence of overlapping and hybrid structures 
The empirical findings confirm the assumption that different patterns of organising co-
exist. A major finding is that the classification along the attributes of organisations and 
networks does not comprehend case reality. As Bommes/Tacke (2005) indicated, reality is 
closer to double inclusion of actors in both networks and organisations. The case studies 
affirm this observation where saving schemes and Federation groups network on horizon-
tal level and are at the same time embedded in a vertical accountability structure. More-
over, a hybrid alliance formation between NGOs and grassroots has emerged. This for-
mation is characterised by strong links, overlapping organisational structures and the 
blending into each other of both networks and organisations. 
Organisations as collective actors as well as networks are assumed to have structuring ef-
fects for the interaction between civil society and the state. A shift towards interdependent 
and multi-centred networks between actors has been outlined in the literature. Here, the 
study applied theories of organisations and networks to shed light on the emerging ar-
rangements between civil society alliances and the state. The findings of the evaluative 
studies provide evidence that support the view that sectors are less homogeneous than 
assumed and that relationships between actors are more complex and expose a variety 
of modes of governance. 
Moreover, case B reveals that state actors are integrated in partnerships with the Federa-
tion Alliance and at the same time they are part of the state bureaucracy.  This coexis-
tence seems to be a self-evident practice in society where some easily network and simul-
taneously operate in a bureaucracy. 
Dynamics create moving targets 
It is assumed that roles and relationships change and adapt with regard to the political op-
portunity structure. During the field study, issues related to dynamics at levels and phases 
were examined. The research evidence supports the claim that modes of governance and 
relations between actors are dynamic. Changing roles and relationships have led to al-
ternating inclusion of actors. Given these dynamics, organisations as collective actors ap-
pear to be ‘moving targets’. 
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Emergence of oscillating structures 
Opportunity structures are changing. This influences how civil society actors organise as 
well as that their way of organising influences the institutionalised opportunity structures. 
Organisations do not only coexist, but also overlap.  Emerging organising structures in al-
liances are not only organisations or networks, but hybrids. In their engagement with the 
state, actors within alliances are dynamic ‘moving targets’ confronted with or confronting 
the political opportunity structures. At times they emerge as organisation-like networks 
and at other times as network-like organisations. 
Given the above complexity and fluidity, this indicates the most crucial finding: It is pos-
sible to sustain the hypothesis that organising structures are oscillating. 
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6.6 Understanding local governance practice in South Africa 
The above conclusions may contribute to an understanding of the housing practices, 
evolving urban governance and the role of civil society widely discussed in the South Af-
rican literature. 
Relevance of self-initiative and difficulty to integrate it to the state framework 
The international thinking of planning and housing as a matter of governance is also re-
vealed in the case studies. However, a juxtaposition of enabling positions is prevalent 
and affects aligned political opportunity structures. 
Titling to enable access to the property market is a key feature of the capital subsidy sys-
tem. It thus links to international development thinking aligned to De Soto’s assumption 
that titling is effective for enabling markets. 
Although the micro-cases were not evaluated in terms of the effectiveness of this ap-
proach, the research has shown that during the land negotiations security of tenure and not 
titles were of primary concern. This supports the thesis that legal recognition is more 
central to poor households than individual ownership of property. Only once the house-
holds sought to access housing subsidies, did titles became of interest as a precondition 
for subsidy allocation. 
Further, the micro-case of Kuyasa indicates that although households hold individual ti-
tles, they seemingly cannot access loan capital as a way to finance the finishing of their 
housing units. This conforms to observations made by Gilbert (2002a), Datta/Jones (2000) 
or Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006) that titling does not strengthen the financial capacity of 
the poor. 
Instead, all micro-cases give evidence of alternative finance sources. All groups were 
practicing savings except for those who were affected by internal leadership conflicts. 
Scholars fear that titling leads to speculation and displacement of the urban poor. The mi-
cro-cases indicate that speculation in their context was less of a concern. But this is due 
rather to the peripheral location of land being made available. It indicates a further diffi-
culty to provide titles in well-situated locations as a precondition for integration and ac-
cess to livelihood opportunities. The micro-cases illustrate that this requirement not only 
exposes a challenge to government; also those groups pro-actively accessing land may re-
produce what has been referred to as the ‘Apartheid City’. 
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A further concern linked to titling is that it relates to social differentiation amongst the 
urban poor. The data of the research supports that view. Firstly, the cases of Klipfontein, 
Freedom Park and Ekupumleni clearly indicate that formalisation of tenure can result in 
severe community conflicts. Secondly, all projects focused on beneficiaries to the capital 
subsidy system which is linked to ownership tenure. Those not eligible to the state subsi-
dies such as the many non-South African migrant population are therefore automatically 
excluded. 
Furthermore, the housing development process in the case studies reflects the discourse 
on self-help (Turner/Burgess). As the People’s Housing Process provides for a conven-
tional housing unit conforming to norms and standards outlined in policy, it is not more 
needs based, effective and affordable than other conventional housing solutions. Self-help 
then just represents another form of delivery which would reaffirm criticism of the myth 
of self-help. The Cape Town context shows that in a context of an absent private sector 
and lack of delivery capacity by the state, delivery responsibility is shifted to civil soci-
ety actors. This links to the critique of Huchzermeyer (2004) who suggests understanding 
the South African support-based models of community-managed housing approaches as 
distorted. The capital subsidy system, according to Huchzermeyer, results in a focus on an 
individual house and neglects comprehensive interventions beyond house construction. 
Although this also holds true for the project-level in the case studies, some of the micro-
cases show grassroots activities beyond house construction such as neighbourhood watch, 
savings or food gardening. 
Instead of self-building, civil society actors promote assisted self/community-managed 
approaches. The case studies reveal the difficulties in implementing such approaches 
confronted with the roles and responsibilities predefined by institutional frameworks. 
Roles continue to be confined to the urban poor as objects of development and to the de-
velopmental local government as an almost paternalistic state. Participation is character-
ised by sporadic involvement in individual housing projects. If grassroots groups are in-
tegrated in the institutional frameworks as with the project steering committees, the mi-
cro-cases revealed a decline in their role for project management. Instead of creating syn-
ergies, the micro-cases reveal a juxtaposition of expert-led top-down processes and the 
continuation of self-organised participation outside the governance space. 
Those micro-cases which insisted on a community-managed process beyond the institu-
tionalised framework were confronted with confusion about aligned roles and respon-
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sibilities amongst all actors. The micro-case of Site C illustrates that resulting conflicts 
emerge not only between state and civil society actors but also within civil society alli-
ances. 
Self-help, it is assumed, represents a means to empowerment. This is particularly 
stressed in the current debates on poverty reduction measures. The South African housing 
policy is therefore seen as a contradiction to debates on urban poverty as it continues im-
plementing technocratic and market enabling approaches. With Breaking New Ground, 
the new national housing policy, and other local efforts, alternatives emerge such as area-
based upgrading. The Cape Town example illustrates that the more progressive elements 
of policy are however difficult to implement in an environment shaped by a dominant 
delivery focus whereby upgrading continues to be implemented as conventional projects 
(in the form of rollover schemes) and people-driven processes are perceived as time-
consuming. Also, the micro-cases of Alliance A showed the negative effects of external 
charities who undermine people-driven initiatives with their focus on speeding-up hous-
ing delivery. 
Relevance of networks and the problem of inclusion 
Partnership conceptions, according to the critique, idealise roles and relationships be-
tween distinct sectors (Majale, DiGaetano/Strom, Lowndes/Skelcher). Instead, it is as-
sumed that relationships are far more complex and heterogeneous. The case studies pro-
vide deep and critical assessments of the governance arrangements on the experiences of 
stakeholders in the two civil society alliances. The research evidence supports the claim 
that relationships are more complex and heterogeneous. The findings also provided evi-
dence that boundaries between sectors are more blurred than outlined by idealised 
‘good governance’ conceptions. 
Network theories stress the relevance of networks to deal with the complexity and inter-
dependencies in society. The key attribute is therefore the participation of actors in net-
works. In the development context this translates into new forms of co-operation in a 
complex landscape of actors. Networks are assumed to be horizontal and thus present an 
opportunity to function as an intermediary between social, economic and political differ-
ences of actors. 
Nevertheless, a key dualism emerges between participants and non-participants of net-
works which became evident particularly on the strategic level where the Alliance B was 
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able to leverage state resources. With its link to Shack/Slum Dwellers International it has 
gained an international reputation which filters down to national and local negotiation 
level. This reconnects to democracy concerns in network theory. On the one hand the 
Federation managed to operate in a “space of flows” which at the same time leaves non-
participants excluded and confined to the “space of place”. This affects non-Federation 
households in the communities. Conflicts such as in Site C where Federation groups are 
opposed and mistrusted by other community groups can be understood against this back-
ground. 
This tendency of exclusion by networks also affects local authorities which are by-passed 
by both alliances who are establishing relations with national and provincial government. 
However, this is less an indication for the exclusiveness of the alliance than a demonstra-
tion that decentralisation has not given local government adequate powers. 
Relevance of internal governance for the democratic functions of civil society 
Enhancing democratic practice is often equated with influencing decision-making and ac-
countability of state actors. In terms of development practice it is hoped that civil society 
will induce a paradigm shift. For instance, Huchzermeyer (2004) stresses that in order to 
change the housing intervention framework the dominant development paradigm in South 
Africa needs to be challenged by civil society. There is evidence in the case studies which 
confirms this democratic role: NGOs who were reduced to service organisations have re-
turned with an oppositional position against the ANC-led government. Moreover, they 
also assist networks from grassroots to emerge which directly address the state. 
Although the research did not intend to measure effectiveness of outcomes in terms of 
empowerment, what needs to be noted is that the current South African housing practice 
is criticised for limiting self-initiative and cooperation. Those singular grassroots organi-
sations that fostered participation in the institutional context were mostly limited to short-
term involvement in steering committees. Acceptance and integration of civil society ac-
tivities seemed to emerge only if it matched political interest. 
The transformation of governance arrangements with the state requires structures from 
civil society which can bring about this change. Here the democratic function transcends 
to internal democratic practices. The experiences of both alliances show the importance 
of internal governance, providing the opportunity for participation within the alliance. 
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Key to both alliances was leadership-building at the grassroots level. All groups devel-
oped over time by voicing their interests and learning to use leadership and manage con-
flicts which emerged during the process. Tenure workshops and other trainings provided 
by NGOs have improved informed grassroots participation. Obviously, both alliances are 
learning organisations in terms of restructuring their set-ups and learning from past fail-
ures. To find consensus at times of internal conflicts seems to be a powerful learning fac-
tor for cooperating in other governance arrangements. All groups have changed their en-
gagement with government and have learned to negotiate more effectively. 
Moreover, the Federations’ internal governance practices created an outside space. Its 
relevance has, however, been differently interpreted: It is either seen as deep democracy 
(by creating this space the poor are empowered to engage) or as “governance beyond the 
state” (by creating a space which then can be co-opted by the state’s agenda). 
 326
 
 327
7. Conclusions 
Based on the evidence from the empirical part which outlined the evolving internal gov-
ernance structures of civil society actors and their interfaces with the state in local hous-
ing processes, this chapter explores the broader implications for theory. 
If the premise of dynamic and hybrid and therefore oscillating structures is accepted, what 
future perspectives derive from the observations as appropriate for planning and housing? 
7.1 Towards oscillating structures in local governance 
This thesis takes into account a multiple theoretical perspective. The focus has been on 
theories which are concerned with organisations as collective actors and networks. Two 
positions are prevalent: on the one hand institutional governance and network theory 
stress the relevance of network governance for enhancing inclusion. On the other hand, 
from a civil society and political economy perspective, stronger focus is given to the de-
mocratic significance of including civil society actors. 
Against this background, South African case studies could be interpreted as an exception 
providing special cases with limited insights for a general discussion on housing, govern-
ance and civil society. South African cities have a relatively effective state provision in 
housing, a relatively advanced governance system and a particularly active civil society. 
Nevertheless, South Africa provides an ideal laboratory to study transformative govern-
ance. In this context the housing crisis represents a central concern in politics. The grow-
ing housing backlog at times of economic growth reflects the international tendency of in-
creasing inequalities in urban societies. Civil society actors are confronted with an am-
biguous role of the local state with regard to housing policy, typical for emerging markets 
where pro-poor and pro-growth initiatives inform policy-making. Thus actors need to 
adapt and find innovative strategies to sometimes collaborate with, and sometimes contest 
the state. South Africa therefore is exemplary and provides insights to the relevance of 
governance concepts in transformative contexts.  
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7.1.1 Housing as governance 
The findings of the research have implications for the discourse on housing. As housing is 
increasingly recognised as a governance challenge, the role of local government is then to 
enable institutional cooperation and partnership models.  
Generally it can be said that an enabling role for the state translates both in enabling mar-
kets and self-help approaches with a shifting emphasis between the two. As a result, ena-
bling strategies reflect a degree of ambiguity which creates a governance gap for their im-
plementation. Governance gaps then leave open space for interpretation by local actors. 
Hence, the role of planning and housing aligned to partnership models requires an analy-
sis of which actors make use of this interpretative space. 
From a pro-poor perspective it is civil society organisations that are capable of addressing 
the multiple aspects of urban poverty and local governance. The deficiencies of the formal 
state housing process indicate the importance of civil society organisations that assist in 
developing appropriate alternative mechanisms which are responsive to the social situa-
tion of households. These mechanisms require a high degree of flexibility as they are in-
formed by the changes in institutional channels for participation. It seems to be necessary 
to apply analytical concepts which take into account the dynamics of civil society actors 
so as to fully comprehend their capability to make use of changing governance spaces. 
Civil society’s capability to adapt and to change roles and relationships seems to aggra-
vate confusion and raise mistrust amongst actors within and outside civil society alliances. 
Collective approaches are then constrained or enhanced by the ability to enable flexibility 
whilst ensuring accountability and transparency.  These internal governance challenges 
and their effects on local governance have not been taken into consideration adequately. 
They are often summarised as ‘community conflict’ and accused of causing blockages 
and standstill in development projects. Instead, the case studies indicate that if these inter-
nal governance challenges are not taken as the ‘abnormal’ incident, but as a constant 
threat, groups then accept to learn from the experience in the long run. The learning proc-
ess could then be a ground for reaching consensus and accountable and transparent lead-
ership and ultimately enhance empowerment. 
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7.1.2 Governance actors as moving targets  
Tendency towards flexible formations 
The research has shown that hybrid and oscillating structures emerge which cannot be ex-
plained by existing typologies of organisations and networks. The fluidity signifies an in-
accuracy when applying organisations and network concepts which have been elaborated 
in contexts of stable democracies with formal regulation of the functions of actors. This is 
not a universal context and particularly questionable in situations of transformative insti-
tutions and a high degree of informal mechanisms at work. 
The case studies illustrated a civil society alliance with clear and one with fluid bounda-
ries. That raises the question as to which of the forms is more typical under condition of 
transformative governance. The tendency to withdraw from NGO-centred and organisa-
tion-type structures and instead to establish grassroots networks and autonomy, is indica-
tive that more flexible alliance formations are emerging. 
Oscillating and hybrid structures as new forms of social organisation 
The central question is if these hybrid and oscillating structures merely constitute a reac-
tion during a phase of transition or if they indicate a substantial change in social organisa-
tion. If taken as a transitional phenomenon, conventional types of urban governance and 
decentralisation, which assign a driving role to the state, would then not yet be capable to 
solve urban problems. Thus participation and partnerships would merely be a mechanism 
to enhance effectiveness. But reality is closer to that public steering of urban development 
is constrained under the conditions of structural shortcomings. Then hybrid and oscillat-
ing forms of governance are not a short-term phenomenon. They go beyond single pro-
jects and are capable of innovations to appropriate and re-interpret the dominant devel-
opment paradigm and thus indicate that new forms of social organisation have been con-
stituted.  
Convergence towards the informal 
Relations emerge in a governance space. Partnership frameworks assume that governance 
spaces are provided by the state and rely on the involvement of non-state actors which 
then have to formalise their relations. The research has shown that governance spaces can 
also be organised outside the state (which would be labelled ‘informal’ by the administra-
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tion). Therefore, initiative is not confined to the state. Goethert (2005) envisages a change 
of participation which does not try to integrate the informal into the formal framework, 
but instead he assumes a convergence towards the informal. The institutionalised spaces 
and integration of state actors by the Federation, point to the relevance of this process. 
This seems to be an essential pre-requisite for the continuity of informal relations. 
Actors as moving targets 
The thesis indicates the deficits of theories which try to align particular functions to spe-
cific actors. Usually relationsships are conceptualised in terms of links between separate 
actors. Roles may shift but are predefined by institutional frameworks at work. The study 
provided important arguments that actors within hybrid structures, instead, show a com-
plexity and fluidity of roles beyond the institutional frameworks. Functions are then not 
specific to one organisation. Instead, within hybrid and oscillating organisational forms, 
functions move from one actor to another.  For instance an intermediary function does not 
apply to one specific third actor between two separate entities. Also a watchdog function 
can then even transcend to the state sector. As a result actors are far more dynamic than 
suggested by conceptions. At the same time this flexibility causes confusion and suspicion 
by inside and external actors. 
7.1.3 Civil society as a laboratory for internal governance 
For some time the development discourse did not focus on the democratic relevance of 
civil society. Instead, questions of performance, accountability, scaling-up, institutional 
development, aid flow and social capital were of concern. Recently a shift to the role of 
civil society actors as structural change agents has been noted. This understanding links 
development thinking to the discourse on the democratic value of civil society in urban 
development. 
Fluidity of roles 
The research well illustrates the diversity of what is believed as one sector in society. This 
said, it becomes evident that a third sector function (prescribing a role as intermediary) is 
reducing the roles fulfilled in this plurality. The case studies reveal that a clear division of 
roles is not applicable in a complex local context where these intermediary functions al-
ternate between actors. This observation raises questions about appropriate structures 
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within civil society which are able to integrate flexible functions. Hybrid forms might 
then be more adapted to deal with the outlined fluidity of roles. 
Internal governance as key to democratic practices 
This leads to a further observation: the return to democratic function is linked to organisa-
tional change within civil society. The underlying assumption is that by creating democ-
ratic practices internally, a precondition is given for state engagement. Nevertheless, in-
ternal governance arrangements are not free of conflict and should therefore not raise ide-
alised expectations. The reality shows that practices towards the state are unpredictable 
and actors can become gate keepers when gaining a high degree of influence. 
Generally, this points to a critical aspect about the inclusion of grassroots which is norma-
tively assumed to make governance more responsive to the needs of the poor. ‘Input le-
gitimacy’ in terms of responsiveness to group interests is high, but exposes substantial 
weaknesses in terms of producing ‘output legitimacy’ by integrating larger society inter-
ests. 
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7.2 Future perspectives  
Challenges for development actors 
Poverty has been put back on the global agenda with the Millennium Development Goals 
as the action plan for ending poverty by investing in development. Target 11 which spe-
cifically focuses on the urban poor seems to suggest investment in tangibles such as sani-
tation and housing. At the same time aid harmonisation led to an increase of aid flow to 
national governments in terms of budget support. This seems to be a disadvantage to civil 
society and local government initiatives. Careful attention needs to be given that imple-
mentation does not bypass local processes. Enabling strategies should make use of and 
strengthen local potential and initiative.  
To support internal governance seems to have democratic relevance in voicing grassroots 
interest within civil society alliances. This implies that donors should review their fund-
ings:  
Firstly, the development of internal governance structures seems to require long-term 
support of organisations and networks instead of once-off project-support.  
Secondly, diversity in civil society is eligible. It would have adverse effects to give pref-
erence to a single actor, strategy or organisational form. The diversity offers an added 
value of checks and balances. Only by unfolding the shortcomings of the others’ ap-
proach, the other is pressurised to react and adapt towards more general societal concerns. 
A single actor is more threatened to act in self-interest. This indicates that consequently 
the plurality of civil society and of their strategies and organisational forms needs to be 
supported.   
Thirdly, this leads to a further aspect which needs to be stressed: Obviously the diversity 
of civil society varies in different localities. The establishment of networks will therefore 
take different expressions and require thorough and context-sensitive analysis on agency 
structures. As a result of the complexity of relationships, it is not possible to implement 
standardised partnerships models in complex local contexts. 
Fourthly, funding to grassroots initiatives does not necessarily enhance their democratic 
practices. However, careful balancing is required between formalising grassroots struc-
tures to ensure accountability on the one hand and enabling a continuity of informality to 
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mitigate the negative effects that come with formalisation (loss of flexibility, leadership 
conflicts) on the other.  
Fifthly, external actors involved (consultants, charity organisations) should be informed 
about the implications of people-driven processes in order to prevent adopting an inter-
ventionist role which is well-intentioned but counterproductive as it takes over local ini-
tiative. 
Challenges for planners in local government 
An enabling role for local government officials implies a number of challenges and op-
portunities: 
Firstly, housing development in a context of poverty requires a diversification of strate-
gies. This has been stated time and time again. Still, if housing policy is not comprehen-
sive and pro-active, it is unlikely that the needs of the target group will be met.  
Secondly, progressive planners can take the risk on themselves of pursuing an enabling 
role; they might as well look for coalitions. Civil society actors can provide planners with 
the necessary legitimacy to test innovative solutions. This seems to be of central impor-
tance to situations where the political-administrative context is highly fragmented and 
characterised by political patronage.  
Thirdly, whereas government officials are often held accountable for the lack of policy 
implementation, the case of Cape Town well illustrates their limited latitude given the po-
litical interests in housing. This is a substantial point: As long as housing is used for po-
litical patronage, it will be difficult for local government to fulfil its mandate for partici-
pation and people-driven housing development. It seems to be relevant to take authority 
away from local politicians to prevent housing from becoming a question of local political 
power games. 
Fourthly, there is no stereotype counterpart in civil society. Singling out particular civil 
society actors and inviting them as representatives to stakeholder forums or entering into 
partnership agreements can be detrimental to those whose interests are left outside these 
governance spaces. Institutional frameworks in housing development create spaces of in-
clusion and exclusion. Local government should ensure that criteria for participation is 
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made transparent and lay open agreements reached so as not to be accused of cutting deals 
or sidelining the grassroots.  
Fifthly, there are also no stereotype roles when cooperating with civil society organisa-
tions. There are indications that partnerships with grassroots continue to be on the rise. 
Planners should not expect them to be a stable partner in delivery. Housing at the end of 
the day is a decision over resource allocation which is a highly conflictual issue. Frustra-
tions are often caused when community conflicts arise, projects are blocked and local 
government backs out of the development process. It is exactly here were planners to-
gether with NGOs can take over a function as mediator between contesting groups to un-
block stalled projects in the interest of all.  
Finally, it should be recognised that channels for participation have opened at local level 
thanks to decentralisation and innovations by municipalities. Nevertheless, there is a ten-
dency to interpret decentralisation as a matter of local level service delivery and perform-
ance of public entities. There continuous to be a need for improving and specifically 
opening channels for strategic decision-making. Currently discursive spaces for housing 
development are organised outside the state. Informal spaces are met with suspicion and 
reluctance and often equated with clientelism. They nevertheless present a vehicle in de-
velopment, but require a high degree of transparency. 
Challenges for civil society actors 
With the shift from a focus on performance to its democratic relevance in society, civil 
society organisations need to pay attention to both their internal governance and their rela-
tions to the state. This implies the following: 
Firstly, transparency is most needed in situations of flexible functions. There is a high de-
gree of uncertainty in the allocation of roles and powers between actors. Where informal 
governance spaces are created, civil society organisations have to balance the requirement 
to be accountable and transparent for others without losing their flexibility. 
Secondly, antagonistic attitudes between right-based and alternative development sup-
porters should be overcome in terms of innovative cooperation in order to accomplish 
common aims on the least common denominator. There are shared understandings about 
the shortcomings in urban development. Nevertheless, the opportunity for cooperation has 
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not been exploited to its full degree. The reason lies partly in the dependency of donor 
funding which causes competition amongst NGOs. A stronger position could be pursued 
by jointly addressing donors, who are in any case similarly dependent on the NGOs as 
channels for their funding streams. 
Thirdly, in the context of distorted decentralisation, cooperation with the implementing 
arm of local government remains limited. Nevertheless, civil society actors should proac-
tively create synergies with local government actors to enhance decentralisation instead of 
by-passing local government. It is central for those localities where decentralisation will 
advance and where local government will increasingly take over responsibility. In other 
localities where decentralisation remains unfulfilled, coalitions at local level can jointly 
address the devolution of functions to the local level. Otherwise the hierarchy of the state 
will be omnipresent by centralising power relations. Civil society can then just react by 
addressing higher spheres of government. 
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7.3 Recommendations for further research 
Housing in the rapidly urbanising world has been studied by different disciplines which 
have created indepth-insights in their respective fields, but also aggravated a disconnec-
tion from one another. The reconnection helps to understand processes at work and to 
make recommendations.  
Conclusions derived from two cases must necessarily remain propositions that require fur-
ther research that investigates a larger number of cases and narrows down critical aspects: 
Firstly, further empirical research will have to consider the broader political context as the 
effectiveness of interfaces between civil society actors and the state is limited by the con-
text. This should also take into account the role of private sector actors in relational webs. 
Secondly, further research could analyse the link between innovative informal governance 
and formal institutional governance practices.  
Thirdly, this study focused on the meso level where organisations as collective actors are 
linked up with state actors. In order to understand their impact at micro level a long term 
analysis of households linked up in networks would be of value.  
Fourthly, this leads to a final suggestion when investigating the household level. All in-
vestigated local housing developments were driven by women. This gender aspect has not 
been the focus of this study. Nevertheless, it could provide central insights for understand-
ing the effects of empowerment. 
Also, there is a second aspect aligned to this. ‘Household’ is a stereotype category often 
misleadingly equated with families. In a context of often fragmented family structures, it 
is highly recommended to differentiate household composition and reveal if the most vul-
nerable households are adequately represented. This analysis will be central to inform 
pro-poor urban strategies. 
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(informal discussion) 
University of the Witwatersrand Researcher and senior lecturer 
Housing & Planning 
04.09.06 
Marianne Millstein 
(informal discussion) 
University of Oslo Researcher 03.10.06 
Francois Menguele Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ),  
Strengthening Local 
Governance Programme (SLGP) 
GTZ advisor, Human 
Settlements & Urban Renewal  
01.09.06 
Dr. Mark Napier Urban Land Mark Project Director 07.11.06 
Laila Smith  
(informal discussion) 
Raising citizens’ voice Director 05.10.06 
Nigel Titus CndV Africa Director 16.10.06 
Jackie Boulle  Freelance consultant 30.10.06 
Ahmedi Vada 
(informal discussion) 
 Freelance consultant 05.10.06 
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Meetings observed 
Meeting Organisations/Stakeholder Date 
Negotiations with councillor around land claims FEDUP Macassar 13.09.06 
Funding negotiations for telecentre, action plan for city 
profiling 
FEDUP City profiling team, 
CORC, NASHUA 
14.09.06 
FEDUP meeting with saving schemes FEDUP Macassar 17.09.06 
Chambers, Claim for interdict to close community trust Klipfontein Communal 
Committee 
20.09.06 
Meeting with city official around Site C project procedure uTshani Fund, PEP, CMN, City 21.09.06 
Survey in Macassar for FEDUP database  CMN coordinator, FEDUP 
regional coordinator 
29.09.06 
World Habitat Day DAG, Netreg Housing Project, 
Freedom Park Development 
Association 
02.10.06 
Meeting to discuss conflict between uTshani Fund and 
FEDUP group 
FEDUP Site C, FEDUP national 
coordinator, uTshani Fund, City 
11.10.06 
Portfolio Committee, workshop on informal settlements 
upgrading 
City of Cape Town 13.10.06 
Saving group exchange in Strand FEDUP Macassar and Strand 17.10.06 
Project steering committee meeting Netreg Housing Project, DAG, 
NMTT, City 
18.10.06 
Regional meeting FEDUP coastal in Mannenberg FEDUP national and regional 
coordinators 
20.10.06 
Leadership training workshop on advocacy and lobbying Various People’s Organisations, 
DAG 
20.10.06 
Klipfontein mediation meeting CORC, consultant, Klipfontein 
Communal Committee 
20.10.06 
Group discussion with FEDUP Piesang River FEDUP local members, FEDUP 
national coordinator, uTshani 
Fund 
02.11.06 
 
Site visits 
Site Project Date 
Sweet Home Verification City Profilie 14.09.06 
Freedom Park Housing/ Land 25.09.06 
Site C, Khayelitsha Housing 26.09.06 
Kuyasa, Khayelitsha Unfinished Houses 26.09.06 
Klipfontein Housing/ Land 28.09.06 
Macassar Land 28.09.06 
Netreg Housing 18.10.06 
Ekupumleni Land transfer, housing 25.10.06 
Piesang River, Durban Housing/ Land 02.11.06 
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Annex B 
Interview guidelines 
1. Interview guideline for NGOs 
Introduction 
Name of informant 
Professional background 
Position 
Background 
1. When was the organisation established? How did the organisation come into 
being?  
2. What legal status does the organisation have? Where and how is it registered? 
3. In what fields does it work? Is the NGO specialised in a field (consulting, 
education, advocacy, service etc.)? 
Staff 
4. How many people are employed? What is their professional background? 
5. Are there volunteers active? 
6. Why do they work at the NGO (social advancement, engagement, no alternatives 
etc.)? 
7. How do they see the NGO? 
Internal Organisation 
8. How is the NGO structured (departments, responsibilities)? 
9. How is the management/internal decision-making organised (democratic, 
professional, hierarchy)? 
10. Is there any self-evaluation? 
11. Is there any “proven track record” of implemented projects? Is there any 
documentation published? 
Donors/ Finance 
12. Who finances the NGO? 
13. On whose commission did the NGO work until now? Did it apply for own projects? 
Where and with which success? 
14. What turnover does it have? 
15. How many projects are currently implemented?  
16. How does the organisation perceive its relationship to donors? 
Position in housing development 
17. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to 
reduce poverty/the housing backlog?  
18. What connection is there between the understanding of poverty/housing and the 
work approach? What role does it see for itself in housing development? 
19. Who are the target groups? Does the organisation work with specific groups 
(ethnic, men/women/youth, professional groups)? 
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20. What understanding does the organisation have of participation? How are target 
groups integrated into decision-making? 
21. How present is it locally? Are there affiliations/local offices outside the head 
office? 
Cooperation within alliance 
22. Are there strong relationships to other civil society organisations? NGOs? 
People’s Organisations? 
23. Are there commonly defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the 
aims? 
24. What hierarchies exist? How centralised is the network concerning its functions, 
competences, rights? What consequences does this have? 
25. Who is responsible for what? 
26. Are there conflicts within the network? How are conflicts dealt with? 
27. How does communication look like?  
28. Who initiates activities? 
29. Who makes the decisions? 
30. Are grassroots groups included in decision making? 
31. Is responsibility decentralised so that members can actively participate in the 
network? 
32. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why? 
33. To what and to whom is the alliance accountable? 
34. Do grassroots groups have access to alliance resources (also information)? 
Interface with state 
35. What is the relationship of the NGO to government, particular local government? 
Cooperation? Conflicts? 
36. With which government actors does cooperation exist and in what way? 
37. Does the NGO participate at meetings (committees etc.)? Is this institutionalised 
or rather informal? How is the NGO integrated into the decision-making of a 
project? 
38. Are there any (personal) relations to the state (former state employees who work 
at NGO or vice versa)? What does this imply? 
39. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply? 
Relationships to other civil society actors 
40. Which contacts exist “outside”? Cooperation? Conflicts? 
41. What is the relation of the NGO to other civil society actors? 
42. With which actors does cooperation exist and in what way? 
43. Does the NGO participate at meetings of other development actors (board 
meetings etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal? 
44. Is there any networking between other NGOs? Is there any coordination or 
agreements? How much information does the NGO have about other NGOs? 
45. Are there any relations to parent associations? In what way? 
46. Are there any international contacts (besides donors)? Which? Are there contacts 
to academics/university? 
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2. Interview guidelines for Federation of the Urban Poor and Coalition of the Urban 
Poor 
Introduction 
Name of informant 
Position in movement 
Background 
1. When was the organisation/network established? How did it come into being?  
2. What legal status does it have? Where and how is it registered? 
3. In what fields does it work? 
Internal Organisation 
2. How many groups/people are members? How does a group/person become a 
member? 
3. Are there clear defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the aims? 
4. What benefits exist for members? What do they expect and what is offered to 
them? 
5. What hierarchies exist? How centralized is the network/organisation concerning 
its functions, competences, rights? What consequences does this have? 
6. Who is responsible for what? 
7. Are there conflicts within the coalition/federation? How are conflicts dealt with? 
8. What does the communication look like?  
9. Who initiates activities? 
10. Is responsibility decentralised so that members can actively participate in the 
network? 
11. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why? 
Position in housing development 
12. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to 
reduce poverty/the housing backlog? What connection is there between the 
understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach? 
13. What role does it see for itself in housing development? 
14. What understanding does the organisation have of the role of NGOs in housing 
development? 
Cooperation within alliance 
15. Are there strong relationships to other civil society organisations? NGOs? 
People’s Organisations? 
16. Are there commonly defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the 
aims? 
17. What hierarchies exist? How centralised is the network concerning its functions, 
competences, rights? What consequences does this have? 
18. Who is responsible for what? Is responsibility decentralised so that members can 
actively participate in the network? 
19. Are there conflicts within the network? How are conflicts dealt with? 
20. What does communication look like?  
21. Who initiates activities? 
22. Who makes the decision? Are grassroots groups included in decision making? 
23. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why? 
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24. To what and to whom is the alliance accountable? 
25. Do grassroots groups have access to alliance resources (also information)? 
Interface with state 
26. What is the relationship to government, particular local government? 
Cooperation? Conflicts? 
27. With which government actors does cooperation exist and in what way? 
28. Does the network participate at meetings (committees etc.)? Is this 
institutionalised or rather informal? 
29. Are there any (personal) relations to the state? What does this imply? 
30. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply? 
Relationships to other civil society actors 
31. Which contacts exist “outside”? Cooperation? Conflicts? 
32. What is the relation to other civil society actors? 
33. With which actors does cooperation exist and in what way? 
34. Does the network participate at meetings of other development actors (board 
meetings etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal? 
35. Is there any networking between other networks/non-Federation groups? Is there 
any coordination or agreements? How much information does the Federation 
have about other NGOs? 
36. Are there any international contacts (besides donors)? Which? Are there contacts 
to academics/university? 
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3. Interview guidelines for local FEDERATION groups and People’s Organisations 
Introduction 
Name of informant 
Name of project 
Position in grassroots group 
Background 
1. When was the organisation/network established? How did it come into being?  
2. What legal status does it have? Where and how is it registered? 
3. In what fields does it work? 
Perception of the housing process 
4. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to 
reduce poverty/housing backlog? What connection is there between the 
understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach? 
Interface with the State 
5. What is the relation to local government? 
6. Are there any (personal) relations to the state? What does this imply? 
7. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply? 
8. What kind of cooperation with the state do they have? 
9. How is the group integrated to the decision-making, design phase, preparation 
and implementation of a project? 
Cooperation within alliance 
10. What reputation do NGOs have (poverty reduction, integrity, professional)? 
11. How can alliances be accountable to their members? 
12. How does the division of roles and responsibilities among alliance members look 
like? 
13. How close is it to the civil society? 
Policy outcomes 
14. Did the alliance win desired policy advantages for those it represented? 
15. How significant were its compromises? 
16. Even if the gains were small, were they consistent with longer-term objectives, or 
was the alliance co-opted? 
Civil society outcomes  
17. To what extent has the alliance, through its organisation and campaigns, 
strengthened the institutional base for citizen action? 
18. Has it nurtured informed grassroots participation? 
19. Has it contributed positively to an inclusive political culture and to public resolution 
of conflict? 
20. Is there a commitment to strengthen civil society? (impact on participation and 
building grassroots) 
21. Do grassroots groups influence on structure, goals and strategies of alliances? 
 378
4. Interview guidelines for local government respondents 
Introduction 
Name of informant 
Professional background 
Position 
Perception of housing 
1. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to 
reduce poverty/housing backlog? What connection is there between the 
understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach?  
2. How is housing delivery by the City perceived within local government? 
3. What role does it see for itself in housing development? 
4. What constraints do officials face in carrying out housing projects? 
Perception of participation 
5. What understanding does local government have of participation? How are 
target groups integrated to decision-making? What avenues of communication 
are open to residents wanting to access Council? Do the residents have any 
input into strategic planning? 
6. How much interaction do officials have with residents regarding housing and 
servicing? 
7. How present is local government locally? (Visits by staff, discussion groups…) 
8. What constraints do officials face in carrying out participatory approaches? 
9. What would officials like to see to be done in terms of participation? 
Perception of civil society organisations 
10. What is the relation to civil society organisations (NGOs, federation groups, 
People’s Organisations? 
11. Are there any (personal) relations to the civil society organisations (e.g. 
employers who worked at NGO or vice versa)? What does this imply? 
12. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply? 
13. What kind of cooperation with civil society do they have (advocacy, design, 
implementation, training)? 
14. How is civil society integrated to the decision-making, design phase, 
preparation and implementation of a project? 
15. What constraints do officials face cooperating with civil society organisations? 
16. What role would they like them to perform? 
Relation to other spheres of government/ government departments 
17. What is the relation to other spheres of government? 
18. Does the department participate at meetings of other departments? Is this 
institutionalised or rather informal? 
19. Is there any networking between other departments? Is there any coordination 
or agreements? How much information do staff members have about other 
departments? 
20. Are there any external contacts? Which? (consultants, academics/university) 
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Annex C  
Evaluation framework for roles and relationships 
 
Actor Role Land Access Project 
Preparation 
Housing 
Development 
Local 
Government 
Surrogate(interventionist)    
Advocate    
Stakeholder (enabler)    
Resource     
No role    
NGO Surrogate    
Advocate    
Stakeholder (mediation)    
Resource (technical)    
No Role    
PO/ local 
FEDUP group 
Principal    
Stakeholder    
Interest group    
No role    
Alliance Principal    
Stakeholder    
Interest group    
No role    
 
 
Relationship Characteristic Land Access Project 
Preparation 
Housing 
Development 
Mode of 
governance in  
relationship 
Network - horizontal    
Network supplemented 
with technical relations 
   
Technical relations 
supplemented with 
network 
   
Technical-bureaucratic-
hierarchical 
   
No relationship    
Style of 
interface 
Collaborative (Shared 
control) 
   
Consultative    
Negotiative 
(competition) 
   
Claim (competition)    
Contract (resources)    
Command (power)    
Closeness of 
civil society 
actors 
Strong link alliance 
(high) 
   
Strong link GRO 
(medium) 
   
Strong link NGO (low)    
Self-help (No influence)    
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